Logic of phantasy 06 Jacques Lacan

Logic of phantasy 06
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 06

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

Here indeed is where there may be situated the phantasy which is properly the poetic phantasy par excellence, the one which obsessed Mallarme: of the absolute Book.


It is at this level where things are tied together at the level of the use not of pure signifier, but of the purified signifier, in so far as I say – and that I write that say – that the signifier is here articulated as distinct from any signified and I then see there being outlined the possibility of this absolute Book, whose property would be that it would encompass the whole signifying chain, properly in the following: that it may no longer signify anything. In this, then, there is something that proes to be founded in existence at the level of the Universe of discourse, but (11) we have to suspend this existence on the proper logic which that of the phantasy may constitute, because moreover, it is the only one that can tell us the way in which this region is attached to the Universe of discourse.


Undoubtedly, it is not excluded that it should enter it, but on the other hand, it is quite certain that it specifies itself in it, not at all by this purification of which I spoke earlier, for purification is not at all possible of what is essential to the Universe of discourse, namely, meaning. And were I to speak to you for another four hours about this absolute Book it would nevertheless remain that everything that I tell you has a sense.


What characterises the structure of this B – in so far as we know where to situate it in the Universe of discourse, inside or outside – is very precisely this feature that A announced earlier, in making for you the circle, simply of this A B C D E, in so far as, by simply closing the chain, there results that each group of four can easily leave outside itself the extraneous signifier, which can serve to designate the group, for the simple reason that it is not represented in it, and that nevertheless the whole chain will be found to constitute the totality of all these signifiers, giving rise to this additional unit, uncountable as such, which is essential for a whole series of structures, which are precisely the ones on which I founded, since the year 1960, my whole operation (operatoire) of identification.


Namely, what you find of it, for example, in the structure of the torus, being quite obvious that by buckling on the torus a certain number of circuits, by making operate a series of complete circuits at a cut and by making of them the number that you like (naturally the more of them there are, the more satisfying it is, but the more obscure it is). It is enough to make two of them to see there appearing at the same time this third required for these two to buckle together and, as I might say, for the line to bite its own tail: it will be this third circuit, which is assured by the buckling around the central hole, through which it is impossible not to pass in order for the first two loops to cut one another.


If I am not making any drawing on the board today, it is because in truth – in saying it – I am saying enough about it for you to understand me and also a good deal too little for me to show you that they are at least two paths, at the origin, along which this can be effected and that the result is not at all the same as regards the emergence of this additional One (Un en plus) that I am in the process of speaking to you about.


This simply suggestive indication contains nothing to exhaust the richness of what the least topological study provides us with.


What it is a matter simply of indicating today, is that the specificity of this world of writing is precisely to distinguish itself from discourse by the fact that it can close. And, closing on itself, it is precisely from there that there arises this possibility of a “one” which has a completely different status to that of the one which unifies and encompasses.


But from this “one” which already, from the simple closing – without there being any need to go into the status of repetition, which nevertheless (12) is closely linked to it – just from its closing, it gives rise to what has the status of the additional One, in so far as it is only sustained by writing and that it is nevertheless open, in its possibility, to the Universe of discourse: since it is sufficient, as I pointed out to you, for me to write – but it is necessary that this writing should take place – what I say about the exclusion of this one, this is enough to generate this other plane where there unfolds properly speaking the whole function of logic: the thing being sufficiently indicated to us by the stimulus that logic received, by submitting itself to the simple operation of writing, except for the fact that it still fails to remember that this only reposes on the function of a lack, in the very thing that is written and which constitutes the status, as such, of the function of writing.


I am saying simple things to you today, and perhaps this in itself risks making this discourse appear disappointing to you. Nevertheless, you would be wrong not to see that this is inserted into a register of questions which henceforth give to the function of writing something which cannot but have repercussions down to the deepest level of any possible conception of structure. For if the writing of which I speak is only supported from the return buckled onto itself, from a cut (as I illustrated it from the function of the torus), we find ourselves lead to the following: that precisely the most fundamental studies, linked to the progress of mathematical analysis, have put us in a position to isolate in it the function of the edge.


Now, once we speak about edge, there is nothing which can make us substantify this function, in so far as here you might improperly deduce that this function of writing is to limit this changeability (mouvant) of which I spoke to you earlier as being that of our thoughts or of the Universe of discourse. Far from it! If there is something which is structured as edge, what it itself limits is in a position to enter in its turn into the edging function. And here indeed is what we are going to have to deal with.


Or indeed – and this is the other face on which I intend to end – it is the reminder of what has always been known about this function of the unary stroke (trait unaire)


I will end by evoking the 26th verse of a book which I have already made use of, at one time, to begin to make understood what is involved in the function of the signifier: the book of Daniel and in connection with the story about the zouave’s trousers which is designated in it by a word which remains in the state of what is called an hapax and which is impossible to translate unless it was the socks that the characters in question wore.


In the book of Daniel, you already have the theory of the subject that I am presenting to you, and precisely arising at the limit of this Universe of discourse. It is the famous story of the dramatic festival of which we no longer find, moreover, the slightest trace in the annals, but no matter!


(13) Mene, Mene, for this is how verse 26 is expressed, Mene, Mene, Tekel, Parsin, which is usually transcribed in the famous Mene, Tekel, Parsin. It does not seem useless to me for us to notice that Mene, Mene which means “counted” – as Daniel pointed out in interpreting it to the worried prince – is expressed twice in order to show the most simple repetition of what constitutes counting: it is enough to count up to two for everything that is involved in this additional One, which is the true root of the function of repetition in Freud, to take place and to be marked in the following: except for the fact that contrary to what occurs in set theory, one does not say it.

「计算,计算,」这确实是第二十六诗篇的表达,「计算,计算,铁克,欠缺重量 」这几句通常被书写在这篇著名的「计算,铁克,欠缺重量」。我们如果注意到 Mene Mene 的意思是「计算」,对於理解似乎不无帮助。如丹尼尔对这位焦虑的王子的解释,「计算」一词被表达两次,为了显示组成计算的最简单的重复;牵涉到这个「额外的个体」的每一样东西,计算到两次,也就足够了。这个「额外的个体」,在佛洛伊德的着作里,重复的功用的真实的根源。它运作及被标示如下:除了这个事实,跟集合理论相反,我们不将它说出来。

One does not say the following: that what repetition seeks to repeat is precisely what escapes, because of the very function of the mark, in so far as the mark is original in the function of repetition. That is why repetition takes place, not because the mark is repeated, but that for the mark to provoke the sought-for repetition, it is necessary that on what is sought because the mark marks the first time, this very mark in effaced at the level of what it has marked and that is why what is sought for in repetition, of its nature slips away, allows there to be lost the fact that the mark cannot not be reduplicated, except by effacing, on what is to be repeated, the first mark, namely, to let it slip out of reach.


Mene, Mene … something in what is rediscovered lacks weight: Tekel. The prophet Daniel interprets it, and interprets it by saying to the prince that he was in effect weighed, but that something is missing there, which is expressed as “Parsin”. This radical lack, this first lack which flows from the very function of the counted as such, this additional One that one cannot count, it is this which constitutes properly this lack to which it is a matter for us of giving its logical function, in order that it should secure what is involved in the final “Parsin”, the bubble, of the empire in question, of the sufficiency of what is closed in on the image of the imaginary whole.


Here is exactly the path along which there is brought to bear the effect of the entry of what structures discourse at the most radical point, which is undoubtedly – as I always said and accentuated, to the extent of employing the most popular images for it – the letter that is involved, but the letter in so far as it is excluded, as it is lacking.


This is indeed about what – that moreover, since today A am making anew irruption into this Jewish tradition – to tell the truth, I had so many things prepared, even to the extent of having come to grips with a little exercise of learning to read Massoretic, a whole work which was in a way put in cold storage because of the fact that I was not able to construct the thematic that I had intended to develop around the Name of the Father – and that moreover, there remains something of all of this and specifically that at the level of history of Creation: “Berechit, Bara, Elohim” the Book begins, namely by a Beth. And it is said that this very letter that we have used today, the capital A, otherwise called Aleph, was not, at the beginning, among those from which there emerged the whole of creation.

确实就是这种情况。因为「阿拉」我,今天从新闯入这个犹太教的传统,坦白说,我事先做了许多预备的功课,甚至殚精竭力地学习阅读犹太教经文的学者马索惹提克的着作,他的全部着作曾经受到世人冷淡地对待,因为我没有能力建构我的主题宣扬它们。环绕「以天父之名」的这个主题,我曾经打算周延建构,可是在创世纪的历史的层次,总是有某件东西,很明确地漏失:创世纪书的开始写着:「Berechit, Bara,Elohim」,换句话说,作者是伯利恒的人。据说,这就是我们今天还在使用的这个「字词」,这个大写的字母「A」,也被称为「阿拉」,在开始的时候,並没有被列入整个宇宙的创造者之一。

(14) This indeed is here to indicate to us, but in a fashion that is in a way turned in on itself, that it is in so far as one of these letters is absent that the others function, but that no doubt it is in its very lack that there resides the whole fruitfulness of the operation.



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