Knowledge and truth

Knowledge and Truth
知識與真理
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡

I would really like it if, from time to time, I had a response, even a protest.

有時,我真希望有人對我回應,即使是抗議都好。

I left rather worried the last time, to say the least. It seemed altogether bearable to me, nevertheless, when I reread what I had said—that’s my way of saying that it was very good. But I wouldn’t be displeased if someone could attest to having understood something. It would be enough for a hand to go up for me to give that hand the floor, so to speak.

上一次我離開時,心理忐忑不安,容我含蓄地說。我覺得我講得太過火爆,可是當我重新閱讀我講的內容,我又覺得句句出之肺腑,沒有什麼不好。即使有人認為我是胡說八道,我也不會有什麼不高興。換句話說,假如有人舉手發言,要求我立即中止胡說。

I see that no one is putting a hand up, and thus I must go on.

我看到,現在並沒有人舉手,那我就繼續講下去。
1
What I will willingly write for you today as “ hainamoration” is the depth ( relief) psychoanalysis was able to situate the zone of its experience. It was evidence of good will on its part. If only it had been able to call it by some other name than the bastardized one of “ ambivalence,” perhaps it would have succeeded better in shaking up the historical setting in which it inserted itself. But perhaps that was modesty on its part.

.今天,我很樂意為你演講的內容是「愛恨情結」,這是精神分析學在經驗的領域所能夠探勘到的縱深位置。這是它的善意。即使它想不出其它更好的名稱,而套用一般的陳腔濫調為「愛恨交加」,它仍然成功地動搖到,精神分析學能夠成為一門科學的真理的歷史背景。但是,將它定位為一門學科,可能是小覷了它的功能。

I mentioned last time that it’s no accident Freud arms himself with Empedocles’ statement that God must be the most ignorant of all beings, since he does not know hatred. The question of love is thus linked to that of knowledge. I added that Christians transformed God’s non-hatred into a mark of love. It is here that analysis reminds us that one knows nothing of love without hate. Well, if the knowledge ( connaissance)that has been fomented over the course of the centuries disappoints us, and if today we must overhaul the function of knowledge, it is perhaps because hatred has never been put in its proper place.

我上一次提到,佛洛伊德不是無緣無故,才引述恩比特克拉斯的陳述:宇宙萬物,上帝最為純樸無知,因為他不懂得什麼叫恨。愛的問題因此跟認知的問題息息相關。我補充說,基督徒將上帝的無所怨恨,轉變成為博愛眾生。但是,過去幾個世紀來,這個認知的宣導變成只是陳腔濫調,真是令人大失所望。今天,假如我們必須對這個認知的功能大加整修,那可能是因為恨的位置沒有被適當地擺好。

True, that doesn’t seem to be the most desirable thing to mention. That’s why I ended last time with the sentence, “ One could say that the more a man believes a woman confuse him with God, in other words, what she enjoys,” recalls the schema I presented last time, “ the less he hates,” and simultaneously, “ the less he loves.” I wasn’t too happy about having ended on that note, which is nevertheless a truth. That is why today I will examine once more in what respect the true and the real apparently get confused.

的確,我們似乎很不願意提起這樣的事情。那就是為什麼上一次結束時,我會說出這樣的句子:「我們能夠說,男人越是相信女人將他跟上帝混淆,換句話說,跟她心目中的仰慕混淆,」請回想一下我上一次提出論述,「他就恨得越少,」同時,「他也愛得越少。」以那樣悲觀的語調作為終結,我自己並不太樂意,可是那是一句真實的論述。那就是為什麼我今天要再一次審察一下,我將真理的論述跟真實界在哪些方面混為一談。

“ The true aims at the real”—that statement is the fruit of a long reduction of pretensions to truth. Wherever truth presents itself, assers itself as if it were an ideal that could be based on speech, it is not so easily attained. If analysis rests on a presumption, it is that knowledge about truth can be constituted on the basis of its experience.

「真理的論述的目標是真實界。」那句陳述是真理長期被冒充偽裝的結果。無論真理在哪裡展現自己,宣稱自己宛如是一個能夠以言語為基礎的理想,實際上,真理並沒有那麼容易獲得。假如精神分析學要以真理作為前提,那是它對於真理的認知,是以它實際的經驗所構成。

In the little writing ( gramme) I gave you of analytic discourse, a is written in the upper left-hand corner, and is supported by S2, in other words, by knowledge insofar as it is in the place of truth. It is from that point that it interrogates $, which must lead to the production of S1, that is, of the signifier by which can be resolved what ? It s relation to truth

我用底下的小公式,來為你們說明精神分析學的論述。小客體a被放置左上方,底下支撐它的是第二主體S2,換句話說,在真實界認知的主體。這個主體從那個位置質疑右上方被禁制的主體 $。這個被禁制的主體會導致右下方的第一主體S1的產生,換句話說,藉由意符而產生什麼,產生它跟真理的關係。

Truth, let us say, to go right to the quick, is originally δληθεια, a term about which Heidegger speculated extensively. Emet, the Hebrew term, is, like every term for truth, of juridical origin. Even in our times, a witness is asked to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, and, what’s more, the whole truth, if he can—but how, alas, could he? We demand of him the whole truth about what he knows. But, in fact, what is sought—especially in legal testimony—is that on the basis of which one can judge his jouissance. The goal is that jouissance be avowed, precisely insofar as it may be unavowable. The truth sought is the one that is unavowable with respect with respect to the law that regulates jouissance.

容我們直截了當地說,真理就是原先的「實存」,關於這個術語,哲學家海德格曾經上窮碧落下黃泉般地探索。猶如希伯來文的Emet,這個術語道地是真理的術語,是公平正義的起源。即使在我們的時代,法庭上的證人被要求說真實的話,僅僅就是真實的話。而且是盡可能是全部的實話。問題是他怎麼可能呢?我們要求他說出全部他所知道的真實的話,但是事實上,我們所尋求到的,特別是在法庭的證詞,只是判斷證人是否憑良心的歡爽說出真相。問題是,即使對著聖經公開宣稱,那種公開宣稱也不見得就是憑著良心的歡爽。我們所要尋求的真相,往往是無法公開宣稱出來,因為良心的歡爽隸屬於法律的規範,必然會有隱瞞。

It is also in that sense that, in Kant’s terms, the problem is raised of what a free man should do when one proposes to him all the jouissance if he denounces the enemy who the tyrant fears is disputing his jouissance. From the imperative that nothing pathetic should dicate testimony, must we deduce that a free man ought to tell the tyrant the truth, even if that means delivering the enemy or rival into the tyrant’s hands by his truthfulness? The reservations sparked in all of us by Kant’s answer, which is affirmative, stem from the fact that the whole truth is what cannot be told. It is what can only be told on the condition that one doesn’t push it to the edges, that one only half-tells ( mi-dire) it.

用康德的術語來說,那種困境牽涉到一個難題:當一位自由人被要求發乎良心的歡爽時,他應該做何選擇?假如他正在指控的敵人,是暴君最為畏懼,卻正在爭辯說他要發乎良心的歡爽作證詞。由於法律要求作證詞時,要據實以告,不受私情干擾,我們一定會推論出,一位自由人應該對暴君說實話,即使那意味著,說實話會將敵人或對方送進暴君的虎口。康德的回答是肯定的,但我們大家內心都難免還是有所保留,這起源於這個事實:全部的真相就是不能夠據實以告。說出的部份是無關緊要,就是不要引起大禍。我們只好似真似假地說。

Yet another thing restrains ( ligote) us regarding the status of truth: the fact that jouissance is a limit. This is related to the very structure that was evoked by my “ quadripodes” at the time at which I constructed them for you—jouissance is questioned , evoked, tracked, and elaborated only on the basis of a semblance.

可是,關於真理的地位,還有一件事約束著我們。那就是,良心的歡爽有一個限制。容我用「四個階段」的結構來加以說明:良心的歡爽是真理的冒充偽裝,中間要經歷質疑、召喚、追蹤、裝扮等四個階段。

Love itself, as I stressed last time, is addressed to the semblance. And if it is true that the Other is only reached if it attaches itself, as I said last time, to a, the cause of desire, then love is also addressed to the semblance of being. That there-being is not nothing. It is attributed to that object that is a.

如我上一次強調的,愛的本身面臨的對象是冒充偽裝。如我上次所說,如果大它者要先連接到小客體,這個欲望的原因,我們才能夠接近它,那麼愛所面臨的對象,也是主體存在的冒充偽裝。那個冒充偽裝的存在並不是空無,它可追根究底到那個小客體。

Shouldn’t we find anew here the trace that, insofar as such, it (cor)responds to some imaginary? I have expressly designated that imaginary as I ( lI), insolated here from the term “ imaginary.” It is only on the basis of the clothing of the self-image that envelops the object cause of desire that the object relationship is most often sustained—that is the very articulation of analysis.

我們在此難道不應該重新找到那個對應或回應於想像界的小客體的蹤跡?我曾經簡明地指出,作為自我主體的「想像界」,跟一般「想像」的術語,是兩碼子事。只有根據小客體作為欲望的原因,來裝扮自我的表面形象,我們才能夠維持這樣的客體關係。這是精神分析學清楚表明的。

The affinity of a to its envelope is one of the major conjunctions put forward by psychoanalysis. To me it essentially introduces a point about which we must be suspicious.

小客體跟它的表面的自我形象的密切關係,是精神分析學所提出的幾個重要的聯合之一。對於我而言,這個關係基本上會產生一個可疑之點,我們必須要注意到。

This is where the real distinguishes itself. The real can only be inscribed on the basis of an impasse of formalization. That is why I thought I should provide a model of it using mathematical formalization, inasmuch as it is the most advanced elaboration we have by which to produce signifierness. The mathematical formalization of signifierness runs counter to meaning—I almost said “ a contre-sens.” In our times, philosophers of mathematics say “ it means nothing” concerning mathematics, even when they are mathematicians themselves, like Russell.

那就是真實界顯現出來的地方。真實界只有在形式化的公式形成僵局時,它的銘記才會顯現出來。那就是為什麼我應該用數學的形式化公式,提供一個真實界的模式,這是我們用來產生意符意義的最先進的建構方法。意符的數學的形式化公式,跟意義相對並存,容我誇張地說,有時是「矛盾並存」。在我們的時代,數學的哲學家,甚至他們本身也是數學家,如羅素,談到數學時說到:「數學別無意義」。

And yet, compared to a philosophy that culminates in Hegel’s discourse—a plentitude of contrasts dialectized in the idea of an historical progression, which, it must be said, nothing substantiates for us—can’t the formalization of mathematical logic, which is based only on writing, serve us in the analytic process, in that what invisibly holds bodies is designated therein?

可是,跟在黑格爾的真理論述登峰造極時的哲學比較起來,數學邏輯的形式化公式,無數的符號演算,難道不是可以用來詮釋精神分析經驗的過程?正如黑格爾的正反合的歷史辯證法的進展,演算了一大堆的對比符號,雖然沒有幾樣可以讓我們在現實中驗證的,但是具體的事物背後的隱形力量,難道不是隱隱約約地顯現嗎?

If I were allowed to give an image for this, I would easily take that which, in nature, seems to most closely approximate the reduction to the dimensions of the surface writing requires, at which Spinoza himself marveled—the textual work that comes out of the spider’s belly, its web. It is a truly miraculous function to see, on the very surface emerging from an opaque point of this strange beings, the trace of these writings taking form, in which one can grasp the limits, impasses, and dead ends that show the real acceding to the symbolic.

容許我以一個意象具體說明:數學公式化的寫作要求一個表面的向度,似乎最酷似這個表面的向度的情境,就是本文的作品像一張蜘蛛網,是從蜘蛛的肚子裡吐出來,對這個現象,哲學家史賓諾莎本人都大吃一驚。看到這些寫作的痕跡逐漸成形,像是蜘蛛這樣的奇怪動物從某一個模糊的地方,綿綿吐出一大張蜘蛛網,
這真是令人歎為觀止的功用!從這些寫作的痕跡,我們能夠理解到限制、困境、及進退兩難顯示,真實世界如何委曲求全於意符世界。

That is why I do not believe that it was in vain that I eventually came up with the inscriptions a, the $ o the signifier, A, and ψ. Their very writing constitutes a medium that goes beyond speech, without going beyond language’s actual effects. Its value lies in centering the symbolic, on the condition of knowing how to use it, for what? To retain a congruous truth—not the truth that claims to be whole, but that of the half-telling, the truth that is borne out by guarding against going as far as a vowal, which would be the worst, the truth that becomes guarded starting right with the cause of desire.

這就是為什麼我不相信,我是白費力氣,當我最後終於想出這一些符號銘記,諸如小客體a,意符世界被禁制的主體$,大它者A,及被閹割的陽具Φ。它們的寫作形成一種媒介,超越言語的限制,卻還是保持在語言的實際的效果之內。它們的價值在於意符符號專注於如何使用的情況。為了什麼呢?為了要保持一個和諧的真理,不是宣稱是整體的真理,而是半真半假的真理。這個真理的驗證,在於它小心警覺提防不要公開承認。那是最糟糕的情況,真理直接從欲望的原因開始,就必須要小心警覺提防。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com
a

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