拉岡講座210

拉岡講座210

ANAMORPHOSIS
歪像
The privilege of the gaze as objet a
凝視作為小客體特權
2
But what is the gaze? I shall set out from this first point of annihilation in which is marked, in the field of the reduction of the subject, a break—which warns us of the need to introduce another reference, that which analysis assumes in reducing the privileges of the consciousness.

但是什麼是凝視?我將先從毀滅力量這一點先講起。一個斷裂發生在主體的處境場域,就是毀滅的力量。這個毀滅的力量警告我們,有需要介紹精神分析學從事的另一個命題, 將意識的特權規範一下。

Psycho-analysis regards the consciousness as irremediably limited, and institutes it as a principle, not only of idealization, but of méconnaissance, as—using a term that takes on new value by being referred to a visible domain—scotoma. The term was introduced into the psycho-analytic vocabulary by the French School. Is it simply a metaphor? We find here once again the ambiguity that affects anything that is inscribed in the register of the scopic drive.

精神分析學認為意識是無可救藥地受到限制,不但將它限定為理念的原則,而且是錯誤辨識的根源。意識被認為是「盲點」所在,用在視覺領域頗具新義的術語來說。這個術語被法國學派介紹到精神分析學的辭彙。「盲點」只是個比喻嗎?我們在此再一次發現到,在視覺驅力欲望的場域,曖昧不清影響著一切。

For us, consciousness matters only in its relation to what, for propaedeutic reasons, I have tried to show you in the fiction of the incomplete text—on the basis of which it is a question of recentring the subject as speaking in the very lacunae of that in which, at first sight, it presents itself as speaking. But I am
stating here only the relation of the pre-conscious to the unconscious.

我們認為,意識的重要只存在於人作為主體,被構想成為是不完整的文本,這是我一再設法告訴你的。由於基礎是在缺憾中的文本不完整,乍看來,主體只得以言說來表現自己,因此就必須不斷以言說來找回作為主體的中心。但是我現在只先講前意識與無意圖的關係。

The dynamic that is attached to the consciousness as such, the attention the subject brings to his own text, remains up to this point, as Freud has stressed, outside theory and, strictly speaking, not yet articulated.

連接到意識這種狀況的動力是什麼,也就是主體如何看待他自己的文本,直到目前,理論學說始終沒有道盡其詳,如佛洛伊德所強調。嚴格地說,還沒有受到清楚研究。

It is here that I propose that the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it—namely, a privileged object, which has emerged from some primal separation, from some induced by the very approach of the real, whose name, in our algebra, is the objet a.

在此,我提出,主體對自己的分裂如此興趣濃厚,是跟主體的結構,換言之,跟特權的客體,也就是我們精神分析學所稱為的小客體,有密切關係。因為這個特權的客體的出現,是從某些原初的分裂,從真實界接近不得的分裂。

In the scopic relation, the object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze. Its privilege—and also that by which the subject for so long has been misunderstood as being in its dependence—derives from its very structure.

在視覺的關係,幻見所依賴的客體就是凝視,因為主體與幻見之間的懸盪基本上搖擺不定,而且凝視的特權來自於它自己的結構,因此主體長久以來都被誤解是依賴凝視的存在。

Let us schematize at once what we mean. From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt himself to it, he becomes that punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his own failure. Furthermore, of all the objects in which the subject may recognize his dependence in the register of desire, the gaze is specified as unapprehensible.

讓我們馬上將我們的意思系統化。從凝視出現的時刻,主體就設法讓自己適應它,他成為那個點狀的客體,那個存在消失的點,主體將他的失敗跟那個存在消失點混為一談。而且,在所有主體辨認是自己欲望所依賴的客體中,凝視被明確指定為無法理解。

That is why it is, more than any other object, misunderstood (méconnu), and it is perhaps for this reason, too, that the subject manages, fortunately, to symbolize his own vanishing and punctiform bar (trait) in the illusion of the consciousness of seeing oneself see oneself, in which the gaze is elided.
If, then, the gaze is that underside of consciousness, how shall we try to imagine it?

那就是為什麼凝視被錯誤辨識,遠超過其它客體。可能也因為這個理由,主體幸運地得以用看見自己看見自己的意識的幻覺,來象徵他自己正在消失的點狀客體,儘管凝視撲朔迷離。然後,假如凝視就是意識的陰暗面,我們將如何設法想像它?

The expression is not inapt, for we can give body to the gaze. Sartre, in one of the most brilliant passages of L’Etre et le Xéant, brings it into function in the dimension of the existence of others. Others would remain suspended in the same, partially conditions that are, in Sartre’s definition, those of
objectivity, were it not for the gaze. The gaze, as conceived by Sartre, is the gaze by which I am surprised—surprised in so far as it changes all the perspectives, the lines of force, of my world, orders it, from the point of nothingness where I am, in a sort of radiated reticulation of the organisms. As the locus of the relation between me, the annihilating subject, and that which surrounds me, the gaze seems to possess such a privilege that it goes so far as to have me scotomized, I who look, the eye of him who sees me as object. In so far as I am under the gaze, Sartre writes, I no longer see the eye that looks at me and, if I see the eye, the gaze disappears.

這樣說法並不恰當,因為我們不是能夠給凝視賦予身體嗎?哲學家沙特在他的「存在與空無」最著名的段落,將凝視的功用歸屬於別人的存在的向度。若是沒有這個凝視,別人將或多或少地會被懸空於同樣的情境,以沙特的定義,就是客觀存在的情境。對於沙特所構想的這個凝視,我非常驚訝,我的驚訝是因為它改變了我的世界的所有的觀看點,力量的途徑,凝視從我存在是空無的這一點,以有機體的視網膜煥發光輝的方式規劃秩序。作為我、無常的客體、及我四周的環境之間的關係的軌跡,凝視似乎擁有如此一個特權,可以囂張到將我變成為盲點,我是觀看者,卻存在於看待我當著客體的他的眼睛。沙特寫到,當我在別人的凝視之下,我不再看到眼睛正在看我,而是假如我看到別人的眼睛,凝視就消失。

Is this a correct phenomenological analysis? No. It is not true that, when I am under the gaze, when I solicit a gaze, when I obtain it, I do not see it as a gaze. Painters, above all, have grasped this gaze as such in the mask and I have only to remind you of Goya, for example, for you to realize this.

這是一個正確的現象學分析嗎?其實不然。當我受到凝視,當我祈求它,得到它,我就沒有看到它是凝視,這種說法並不真實。很多人,特別是畫家,都曾在面具上捕捉到這種的凝視。舉個例子,我只需要提到哥耶,你們就能體會到。

The gaze sees itself—to be precise, the gaze of which Sartre speaks, the gaze that surprises me and reduces me to shame, since this is the feeling he regards as the most dominant. The gaze encounter— you can find this in Sartre’s own writing—is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field
of the Other.

凝視看到它自己。確實地說,沙特所提到的凝視,使我驚訝到無以自容的凝視,會看到自己,因為這就是他認為是最具支配性的感覺。你在沙特的作品裡會發現到,凝視的邂逅並不是被看見的凝視,而是在大它者的領域,被我想像的凝視。

If you turn to Sartre’s own text, you will see that, far from speaking of the emergence of this gaze as of something that concerns the organ of sight, he refers to the sound of rustling leaves, suddenly heard while out hunting, to a footstep heard in a corridor. And when are these sounds heard? At the moment when he has presented himself in the action of looking through a keyhole. A gaze surprises him in the function of voyeur, disturbs him, overwhelms him and reduces him to a feeling of shame

假如你轉向沙特的本文,你會看到,他並沒有提到這個凝視的出現,是某件與視覺器官有關的東西,他只是提到落葉的沙沙作響聲,在狩獵時突然被聽見,提到在走廊被聽見的腳步聲。那些聲音什麼時候被聽見?在他透過鑰匙洞口窺看的行動,而洩露自己的時刻。在這個窺視的功用中,有個凝視驚嚇到他,困擾到他,使他陷入無地自容的羞愧感。

. The gaze in question is certainly the presence of others as such. But does this mean that originally it is in the relation of subject to subject, in the function of the existence of others as looking at me, that we apprehend what the gaze really is? Is it not clear that the gaze intervenes here only in as much as it is not the annihilating subject, correlative of the world of objectivity, who feels himself surprised, but the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire? Is it not precisely because desire is established here in the domain of seeing that we can make it vanish?

我們所討論的這個凝視,確實是因為別人作為凝視的存在。但難道這就意味著,凝視原先是主體與主體的關係,是別人作為觀看我的存在的功用,是我們理解凝視的真正的內涵? 凝視的介入,不是在它作為與客觀世界相對時,使自己感受驚嚇的無常的主體,而是在藉欲望的功用維持自己的主體,這難道不是顯而易見?難道不就是因為在看到我們能夠使凝視消失的場域,欲望才在此被建立?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

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