可能不是類似 217b

可能不是類似 217b

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance

可能不是類似的真理論述

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

And yeh is something that concludes a sentence without saying, properly speaking, that what is at stake is something of the order that what we are stating here is, being, it is a conclusion.

「也」是某件結束一個句子的東西,而沒有說,適當地說,岌岌可危的是某件秩序的東西,我們在此正在陳述的是「命」,這是一種結論。

It is a conclusion or let us say a punctuation, because the sentence continues here since things are written from right to left, the sentence continues here with a certain tse which means consequently, or which in any case indicates the consequence. So then let us see what is at stake.

它是一種結論,或是讓我們說是一種標點符號,因為這個句子在此繼續,因為事情被寫從右到左,這個句子在此繼續帶有某種的「则」,意思是「結果」。無論如何,它指示這個結果。所以讓我們看,岌岌可危的是什麼。

Yen means nothing other than language, but like all the terms stated in the Chinese tongue, it is liable also to be used in the sense of a verb. So then that can mean both the word and the one who speaks, and who speaks what? In this case that would be what follows, namely hsing, nature, what speaks about nature under the heavens, and yeh would be a punctuation.

「言」的意思道道地地是語言,但是像中文語言裏,被陳述的所有其他的術語,它很容易被使用當作動詞的意涵。那樣的話,它能夠意指這個字及說話的這個人。是誰說什麼?在這種情況,那將是後面的東西,也就是「性」,自然,什麼東西談論到天底下的自然,「也」將是一個標點符號。

Nevertheless, and this is why it is interesting to take an interest in a sentence of the written tongue, you see that you can cut things up differently and say: the word, indeed the language, because if it was a matter of specifying the word, we would have another character that is slightly different. At this level, as it is written here, this character can just as well mean word as language. These sorts of ambiguities
are altogether fundamental in the use of what is written, very (58) precisely, and this is the importance of what I am writing.

可是,這就是為什麼對於文字語言的一個句子感到興趣是如此耐人尋味。你們看出,你們能夠以不同方式切割東西,然後是:這個字,確實就是這個與言,因為它是明確指明這個字的問題,我們會有另外一個字,稍微不同。在這個層次,因為它被書寫在這裏,這個字很有理由意味著這個字當語言。這些的曖昧性完全是基本的,在使用被書寫的東西,非常確實地。這就是我正在書寫的重要性。

As I pointed out to you, as I pointed out to you at the start of my discourse this year, and especially the last time, it is very precisely in so far as the reference as regards everything involved in language is always indirect that language takes on its import.

當我跟你們指出,如同在今年我的論述的開始,我跟你們指出,特別是上一次,確實是當這個指稱,關於每一樣牽涉到語言的東西,語言形成它的意義,總是間接、

We could then also say: language, in so far as it is in the world, as it is under the heavens, language, is what makes hsing, nature, because this nature is not, at least in Meng-Tzu, just any nature, what is at stake is precisely the nature of the speaking being, which, in another passage, he is careful to specify is the difference between this nature and the nature of the animal, a difference, he adds, he highlights in two terms which mean what they mean, “an infinite difference.” And which perhaps is the one that is defined there.

我們因此也能夠說:語言,就它存在於世界而言,它是在天底下,語言是使「性」成為自然的東西,因為自然並不是,至少在孟子裏,自然不僅是任何自然,岌岌可危的,確實是說話的生命主體的天性。在另外一個段落,他很小心指明這個差異,處於自然與動物的天性,一種天性,他補充說,他以兩個術語強調,它們的意思是「無限的差異」。或許那就是在那裏被定義的東西。

You will see, moreover, whether we take one or other of these interpretations, the
axis of what is going to be said as a consequence will not be changed. Tse therefore, is the consequence. In consequence, ku, is here ku, in consequence, relates to the cause – because cause means nothing else, whatever may be the ambiguity that in a certain book, a certain book called Mencius on the mind, namely, a book produced by someone called Richards, who was certainly not a newcomer – Richards and
Ogden are two leaders of a position originating in England and altogether in agreement with the best tradition of English philosophy, who established at the beginning of this century the doctrine described as logical positivism, whose major work is entitled The meaning of meaning.

而且,你們看出,是否我們接受這些解釋,將要被說作為結果的軸心,將不會被改變。因此,「则」就是結果。結果是「故」,在此的「故」,結果會跟原因有關,因為原因不意味著任何其他東西,無論曖昧的是什麼。在某本書裏,某本被稱為「孟子論心」,也就是一本名叫李察茲的人所寫。我們對他確實並不陌生—李察茲跟奧格敦是起源於英國的一家之言的領導者,跟英國哲學的最佳傳統完全一致。在這個世紀初,他創建被描述為邏輯實證論的信條。他的主要著作標題是:「意義的意義」。

It is a book to which you will already find an allusion in my Ecrits where I take up a certain disparaging position with regard to it. The meaning of meaning means le sens du sens. Logical-positivism proceeds from this requirement that a text should
have a graspable meaning, which leads it to a position which is the following: a certain number of philosophical statements find themselves in a way devalorised in principle by the fact that they are not…that they give no graspable result as regards a search for meaning. In other words, if a philosophical text is caught red handed
in non-sense, it is ruled out for that very reason.

在我的精神分析論文集,你們將會發現我提到這本書。在書裏,我採取某種貶低它的立場。「意義的意義」意思是「le sens du sens.」。邏輯實證論繼續從這個要求出發,一個文本應該有一個可理解的意義,這個意義引導它到一個如下的立場:某些的哲學陳述發現它們自己,原則上被它們並不存在這個事實,貶低價值、、、他們沒有給予可理解的結果,關於對於意義的追尋。換句話說,假如一個哲學的文本在無意義的場所被人贓俱獲,它會因為那個理由而被排除。

It is only too clear (59) that this is a way of pruning away the things that scarcely allows us to find our way, because if we start from the principle that something that has no meaning cannot be essential in the development of a discourse, we quite simply lose our bearings.

這太顯而易見,有某種方式修剪這些東西,它們很少讓我們找到我們的道路。因為假如我們從這個原則開始,某件沒有意義的東西,在真理論述的發展中,不可能是重要的。我們就是失去我們發言的立場。

I am not saying of course, that such a requirement is not a procedure, but that this procedure forbids us in a way any articulation whose meaning is not graspable, this is something which, for example, may culminate in the fact, for example, that we can no longer make use of mathematical discourse, which, on the admission of the most qualified logicians, is characterised by the fact that it may be that at one or other of its points, we can no longer give it any meaning – which does not prevent it from being precisely, among all the discourses, the one that is developed with most rigor.

當然,我並不是正在說,這樣一種要求並不是一種程式,而是說,這個程式禁止我們以任何方式,發表無法理解意義的表達。例如,這件事情會在這個事實達到顛峰的:即使是最傑出的邏輯專家都承認,我們不再能夠使用數學的論述,數學論述的特性在於這個事實:很有可能在某個點,我們不再能夠給予數學論述任何意義。儘管如此,數學論述並沒有被阻礙,不能跟其他的論述一樣,讓人全力以赴地追尋。

We find ourselves moreover, because of this fact, at a point that is quite essential to highlight concerning the function of writing.

而且,因為這個事實,我們發現自己處於這個點,關於寫作的功用,必須強調的一點。

So then, it is ku that is at stake, it is ku that is at stake and as i wei, because I already told you that this wei that can in certain senses mean to act indeed something that is of the order of to do even though it is not just anything whatsoever, i here has the sense of something like with, it is with that we are going to proceed like, like what? Like li, this is the word about which I point out to you, I am highlighting for you the fact that li, I repeat, that this li which means reward, interest, profit, and the thing is all the more remarkable in that precisely Mencius, Mencius in his first chapter, in presenting
himself to a certain prince, it does not matter who, of what made up the kingdoms described, described afterwards, as the warring kingdoms, finds himself with this prince who demands his advice, with this prince, pointing out that, he is not there to teach him what constitutes our law which is present to everyone, namely, what is
appropriate for the increase of the wealth of the kingdom, and specifically what we would call surplus value. If there is a meaning that one can give retroactively to li, this indeed is what is at stake.

因此,這個「故」變得岌岌可危。這個「故」岌岌可危。作為「无為」,因為我已經告訴過你們,這個「為」,在某些意義是「採取行動」。它確實是屬於「行動」的層次,即使它並不僅是任何其他東西。「義」在此的意義有點像是「用」,用那個東西,我們將繼續前進,像什麼,像「利」。這是我跟你們指出的這個字。我正在跟你們強調這個事實。我重複一遍:這個「利」義是說「酬勞」「利益」「利潤」。事情更加引人注意,因為確實是在孟子裏。在孟子的第一章,當他出現在一位國王面前,哪一位國王並不重要,被描述的王國由什麼組成,後來被描述為戰鬥的王國。孟子發現國王請教他的意見,他就跟這位國王指出:他在那裏,並不是要教他建構我們的法律來規範每個人,換句話,不是要從事增加王國的財富,明確地說,就是我們所謂的「剩餘價值」。若是有一種意義,能夠反彈地給予「利」,這確實岌岌可危之處。

(60) Now, it is indeed here that it is remarkable to see that what Mencius points out on this occasion, is that starting then from this word which is nature, or if you wish from the word that concerns nature, what is going to be at stake, is to arrive at the cause, in so far as the aforesaid cause, is li, erh, i i, which means the li, erh is something that means at the same time like and, and like but, erh i, is simply that, and so that there can be no doubt about it, the i that ends, which is a conclusive i, this i has the same accent as simply. It is li, and that is enough. Here I am allowing myself in short to recognize that, as regards the effects of discourse, as regards what is under the
heavens, what emerges from it is nothing other than the function of the cause, in so far as it is surplus enjoying.

現在,確實就是在這裏,值得注意的讓我們看出,孟子在這個場合所指出是,從自然這個字開始,或是假如你們希望從跟自然有關的這個字開始,將會岌岌可危的是,到達這個原因,以上所提的原因,是「亦而已矣」,它的意思是「利」,「而」是某件東西,同時是「像」,但是「像利」僅是那樣。關於那件事情,是無可置疑點。結果是這個「义」,它是一個結論的「义」,這個「義」跟「亦」的發音一樣。這才是「利」,那就很夠了。在此,我容許自己,總之,體會到:關於真理論述的影響,關於天底下的東西,從那裏出現的,道道地地就是這個原因的功用,因為它是剩餘享樂。

雄伯:
拉康談論孟子梁惠王的義利之辨,夾了幾個中文的拼音字。可是對照孟子原文,似乎有點出入。能否有人給我指教一下。

性,物性或人性。
故:故常之迹,指事物在运行中已表现于外的现象。

梁惠王章句上‧第一章

孟子見梁惠王。

王曰,「叟,不遠千里而來,亦將有以利吾國乎?」

孟子對曰,「王何必曰利?亦有仁義而已矣。」

「王曰:『何以利吾國?』大夫曰:『何以利吾家?』
士庶人曰:『何以利吾身?』上下交征利,而國危矣!
萬乘之國弒其君者,必千乘之家;千乘之國,弒其君者,必百乘之家。
萬取千焉,千取百焉,不為不多矣;苟為後義而先利,不奪不饜。」

「未有仁而遺其親者也,未有義而後其君者也。」

「王亦曰仁義而已矣,何必曰利?」

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