Logic of phantasy 05 Jacques Lacan

Logic of phantasy 05
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 05
幻见的逻辑

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

(8) But let us leave “obsolete” and let us start from the opposition that Russell sets up to mark something which is supposed to be a contradiction in the formula which might be stated as follows:
(B A / S W S)
of a sub-set B whose status it would be impossible to guarantee, starting from the fact that it would be specified in a different set A, by a characteristic such that an element of A would not contain itself.
Is there some sub-set, defined by this proposition of the existence of elements which do not contain themselves?

(八)但是我们先将「过时」这个单字放置一旁。让我们先从罗素所建立的对立,为了标示某件在公式里,应该是一个矛盾的东西。这个公式可以书写如下:
(B的意符大於或小於A的意符
————————————————-
S的意符跟S的意符,彼此之间有鸿沟)

次级集合的B意符的地位,不可能得到保证,因为它必须在不同的A集合那里被明确指出。这样的一个特性,使的A的元素,无法包容自己。事实上,这样一个次级集合会存在吗?它的定义是由没有包容自己的元素的存在所提出。

It is undoubtedly easy, in this condition, to show the contradiction that exists in this because we have only to take an element y as forming part of B, as an element of B: for us to see the consequences that there then are in making it at the same time, as such, form part, as an element, of A:
(y E B) (y E A / y ~E y)

在这种情况下,要指出存在於这里的这个矛盾,毫无疑问是很容易,因为我们只需要拿一个y的元素,来组成B意符的一个部分,我们就能看出所有的这些结果,当我们同时也使它当一个元素,来组成A的意符的一个部分。(y E B) (y E A / y ~E y)

And not being an element of itself. The contradiction is revealed by putting B in the place of y:
(B E B) (B E A / B ~E B)

由於本身並不是一个元素,,这个矛盾的显露,是用B的意符代替y的元素。
(B E B) (B E A / B ~E B)

and seeing that the formula operates from the fact that every time we make B an element of B, there results, because of the solidarity of the formula, that since B forms part of A, it ought not to form part of itself. If on the other hand — B having been put, substituted for the place of this y – if on the other hand it does not form part of itself, satisfying the parenthesis on the right of the formula, it the forms part of itself being one of these y’s which are elements of B.

然后看到,这个公式根据这个事实来运作:每一次我们使B的意符成为B的意符的一个元素,因为这个公式的凝聚力,产生的结果是,因为B的意符组成A的意符的一部分,它不应该组成自己的一部分。另一方面,假如B的意符被提出,被用来代替这个y的元素的位置,假如在另一方面,它没有组成自己的一部分,而满足公式右边的这个括弧内容,它会让它自己的一部分成为那些y的元素的一个元素,那些y的元素,就是B意符的元素。

This is the contradiction before which Russell’s paradox put us.

这就是罗素的矛盾律使我们面对的二律悖反。

It is a matter of knowing whether, in our register, we can stop at it, provided we notice in passing what is meant by the contradiction highlighted in set theory, which would allow us perhaps to say the way in which set theory is specified in logic, namely, what step forward it constitutes as compared to the more radical one that we are trying to establish here.

问题是要如何知道,在我们的铭记里,是否我们能够适可而止,假如我们偶然注意到,集合理论所强调的二律悖反是什麽意思。它让我们能够说出,集合理论在逻辑里明确被标示的方式,换句话说,我们能够说出,组成向前的步骤是什麽,相较於我们目前正在建立的这个较激进的步骤。

The contradiction involved at this level where Russell’s paradox is articulated, depends precisely – as the simple usage of words shows us – on the fact that I say it. For if I do not say it, nothing prevents this formula, the second one, very precisely, from holding up as such, written out and there is nothing to say that its use will stop there.

罗素的矛盾律所表达的这个二律悖反,在这个层次所牵涉到,準确地说,是依靠我在说它的这个事实。这一点,我们从字词的简单用法可以看出。因为假如我不在说它,没有一样东西会阻挡这个公式,这个第二个公式,不继续照这样演绎,以及被书写下去。没有一样东西能够说,它的用途将就此停止。

What I say here is no word play, for set theory as such has absolutely no other support except the fact that I write as such, that everything that can be (9) said about a difference between the elements is excluded from the operation.

我在这里所说的,並不是文字遊戏。因为集合理论本身绝对没有其它的支撑,除了「我在书写」这个事实,除了关於元素之间的差异,每一件能够被说的出来的东西,都被排除在这个运作之外。

To write, to manipulate the literal operation which constitutes set theory consists in writing, as such, what I am saying there: namely, that the first set can be formed at once from the charming person who is in the process today, for the first time, of typing my discourse, from the mist on this window and from an idea which just now is going through my head, that this constitutes a set, from this fact, that I say expressly that no other difference exists than the one which is constituted by the fact that I can apply to these three objects, that I have just named and which you see are rather heteroclite, a unary stroke upon each one and nothing else.

书写,操作形成集合理论的实质上的运作,关键在於书写。这就是我在那里所说:换句话说,第一组的集合理论能够同时被形成,从今天正在这里,第一次替我的论述打字的那位可爱的人,从这个窗户上的雾气,以及从闪过我的脑海的一个意念。这样就形成一个集合,从我清楚地说出这个事实,没有其它的差异存在,除了我能够运用这三样东西所形成的差异,从我刚刚提到,以及你们看到的,相当诡异的这三样东西。打字的人、窗户上的雾气、脑海的意念,每一样都是独特的述写,除外没有别的。

Here then is what ensures that since we are not at the level of such speculation, since what I bring into play is the Universe of discourse, my question does not encounter Russell’s paradox, namely, that there is deduced no impasse, no impossibility to the following, that B which I do not know, but which I have begun to suppose forms part of the Universe of discourse, undoubtedly for its part, although constituted from the specification that the signifier cannot signify itself, may perhaps have this sort of relation to itself which escape Russell’s paradox, namely, demonstrate to us something which might be perhaps its own dimension and in connection with which we are going to see in which status it forms part or not of the Universe of discourse.

因此,这就获得确定,我的问题並没有遭遇到罗素的矛盾律,因为我们並不是处於如此推理的层次,因为我所运作的是真理论述的宇宙。换句话说,我的演绎没有僵局,没有以下的不可能,我不认识,但是我却已经开始假设的B的意符,组成真理论述的宇宙的一部分。无可置疑地,组成的这个部分,虽然是由这个明确细节:意符无法使自己被意符化,它跟它自己,可能拥有免除罗素的矛盾律的这种关系,换句话说,它可以替我们证明,某件可能属於它自己的向度的东西,关於这件东西,我们将看出,以怎样的地位,它组成真理论述的宇宙的部分。

In effect, if I was careful to remind you of the existence of Russell’s paradox, it is probably because I am going to be able to make use of it to make you sense something. I am going to make you sense it first of all in the simplest fashion and, after that, in a fashion that is a little bit richer. I am going to make you sense it in the simplest fashion because I am prepared, for some time now, for any concession (laughter). People want me to say simple things, well then, I will say simple things! You are already, all the same, sufficiently formed to the following, thanks to my care, to know that there is not such a direct path towards understanding. Perhaps, even if what I tell you appears simple, there will remain with you, all the same, a little mistrust …

事实上,我小心翼翼地提醒你们,有关罗素的矛盾律的存在,可能是因为我将能够使用它,来使你们感觉到某件事情。首先我将用最简单的方式,使你们感觉到它。然后,我将再用稍加复杂的方式。我将用最简单的方式,来使你们感觉到它,因为有一段时间来,我準备要做任何的妥协(引起一阵笑声)。人们期望我说些简单明白的事情。好吧,我就说些简单明白的事情。儘管如此,你们已经足够组成一个集合,由於我的小心翼翼,你们知道,对待了解,其实並没有如此一条直接的通道。即使我告诉你们的内容,看起来简单,你们可能还是会存有不敢置信的心理。

A catalogue of catalogues: here indeed, in a first approach, is what is involved as a signifier. Why should we be surprised that it does not contain itself? Naturally, since this seems, to us, to be required from the beginning.

分类目录中的一个分类目录:以第一个方法,这确实是作为一个意符所牵涉到的东西。为什麽我们竟然没有驚奇地发现:一个分类目录没有包含它自己本身?当然,对於我们而言,这个问题应该从一开始就必须要问。

Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the catalogue of all the catalogues which do not contain themselves, from printing itself, inside it! In truth, nothing would prevent it, even the contradiction that Lord Russell would deduce from it!

可是,虽然所有的分类目录都没有包含它们本身,却没有一样东西能够阻挡这样一个目录,不能出版自己,不能在它自己里面出版!事实上,没有一样东西将会阻挡它,即使罗素爵士从它这里演绎出一个矛盾律。

But let us consider precisely this possibility that exists, that in order not to contradict itself, it does not inscribe itself in itself.

但是,让我们準确地考虑这个存在的可能性:这个分类的目录为了避免跟自己相牴触,它没有将自己铭记在自己里面。。

Let us take the first catalogue; there are only four catalogues, up to then, which do not contain themselves:
A B C D
让我们以第一个分类目录当例子。直到当时,只有四个分类目录。它们都没有包括它们自己。
A B C D

(10) Let us suppose that there appears another catalogue which does not contain itself, we add it on: E.
Why is it inconceivable to think that there is a first catalogue which contains A B C D, a second catalogue which contains B C D E, and not be surprised that each of them lacks this letter which is properly the one which would designate itself?

(十)让我们假定,又出现另外一本没有包括自己的分类目录。我们就给它填加为:E。为什麽我们那麽难於想像地认为,有这麽第一本分类目录,包括A B C D,然后又有第二本分类目录,包括B C D E,然后不大吃一惊,每一本分类目录都短缺这个将会适当地指明自己的字母?

But from the moment that you generate this sequence, you have only to arrange it around the circumference of a disc and see that it is not because in each catalogue one of them will be missing, indeed even a greater number, that the circle of these catalogues will not add up to something which is precisely what corresponds to the catalogue of all the catalogues which do not contain themselves. Simply what will constitute this chain will have this property of being an additional signifier (un signifiant en plus) which is constituted from the closure of the chain. An uncountable signifier and which, precisely because of this fact, is able to be designated by a signifier.

但是从你产生这个系列的时刻,你所需要做的,就是安排它,环绕着一个园盘的四周,然后注意到,在每一本分类目录里,它们每一个都会欠缺一个更大的数目,那就是,所有这些分类目录的园周,将不会增加到所有对应於「並没包括它们自己」的分类目录的这个目录里。仅仅是组成这个意符锁链的本身,就会具有成为一个填加的意符的这个属性,而这一个填加的意符的组成,却是因为意符锁链的封闭。它是一个不可数的意符,也确实因为它的不可数,它才能够被一个意符所指明。

Because, being nowhere, there is no difficulty in a signifier arising which designates it as the additional signifier: the one that is not grasped in the chain.

因为意符並不固定属於哪个地方,所以要出现一个意符来指明它,当着是一个填加的意符,这並不困难。
这个填加的意符在意符锁链里,並没有被了解到。

I take another example: catalogues are not made, in the first place, to catalogue catalogues, they catalogue objects which have some right (titre) to be there (the word “titre” having here all its importance). It would be easy to become engaged on this path in order to open up the dialectic of the catalogue of all the catalogues, but I am going to go to a more lively path, since it is necessary that I should leave you some exercises for your own imagination.
我再举另外一个例子。起初,分类目录並不是为了要将分类目录予以分类而制作。它们是将具有资格(「资格」这个字有其意义的重要性)被列在那里的东西编排分类目录。然后,我们很容易就会乐此不疲地去从事将所有分类目录,再编一本总分类目录的辩证法,但是,我要要走的途径,还会更加灵活,因为我还要留个你们一些想像的练习的空间。

The book: with the book we enter, apparently, into the Universe of discourse. Nevertheless, in the measure that the book has some referent and that it also may be a book that has to cover a certain surface, in the register of some title (titre), the book will include a bibliography. Which means something which is presented properly for us to image the following, what results in so far as the catalogues live or do not live in the Universe of discourse. If I make the catalogue of all the books that a bibliography contains, naturally I am not making a catalogue of bibliographies! Nevertheless, in cataloguing these books, in so far as in the bibliographies they refer on to one another, I may very well cover the totality of all the bibliographies.

这本书:用我们进入的这本书,我们进入真理论述的宇宙。可是,就这本书会有一些指称的幅度而言,它也可能是一本包括某些表面的书,从它的某些标题看出,这本书会包括一个索引目录。这意谓着,某件事情适当地呈现,是为了让我们想像以下随之而来的内容,因为分类目录本身並不存活於真理论述的宇宙里。假如我将索引目录里所包括的一切的书,制作成一个分类目录,当然,我正在制作的,並不是索引的分类目录!可是,在将这些书制作一个分类目录时,我很有理由涵盖所有索引目录的全部,因为在索引目录里,它们会互相提到。

雄伯译
springherohsiung@gmail.com

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