Knowledge and truth 4

Knowledge and truth 4
知識與真理
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡:再來

I am going to tell you a little secret about those beings from which the letter is wrought. Despite everything people have said, for example, about Lenin, I don’t think either hate or love, hainamoration, has ever really killed anyone. Don’t tell me stories about Mrs. Freud! On that score, I have Jung’s testimony. He told the truth. Indeed, that was his flow—he told nothing but that.

我想要告訴你們一個小秘密,關於那些字母意符構成的主體。例如,不管人們對於列寧的愛恨如何毀譽交加,我不認為愛恨情結真的會如此使人喪心病狂。更別告訴我有關佛洛伊德跟她的妻子的愛恨糾纏。在那種愛恨糾纏的情結,榮格的告白,更是令人心力交瘁。他說的是實話。的確,那是榮格的真情流露,他說的就是實話。

Those who still manage to make those kinds of rejections of being are really the ones who partake of scorn. I will make you write it this time, since today I’m having fun, meprix. That makes uniprix. We live in the age of supermarkets, so one must know what one is capable of producing, even by way of being.

那些依舊能夠悍然拒絕生命的實存的人,確實是睥睨群倫的人。這一次,我要你們寫下來,因為我今天心情很好,靈感泉湧。我們現在生活在超級市場的時代,所以我們必須要知道,自己能夠生產什麼,即使是以生命的實存作為生產。

That hitch is that the Other, the locus, knows nothing. One can no longer hate God if he himself knows nothing—in particular, of what is going on. When one could hate him, one could believe he loved us, since he didn’t hate us in return. This is not apparent, despite the fact, in certain cases, people went at its full speed ahead.

關鍵所在是,大他者,這位生命的樞紐,一無所知。即使上帝本身一無所知,特別是對於正在發生的事一無所知,我們也不再因此而痛恨他。若是我們能痛恨他,我們就能相信他依舊愛我們,因為他並不以痛恨來報復我們。這種心理並不顯而易見,儘管在某些狀況,人們痛恨時會盲目地奮不顧身。

Lastly, as I come to the end of these discourses that I have the strength to pursue before you, I would like to tell you an idea that came to me, about which I have reflected just a little bit. The misfortune of Christ is explained to us by the idea of saving men. I find, rather, that the idea was to save God by giving a little presence and actuality back to that hatred of God regarding which we are, and for good reason, rather indecisive.

最後,當我膽敢在你們面前,將這這些真理的論述不厭其煩地闡明的末了,我想要告訴你們一個我曾經沉思良久的想法。耶穌被釘上十字架的不幸,被用來解釋是上帝為了拯救世人,而犧牲他的獨生子。相反地,我發現到,這種解釋是為了拯救上帝,因為它將上帝的痛恨稍微賦予具體的存在,而我們人類對於上帝的痛恨始終猶豫不決,不是沒有理由的。

That is why I say that the imputation of the unconscious is an incredible act of charity. The subjects know, they know. But all the same, they don’t know everything. At the level of this not-everything ( pas-tout), only the Other doesn’t know. It is the Other who constitutes the not-everything, precisely in that the Other is the part of the not-at-all-knowledgeable ( pas-savant-tout) in the not-everything.

這就是為什麼我說上帝造人時,賦予無意識是一件無與倫比的慈善行為。主體知道,他們知道。但是自始至終,他們只是一知半解。而在主體一知半解的相形之下,上帝卻是一無所知。問題是,主體的一知半解是由於上帝的一無所知組成,因為主體的一知半解,必須以上帝的一無所知為先決條件。

Thus, it may momentarily be convenient to make the Other responsible for this, to which analysis leads in the most avowed manner, though no one realizes it: if libido is only masculine, it is only from where the dear woman is whole, in other words, from the place from which man sees her, that the dear woman can have an unconscious.

因此,容我們姑且讓大他者來負責這件事罷!精神分析學信誓旦旦地引導我們尋求大他者,雖然沒有人體會到:假如生命力的力比多只是男性,那是因為他出發的立場,是將他喜愛的女性視為生命整體的地方,換句話說,從男性看待女性的立場,從他喜愛的女性也有無意識的地方來看。

And what does it help her do? It helps her, as everyone knows, make the speaking being, who is reduced her to man, speak, in other words—I don’t know if you have noticed this in analytic theory—it helps her exist only as mother. She has unconscious effects, but her unconscious—at the limit point at which she is not responsible for everyone’s unconscious, in other words, at the point at which the Other she deals with, the Other with a capital O, works in such a way that she knows nothing, because the Other knows even less, given how difficult it is to even maintain its existence—this unconscious, what can we say of it, if not to sustain with Freud that it doesn’t leave her sitting pretty?

女性有無意識對她有何幫助?如眾所周知,女性有無意識幫助她使言說的存在主體言說,換句話說,使存在主體的男性言說。我不知道你們在理解精神分析理論時,是否注意到這一點:女性有無意識只是幫助她的存在成為一位母親。她是有無意識的效應,但是她的無意識的極限是,她並不負責其它每個人的無意識,換句話說,她的無意識的極限是,跟她打交道的大他者,那個大寫字母O開頭的大他者,運作的狀況是,她一無所知,因為大他者知道得更少,假如我們考慮到,即使要維持無意識的存在都不是一件容易的事。這個無意識,我們要怎麼說它呢?它不就是証明佛洛伊德所說的:女性不光是玲瓏剔透的模特兒而已。

The last time, I played ( joue), as I allow myself to do, on the equivocation, a bit farfetched, between il hait ( he hates) and il est ( he is). I enjoy ( jouis) that equivocation only insofar as I ask whether it is worthy of a pair of scissors. That is precisely what is at stake in castration.

上一次,我一時興起,運用「他恨」跟「他存在」之間的弔詭,條分縷析「歡爽」一詞的雙關語。我對於「歡爽」一詞的雙關語樂此不疲,因為我一直在探問,是否它值得我們用剪刀將它一切為二。那確實是談到閹割時最危險的地方。

That being as such may provoke hatred cannot be ruled out. Certainly, Aristotle’s whole concern was, on the contrary, to conceive of being as that by which beings with less being participate in the highest of beings. And Saint Thomas succeeded in reintroducing that into the Christian tradition—which is not surprising given that, having spread among the Gentiles, the Christian tradition had necessarily been thoroughly shaped thereby, the upshot being that one had but to pull the strings to work again. But do people realize that everything in the Jewish tradition goes against that? The dividing line ( coupure) there does not run from the most perfect to the least perfect. The least perfect there is quite simply what it is, namely, radically imperfect, and one must but obey with the finger and the eye, if I dare to boot. The latter chose his people and one cannot go against that.

作為被閹割的存在主體可能會激發痛恨之感,這個可能是無可排除的。的確,在另一方面,亞里斯多德的全部關注點,是天機不可洩露,只有較少的存在主體能夠參與最高層次的生命存在。聖湯姆士成功地重新介紹這個觀點到基督教的傳統信仰,並不令人驚訝,因為在異教徒當中早就散播這樣的觀念,基督教的傳統信仰就是如此根深柢固地被形成,追根究底就是只有基督教徒才是上帝的選民。但是有人體認到嗎?所有猶太教的傳統信仰都跟這一點恰恰背道而馳。那裡分歧點並不是從最完美的選民,一直延續到最不完美的選民。最不完美的選民原先就存在那裡,換句話說,他們蒙昧無知,他們只必須頂禮膜拜耶和華之名,容我膽敢如此表達,另外,他還有許多其他的名號。耶和華選擇他的子民,我們不能違背他的意旨。

Isn’t it revealed therein that it is far better to betray him occasionally than to “ be-thrate’ ( l’etre-hair) him, the former being what the Jews obviously did not deprive themselves of doing. They couldn’t work it out (en sortir) any other way.

這裡難道不是透露出,有時候違背一下上帝,比一味地盲目服從好?因為違背上帝去痛恨是猶太人顯而易見的所做所為。他們不這樣痛恨,就無法解決問題。

On the subject of hatred, we’re so deadened that no one realizes that a hatred, a solid hatred, is addressed to being, to the very being of someone who is not necessarily God.

談到痛恨這個議題,我們已經是如此的麻木不仁,以致以沒有人體認到,每一個痛恨,每一個具體的痛恨,目標是朝著生命的主體存在,朝著活生生的某個人,而對方未必就是上帝

We remain stuck—and that is why I said that a is a semblance of being—at the level—and it is in that respect that analysis, as always, is a little bit lame—of the notion of jealous hatred, the hatred that springs forth from “ jealoussance,” the hatred that ‘ sprimages forth” from a third party. He observes the little guy and, pallidus, the latter pales in observing the conlactaneum suum hanging on the nipple. Fortunately, this ( jealousissance) is the first substitute jouissance, according to Freud—the desire evoked on the basis of a metonymy that is inscribed on the basis of a presumed demand, addressed to the Other, that is, on the basis of the kernel of what I called Ding, in my seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, namely, the Freudian Thing, in other words, the very neighbor ( prochain) Freud refuses to love beyond certain limits.

在那個層次上,我們始終進退維谷,那是為什麼我會說,小客體只是主體存在的酷似冒充。在談論到妒嫉之恨那一方面,精神分析學如往常一樣,總是有一點力不從心,因為妒嫉之恨起源於「妒嫉的歡爽」。聖奧古斯丁曾經觀察到,卑微小人物的眼神凝視會煥發出那種「妒嫉的歡爽」。奧古斯丁在那裡是充當一位旁觀者。他觀察到,卑微小人物妒慕交加地凝視懸垂在女性乳房上的罩飾。依照佛洛伊德的說法,幸好,這種「痛恨的歡爽」只是最初的替代的歡爽,根據假定的需求的換喻的基礎,所召喚出來的慾望,目標是朝著大他者,換句話說,基礎是我的講座「精神分析學的倫理學」所說的「真實界」的存在核心。也就是佛洛伊德所說的「真實生命」,更貼切些,就是佛洛伊德超過某個限度,無法像愛自己一般去愛的「鄰居」。

The child who is gazed at has it—he has the a. Is having the a the same as being it? That is the question with which I will leave you today.

被凝視的小孩擁有這樣的「妒嫉的歡爽」,因為他擁有小客體。擁有小客體跟成為小客體是相同的一件事嗎?那個問題,我今天暫且讓你們自己去思索。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springhsiung@gmail.com

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