Deleuze31 德勒茲 The Folds of the Soul 靈魂的摺疊

Translated by Springhero 雄伯



We have gone from variable curvature to the origin of curvature ( from the concave side), from variation to point of view, from the fold to envelopment, in a word, from inflection to inclusion. The transition cannot be discerned, somewhat like aright angle that is not measured by a great arc but by a tiny are situation close to the summit: it is at the summit “ that the angle or the inclination of the two lines is found.” We would nonetheless hesitate to say that visibility is located in point of view. We would need a more natural intuition to allow for this passage to the limit. Thus it is a very simple intuition: . Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else? It appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is no longer an envelope of coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the “ reciprocal envelopment” of organic parts. Nor even a mathematical envelop of adherence or adhesion, where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope that touches an infinity of curves in an infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or unilateral “ inhesion” : inclusion or inherence is the final cause of he fold, such that we move indiscernibly from latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that why is folded is only virtual and currently eists only in a envelope, in something that envelops it.




  From now on it is not exactly point of view that includes: or at least, it does so only as an agent, but not of a final cause or a finished act ( entelechia). Inclusion or inherence has a condition of closure or envelopment, which Leibniz puts forward in his famous formula, “ no windows,” and which point of view does not suffice to explain. When inclusion is accomplished, it is done so continuously, or includes the sense of a finished act that is neither the site, the place, nor the point of view, but what remains in point of view, what occupies point of view, and without which point of view would not be. It is necessarily a soul, a subject. A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in other words, inflection. Infection is an ideal condition or a virtuality that currently exists only in the soul that envelops it. Thus the soul is what has folds and is full of folds.




  Folds are in the soul and authentically exist only in the social. That is already true for “ innate ideas”: they are pure virtualities, pure powers whose act consists in habitus or arrangements ( folds) in the soul, and whose completed act consists of an inner action of the soul ( an internal deployment). But this is no less true for the world: the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the soul which convey it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a representation of the enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to the real, inflection defining the fold, but inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is, what envelops the fold, its final cause and its completed act.




  Whence the distinction of three kinds of points as three kinds of singularities. The physical point is what runs along inflection or is the point of inflection itself; it is neither an atom nor a Cartesian point, but an elastic or plastic point-fold. Thus it is not exact. On the one hand, it is important to note that it devalorizes the exact point while, on the other, it leads the mathematical point to assume a new status that is rigorous without being exact. On one side, the exact point is effectively not a part of extension, but a conventional extremity of the line. On the other side, the mathematical point in turn loses exactitude in order to become a position, a site, a focus, a place, a point of conjunction of vectors of curvature or, in short, point of view. The latter therefore takes on a genetic value: pure extension will be the continuation or diffusion of the point, but according to the relations of distance that define pace ( between two given points) as the “ place of all places.” However, if the mathematical point thus stops being the extremity of the line in order to become the point of focus, it is nonetheless a simple “ modality.” It I in the body, in the thing extended. But in this way, as we have seen, it is only the projection of a third point in the body. That is the metaphysical point, the soul or the subject. It is what occupies the point of view, it is what is projected in point of view. Thus the soul is not in the body in a point, but is itself a higher point and of another nature, which corresponds with the point. The point of inflection, the point of position, and the point of inclusion will thus be distinguished.




   Everyone knows the name that Leibniz ascribes to the sol or to the subject as a metaphysical point: the monad. He borrows this name from the Neoplatonists who used it to designate a state of One, a unity that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity developing the One in the manner of a “ series.” The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development, while the multiple is inseparable from the folds that it makes when it is enveloped, and of unfoldings when it is developed. But its envelopments and developments, its implications and explications, are nonetheless particular movements that must be understood in a universal Unity that “ complicates” them all, and that complicates all the Ones. Giordano Bruno will bring the system of monads to the level of this universal complication: the Soul of the world that complicates everything. Hence Neo-Platonic emanations give way to a large zone of immanence, even if the rights of a transcendent God or an even higher Unity are formally respected.




  Explication-implication-complication from the triad of the fold, following the variations of the relation of the One-Multiple. But if we ask why the name “ monad” has been associated with Leibniz, it is because of the two ways that Leibniz was going to stabilize the concept. One the one hand, the mathematics of inflection allowed him to posit the enveloping series of multiples as a convergent infinite series. One the other hand, the metaphysics of inclusion allowed him to posit enveloping unity as an irreducible individual unity. In effect, as long as series remained finite or undefined, individuals risked being relative, called upon to melt into a universal spirit or a soul of the world that cold complicate all series. But if the world is an infinite series, it then constitutes the logical comprehension of a notion or of a concept that can now only be individual. It is therefore enveloped by an infinity of individuated souls of which each retains it irreducible point of view. It si the accord of singular points of view, or harmony, that will replace universal complication and ward off the dangers of pantheism or immanence: whence Leibniz’s insistence upon denouncing the hypothesis, or rather the hypostasis, of a Universal Spirit that would turn complication into an abstract operation in which individuals would be swallowed up.




   All of this remains obscure.  For if, by pushing to its limit a metaphor sketched by Plotinus, Leibniz makes of the monad a sort of point of view on the city, must we understand that a certain form corresponds to each point of view? For example, a street of one from or another? In conic sections, there is no separate pint of view to which the ellipse woul return, and another for the parabola, and another for the circle. The point of view, the summit of the cone, is the condition under which we apprehend the group of varied forms or the series of curves to the second degree. It does not suffice too state that the point of view apprehends a perspective, a profile that would each time offer the entirety of a city in its own fashion. For it also brings forth the connection of all the related profiles, the series of all curvatures or inflections. What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all possible connections between the course of a given street and that of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered. The world is an infinite eries of curvatures or inflections, and the entire world is enclosed in the soul from one point of view.




  The world is the infinite curve that touches at an infinity of points an infinity of curves, the curve with a unique variable, the convergent series of all series. But why then is there not a single and universal point of view? Why does Leibniz so strongly deny “ the doctrine of a universal spirit” ? Why are there several points of view and several irreducible souls, an infinity? We can consider the series of the twelve sounds: the series can undergo in turn many variations that are both rhythmic and melodic, but that also follow the contrary, or retrograde, movement. With greater reason an infinite series, even if the variable is unique, cannot be separated from an infinity of variations that make it up: we necessarily take it in accord with all possible orders, and we favor this or that partial sequence at this or that time. That is why only one form—or one street—recovers its rights, but only in respect to the entire series.



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