拉岡講座243

  • 拉岡講座243

‘7
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者:失蹤

The question of the Vorstellungsreprasentanz
自由符號的問題

Freedom, Representation, and the Hegelian lure
自由、符號、與黑格爾的陷阱

When I said, at the beginning of these talks— I do not seek, I find, I meant that, in Freud’s field, one has only to bend down and pick up what is to be found. The real implication of the nachtrdglich, for example, has been ignored, though it was there all the time and had only to be picked up. I also remember the surprise of someone who was on the same track as I, seeing one day what could be done with the einziger Zug, the single stroke.

在我這些演講的開始,我說「我並沒有尋求,我只是找到」,我的意思是,在佛洛伊德的學說,我們只需要彎下身,檢拾起我們所必須要找到的東西。例如,「自由」的真正意涵一直受到忽視,僅管它始終是在那裡,我們只需要將它檢拾起來。我也記得有某個人大吃一驚,因為他研究的途徑跟我一樣,有一天他看到,只要敢放手一搏,就會豁然開朗。

Today I would like to show you the importance, already designated by my schema last time, of what Freud calls, at the level of repression, the Vorstellungsreprasentanz.

今天,我想要給你們觀看,佛洛伊德所謂的the Vorstellungsreprasentanz.「表象代表」,在表壓抑的層次,有多麼重要,雖然在上一次,我已經用我的構圖指明過。

Vorstellung involves a sort of defect that leads the German language to put unwarranted ss, which cannot be attached to the normal declension of the determinate, but which are necessary to it when forming composite words. There are therefore two terms— Vorstellung, Representan.

Vorstellung表象,牽涉到某種的缺點,導致德文的語言,沒來由地將Vorstellungs-reprasentanz 表象代表這個複合字,前後兩個字,各有複數的s跟z,這並非是的限定詞的語尾變化的正式用法。可是組成複合字時,卻又無法避免。因此,這裡有兩個術語:表象與代表。

I spoke to you last time about the form of alienation, which I illustrated with several examples, and which I told you could be articulated in a vel of a very special nature. Today we might try to articulate it in some other ways. For example—not something. . . without something else. The dialectic of the slave is obviously no freedom without life, but there will be no life for him without freedom. From one to the other there is a necessary condition. This necessary condition becomes precisely the adequate reason that causes the loss of the original requirement.

我上一次跟你們談到疏離的形式。我用好幾個例子說明,我也告訴你們,我們能夠用一種特別性質的欲望驅力,來表達疏離。今天,我們將用一些其它的方式來表達它。例如,沒有某件東西,就沒有某件其它的東西。奴隸的辯證法邏輯,顯而易見是「要先有生命,才會有自由」,但結果是「沒有自由,生命形同死亡」。從前者到後者,有一個必要的條件。這個必要的條件,確實成為充份的理由,造成原先的要求的喪失。

Perhaps this is something like what also happens among some of my followers. There is no way of following me without passing through my signifiers, but to pass through my signifiers involves this feeling of alienation that incites them to seek, according to Freud’s formula the small difference.

也許,這正是我的某些聽眾也經常發生的事情。假如沒有透過我的意符,他們沒有辦法來了解我的學說,但是要透過我的意符,會牽涉到一種疏離的感覺,因為根據佛洛伊德的模式,這種疏離的感覺會激發他們去尋找這個小小的差異。

Unfortunately, this small difference makes them lose the full significance of the direction I pointed out to them. Heavens, I am not so touchy, I leave everyone to go his own way in the direction that I point out —but I could have done without having to take note of what seemed to a particular individual so worthy of rectification in the translation that I had first given of this Vorstellungsrepr&entanz. I had noted that Freud stresses the fact that repression bears on something that is of the order of representation that he calls the Vorstellungsreprdsentanz.

不幸地,這個小小的差異,使我對他們所標示出來的追尋途徑的意義,全部蕩然無存。我的天呀,我並不是多愁善感,我讓每個人根據我指出的方向各自努力,但是我本來大可自行其是,而不需要去注意,哪一位值得我去糾正他的誤解,我將Vorstellungsrepr&entanz. 「表象代表」這個德文字的翻譯。

As soon as I introduced this remark several years ago— which was also a way of reading what Freud writes under the heading of Verdrängung, the article that follows the one on the unconscious in the series of texts collected together under the term metapsychological—I insisted on the fact that Freud emphasizes that it is not the affect that is repressed. The affect —and we shall see what this means in our theory—goes off somewhere else, as best it can. There will always be enough professors of psychology to justify with the patient that its meaning is to be found precisely where it is no longer in its place. So I insisted on the fact that what is repressed is not the represented of desire, the signification, but the representative (it représentant) —I translated literally—of the representation (de la representation).

好幾年前,我剛介紹這個論述時,我堅持說,佛洛伊德強調,被壓抑的並不是情意。佛洛伊德當時寫的標題是Verdrängun,這一篇文章放在「形上心理學」標題的文集裡,緊跟在「論無意識」那一篇之後。情意會盡其可能,在某個地方迸發。讓我們看看在我們的理論裡,這意味著什麼?不乏眾多的心理學教授跟他們的病人證實:情意的意義,要在它不復存在的地方,才能夠被找到。所以,我堅持說,所被壓抑的東西,並不是欲望的符號所代表的意義,而是符號的代表物,容我照字面翻譯。

Here the function of alienation intervenes for this or that individual, who, more or less animated by a care for the privileges of university authority, and anxious to enter the lists, claims to correct the translation that I have given. The Vorstellungsreprosentanz is the representative representative (le reprCsentant reprIsentatif), let us say.

在此,對於這位或那位先生,疏離發揮了功用。他們相當關心到大學當局的特權,渴望慎重其事,宣稱要糾正我對於這字詞的翻譯。「表象代表」就是「符號的代表物」,容我們這樣說。

This doesn’t seem to amount to very much. But in a little book on psycho-somatics that has just appeared, one finds a whole passage arguing that there is some misunderstanding in something that must be called my theory of desire and, in a small note referring to some inaccessible passage taken from the text offered by two of my pupils, it is stressed that, following me, they make desire the representative representative of need.

這似乎無關緊要。但是在一本剛出版的論心理與生理的小書,有人發現有一整個篇章都在辯駁,我的欲望理論,有誤導的地方。並且在注釋裡,還引用我的兩位學生所提供的文本,再斷章取義地強調說,我的學生追隨我之後,將欲望解釋著需求的代表符號。

I’m not questioning whether in fact my pupils wrote that—we have been unable to find the passage in question—the important thing is that the only pertinent remark in this extremely slight book is as follows—we would say rather that desire is the nonrepresentative representative.

我不是在質疑,事實上是否我的學生所寫的東西,因為我無法找到他們所引述的那個段落。重要的是,在這本無關緊要的書裡,唯一中肯的說法應該如下:我們應該說,欲望是無法代表的代表符號。

Now, that is precisely what I mean, and say—for what I mean, I say—in translating Vorstellungsrepro.sentanc by representative of the representation.

現在,這確實是我的意思。我的意思是要將Vorstellungsrepro.sentanc「表象代表」 翻譯為「符號的代表物」

We can locate this Vorstellungsrepresentanz in our schema of the original mechanisms of alienation in that first signifying coupling that enables us to conceive that the subject appears first in the Other, in so far as the first signifier, the unary signifier, emerges in the field of the Other and represents the
subject for another signifier, which other signifier has as its effect the aphanisis of the subject. Hence the division of the subject—when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading’, as disappearance. There is, then, one might say, a matter of life and death between the unary signifier and the subject, qua binary signifier, cause of his disappearance. The Vorstellungsreprtisentanz is the binary signifier.

我們能夠「自由符號」的位置,放在我們原先疏離的機械結構的基模。那個第一個意符的組合,使我們能夠構想,主體首先出現在那個大它者的意符鎖鏈。在大它者的領域,第一個意符出現,代表主體對於另外一個意符。這另外一個意符,擁有主體的失蹤作為自己的影響。因此,主體形成分裂,當主體作為意義,出現在某個地方,他在別的地方,被證明是「隱退」,是消失。我們因此可以說,最初的意符跟主體之間,有一個生死交關的問題,那就是,作為最初的意符,主體造成自己的消失。「表象代表」就是最初的意符。

This signifier constitutes the central point of the Urverdrangung— of what, from having passed into the unconscious, will be, as Freud indicates in his theory, the point of Anziehung, the point of attraction, through which all the other repressions will be possible, all the other similar passages in the locus of the Unterdruckt, of what has passed underneath as signifier. This is what is involved in the term Vorstellungsreprdcentanz.

這個自由意符進入無意識的領域時,處於吸引力的中央位置,如佛洛伊德在其學說所主張。透過這個吸引力的中央位置,所有的其他壓抑,所有通過這個軌跡底下的類似意符,才成為可能。這就是「表象代表」牽涉到的運作。

That by which the subject finds the return way of the vet of alienation is the operation I called, the other day, separation. By separation, the subject finds, one might say, the weak point of the primal dyad of the signifying articulation, in so far as it is alienating in essence. It is in the interval between these two signifiers that resides the desire offered to the mapping of the subject in the experience of the discourse of the Other, of the first Other he has to deal with, let us say, by way of illustration, the mother. It is in so far as his desire is beyond or falls short of what she says, of what she hints at, of what she brings out as meaning, it is in so far as his desire is unknown, it is in this point of lack, that the desire of the subject is constituted.

主體找到疏離的驅力的歸途,就是我前天所稱為的分裂的運作。我們可以說,憑藉這個分裂,主體找到意符表達的原初架構的弱點,因為它在本質上是疏離的。在大它者的論述的經驗中,在主體必須要處理的第一個大它者的領域,例如,母親作為大它者的意符,主體展現的欲望,就駐留在這兩個意符之間的間隔。主體的欲望,常會超越,或沒有達到母親所期望,母親所暗示,以及母親所揭示的意義,因為欲望無以名狀。就在這個欠缺點的地方,主體的欲望被構成。

The subject—by a process that is not without deception, which is not without presenting that fundamental twist by which what the subject rediscovers is not that which animates his movement of rediscovery—comes back, then, to the initial point, which is that of his lack as such, of the lack of his aphanisis.

主體經歷的過程,並非沒有欺騙,並非沒有呈現那個基本的演變,只是在演變的過程,主體重新發現的東西,並不是原先激發他去重新發現的動作的動機。然後,主體又回來,到原初的地方,原先欠缺本身的地方,他失蹤的欠缺處。

We will come back in greater detail to the consequences that flow from it for the analytic treatment itself, and we shall see that this twist effect is essential in integrating the emergence phase of the transference. For the moment, I would like to dwell on what is essential in the function of desire, namely, that it is in as much as the subject plays his part in separation that the binary signifier, the Vorsellungsrepr&sentanz, is untera’rilckt, sunk underneath.

我們將再回來詳述,從精神分析治療本身所觀看到的結果。我們將看到,這個演變的影響的重要性,因為它包含移情出現的部份。目前,我想要先描述欲望的功用最重要的東西,換言之,當主體在分裂的狀況,扮演自己的角色時,這個二元的意符沉落到底下。

The thing is essential if we are to articulate properly—it immediately throws some light on very different regions—what is the sign of interpretation.

假如我們想要表達得貼切,這件事情非常重要。它讓我們明白那截然不同的地區,也就是解釋的符號的地區。

It might be useful in passing to bring out—however metaphysical it may seem, but in any case our technique often makes use, as if it were self-evident, of the expression to free something
—it might be useful to remark that it is there that the whole business of this term freedom, which certainly merits the description of phantom, is played out. What the subject has to free himself of is the aphanisic effect of the binary signifier and, if we look at it more closely, we shall see that in fact it is a question of nothing else in the function of freedom.

聽起來有點形而上地抽象,可是偶爾用它來開導啟發,還是蠻有用途。無論如何,我們精神分析的技巧,經常使用這個表達來解放一些東西,好像這是天經地義。我們也不妨這樣說:「自由」這個術語,聽起來像是天馬行空的幻影,就是在那個主體失蹤的欠缺處耀武揚威。主體必須替自己解放的東西,就是那個二元意符的失蹤的影響。如果我們觀看得更仔細,我們將會看到,事實上,那就是自由的功用,不是別的。

It is not for nothing that having had to justify the term vel of alienation at the level of our experience, the two most obvious supports to occur to us were those two choices which, by their formula, structure, firstly, the position of the slave and, secondly, the position of the master. When the slave is confronted with the choice of his freedom or his life, he decides, no freedom without life–life remains forever deprived of freedom. And, when we stand back to look at things, we will see that the alienation of the master is structured in exactly the same way. For if Hegel shows us that the status of the masters is established in the struggle to the death of pure prestige, it is because it is to bring his choice through death that the master also constitutes his fundamental alienation.

我們必須從精神分析的經驗,來證實疏離的欲望驅力這個術語,並不是沒有道理。我們得到兩個最顯而易見的支持,就是根據這套公式,我們有兩種選擇的架構,首先是奴隸的位置,其次是主人的位置。奴隸面臨「要自由?或是要生命?」的抉擇時,他決定「沒有生命,也等於沒自由」,於是他苟且偷生,始終被剝奪掉自由。可是,當我們回顧那些事情時,我們將會看到,主人的疏離所架構的方式,也確實大同小異。黑格爾告訴我們,主人的地位,自始至終被建立在維護自我的威望跟尊嚴。那是因為主人在將他的抉擇貫徹始終時,也構成了自己基本的疏離感。

Certainly, one can say that the master is no more spared by death than is his slave, that he will always die in the end, and that this is the limit of his freedom. But to say this is insufficient for this death is not the death that constitutes the alienating choice of the master, the death of the struggle to the death of
pure prestige. The revelation of the essence of the master is manifested at the moment of terror, when it is to him that one says freedom or death, and then he has obviously only death to choose in order to have freedom. The supreme image of the master is that character in Claudeian tragedy, Sygne de Confontaine, of whom I have spoken at length in one of my seminars. It is she who wished to abandon nothing of her register, the register of the master, and the values to which she sacrifices bring her, over and above her sacrifice, no more than the need to renounce, in all its depths, her very being. It is in so far as, through the sacrifice of these values, she is forced to renounce her essence, her very being, her most intimate being, that she illustrates, in the end, how much radical alienation of freedom there is in the master

的確,我們能夠說,主人跟奴隸一樣,都沒有被死亡所赦免,他最後還是難逃一死,這是他自由的極限。但是如此說法並不公道,因為這樣的死亡,跟構成主人的疏離的選擇的死亡,跟自始至終護尊嚴威望的死亡,迴然不同。在遭逢恐嚇的時刻,主人的本質顯示得最為明顯。因為是他在說「不自由,毋寧死」,然後,顯而易見地,他只有死亡可以選擇,為了要維護他的自由。主人的崇高意象,就是克勞地安悲劇小說「孔芬坦夫人」 的人物,在我以前的演講,我曾詳細描述過。這位女主角不希望放棄自己的尊嚴,作為主人的尊嚴,以及她願意犧牲一切來維護的價值,正如她不希望放棄生命最真實的存在。可是就在透過這些價值的犧牲,她被迫放棄她的本質,她生命的存在,她最親密的存在。最後,她發揮主人的自由的強烈的疏離,而成為最佳典範。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

One Response to “拉岡講座243”

  1. Says:

    Vorstellungsrepr&entanz並不是什麼自由符號
    而是佛洛伊德德文所說的「表象代表」
    Lacan在seimnar6裡面首次將這個字暴力詮釋為「signifiant」
    表象代表是指欲力在精神層次上的代表
    意即欲力代表,而欲力有兩種代表,一種是情感,另一種是表象
    當創傷的記憶表象被抑制後,情感的命運就會決定神經症的選擇
    這些都清楚地寫在Freud的「欲力及其命運」
    不同之處在於Lacan將本來是處於精神裝置的記憶痕跡
    以結構語言學的意符(signifiant)加以詮釋,
    造成了究竟意符是在無意識之前,還是無意識在意符之前的難題。

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