精神分析的倫理學 07

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析的倫理學 07

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

XXIV
第24章

The paradoxes of ethics
or Have you acted in conformity with your desire?

倫理學的矛盾
或你曾遵循你的欲望行動嗎?

Desire and Guilt
欲望與罪惡

320
What makes Philoctetes a hero? Nothing more than the fact that he remains
fiercely committed to his hate right to the end, when the deus ex machina
appears like the curtain falling. This reveals to us not only that he has been
betrayed and he is aware that he has been betrayed, but also that he has
been betrayed with impunity.

是什麼是菲洛鐵提斯成為英雄?那僅就是這個事實,他始終強烈地奉獻於這個恨,一直到死亡。當這個「貴人」出現,像簾幕垂落。這跟我們不但顯示,他已經被背叛,而且他知道他已經被背叛,而且他被背叛,還無法懲罰人家。

This is emphasized in the play by the fact that Neoptelemes, who is full of remorse because he betrayed the hero and thereby demonstrates his noble soul, comes to make proper amends and gives him back the bow that plays such an essential role in the tragic space of the play — because it operates there like a subject that is spoken about and addressed.

這在劇中被這個事實強調:尼奧鐵力米斯充滿悔恨,因為他背叛這位英雄,因此證明他的高貴靈魂,前來做適當的修正,並且還給他這把弓,弓在這部戲劇的悲劇空間佔有如此重要的地位—因為它在那裏運作,就像一位被人談論及對談的生命主體。

It is the space of the hero and for good reason. What I call “giving ground relative to one’s desire” is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance.

這就是英雄的空間,理有很充分。我所謂的「給予跟欲望相對的空間」,總是有某種的背叛,陪伴著生命主體的命運—你們將會在每個個案裏觀察到它,並且應該注意到它的重要性。

Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their pact entailed– whatever that pact may be, fated or ill-fated, risky, shortsighted, or indeed
a matter of rebellion or flight, it doesn’t matter.

生命主體要不就是背叛他自己的方式,背叛他自己。這個結果對他而言,是很重要的。或者僅僅是說,他容忍這個事實:某個他跟他有某種程度的誓言的人,背叛他的希望,並沒有為他盡到盟約涵蓋的內容—不管那個盟約是什麼,好運或是壞運,冒險、短視,或確實是一件反叛或逃避的事實,都無關緊要。

Something is played out in betrayal if one tolerates it, if driven by the idea of the good – and by that I mean the good of the one who has just committed the act of betrayal – one gives ground to the point of giving up one’s own claims and says to oneself, “Well, if that’s how things are, we should abandon our position; neither of us is worth that much, and especially me, so we should just return to the common path.”

某件事情以背叛方式被演出,假如某個人容忍它,假如它被這個善的觀念所驅使—我的意思是剛剛從事背叛行為的這個人的善,我們承認接受這一點:放棄我們自己的宣稱,然後對自己說:「假如那是事情的樣子,我們放棄我們的立場。我們沒有一個人有那麼高的價值,特別是我。所以,我們應該就是回到共同的途徑。」

You can be sure that what you find there is the structure of giving ground relative to one’s desire.

你們能夠確定,你們在那裏找到的是給于相對於欲望的空間。

Once one has crossed that boundary where I combined in a single term contempt for the other and for oneself, there is no way back. It might be possible to do some repair work, but not to undo it. Isn’t that a fact of experience that demonstrates how psychoanalysis is capable of supplying a useful compass in the field of ethical guidance?

一旦我們已經跨越過那個邊界,在那裏,我就用一個術語,連接對於它者的藐視及對自己的藐視,那麼我們就沒有退路。我們可能做一些修補的工作,但是不能夠恢復它。那難道不是一個經驗的事實,證明精神分析能夠供應一個有用的羅盤指標,在倫理引導的領域。

I have, therefore, articulated three propositions. First, the only thing one can be guilty of is giving ground relative to one’s desire. Second, the definition of a hero: someone who may be betrayed with impunity. Third, this is something that not everyone can achieve; it constitutes the difference between an ordinary man and a hero, and it is, therefore, more mysterious than one might think. For the ordinary man the betrayal that almost always occurs sends him back to the service of goods, but with the proviso that he will never again find that factor which restores a sense of direction to that service.

因此,我曾經表達三個命題:首先,唯一我們會感覺到罪惡感的是給予欲望的相對空間。其次,英雄的定義:某個人可能會被背叛,無法予以懲罰。第三,這是某件並非每個人都能完成的事情。它組成英雄與普通人之間的這個差異。因此,它比我們可能想像的更加神秘。對於普通人,經常發生的背叛,使他回來從事善待服務,但是有個條件但書:他將再也找不到那個讓他恢復那種服務的方向感的因素。

We come finally to the field of the service of goods; it exists, of course, and there is no question of denying that. But turning things around, I propose the following, and this is my fourth proposition: There is no other good than that which may serve to pay the price for access to desire – given that desire is understood here, as we have defined it elsewhere, as the metonymy of our being.

我們最後來到這個善的服務的領域;當然這個善的服務領域存在,我們不可能去否認它。但是將事情反過來說,我建議以下,那是我第四個命題:除了充當償付接近欲望的善外,沒有別的善。假如我們考慮到,欲望在此受人瞭解,如同我們曾經在別的地方定義它,作為我們生命實存的換喻。

The channel in which desire is located is not simply that of the modulation of the signifying chain, but that which flows beneath it as well; that is, properly speaking, what we are as well as what we are not, our being and our non-being – that which is signified in an act passes from one signifier of the chain to another beneath all the significations.

欲望被找到位置的管道,不僅是能指鎖鏈的調整的管道,而且是在欲望底下流動的管道。適當地說,也就是我們生命實存,以及我們生命並不實存,我們的生命實存與生命並不實存—在行動中被意符表達的東西,從鎖鏈的一個能指,到另外一個能指,在所有的意義意符之下。

I explained this last time with the metonymy of “eating the book” that no doubt just came to me, but if you examine it a little more closely, you will see that it is the most extreme of metonymies – something that shouldn’t surprise us on the part of Saint John, the man who placed the Word at the beginning. It really is a writer’s idea, and he was an incomparable one.

我上一次用「吃掉書」來解釋這個。無可置疑的,我剛剛想到這一點,但是假如你們稍微更加仔細地檢視,你們將會看出,這是最極端的換喻—對於聖約翰的這一邊,有某件事情,我們不應該驚奇。他說將「文字」放置在開始之處的人。這真的是一個作家的點子,他是一位無與倫比的人。

But eating the book is, after all, something that confronts what Freud imprudently
told us is not susceptible to substitution and displacement, namely, hunger, with something that isn’t really made to be eaten, a book. In eating the book we come into contact with what Freud means when he speaks of sublimation as a change of aim and not of object. That’s not immediately clear.

「但是吃掉書」,畢竟是某件東西面對著,佛洛伊德粗略地告訴我們,不輕易會受到替代於更換的東西,也就是饑餓。書的這個東西,並不是真的製造是為了要被吃。當我們正在吃一本書時,我們接觸到佛洛伊德的意思,當他提到昇華,作為一種目標的改變,而不是客體的改變。那不是當下就清楚的事。

The hunger in question, sublimated hunger, falls in the space between the two, because it isn’t the book that fills our stomach. When I ate the book, I didn’t thereby become book any more than the book became flesh. The book became me so to speak.

受到置疑的饑餓,受到昇華的饑餓,會掉入這兩者的空間,因為並不是這本書能夠填飽我們的胃。當我吃這本書時,我並沒有因此變成書,正如書沒有變成肉體。也就是說,書變成我。

But in order for this operation to take place — and it takes place everyday — I definitely have to pay a price. Freud weighs this difference in a corner of Civilization and Its Discontents. Sublimate as much as you like; you have to pay for it with something. And this something is called jouissance. I have to pay for that mystical operation with a pound of flesh.

但是為了讓這個運作發生—它每天都發生—我明確地必須付出代價。佛洛伊德衡量這個差異,在「文明及其不滿」書中一個角落。無論你怎樣的昇華,你必須用某件東西償付它。這個某件東西被稱為「歡爽」。我必須用一磅肉,償付那個神秘的運作。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: