拉岡講座208

拉岡講座208

The Eye and the Gaze
眼睛與凝視
3
In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded it—that is we call Gaze.

就視覺方式所組成及按符號數目所排列順序的關係,在人與物的關係,某件東西被傳遞,從一個階段到另一階段,總有幾分程度閃避不見,這就是我們所謂的凝視。

You can be made aware of this in more than one way. Let me describe it, at its extreme point, by one of the enigmas that the reference to nature presents us with. It is a question of nothing less than the phenomenon known as mimicry.

使你明白這一點的方式不只一種。自然界的現象帶給我們許多謎團,讓我用其中一個玄妙至極的謎團描述這個凝視。這個問題道道地地就是眾所周知的模擬的現象。

A lot has been said about this subject and a great deal that is absurd—for example, that the phenomenon of mimicry can be explained in terms of adaptation. I do not think this is the case. I need only refer you, among others, to a short work that many of you may already know, Roger Caillois’ Méduse et compagnie, in which the reference to adaptation is criticized in a particularly perspicacious way.

關於模擬,很多理論曾被提出,不少是荒腔走板。例如,模擬的現象能夠用適應環境的觀點來解釋。我不認為是這樣。我只需要推薦你們去讀一本薄薄的書,你們許多人可能知道,凱洛思的「美杜思在康柏園」。在這本書裡,他頗具洞察力地批判適應環境的主張。

On the one hand, in order to be effective, the determining mutation of mimicry, in the insect, for example, may take place only at once and at the outset. On the other hand, its supposed selective effects are annihilated by the observation that one finds in the stomach of birds, predators in particular, as many insects supposedly protected by mimicry as insects that are not.

在一方面,在昆蟲部份,為了有效果,只有在當下及開始的時刻,模擬的決定性突變才可能發生。在另一方面,它所被認為的選擇模擬的效果其實蕩然無存,因為我們在鳥類,特別是在掠食的動物的胃腸的觀察中發現到:被認為靠模擬保護的昆蟲跟沒有靠模擬保護的昆蟲一樣多。

But, in any case, the problem does not lie there. The most radical problem of mimicry is to know whether we must attribute it to some formative power of the very organism that shows us its manifestations. For this to be legitimate, we would have to be able to conceive by what circuits this force might itself in a position to control, not only the very form of the imitated body, but its relation to the environment,- from which it has to be distinguished or, on the contrary, in which it has to merge.

但是,不管怎樣,問題不是在那裡。模擬最根本的問題是要知道,我們是否要將顯示有模擬能力的有機體的成長力量歸功於模擬。要證實這種主張,我們將必須要能夠構想出,這個力量憑藉怎樣的迴旋,本身不但可以控制被模擬身體的形式,而且還可以控制它跟環境的關係,因為它跟環境必須要區別出來,或相反的,它必須融入環境裡面。

In short, as Caillois reminds us very pertinently, on the subject of such mimetic manifestations, and especially of the manifestation that may remind us of the function of the eyes, that is, the ocelli, it is a question of understanding whether they impress—it is a fact that they have this effect on the predator or on the supposed victim that looks at them—whether they impress by their resemblance to eyes, or whether, on the contrary, the eyes are fascinating only by virtue of their relation to the form of the ocelli. In other words, must we not distinguish between the function of the eye and that of the gaze?

總之,如凱洛思一針見血地提醒我們,有關顯示這些摹擬的主張,特別是許多顯示可能都提到眼睛的功用,換言之,單眼瞳。問題是要瞭解它們是否產生印象,它們有否產生免於掠食動物攻擊的效果,或對認為是提防它們的受害動物有欺敵的效果,是否它們是靠著類似眼睛而產生印象,或相反的,眼睛是憑藉著類似單眼瞳形狀的關係,產生吸引力。換言之,我們難道不是要區別眼睛的功用跟凝視的功用?

This distinctive example, chosen as such—for its location, for its facticity, for its exceptional character—is for us simply a small manifestation of the function to be isolated, the function,
let us say the word, of the stain. This example is valuable in marking the pre-existence to the seen of a given-to-be-seen.

我選擇這個作為區別的例子,是考量到它的位置,它的現實狀況,以及它的特別屬性。我僅是用它來說明功用的顯示能夠被孤立出來,沾染之處的功用,我不妨這樣說。這個例子很有價值,因為它顯示一個被看之物的被看之處,有先存狀態。

There is no need for us to refer to some supposition of the existence of a universal seer. If the function of the stain is recognized in its autonomy and identified with that of the gaze, we can seek its track, its thread, its trace, at every stage of the constitution of the world, in the scopic field. We will then
realize that the function of the stain and of the gaze is both that which governs the gaze most secretly and that which always escapes from the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied
with itself in imagining itself as consciousness.

我們沒有必要去提到一些有關普世的靈視的存在。假如沾染之處的功用在其自主性被體認出來,或被等同於凝視的功用,我們就能夠尋找它的蹤跡,它的線索,它的痕跡,在世界形成的每個階段,在這個視覺的場域。我們就能夠體會到,沾染之處的功用及凝視的功用,兩者都極其隱秘地支配我們的凝視,總是有某個東西閃避視覺形式的理解,因為這種視覺形式滿意於想像自己是意識。

That in which the consciousness may turn back upon itself—grasp itself; like Valery’s Young Parque, as seeing oneself seeing oneself—represents mere sleight of hand. An avoidance of the function of the gaze is at work there.

意識會回向自身,理解自身,如同詩人梵樂希所描述年青人巴奎,看到自己在觀看自己,這代表凝視的靈巧變化。在此運作的是逃避凝視的功用。

This much we can map of this topology, which last time we worked out for ourselves on the basis of that which appears from the position of the subject when he accedes to the imaginary forms offered him by the dream, as opposed to those of the waking state.

上一次,我們曾根據主體的立場所展現的東西,描繪出一種地誌,當他認同夢給予他的幻想形式,相對於清醒狀態的那些幻想形式。但是對於這個地誌我們目前只能描繪到此。

Similarly, in that order, which is particularly satisfying for the subject, connoted in psycho-analytic experience by the term narcissism—in which I have striven to reintroduce the essential structure it derives from its reference to the specular image—in the satisfaction, not to say that diffuses from it, which gives the subject a pretext for such a profound meconnaissance—and does its empire not extend as far as this reference of the philosophical tradition represented by plenitude encountered by the subject in the mode of contemplation— can we not also grasp that which has been eluded,
namely, the function of the gaze?

同樣地,主體特別滿意的地誌的順序,在精神分析學是用自戀這個詞語來表達,用這個詞語,我曾經嘗試重新介紹它從幻影形象所得來的基本結構,那就是滿意,洋洋灑灑地溢出。這給主體一個藉口犯如此重大的錯誤辨識。它的版圖難道不是延伸到哲學傳統的符號,由主體在沉思的狀態所體悟到的圓滿境界,我們難道不是也理解到這種撲朔迷離的境界,換言之,凝視的功用?

I mean, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty points this out, that we are beings who are looked at, in the spectacle of the world. That which makes us consciousness institutes us by the same token as speculum mundi. Is there no satisfaction in being under that gaze of which, following Merleau-Ponty, I spoke just now, that gaze that circumscribes us, and which in the first instance makes us beings who are looked at, but without showing this?

我的意思是,梅洛、龐帝也指出這一點,在世界的景象中,我們是作為被觀看的人。構成我們意識的內涵,形成我們,如同幻影的材料。我跟隨梅洛、龐帝之後,侃侃而談凝視,所受到的凝視難道沒有滿足感?凝視籠罩我們,首先使我們成為被觀看的人,但是又隱而不宣?

The spectacle of the world, in this sense, appears to us as all-seeing. This is the phantasy to be found in the Platonic perspective of an absolute being to whom is transferred the quality of being all-seeing. At the very level of the phenomenal experience of contemplation, this all-seeing aspect is to be found in the satisfaction of a woman who knows that she is being looked at, on condition that one does not show her that one knows that she knows.

世界的景象,從這個意義而言,展現在我們面前作為全面觀看。這就是能夠被發現到的幻影,當
全面觀看的特質被轉移到絕對的主體存在,而成為柏拉圖的宏觀。就在沉思經驗到達圓融的層次,有位知道自己被觀看的女士歡喜踴躍,只要沒有人告訴她眾人知道她也知道自己正在被觀看,這個全面觀看於焉發現。

The world is all-seeing, but it is not exhibitionistic—it does not provoke our gaze. When it begins to provoke it, the feeling of strangeness begins too.

這個世界是全面觀看,但是並沒有是特意炫耀,它並沒有挑釁我們的凝視。當它開始挑釁我們的凝視,奇異陌生之感也於焉開始。

What does this mean, if not that, in the so-called waking state, there is an elision of the gaze, and an elision of the fact that not only does it look, it also shows.? In the field of the dream, on the other hand, what characterizes the images is that it shows。

這是什麼意思,難道不就是在我們所謂的清醒狀態時,凝視有所遺漏,遺漏一個事實,那就是世界不僅觀看,而且顯示?另一方面,在夢的領域,表現影像的特徵就是:世界在顯示。

It shows—but here, too, some form of ‘sliding away’ of the subject is apparent. Look up some description of a dream, any one—not only the one I referred to last time, in which, after all, what I am going to say may remain enigmatic, but any dream—place it in its co-ordinates, and you will see that this it shows is well to the fore. So much is it to the fore, with the characteristics in which it is co-ordinated—namely, the absence of horizon, the enclosure, of that which is contemplated in the waking state, and, also, the character of emergence, of contrast, of stain, of its images, the intensification of their colors—that, in the final resort, our position in the dream is profoundly that of someone who does not see.

世界在顯示!但是在此也甚為明顯的是,有某種主體「遛走」的形狀出現。且讓我們翻閱某些有關夢的描述,隨便哪個夢都可以,不限我上次我提到的夢,畢竟,我正在談論的內容,可能始終是個謎團,而且任何夢。假如你將這個夢放置在完整的狀態,你就會發現,呈現在前面的就是:世界在顯示。它是如此的彰顯在前面,夢的完整的特徵顯著,換言之,沒有地平線,封閉,及在清醒狀態所沉思的東西,還有出現、對比、沾污、及其影像的特徵,顏色的強烈。最後,我們在這個夢中的地位,道道地地就是一無所見的人。

The subject does not see where it is leading, he follows. He may even on occasion detach himself, tell himself that it is a dream, but in no case will he be able to apprehend himself in the dream in the way in which, in the Cartesian cogito, he apprehends himself as thought. He may say to himself, It’s only a dream. But he does not apprehend himself as someone who says to himself—After all, I am the consciousness of this dream.

主體並沒有看見夢正引導到哪裡,他只是跟隨。他甚至可能有時會跟自己保持距離,告訴自己,這是個夢,但是他絕對沒有辦法在夢中理解自己,如同笛卡爾在「我思故我在」中,理解自己當著思想的主體。他可能會告訴自己,這只是個夢。但是他無法理解自己當著是告訴自己的人。畢竟,我是這個夢的意識。

In a dream, he is a butterfly. What does this mean? It means that he sees the butterfly in his reality as gaze. What are so many figures, so many shapes, so many colors, if not this gratuitous showing, in which is marked for us the primal nature of the essence of the gaze? Good heavens, it is a butterfly that is not very different from the one that terrorized the Wolf Man—and Maurice Merleau-Ponty is well aware of the importance of it and refers us to it in a footnote to his text.

在夢中,他是一隻蝴蝶。這是什麼意思?意思是他觀看在他現實中的蝴蝶,當著凝視。那麼多的體態,那麼多的形狀,那麼多的顏色,難道不就是無所為的炫耀,讓凝視的本質的原初特色呈現給我們?我的天!這隻蝴蝶跟驚嚇到狼人的那隻蝴蝶還沒有什麼兩樣!對於這個蝴蝶夢的重要性,梅洛、龐帝知道得很清楚,在他書中的附記中還跟我們提到。

When Choangtsu wakes up, he may ask himself whether it is not the butterfly who dreams that he is Choang-tsu. Indeed, he is right, and doubly so, first because it proves he is not mad, he does not
regard himself as absolutely identical with Choang-tsu and, secondly, because he does not fully understand how right he is. In fact, it is when he was the butterfly that he apprehended
one of the roots of his identity—that he was, and is, in his essence, that butterfly who paints himself with his own colors—and it is because of this that, in the last resort, he is Choangtsu.

莊子醒來時,他可能會問自己,難道不是蝴蝶夢見他是莊周?他確實沒有錯,百分之百沒有錯,首先因為這個夢證明他是正常人,他並不認為自己是完全認同於是莊周。其次,他並不瞭解自己正確到什麼程度。事實上,當他是蝴蝶時,他才理解到他的認同是根源於哪裡。在本質上,他過去是替自己粉飾成五彩繽紛的蝴蝶,現在也是。正因為那樣,他最後發現自己是莊周。

This is proved by the fact that, when he is the butterfly, the idea does not occur to him to wonder whether, when he is Choang-tsu awake, he is not the butterfly that he is dreaming of being. This is because, when dreaming of being the butterfly, he will no doubt have to bear witness later that he represented himself as a butterfly. But this does not mean that he is captivated by the butterfly
—he is a captive butterfly, but captured by nothing, for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody. It
is when he is awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their butterfly net.

他是莊周,以下這個事實可以證明。當他是蝴蝶時,他從來沒有想到要去懷疑,當他是清醒狀態時的莊周,他是不是他所夢見的蛻變的蝴蝶。這是因為他夢見蛻變成蝴蝶時,無疑地,他以後必然要見證到他代表自己當著蝴蝶。但是這並不意味著,他被蝴蝶所捕捉。他是一隻被捕捉住的蝴蝶,但是捕捉他的是空無,因為在夢中,他是一隻不歸屬於任何人的蝴蝶。而就在他清醒時,就別人而言,他是莊周,陷於他們凝視的蝴蝶網中,不能自拔。

This is why the butterfly may—if the subject is not Choangtsu, but the Wolf Man—inspire in him the phobic terror of recognizing that the beating of little wings is not so very far from the beating of causation, of the primal stripe marking his being for the first time with the grid of desire.

這就是為什麼假如主體不是莊周,而是佛洛伊德的狼人,蝴蝶可能會引起他害怕的恐懼,因為他認出小小翅膀的拍打,是那樣的類似於犯錯受到懲罰的拍打,類似於他首次以慾望的蠢動表現生命的存在,卻遭受的原初制約。

Next time, I propose to introduce you to the essence of scopic satisfaction. The gaze may contain in itself the objet a of the Lacanian algebra where the subject falls, and what specifies the scopic field and engenders the satisfaction proper to it is the fact that, for structural reasons, the fall of the subject always remains unperceived, for it is reduced to zero.

下一次,我要跟你們介紹視覺滿足的本質。凝視本身可能包括我時常提到的主體沉迷不拔的小客體。小客體之所成為視覺場域的明確內涵,及滿足的本體,是由於結構上的理由:主體對於小客體的沉迷不拔,自己始終無法覺察,因為小客體一但被剝奪,他便淪為空無。

In so far as the gaze, qua objet a, may come to symbolize this central lack expressed in the phenomenon of castration, and in so far as it is an objet a reduced, of its nature, to a punctiform, evanescent function, it leaves the subject in ignorance as to what there is beyond the appearance, an ignorance so characteristic of all progress in thought that occurs in the way constituted by
philosophical research.

凝視作為小客體,可能會漸漸象徵著閹割恐懼現象所表現的這個中心的欠缺。因為這個欠缺在性質方面,被化簡到零碎及纖細的功用,而成為小客體,主體也就渾然一無所知,在小客體這個表象之外還有什麼。思想界的進步,就哲學研究所採取的方向而言,其特徵也顯示他們蒙昧於表象之外的那個欠缺。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

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