精神分析四個基本觀念 501

Concept 501





Psycho-analysis is not an idealism 精神分析並不是唯心論
The real as trauma 作為創傷的真實界
Theory of the dream and of waking 夢與清醒的理論
Consciousness and representation. 意識與再現
God is unconscious 上帝即無意識
The objet petit a in the fort-da 去回遊戲的小客體

Today I shall continue the examination of the concept of repetition, as it is presented by Freud and the experience of psycho-analysis.


I wish to stress here that, at first sight, psycho-analysis seems to lead in the direction of idealism.


God knows that it has been reproached enough for this—it reduces the experience, some say, that urges us to find in the hard supports of conflict, struggle, even of the exploitation of man by man, the reasons for our deficiencies—it leads to an ontology of the tendencies, which it regards as primitive, internal, already given by the condition of the subject.


We have only to consider the course of this experience from its first steps to see, on the contrary, that it in no way allows us to accept some such aphorism as life is a dream. No praxis is more orientated towards that which, at the heart of experience,
is the kernel of the real than psycho-analysis.


Where do we meet this real? For what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential encounter—an appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us. That is why I have put on the blackboard a few words that are for us, today, a reference-point of what we wish to propose.


First, the tuché, which we have borrowed, as I told you last time, from Aristotle, who uses it in his search for cause. We have translated it as the encounter with the real. The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle.


The real is that which always lies behind the automaton, and it is quite obvious, throughout Freud’s research, that it is this that is the object of his concern.


If you wish to understand what is Freud’s preoccupation as the function of phantasy is revealed to him, remember the development, which is so central for us, of the Wolf Man. He applies himself; in a way that can almost be described as anguish,
to the question—what is the first encounter, the real, that lies behind the phantasy?


We feel that throughout this analysis, this real brings with it the subject, almost by force, so directing the research that, after all, we can today ask ourselves whether this fever, this presence, this desire of Freud is not that which, in his patient, might have conditioned the belated accident of his psychosis.


So there is no question of confusing with repetition either the return of the signs, or reproduction, or the modulation by the act of a sort of acted out remembering. Repetition is something which, of its true nature, is always veiled in analysis, because of the identification of with the transference in the conceptualization of an analysis. Now, this really is the point at which a distinction should be made.


The relation to the real that is to be found in the transference was expressed by Freud when he declared that nothing can be apprehended in effigie, in absentia—and yet is not the transference given to us as effigy and as relation to absence? We can succeed
in unravelling this ambiguity of the reality involved in the transference only on the basis of the function of the real in repetition.


What is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs —the expression tells us quite a lot about its relation to the tuché—as if by chance. This is something that we analysts never allow ourselves to be taken in by, on principle. At least, we always point out that we must not be taken in when the subject tells us that something happened to him that day that prevented him from realizing his wish to come to the session.


Things must not be taken at the level at which the subject puts them—in as much as what we are dealing with is precisely this obstacle, this hitch, that we find at every moment. It is this mode of apprehension above all that governs the new deciphering that we have given of the subject’s relations to that which makes his condition.


The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter—first presented itself in the history of psycho-analysis in a form that was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma.


Is it not remarkable that, at the origin of the analytic experience, the real should have presented itself in the form of that which is unassimilable in it—in the form of the trauma, determining all that follows, and imposing on it an apparently accidental origin?


We are now at the heart of what may enable us to understand the radical character of the conflictual notion introduced by the opposition of the pleasure principle and the reality principle—which is why we cannot conceive the reality principle as having, by virtue of its ascendancy, the last word.



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