Logic of phantasy 04

Jacques Lacan

雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 04

幻见的逻辑

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

(5) Mathematical usage which depends precisely on the fact that when we have somewhere – and not only, as you know, in an exercise of algebra – when we have posited somewhere a letter, capital A, we take it up, subsequently, as if it were still the same the second time that we make use of it. Do not raise this objection; today is not the day I am going to give you a class in mathematics.

（五）数学的用法主要是依靠这个事实，当我们在某个地方拥有， 不单是在代数的练习中，你们知道，而且在某个地方，我们提到一个大写字母A，我们随后接纳它，好似我们第二使用它时，它都会一成不变。

You should know, simply, that no correct statement about any use whatsoever of letters – even if it were, precisely, in what is closest to us today, for example, in the use of a Markov chain – would require of any teacher (and this is what Markov himself did) a stage, which is in a way propaedeutic, to make clear the impasse, the arbitrariness, what is absolutely unjustifiable (quite apparent moreover) in employing A the second time to represent the first A, as if it were still the same. It is a difficulty which is at the source of the mathematical use of so-called identity.

不过，你们应该知道，关於字母的任何用途，没有任何一个陈述，会要求老师一个舞台（这是语言学家马可夫自己作这样的要求），这个舞台是一个预备的阶段，来澄清这个僵局、这个任意性、这个绝对无法自园其说（那更加显而易见），当他第二次使用这个大写字母A，来代表第一次的大写字母A，好像它依旧会一成不变。例如，马可夫的意符锁链的用途里，即使在我们最密切的日常生活中，我们是有可能做这种的要求。可是，在数学用途所谓的符号的认同一致的根源处，我们会遭遇这麽一个困难。

We do not have to deal with it explicitly here today, because we are not dealing with mathematics. I want simply to recall to you that the foundation, that the signifier is not grounded by signifying itself, is admitted by those very people who, on occasion, may make a use that is contradictory to this principle – at least in appearance. It would be easy to see the intermediary by which this is possible, but I do not have the time to go astray in this. I want simply to pursue – and without tiring you any more – my proposition which is then the following: what is the consequence in this Universe of discourse of this principle: that the signifier cannot signify itself?

今天在这里，我们並不需要明确地处理它，因为我们不是在处理数学的问题。我仅仅是要提醒你们，这个基础，那就是意符的基础不是在意符本身，已经受到人们的承认，即使他们有时候会抵触这个原理，至少在外表上，他们常以意符本身充当意符的基础。我们很容易看出因此显现的中间的矛盾，但是我没有时间离题去讨论它。我只是要直接了当地探讨我以下的命题：在「意符无法使自己被意符化」的这个原理的真理述述的这个宇宙里，其结果是什麽？

What does this axiom specify in this Universe of discourse in so far as it is constituted, in short, by everything that can be said? What sort of specification is it and does the specification that this axiom determines, form part of the Universe of discourse? If it does not form part of it, this is undoubtedly a problem for us. What specifies, I repeat, the axiomatic statement that the signifier cannot signify itself, will have the consequence of specifying something which, as such, would not be in the Universe of discourse. Even though, precisely, we have admitted saying that it encompasses everything that can be said, into its ambit. Are we going to find ourselves in some diversion which would signify that what, thus, cannot form part of the Universe of discourse, cannot be said in some way or other?

在真理论述的这个宇宙里，这个定理明确指出什麽？总之，这个真理论述的宇宙，难道不就是由我们所能够言说的一切所组成？它是哪一种明确细节？这个定理所决定的这种明确细节，会形成真理论述的宇宙的一部分吗？假如它並没有组成真理论述的宇宙的一部分，无可置疑地，这对於我们会形成一个问题。我再重复一遍，「意符无法使自己被意符化」这个定理般的陈述，它的明确细节将会造成某件东西的明确细节，而具有这样明确细节的东西，将不可能存在於真理论述的宇宙里。

And, of course, it is clear that since we are speaking about it, about what I am bringing to you, it is obviously not to tell you that it is the ineffable thematic regarding which you know that from pure consistency and without for all that belonging to the school of Mr. Wittgenstein, I consider as: that it is vain to speak.

当然，这是显而易见，因为我们正在谈论它，谈论我正在跟你演说的内容，这个内容显而易见，不是要告诉你们，这是一个言不尽意的主题，关於这个主题，你们会区别它的内容，不同於维根斯坦的逻辑学派的条理一贯。我认为如下：言行道断。

(6) Before coming to such a formula, and you can see after all that I am not sparing you either bits relief or the impasse that it constitutes, since moreover we are going to have to come back to it – really do everything to open up the paths to what I am trying to get you to follow me in – let us take care to put to the test the following: that what specifies the axiom that the signifier cannot signify itself, remains part of the Universe of discourse.

（六）在到达这样一个公式之前，畢竟你们也能看得出来，我並没有替你们省略任何麻烦，或它所形成的僵局，因为我们还是回到这个问题。（我只是儘量展开各种途径，设法使你们跟随我进入。）让我们小心来测试下面这个命题：「意符无法使自己被意符化」这个定理的明确细节，始终是真理论述的宇宙的一部分。

What do we then have to posit? What is at stake in, what specifies the relation that I stated in the form that the signifier cannot signify itself – let us take arbitrarily the usage of a little sign which serves in this logic which is founded on writing, this Win which you will recognise the shape (these games are not perhaps purely accidental) of my diamond, in a way with its hat knocked off, that has been opened up like a little box, and which serves, this W, to designate, in the logic of sets, exclusion. In other words, what is designated by the Latin ora, which is expressed by an aut: one or the other. The signifier, in its repeated presentation, only functions qua functioning the first time or functioning the second. Between one and the other there is a radical gap, this is what is meant by: the signifier cannot signify itself.

S W S

那麽，我们要提出怎样的命题呢？什麽东西会岌岌可危？在「意符无法使自己被意符化」里，我所陈述的这个关系的明确细节是什麽？让我们随意地拿一个小符号的用法当例子，这个小符号可以运用在以书写为基础的逻辑里。在「赢」这个单字的字首W，你们认出我的方块鑽石的形状（我玩弄这个遊戏，不完全是巧合。）只是它的上一半被踢掉，它像一个小盒子被打开，这个W 的形状，在集合的逻辑里，指明的意义是：排除。换句话说，ora这个拉丁字，在法文是aut， 指明的是：一个或另外一个。这个意符，以重复地出现的方式，充当的功用仅仅是，作为第一次的功用，或第二次的功用。在一个或另外一个之间，有一道很大的鸿沟，那就是它的意思：意符无法使自己被意符化。代号就是：S W S

We suppose, as we have said, that what determines this axiom as a specification in the Universe of discourse is what we are going to designate by a signifier, B – an essential signifier which you will notice can be appropriated to something the axiom specifies: that it cannot, in a certain relation and from a certain relation, generate any meaning. B is very specifically the signifier which can be specified, without objection, by the fact that it marks, as I might say, this sterility. The signifier in itself being characterised precisely by the fact that there is nothing obligatory, that it is far from being in the first spurt that it generates a meaning. It is this that gives me the right to symbolise by the signifier B this feature: that the relation of the signifier to itself does not generate any meaning.

我们说过，我们假定，在真理论述的宇宙里，决定这个定理充当明确细节的内容，就是我们将要用意符B指明的内容。意符B是一个基本的意符，你们将会注意到，它能够被合并到定理所明确指定的某件东西上，可是，在某个关系中，由於某种关系，它无法产生意义。很明确地，B是一个无法明确指定的意符，是无可置疑，因为它标示的内容就是「不能生育」，容我这样说。这个意符本身的特色，确实就是：没有一样东西是强制性的，产生意义绝非是它的第一使命。就是这个特色使我有权利，来使用意符B象征这个特征：意符跟本身的关系並没有产生任何意义。

But let us start, to begin with, from the following which after all seems to be required: the fact is that something that I am in the process of stating to you forms part of the Universe of discourse. Let us see what results from that. That is why I make use for the moment – because after all it does not seem to me to be inappropriate – of my little diamond in order to say that B forms part of A, that it has relations with it whose richness I will certainly have to bring into play, for you, throughout this year, and whose complexity I indicated to you the last time, by decomposing this little sign in all the binary fashions in which it can be done.

B A

但是首先让我们从以下的问题开始，畢竟那似乎是必要的条件，这个事实是，我目前正在跟你们陈述的某件事情，组成了真理论述的宇宙的某一部分。让我们瞧一瞧，那造成的结果是什麽。那就是为什麽，我现在会使用我那个小方块鑽石的符号（畢竟这样使用，对我而言，似乎並没有什麽不适当），为了要说，B的意符组成A的意符的一部分。B的意符跟A的意符，彼此关系的繁复，今年一整年，我确实还要跟你们一再演说。它们的复杂性，我上一次已经跟你们指明，我拆开这个小符号，以双边的关系，可以书写成公式如下：B A的念法是： B的意符大於或小於A的意符。

(7) It is a matter of knowing, then, whether there is not some contradiction resulting from it. Namely, whether from the very fact that we have written that the signifier cannot signify itself, we can write that this B, not signifies itself, but, forming part of the Universe of discourse, can be considered as something which, in the style which characterises what we have called a specification, can be written: B forms part of itself. It is clear that the question arises: does B form part of itself? In other words what the notion of specification grounds, namely, what we have learned to distinguish in several logical varieties, I mean that I hope that I hope that there are enough people here who know that the functioning of a set is not strictly speaking super-imposable on that of a class, but that in fact all of this at the origin, must be rooted in this principle of a specification.

（七）因此，问题是如何知道，这个关系会不会造成一些矛盾。换句话说，从我们书写下「意符无法使自己被意符化」，我们能不能够也书写：「B这个意符，无法使自己被意符化，却组成真理论述的一部分」，这件事能够被认为，是某件能够被书写为下面的事：「B这个意符组成它自己的一部分。」显而易见，底下这个问题出现了：「B这个意符有组成它自己的一部分吗？」换句话说，明确细节的观念的基础在哪里？也就是说，在好几个逻辑的变化例子里，我们学习去区别出来的是什麽？我的意思是，我希望，我希望，这里有足够的人知道，严个来说，一个像班级的团体，它的集合力量的运作並非绝对不可能。事实上，从一开始，它的运作就必须以一个明确细节的原理当根源。

Here, we find ourselves before something whose kinship in fact should sufficiently resonate in your ears with what I called the last time Russell’s paradox, in so far as to what I am stating, that here, in the terms which interest us, the function of sets – in so far as it does something that I, for my part, have not yet done, for I am not here to introduce it but to maintain you in a field which logically is on this hither side, but to introduce something that there is an opportunity to grasp in this connection: namely, what is grounded by the bringing into play of the apparatus described as set theory, which today is presented as something quite original, undoubtedly, for any mathematical statement, and for which logic is nothing but what mathematical symbolism can grasp – this function of sets will also be the principle, and this is what I put in question, of the whole foundation of logic.

在此，我们发现我们自己处於某件东西的前面，事实上，这个东西应该早已经迴响在你们的耳际，用我上一次所称为的「罗素的矛盾律」。就我正在陈述的内容而言，使用我们感到興趣的术语，也就是集合的功用，就我而言，它做到以前从未被做过的事情。因为我目前在此，並不是要介绍它，而是要将你们维持在一个逻辑上在此时此地的领域，並且要介绍某件相关的你们有机会了解的东西。换句话说，被描述为集合理论的这个仪器，它的运作的基础是什麽？今天，我呈现集合理论，当着是某件具有原创性的事情，就任何数学的陈述而言，那是无可置疑。就集合理论而言，逻辑仅仅就是数学符号所能理解的东西。集合理论的这个功用，将也是逻辑的整个基础的这个原理，这就是我提出质疑的地方。

If there is a logic of the phantasy, it is because it is more fundamental (principielle) than any logic which flows into the formalising defiles where it has revealed itself, as I have said, to be so fruitful in the modern epoch.

假如有一个幻见的逻辑，那是因为它更加具有基本的重要性，比起任何演变成为实际被运用到浮滥的逻辑。

我曾经说过，在目前这个时代，这些逻辑真是洋洋大观。

Let us try then to see what Russell’s paradox means, when it covers something which is not far from what is there on the board. Simply, it promotes as altogether enveloping this fact of a type of signifier, that it takes moreover to be a class. A strange error! … To say, for example, that the word “obsolete” represents a class in which it would itself be included, under the pretext that the word “obsolete” is obsolete, is undoubtedly a little conjuring trick, which has strictly no interest except to found, as a class, the signifiers which do not signify themselves. While precisely we posit as an axiom, here, that in no case can the signifier signify itself and that it is from there that one must start to sort oneself out, even if it were only to see that it is necessary to explain differently that the word “obsolete” can be qualified as obsolete. It is absolutely indispensable to bring into it what the division of the subject introduces.

然后让我们设法瞧一瞧，当逻素的矛盾律，涵盖某件根本就没有被书写在黑板上的东西，那会是什麽东西？很简单，作为完全涵盖一种意符的事实，它提升成为一个分类的集合。这真是一个奇怪的错误！例如，我们说，「过时」这个单字，代表一个它自己被包括在里面的单字分类，藉口的理由是，「过时」这个单字已经过时，无可置疑的，这是一个卖弄文字的小把戏，完全不会引起人们的興趣，除了充当一种分类，建立没有被自己意符化的意符的基础。在此，我们确实提出一个定理：意符无论个如何，都无法使自己被意符化，从那里，我们开始替自己分类，即使只是要看出，要将「过时」这个单字定义为过时的意涵，我们需要以不同的方式来解释。我们绝对无可免除地要运用到，人作为一个生命的主体，本质上是分裂，所产生的影响。

雄伯译

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