sinthome 13 Jacques Lacan

sinthome 13

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Le Sinthome

Seminar 3: Wednesday16 December 1975

And if you remember the way in which I introduced this fourth element, each one of the others is supposed to constitute something personal with respect to these three elements, the fourth will be what I am stating this year as the sinthome. It is not for
nothing that I wrote these things in a certain order: RSI, SIR, IRS, is indeed what my title last year corresponded to.


It is moreover the same people, the same Soury and Thomé, I already made an allusion to it, explicitly in this seminar, highlighted that, as regards what is involved in knots, the Borromean knots in question, starting from the moment when they
are orientated and coloured, there are two of them of a different nature. What does that mean?


In the flattening out, already, it can be highlighted. Here I am abbreviating. I am simply indicating to you the sense in which one can test it. I told you about the equivalence of these three circles, of these three rings of string. It is remarkable that it is only by the fact that, not between them, there is marked the identity of any one. For the identity would be to mark them by the initial letter. To say R, I and S, is already to entitle each one, each one as such, as Real, as Symbolic and as Imaginary. But it is
notable that it appears that the efficacious thing that is distinguished among them in the orientation is only locatable from that which by the colour marks their difference.

當我們正在處理的時候,我們能夠強調它。在此我有點縮減。我僅僅跟你們指示,我們能夠用怎樣的意義測試它。我告訴你們有關這三個環圈的相等,因為顯而易見的,任何一個環圈的認同被標示,不是在彼此之間。認同將要以第一個字母來標示它們。說出R,I, S的第一個字母,代表真實界、想像界、及意符界,就已經替它們定上標題。但是值得注意的是,在定位時,這個有效的事情能夠從它們中間區別出來,位置就在我用不同的顏色,標示它們的不同。

Not from one another, but as I might say their absolute difference in that it is the
difference common to the three. It is in order that there should be something which is one, but which, as such, marks the difference between the three, but not the difference in two’s, that there appears in consequence the distinction of two structures of the
Borromean knot. Which is the true one? Is the true one with respect to what is involved in the way in which the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real are knotted together, in what supports the subject?


Here is the question that deserves to be examined. You should refer to my preceding allusions about this duality of the Borromean knot in order to appreciate it. Because today I was only able to evoke it for an instant.


There is something remarkable, which is that the knot of three, on the other hand, bears no trace of this difference. In the knot of three, namely, in the fact that we put the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real in continuity, it is not surprising that we should see in (51) it that there is only a single knot of three. I hope that there are enough people here taking notes. Because this is important. Important to suggest to you to go and verify what is at stake.


Namely, specifically that as regards the knot of three that homogenises the Borromean knot, there is on the other hand, only one kind.


Does that mean that it is true?


Everyone knows there are two knots of three. There are two depending on whether it is dextrogyratory or laevogyratory. This is then a problem that I am putting to you: what is the link between these two kinds of Borromean knots and the two kinds of
knots of three?


In any case, if the knot of three is indeed the support for every kind of subject, how can it be examined? How can it be examined in such a way that it is indeed a subject that is at stake?


There was a time when I was advancing along a certain path, before I had got onto the path of analysis, it was that of my thesis: Paranoid psychosis in its relationships, I said, with the personality. If I resisted the republication of my thesis for so long, it is simply for the following reason: the fact is that paranoid psychosis and personality, as such, have no relationship; simply because of the fact that it is the same thing. In so far as a subject knots together in three, the Imaginary the Symbolic and the Real,
it is supported only by their continuity. The Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real are one and the same consistency. And it is in this that paranoid psychosis consists.


To clearly understand what I am stating today, one could deduce from it that to the paranoid three there could be knotted, under the heading of symptom, a fourth term which would situate as such, as personality, in so far as it itself would be distinct with regard to the three preceding personalities and their symptom. Does that mean that it would also be paranoid?


Nothing indicates it in the case, the case which is more than probable, which is certain, in which it is from a certain indefinite number of knots of three that a Borromean chain can be constituted. Which does not prevent that, with respect to this chain, which henceforth no longer constitutes a paranoia if only because it is common, with regard to this chain the possible flocculation of fourth terms, in this braid which is the subjective braid, the possible terminal flocculation of fourth terms leaves us with the possibility of supposing that on the totality of the texture, there are certain elective points which, are found to be (52) the limit of this knot of four.


And it is indeed in this properly speaking that the sinthome consists. And the sinthome not in the phase that it is personality, but with respect to three others, it specifies itself by being symptom and neurotic. It is in as much as the sinthome specifies it, that there is a term that there is more specially attached to it which, with regard to what is involved in the sinthome, has a privileged relationship. Just as here in the knot of three knotted in a Borromean way of four, you will see that there is a particular response from the red to the brown, just as there is a particular response from the green to the black.



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