拉岡講座223

拉岡講座223

The I lie and the I think•
我說謊及我思故我在
2
You will see why the relation of the subject to the signifier is the reference-point that I wished to place at the forefront of a general rectification of analytic theory, for it is as primary and constitutive in the establishment of analytic experience as it is primary and constitutive in the radical function of the
unconscious.

你們將看出,為什麼主體跟意符的關係是我希望擺置在分析理論矯正的前鋒的符號點,因為那個關係是精神分析經驗建立的根基,如同它是無意識的積極運作的根基。

It is, no doubt, one of the effects of my teaching to limit the unconscious to what might be called its narrowest platform. But it is in relation to this point of division that I cannot err on the side of any substantification.

無疑地,將無意識局限於它最狹窄的平台,是我講學受到影響的不得不然。由於這個區分點,我要將無意識具體表述時,我才不會犯錯誤。

I will centre things on the four-cornered schema of my graph, which purposely distinguishes the level of the enunciation (énonciation) from the level of the statement (énoncé). Its use can be illustrated from the fact that a too formal logical thinking introduces absurdities, even an antinomy of reason in the statement I am lying, whereas everyone knows that there is no such thing.

我將主題集中於我圖形的四個角落的基型,這樣我才可以刻意區分表達的層次跟陳述的層次。它的用途可以從以下事實看出端倪:太過正式的邏輯推理會導致自相矛盾的悖論,即使在「我正在說謊」這句陳述,本身就是邏輯上自相否定的矛盾,可是大家卻習焉不察。

It is quite wrong to reply to this I am lying—If you say, I am lying, you are telling the truth, and therefore you are not lying, and so on. It is quite clear that the I am lying, despite its paradox, is perfectly valid. Indeed, the I of the enunciation is not the same as the I of the statement, that is to say, the shifter which, in the statement, designates him. So, from the point at which I state, it is quite possible for me to formulate in a valid way that the I—the I who, at that moment, formulates the
statement—is lying, that he lied a little before, that he is lying afterwards, or even, that in saying I am lying, he declares that he has the intention of deceiving. One does not have to go very far to illustrate this with an example—take the Jewish joke in which one Jew tells another that he is catching the
train for Lemberg.

「我正在說謊」這句話怎麼回答都會有矛盾。假如你說「我正在說謊」,這句話屬實,那麼你就不算是正在說謊。可是,顯而易見地,「我正在說謊話」這句話,雖然本身矛盾,卻又是千真萬確。的確,作為表達的「我」跟作為陳述的「我」,並不相同,換言之,在陳述中,「我」被轉換成為指明是「他」。所以,從我在陳述這個角度來看,我明確地說明,在當時,正在說明這句陳述的「我」,其實是在說謊。他先前說謊,他隨後又圓謊說,在說「我正在說謊」時,他宣稱他是有意說謊。這樣的情境是可能存在的。這樣的例子多到不勝枚舉。例如,有個猶太人的笑話。一位猶太人告訴另一位猶太人,他正在趕搭乘開往列伯革的火車

Why are you telling me you are going to Lemberg, the other replies, since you really are going there, and that, jf you are telling me this, it is so that I shall think that you are going to Cracow?

「你為什麼告訴我,你正在往列伯革途中?」另一位猶太人問,「假如你真的正在那裡的途中,那在我面前是誰?我們現在搭乘的是開往克拉羅的火車。」

This division between the statement and the enunciation means that, in effect, from the I am lying which is at the level of the chain of the statement—the I am lying is a signifier, forming part, in the Other, of the treasury of vocabulary in which the I, determined retroactively, becomes a signification, engendered at the level of the statement, of what it produces at the level of the enunciation—what results is an I am deceiving you. The I am deceiving you arises from the point at which the analyst awaits the subject, and sends back to him, according to the formula, his own message in its true signification, that is to say, in an inverted form. He says to him— in this I am deceiving you,
What you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are felling the truth.

陳述主體跟表達主體的區分意味著,從「我正在說謊」這句陳述的鎖鏈層次而言,「我正在說謊」是意符,在大它者那裡組成辭彙集錦的部份。在辭彙集錦裡,「我」勢必被反應成為一種符號意義,這個意義在陳述的層次被產生。而在表達層次所產生的結果,就變成一句「我正在欺騙你」。「我正在欺騙你」這句陳述之所以成立,因為精神分析師正在等待主體的時刻,將自己的訊息的真實意義,禮尚往來地回饋給他,換言之,以一種倒轉的方式。他對他說,「我正在欺騙你」這句陳述,你所要傳送的訊息,是我對你所表達的內容,當你在傳送訊息時,你正在說實話。

In the way of deception in which the subject is venturing, the analyst is in a position to formulate this you are telling the truth, and my interpretation has meaning only in this dimension.

主體正在欺騙,精神分析師回之以欺騙,他的立場能夠說「你正在欺騙我」這句話是實話。我的詮釋只有從這個角度來看,才有意義。

I would like to show you how this schema can help us in grasping Freud’s fundamental approach, which became possible with the discovery of the unconscious—which, of course, has always been there, at the time of Thales and at the level of the most primitive inter-human modes of relations.

我想要告訴你們,這個基型如何能夠幫忙我們,設法了解佛洛伊德在發現無意識之後,建立的一些基本的研究途徑。當然,自古以來,即使在原始的人際關係模式中,無意識早已經存在。

Let us bring to this schema the Cartesian I think. Certainly, the distinction between the enunciation and the statement is what makes their sliding away (glissement) always possible, and their possible stumbling block. In effect, if anything is established by the cogito, it is the register of thought, in so far as it is extracted from an opposition to extension—a fragile status, but a sufficient status in the order of the constitution.

讓我們再回到笛卡爾的「我思故我在」。的確,表達跟陳述之間的區別是彼此閃失,障礙的原因。事實上,在認知的「我」方面,可成立的部份就是思想,因為思想是從其相對的部份(也就是身體)延伸出來。這是一個脆弱的地位,但是在構成的秩序上卻能自成一方。

Let us say that it is by taking its place at the level of the enunciation that the cogito acquires its certainty. But the status of the I think is as reduced, as minimal, as punctual—and might be just as affected by the connotation of the that is meaningless— as that of the I am lying referred to earlier.

我們不妨這樣說,就是認知的我思,在表達的層次上替而代之,他才得到自己的確定性。但是這個「我思」的地位,跟我先前所提到的「我正在說謊」一樣,是抵銷,是妄自菲薄的確定,同樣受到「我說的是空話」的內涵的影響。

Perhaps the I think, reduced to this punctuality of being certain only of the absolute doubt concerning all signification, its own included, has a still more fragile status than that in which we were able to attack the I am lying.

也許這個「我思」甚至比「我正在說謊」的地位還更加脆弱,因為它淪落的地位,是確定他對於所有意義都絕對懷疑

I will now dare to define the Cartesian I think as participating, in its striving towards certainty, in a sort of abortion. The difference of status given to the subject by the discovered dimension of the Freudian unconscious derives from desire, which must be situated at the level of the cogito. Whatever animates, that which any enunciation speaks of, belongs to desire. I would remark in passing that desire, as I formulate it, in relation to what Freud contributes here, goes further.

我現在大膽地把笛卡爾的「我思故我在」定義為:一邊追求確定性,一邊又參與廢除確定性。佛洛伊德所發現的無意識國度,使主體的地位整個改觀,其根源來自欲望,位於「我思故我在」的層次。任何激發生命力的東西,任何表達所提到的東西,都屬於欲望。容我再三地說,我所闡述的,以及佛洛伊德所發現的這個欲望,影響還不僅僅是這些。

I will pinpoint the function of the Cartesian cogito by the term monster or homunculus. This function is illustrated by the curve, which has not failed to occur in the history of what is called thought, which consists in taking this I of the cogito for the homunculus who has long been represented whenever one has wished to practise psychology—whenever one has wished to account for inanity or psychological discordance by the presence, inside man, of the celebrated little fellow who governs him, who is the driver, the point of synthesis, as we now say. The function of this little fellow was already denounced by pre-Socratic thought.

我想要用怪物或侏儒的觀念,來詮釋笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的功用。在所謂的思想史上,「我思」的地位有其興衰的變化。有時,「我思故我在」的「我」被認為是怪物。每當我們希望從事心理學,我們就以這個怪物的「我思」當代表。而每當我們希望解釋,由於支配人的這位著名的侏儒怪物「我思」存在於人的內部,產生了生命的麻木不仁及不協調,這個侏儒的怪物又成為人的行為的驅動者,成為總其事者,如我們現在的說法。這個「我思」的侏儒怪物的功用,在前蘇格拉底思想的時代,就已經受到抨擊。

In my own vocabulary, on the other hand, I symbolize the subject by the barred S [$1, in so far as it is constituted as secondary in relation to the signifier. In order to illustrate this, I will remind you that the thing may be presented in the simplest possible way by the single stroke. The first signifier is the notch by which it is indicated, for example, that the subject has killed one animal, by means of which he will not become confused in his memory when he has killed ten others. He will not have to remember which is which, and it is by means of this single stroke that he will count them.

另一方面,以我的術語,我用中間畫一條斜線槓的S,來象徵作為主體的人,因為意符與主體組成的關係的層次是次級。我要提醒你們,這一條斜線的槓,簡單地呈現人的真相。第一層次的意符就是那被指明的猛力一擊,例如,主體殺死一隻動物,這第一次的殺戮記憶最為鮮明,即使當他後來又殺死十隻其它動物。他不需要去記住哪一次是哪一隻,憑藉那猛力一擊,他就能夠算得清楚。

The subject himself is marked off by the single stroke, and first he marks himself as a taboo, the first of the signifiers. When this signifier, this one, is established—the reckoning is one one. It is at the level, not of the one, but of the one one, at the level of the reckoning, that the subject has to situate himself as such. In this respect, the two ones are already distinguished. Thus is marked the first split that makes the subject as such distinguish himself from the sign in relation to which, at first, he has been able to constitute himself as subject. I would now warn you against confusing the function of the $ with the image of the objet a, in so far as it is thus that the subject sees himself duplicated— sees himself as constituted by the reflected, momentary, precarious image of mastery, imagines himself to be a man
merely by virtue of the fact that he imagines himself.

主體本身就是由那一擊標示出來。首先,他標示自己是一個受到禁忌的主體,是意符的第一層次。當這個意符,這個第一次,被建立的時刻,刻骨銘心的就是這個第一次。主體將自己的位置,不是定在意符的刻痕,而是定在刻骨銘心的第一次。在這一方面,兩個主體的第一次就被區分出來。主體的第一次分裂在此被標示,區別他自己跟符號有所不同。起初,他還能夠維持跟符號的互動關係,組成自己作為主體。不過,我現在要警告你們,不要將這個欲望被禁制的主體的功能,跟小客體的形象混為一談。在小客體的地方,主體看到自己被複製,看到組成自己的形象,是倒影、是瞬間、是身不由己的變化無常。他想像自己作為人的主體,只存在於自己的想像之中。

In analytic practice, mapping the subject in relation to reality, such as it is supposed to constitute us, and not in relation to the signifier, amounts to falling already into the degradation of the psychological constitution of the subject.

在精神分析領域,不是找出主體跟意符的關係,而是找出主體跟真實界的關係,因為主體應該是在真實界組成。不過,這等於是倒退到以前的說法:人是個心理組成的主體。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

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