龐蒂論自由 01

龐蒂論自由 01
Merleau-Ponty on Freedom
From The Phenomenology of Perception 感覺現象學 p.434

Again, it is clear that no causal relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. Only at the cost of losing the basis of all my certainties can I question what is conveyed to me by my presence to myself.

再一次,顯而易見,我們無法想像,主體跟其身體、世界、或社會,有任何因果關係。只有以喪失我所有的穩定結構的基礎作為代價,我才可能會質疑到,我存在於自我世界,所被傳達的訊息。

Now the moment I turn to myself in order to describe myself, I have a glimpse of an anonymous flux, a comprehensive project in which there are so far no ‘states of consciousness’, nor, a fortiori, characteristics of any sort. For myself I am neither ‘ jealous,’ nor ‘inquisitive’, nor ‘ hunchbacked’, nor ‘ a civil servant’.

此時,我一轉身內省,以便描述自己,我瞥見一股無以名狀的流動,一種迄今尚無「意識狀態」,遑論有任何特徵的全面洪流。對我自己而言,人家說我妒嫉、好打聽、駝背、或公務員,皆非我內在屬性。

It is often a matter of surprise that the cripple or the invalid can put up with himself. The reason is such people are not for themselves deformed or at death’s door. Until the final coma, the dying man is inhabited by a consciousness, he is all that he sees, and enjoys this much of an outlet. Consciousness can never objectify itself into invalid-consciousness or cripple-consciousness, and even if the old man complains of his age or the cripple of his deformity, they can do so only by comparing themselves with others, that is, by taking a statistical and objective view of themselves, so that such complaints are never absolutely genuine: when he is back in the heart of his own consciousness, each one of us feels beyond his limitations and thereupon resigns himself to them. They are the price which we automatically pay for being in the world, a formality which we take for granted. Hence we may speak disparagingly of our looks and still not want to change our face for another.

我們時常驚奇,殘障人士跟病患為何能忍受他們自己的處境。道理很簡單,對他們自己而言,他們並沒有意識到自己是殘障或彌留病床。直到昏迷之前,逗留在垂死者心中的,只有一種意識,那就是他自己是他所看到的一切,對於這樣的逃避現實,他坦然心安。意識永遠無法客體化成為成為病患意識,或殘障意識。即使老人抱怨自己的年老體衰,殘障人士抱怨自己的殘疾不全,他們會如此抱怨,是因為跟別人互相的比較,或是透過別人眼光看待自己,換句話說,他們開始以量化及客觀的觀點看待自己,所以這種抱怨並非全然都是真誠發出。當他回到自己意識的核心,我們每個人都會感覺到,自己能超越自己局限性,因此對於他們也就不會那麼耿耿於懷。我們生存在世,必然要付出代價承接這樣的局限性,這是我們視為理所當然的條件。因此我們或許會對自己的容貌自慚形穢,可是依舊不願以自己的容貌跟別人交換。

No idiosyncrasy can, seeming, be attached to the insuperable generality of consciousness, nor can any limit be set to this immeasurable power of escape. In order to be determined ( in the two sense of the word) by an external factor, it is necessary that I should be a thing. Neither my freedom nor my universality can admit of any eclipse. It is inconceivable that I should be free in certain of my actions and determined in others: how should we understand a dormant freedom that gave full scope to determinism? And it is assumed that it is snuffed out when it is not in action, how could it be rekindled? If per impossibile I had once succeeded in making myself into a thing, how should I subsequently reconvert myself to consciousness?

似乎,意識這種無法客體化的普遍性,也不能將它歸咎於任何怪誕行徑,正如人有逃避現實的無窮能力,也無法受到任何限制。我若是要受外在因素所決定(決定論的雙重意涵),我必然會淪為物化的命運。可是,我的自由跟我的意識無法客體化的普遍性,卻不容許受到任何損害。我們無法想像,我的某些行為是自由行使,而在其它行為上卻是受到命運決定。我們怎麼可能理解:我們的自由會備而不用,卻讓決定論大行其道?有人假設自由不行使時,會像燭火熄滅,那請問要如何重新點燃?就算是我有朝一日真的成功地將自己物化(實際上不可能),我以後要怎麼將自己重新轉換回到意識?

Once I am free, I am not to be counted among things, and I must then be uninterruptedly free. Once my actions cease to be mine, I shall never recover them, and if I lose my hold on the world, it will never be restored to me. It is equally inconceivable that my liberty should be attenuated; one cannot be to some extent free, and if, as is often said, motives incline me in a certain direction, one of two things happens: either they are strong enough to force me to act, in which case there is no freedom, or else they are not strong enough, and then freedom is complete, and as great in the worst torments as in the peace of one’s home.

一但我是自由,我就不可能被認為是物化,我必須毫無阻礙地自由。一但我的行動不再屬於我自己的意志,我將身不由己。假如我失去對於世界的掌控,我將永遠無法恢復這種掌控世界的自由。我們也同樣無法想像,我的自由應該受到約束,因為我們不可能只是有限度的自由。就算是如俗話所說,動機會使我們必然走向某個方向,這時只有兩種可能:一種是動機足夠強烈,我不得不聽令行事,在這種情況,我無自由可言。另一種是動機不夠強烈,我的自由毫髮無傷,無論是接受苦刑拷打,或是在自己平靜的家裡,我都自由自在。

We ought, therefore, to reject not only the idea of causality, but also that of motivation. The alleged motive does not burden my decision; on the contrary my decision lends the motive its force. Everything that I ‘am’ in virtue of nature or history—hunchbacked, handsome or Jewish—I never am completely for myself, as we have just explained; and I may well be these things for other people, nevertheless I remain free to posit another person as a consciousness whose views strike through to my very being, or on the other hand merely as an object.

因此,我們不但應該拒絕因果的觀念,而且也要拒絕動機的觀念。別人所宣稱的動機,並沒有成為我決定的負擔,相反的,我的決定借助力量給動機。我因為天生或歷史遺傳的我的屬性,無論是駝背,帥俊,或猶太人血統,我都不是因為自己而擁有這些屬性,如我剛才所說,而是因為別人的看待才如此被物化。可是,我始終擁有自由選擇另外一個人一方面作為意識,這個意識的觀點直接襲擊到我存在核心,或者另一方面僅僅是當一個客體。

It is also true that this option is itself a form of constraint: if I am ugly, I have the choice between being an object of disapproval or disapproving of others. I am left free to be a masochist or a sadist, but not free to ignore others. But this dilemma, which is given as port of the human lot, is not one for me as pure consciousness: it is still I who makes another to be for me and makes each of us be as human beings.

沒錯,這種選擇本身也是一種受到約束的形式:假如我長得醜,我可以選擇成為別人不認同的對象,也可以選擇不認同別人的觀點。問題是,我有自由選擇成為受虐狂者或虐待狂者,卻沒有自由選擇不理會別人觀點。但是這個困境是人類的部份命運,我並不必要把它當著是我的純淨意識:創造另一種困境來充當我的存在,使我們兩個人各自擁有作為人的存在的,依舊是我。

Moreover, even if existence as a human being were imposed upon me, the manner alone being left to my choice, and considering this choice itself and ignoring the small number of forms it might take, it would still be a free choice. If it is said that my temperament inclines me particularly to either sadism or masochism, it is still merely a manner of speaking, for my temperament exists only for the second order knowledge that I gain about myself when I see myself as others see me, and in so far as I recognize it, confer value upon it, and in that sense, choose it.

而且,即使作為人的存在是上天賦予,聽任我選擇的方式只有一種,這依舊算是一種自由的選擇,假如我們考慮到這種選擇的本身的性質,並且不要去理會選澤的方式是多麼有限。即使我的性情據說會使我特別傾向於成為虐待狂,或受虐狂,那也是表達的問題,因為我的性情的存在,僅是我對於自己的次級的知識,也就是我依照別人看待我的方式看待自己,再依照我的認識,賦予價值在那個知識上,然後以那個意義選擇我的性情。

What misleads us on this, is that we often look for freedom in the voluntary deliberation which examines one motive after another and seems to opt for the weightiest or most convincing. In reality the deliberation follows the decision, and it is my secret decision which brings the motives to light, for it would be difficult to conceive what the force of a motive might be in the absence of a decision which it confirms or to which it runs counter.

在此誤導我們的是,我們往往在一廂情願的深思熟慮中尋求自由,將動機反覆審察,似乎總是選擇最沉重,或是最令人信服的。事實上,先有決定才跟著深思熟慮,而且是我的秘密決定使動機為人所知,因為動機所證實,所對立的決定若是不存在,我們很難想像動機的力量是什麼。

When I have abandoned a project, the motives which I thought held me to it suddenly lose their force and collapse. In order to resuscitate them, an effort is required on my part to reopen time and set me back to the moment preceding the making of the decision. Even while I am deliberating, already I find it an effort to suspend time’s flow, and to keep open a situation which I feel is closed by a decision which is already there and which I am holding off. That is why it so often happens that after giving up a plan I experience a feeling of relief: “ After all, I wasn’t all that involved’; the debate was purely a matter of form, and the deliberation a mere parody, for I had decided against from the start.

當我已經放棄一個計劃,原先讓我堅持以赴的動機,會突然失去力量而崩塌。為了復甦這些動機,我必需要努力重新開啟時間,讓我回到做決定前的那個時刻。即使在我深思熟慮的時刻,我發覺要費相當努力,才能將時間的流動懸置,並開放一個情境。這個情境被我認為是已經存在,而且我正在抗拒的決定所封閉。這就是為什麼在我放棄一個計劃之後,我往往會經驗到身心輕鬆的感覺:「畢竟,我還不至於那麼欲罷不能!」所爭議的純粹是形式的問題,深思熟慮充其量是扭捏作態,因為從一開頭,我就已經是決定反對。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

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