拉岡講座254

拉岡講座254

20
IN YOU MORE THAN YOU
不僅是你的肉身

I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you—
我愛你,但是微妙的是 我愛的不僅是你的肉身

It now remains for me to conclude, for this year, the series of seminars that I was forced to hold here owing to certain circumstances that have introduced into the course of my teaching something which, after all, is accounted for by one of the fundamental notions that I have been examining here—that of
dustuchia, misfortune.

現在我剩下要做的是,替今年這一系列的講座做個總結。由於某種因緣,我不得不在此舉行這一系列講座,介紹我的教學課程。這個處境正是印證了我一直在探討的基本主題:身不逢時。

So I had to postpone dealing with a subject that I was preparing to embark on with those who were following my course on the Names-of-the-father, and to return here, before a rather different audience, to the question that has been at issue from the outset of the teaching, my teaching, namely, what is the order of the truth that our praixis engenders?

所以我必須對那些已經聽過我的「以父之名」課程的人,延遲我準備要開講的主題,因為現在聽眾不同,我先回到自從我開講以來,一直受到爭議的問題,換言之,「人作為本體,產生的真理,定位在哪裡?」

What makes us certain of our practice is something whose basic concepts I think I have outlined for you here, under the four headings of the unconscious, repetition, the transference and the drive—a sketch of which, as you have seen, I was led to Include in my exploration of the transference.

我們對於精神分析深具信心,一些基本的概念,我在此已經為你們揭曉,分成四個標題:無意識、重復、移情、及驅力。如你們所看到,我不得不將它們的描述涵蓋在我對於移情的探討。

Has that which our praxis engenders the right to map out for itself necessities, even contradictory ones, from the standpoint of truth? This question may be transposed in the esoteric formula: how can we be sure that we are not imposters?

人作為主體所產生的東西,有權利從真理的觀點,替自己定位為必要條件,甚至是彼此矛盾的必要條件嗎?這個問題可以換一個奧妙的公式來調適:我們如何能確定我們不是騙子?

I
It would not be too much to say that, in the putting in question of analysis, in so far as it is always in suspense, not only in the popular mind, but still more in the most private feelings of each psycho-analyst, imposture looms overhead—as a contained, excluded, ambiguous presence against which the psychoanalyst barricades himself with a number of ceremonies, forms and rituals.

我不是危言聳聽,不僅是一般人,而且每一位精神分析師私底下的感覺, 都對精神分析有所質疑,總是持保留態度。騙子的形象隱約在望,像是自以為是,枉顧事實的可疑人物。精神分析用一大堆儀式、規矩、及架式,替自己裝模作樣。

If I am stressing the term imposture in my talk today, it is because it is certainly the first step by which one might approach the relation of psycho-analysis with religion and, through this, with science.

假如我今天在我的談話中,強調騙子這個術語,那是因為那確實是第一步,我們可能能到達精神分析學跟宗教的關係,然後透過這層關係,到達跟科學的關係。

I would draw your attention here to a formula that had considerable historical value in the eighteenth century, when enlightenment man, who was also the man of pleasure, put in question religion as a fundamental imposture. I do not need to point out to you the road we have travelled since then. Who,
nowadays, would dream of reducing the concerns of religion to such simplistic terms? It can be said that, throughout the world, and even where the struggle against it may be at its sharpest, religion nowadays enjoys universal respect.

我在此吸引你們注意一個被被認為是具有歷史價質的十八世紀的慣例。當時,開明人士也是懂得尋求歡樂的人士,質疑宗教是一種根本的欺騙。從那時起,我們知識進展的歷程,就無庸我再一一枚舉了。今天,還有誰會將對於宗教的關懷,化約到如此簡單的術語?我們能夠說,在全世界,即使在宗教被排斥得最激烈的地方,宗教今天還是到處受到尊敬。

This question also involves that of belief, which is presented by us in terms that are no doubt less simplistic. We have the practice of the fundamental alienation in which all belief is sustained, in that double subjective term by which, at the very moment when the signification of belief seems most profoundly to vanish, the being of the subject is revealed from what was strictly speaking the reality of that belief. It is not enough to overcome superstition, as one says, for its effects in the human being to be attenuated.

這個問題牽涉到信仰的問題,只是無可置疑的,我們用比較複雜的術語來呈現。我們維持所有的信仰的做法,基本上是疏離的雙重主體的術語,也就是在信仰的意義似乎蕩然無存的時刻,主體的存在才從嚴謹來說,是信仰的真實中顯現出來。如俗話說,為了減弱迷信對於人的影響,光是消除迷信還不夠。

It is certainly this that makes it difficult for us to recognize what, in the sixteenth century, could have been the status of what was, strictly speaking, disbelief. In this sphere, we know that we are, in our time, incomparably and paradoxically disarmed. Our bulwark, the only one we have, and the religious
have felt this in a quite admirable way, is, as Lamennais remarked on the subject of religion, that indifference that takes as its status precisely the position of science.

確實就是因為這樣,我們很難去認出,在十六世紀,嚴謹來說,沒有信仰的狀況本來會是什麼樣子。就沒有信仰而言,我們知道在我們的時代,我們喪失信仰的程度,已經是無可倫比,而且矛盾重重。我們僅有一個自圓其說的堡壘,這一點,宗教界感受得特別刻骨銘心。如拉眠納思論宗教時所說的:科學的立場讓我們振振有詞,拒絕迷信。

It is in as much as science elides, eludes, divides up a field determined in the dialectic of the alienation of the subject, it is in as much as science is situated at the precise point that I have defined as the point of separation, that it may also sustain the mode of existence of the scientist, of the man of science. This
man of science could be approached in his style, his morals, his mode of discourse, in the way in which, through a series of precautions, he protects himself from a number of questions concerning the very status of the science of which he is the servant. This is one of the most important problems from the
social point of view—less important, however, than that of the status to be given to the corpus of acquired scientific knowledge.

主體的疏離的辯證法運作的領域,受到科學的刪除、閃躲、及分裂。科學的位置,確實就是我曾定義的分開點,這樣,科學家及科學人士存在的地位才能屹立不搖。這種科學人士有自己一套風格、規範、及論述的模式。憑藉一系列的嚴謹慎重,他們保護自己免於受到質疑,他們作為科學奴僕的地位。從社會的觀點,這形成一個最重要的問題之一,僅次於我們學習而來的知識應置於何等地位的問題。

We will not appreciate the full implication of this corpus of science if we do not recognize that it is, in the subjective relation, the equivalent of what I have called here the objet petit a. The ambiguity that persists in the question as to what in psycho-analysis is or is not reducible to science can be explained
if we realize to what extent analysis implies, in effect, a beyond of science—in the modern sense of Science itself, whose status in the Cartesian departure I have tried to demonstrate. If measured against science understood in this sense, psycho-analysis might be reduced to the rank of something with whose forms and history it so often suggests an analogy—namely, a church and, therefore, a religion.

假如我們沒有認出,在主體的關係上,我在此所稱為的小客體的相等物,我們就無法欣賞這個科學綜合體的完整的意涵。假如我們體會到,精神分析學實際上超越了科學的範疇到什麼程度,我們才能夠解釋,精神分析學是否是一門科學的問題,為何會那樣模稜兩可。我曾經設法證明,現代科學的意涵,在笛卡爾那裡,就己經偏離。假如以這層意涵的科學來衡量,精神分析學,在形態上及歷史上,差可比擬的地位是教堂。因此,精神分析學淪於宗教的地位。

The only way to approach this problem is on the basis of the following—that, among the modes at man’s disposal for posing the question of his existence in the world, and beyond, religion, as a mode of subsistence of the subject who interrogates himself; is to be distinguished by a dimension that is proper to it, and which is struck by a kind of oblivion. In every religion that deserves the name, there is in fact an essential dimension reserved for something operational, known as a sacrament.

解決這個問題的唯一方法,是根據以下的基礎:人類提出自己存在於世界的問題的可用模式,跟宗教是主體質疑自身的生存模式,區別的分法要根據世界本身的特色,因為這個特色日久就被人習而不察。在聲名顯著的各個宗教,事實上都保留一種基本的特色,那就是眾所周知的功用性的聖典。

Ask the faithful, or even the priests, what differentiates confirmation from baptism—for, indeed, if it is a sacrament, if it operates, it operates on something. Where it washes away sins, where it renews a certain pact—I would put a question-mark here— Is it a pact? Is it something else? What passes through this dimension ?—in all the answers we get, we will always find this mark, by which is invoked the beyond of religion, operational and magical. We cannot evoke this operational dimension
without realizing that within religion, and for strictly defined reasons—the separation and impotence of our reason, our finitude —it is this that is marked with oblivion.

問問那些信徒,或那些牧師,堅信禮與洗禮都是一種聖典,都根據信仰來運作,那它們的差別在哪裡?就洗刷我們的原罪,及更新跟上帝的契約而言,我在此提出一個問號:那是一個契約嗎?或那是某件其它的東西?這些儀式所顯現的是什麼?在我們所得到的答案,我們總是發現這個問號:宗教的超越都召喚既是功用性,又是魔術般的神秘存在。每當我們召喚這功用性的神秘存在時,我們就會體會到,在宗教裡面,為了振振有詞的理由,理性被隔開,而且無能為力。就是這一點,我們習而不察。

It is in as much as psycho-analysis, in relation to the foundation of its status, finds itself in some way struck by a similar oblivion, that it manages to rediscover itself marked, in ceremony, with what I will call the same empty face.

就自身的地位的關係而言,精神分析學發現自己在某方面,也同樣遭遇到這樣的習而不察。它在儀式中,設法重新發現自己成為我所說裝模作樣的虛有其表。

But psycho-analysis is not a religion. It proceeds from the same status as Science itself It is engaged in the central lack in which the subject experiences himself as desire. It even has a medial, chance status, in the gap opened up at the centre of the dialectic of the subject and the Other. It has nothing to forget, for it implies no recognition of any substance on which it claims to operate, even that of sexuality.

但是精神分析學不是宗教。它從科學本身一樣的地位發展。它從事於中心立場的欠缺,因為在欠缺中主體經驗到自己作為欲望。它甚至擁有中間的際遇的地位,處於主體與大它者的辯證的中心,所展開的分裂。它沒有什麼可遺忘,因為它並沒有要承認任何它宣稱要運作的物質,甚至是性的物質。

On sexuality, in fact, it operates very little. It teaches us nothing new about the operation of sex. Not even a tiny piece of erotological technique has emerged from it, and there is more of this kind of thing to be found in any of the books that are constantly being reprinted, and which come to us from the
depths of an Arab, Hindu, or Chinese tradition, even sometimes from our own. Psycho-analysis touches on sexuality only in as much as, in the form of the drive, it manifests itself in the defile of the signifier, in which is constituted the dialectic of the subject in the double stage of alienation and separation.
Analysis has not kept, on the field of sexuality, what one might, mistakenly, have expected of it by way of promises—it has not kept such promises because it does not have to keep them. This is not its terrain.

事實上,精神分析學罕見以性的物質運作。關於性的運作,它並沒有教導任何新的東西。甚至連一點兒性愛的技巧都沒有。而從阿拉伯、印度、或中國傳統,甚至我們自己的傳統,不斷出版的書籍中,卻可以找到越來越多的性愛寶鑑。精神分析學只有以欲望驅力的形式,談論到性。性在意符的褻瀆中彰顯自己,因為主體的辯證法在那裡組成,分成疏離與分開兩個階段。在性的領域,精神分析學並沒有承諾,或實踐大眾錯誤的期許。他沒有實踐這樣的承諾,因為它不需要做這樣的承諾。性並不是它的領域。

On the other hand, in its own terrain, it is distinguished by such an extraordinary capacity for inconsequence and confusion that, sometime in the not too distant future, its entire literature will, I assure you, be classified among the works of what are known as the bus littéraires.

在另一方面,在它自己的領域,精神分析學的特色,是它擁有特別的能力來處理矛盾及混亂。我可以預測,在不久的將來,精神分析學的全部研究,將會被歸類為眾所周知「異端邪說」。

Certainly, one cannot but be struck by the extent to which an analyst may err in the correct interpretation of the very facts he advances—and recently I was struck once again on reading a book like Basic Neurosis, a book that is nevertheless so winning in the smart way it gathers together a number of very different observations that can certainly be borne out in practice. The particular fact that Bergler contributes concerning the function of the breast is truly wasted in a pointless discussion, of a rather fashionable kind, concerning the superiority of man over woman, and of woman over man, that is to say, concerning things which, by arousing the greatest possible emotion, are also, as far as the main question is concerned, what is of least interest.

的確,對於精神分析師解釋自己提供的事實,牽強附會可能犯錯的程度,我們不免大吃一驚。最近,我閱讀一本「精神官能症入門」,再次大吃一驚。可是,這本書文筆生動,還真引人入勝。它收集了許多確實可以在診療時驗證的不同的觀察。作者波格勒提供這個特別的事實,有關乳房的功用,實在是無稽之談,關於男人與女人,孰優孰劣的論調,也是追隨時髦流行,換言之,關於那些問題本身乏善可陳的事情,他故作危言聳聽。

Today, I must stress what, in the psycho-analytic movement, is to be referred to the function of what I isolate as the objet a —and it is not for nothing that I referred here to Bergler’s book, which, because it lacks an adequate mapping of the proper function of the part-object, and of what is signified, for example, by the breast, which he deals with at length, is doomed although interesting in itself, to an aimless development that leads nowhere.

今天,我必須強調,在精神分析的運動,我突顯出來的小客體的功用。我在此提到波格勒的書,不是沒有用意的。因為對於這個部份客體的適當功用,他沒有充份的發揮,對於他詳細描繪的成為意符的東西,例如,乳房,雖然本身生動有趣,卻是天馬行空,漫無邊際。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

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