Deleuze31 德勒茲 The Folds of the Soul 靈魂的摺疊

Translated by Springhero 雄伯

We have gone from variable curvature to the origin of curvature ( from the concave side), from variation to point of view, from the fold to envelopment, in a word, from inflection to inclusion. The transition cannot be discerned, somewhat like aright angle that is not measured by a great arc but by a tiny are situation close to the summit: it is at the summit “ that the angle or the inclination of the two lines is found.” We would nonetheless hesitate to say that visibility is located in point of view. We would need a more natural intuition to allow for this passage to the limit. Thus it is a very simple intuition: . Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else? It appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is no longer an envelope of coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the “ reciprocal envelopment” of organic parts. Nor even a mathematical envelop of adherence or adhesion, where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope that touches an infinity of curves in an infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or unilateral “ inhesion” : inclusion or inherence is the final cause of he fold, such that we move indiscernibly from latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that why is folded is only virtual and currently eists only in a envelope, in something that envelops it.

我們已經從變化的彎曲到彎曲的起源（從凹面），從變數到觀點，從摺疊到涵蓋，總之，從曲折到內蘊。轉折點無法被覺察，有點像右角不是被大的弧形，而是被靠近頂端的小弧所測量：兩線的角度或傾斜，在頂端被找到。我們仍然猶豫地說，能見度是位在觀點，我們將需要更自然的直覺來考慮到達極限的過程。因此，這直覺很簡單：為什麼物品會摺疊？若非它無法被涵蓋、包裹、被放進它物品裏？似乎這裏所指的涵蓋得到其親密或甚至是最終的意義：它不再是一貫性或附屬的涵蓋，像蛋，在有機部份的「相互涵概」。甚至也不是黏貼或黏附的數學的涵蓋，摺疊依舊涵蓋其它摺疊，如同碰到無限曲折在無限點的涵蓋的涵蓋。這是天生或單邊「固有」的涵蓋；內含或天生就是摺疊的最終原因，這樣我們不知不覺從後者移動到前者。在這兩個之間，展開一個空隙，使涵蓋成為摺疊的理由。可以這樣敘述：所摺疊的只是虛擬，目前只存在於摺疊，於涵蓋的物品當中。

From now on it is not exactly point of view that includes: or at least, it does so only as an agent, but not of a final cause or a finished act ( entelechia). Inclusion or inherence has *a condition of closure or envelopment*, which Leibniz puts forward in his famous formula, “ no windows,” and which point of view does not suffice to explain. When inclusion is accomplished, it is done so continuously, or includes the sense of a finished act that is neither the site, the place, nor the point of view, but what remains in point of view, what occupies point of view, and without which point of view would not be. It is necessarily a soul, a subject. A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in other words, inflection. *Infection is an ideal condition or a virtuality that currently exists only in the soul that envelops it.* Thus the soul is what has folds and is full of folds.

從此開始，包含的不完全是觀點，或至少，它只是充當代理，不是最終原因或完成的行動。內含或天生的狀況是封閉或涵蓋，萊布尼茲在他著名的公式提出，「沒有窗戶」，觀點說無法充份解釋。當內含完成，它不斷完成，或包含一件完成的動作感，既不是地點、地方、也不是觀點，而是觀點的剩餘，觀點的佔據，觀點所不欠缺的東西。這必須要是靈魂，一個主體。靈魂總是包含從他觀點所能理解的，換言之，曲折。*曲折是一個理想的狀況或目前只存在函蓋它的靈魂的虛擬*。因此，靈魂就是擁有摺疊，而且折充滿摺疊。

Folds are in the soul and authentically exist only in the social. That is already true for “ innate ideas”: they are pure virtualities, pure powers whose act consists in habitus or arrangements ( folds) in the soul, and whose completed act consists of an inner action of the soul ( an internal deployment). But this is no less true for the world: the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the soul which convey it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a representation of the enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to the real, inflection defining the fold, but inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is, what envelops the fold, its final cause and its completed act.

摺疊在於靈魂，而且真實地只存在於摺疊。「天生的理念」也已經是如此：他們純粹是虛擬，純粹是力量，其動作在於靈魂的習性或安排（摺疊），其完成的動作在於靈魂的內在行動（內部的部署）。對於世界而言，也是同樣的真實：整個世界只是虛擬，目前只存在於表達它的靈魂的摺疊。靈魂利用內在摺襉，賦予本身封閉世界的符號。我們從曲折到主體的內含，好像從虛擬到真實，曲折定義摺疊，但是內含定義靈魂或主體，換言之，函蓋摺疊，其最終原因及完成的動作。

Whence the distinction of three kinds of points as three kinds of singularities. The *physical point* is what runs along inflection or is the point of inflection itself; it is neither an atom nor a Cartesian point, but an elastic or plastic point-fold. Thus it is not exact. On the one hand, it is important to note that it devalorizes the exact point while, on the other, it leads the mathematical point to assume a new status that is rigorous without being exact. On one side, the exact point is effectively not a part of extension, but a conventional extremity of the line. On the other side, the mathematical point in turn loses exactitude in order to become a position, a site, a focus, a place, a point of conjunction of vectors of curvature or, in short, point of view. The latter therefore takes on a genetic value: pure extension will be the continuation or diffusion of the point, but according to the relations of distance that define pace ( between two given points) as the “ place of all places.” However, if *the mathematical point* thus stops being the extremity of the line in order to become the point of focus, it is nonetheless a simple “ modality.” It I in the body, in the thing extended. But in this way, as we have seen, it is only the projection of a third point in the body. That is the *metaphysical point,* the soul or the subject. It is what occupies the point of view, it is what is projected in point of view. Thus the soul is not in the body in a point, but is itself a higher point and of another nature, which corresponds with the point. *The point of inflection, the point of position, and the point of inclusion will thus be distinguished.*

在此，有三個點表現三種獨特性。*生理點*沿著曲折運行，是曲折點本身：它既非原子，也非笛卡爾的點，而是具有彈性或伸縮的摺疊點。因此，它並不確實。在一方面，不可忽視的是，它貶抑確實點，而在另外，它引導數學點擔任新的地位，不確實，但有活力。在一方面，確實點有效地不是延伸的部份，而是線的傳統極限。在另一方面，數學點也跟著喪失確實，為了要成為位置、地點、焦點、地方、凹面向量連接點，總之，就是觀點。後者因此具有基因價值：純粹延伸將是點的延伸跟擴散，但是依照距離的關係定義空間（兩個特定點之間），當著是「位置的位置」。可是，假如數學點為了要成為焦點，因此不再是線的極端，它仍然是簡單的「輔助」。它在於身體裡，在延伸的東西裡。以這種方式，如我們所見，它只是身體第三點的投射。這就是*數學點*，靈魂或主體。這就是佔據觀點，被投射在觀點的東西。因此，靈魂不是在點的身體裡，而是本身就是一個較高點，性質不同，但是跟觀點一致。*曲折點，位置點，及內含點因此可以區分。*

Everyone knows the name that Leibniz ascribes to the sol or to the subject as a metaphysical point: the monad. He borrows this name from the Neoplatonists who used it to designate a state of One, a unity that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity developing the One in the manner of a “ series.” The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development, while the multiple is inseparable from the folds that it makes when it is enveloped, and of unfoldings when it is developed. But its envelopments and developments, its implications and explications, are nonetheless particular movements that must be understood in a universal Unity that “ complicates” them all, and that complicates all the Ones. Giordano Bruno will bring the system of monads to the level of this universal complication: the Soul of the world that complicates everything. Hence Neo-Platonic emanations give way to a large zone of immanence, even if the rights of a transcendent God or an even higher Unity are formally respected.

每個人都知道萊布尼茲給靈魂或主體取名稱當形上點：單子。他從新柏拉圖主義借用這個名稱。前者用它指明一個個**個體**的狀態，一個涵蓋多重性的統合，這個多重性以「系列」的方式，發揮這個**個體。**這個**個體**明確地具有內含及發展的力量，而多重性跟它內含時所造成的摺疊，及發展時的展開摺疊，不可分離。但是它的內含跟發展，它的暗示跟說明，仍然是特別的行動，必須要以普及的**統合**來了解，因為它使它們複雜化，把所有的**個體**都複雜化。布魯諾將單子的系統發揮到普及的複雜性的層次：世界的靈魂使每件事都複雜化。因此，新柏拉圖的光輝被的內在性的一大片地區我取代，即使超驗上帝或甚至更高統合的權利形式上仍受尊重。

Explication-implication-complication from the triad of the fold, following the variations of the relation of the One-Multiple. But if we ask why the name “ monad” has been associated with Leibniz, it is because of the two ways that Leibniz was going to stabilize the concept. One the one hand, the mathematics of inflection allowed him to posit the enveloping series of multiples as a convergent infinite series. One the other hand, the metaphysics of inclusion allowed him to posit enveloping unity as an irreducible individual unity. In effect, as long as series remained finite or undefined, individuals risked being relative, called upon to melt into a universal spirit or a soul of the world that cold complicate all series. But if the world is an infinite series, it then constitutes the logical comprehension of a notion or of a concept that can now only be individual. It is therefore enveloped by an infinity of individuated souls of which each retains it irreducible point of view. It si the accord of singular points of view, or harmony, that will replace universal complication and ward off the dangers of pantheism or immanence: whence Leibniz’s insistence upon denouncing the hypothesis, or rather the hypostasis, of a Universal Spirit that would turn complication into an abstract operation in which individuals would be swallowed up.

說明、暗示、複雜化形成摺疊的三角鼎立，遵照個體跟多重性的關係變數。但是我們若問為什麼「單子」一詞跟萊布尼茲扯上關係，那是因為萊布尼茲用兩種方式穩定這個觀念。在一方面，曲折的數學使他能夠假設多重性的內含系列當著是聚集的無限系列。在另一方面，內蘊的形上學使他能夠假設涵蓋的統合當著是不可化減的個別統合。事實上，只要系列保持有限或不下定義，個體就是有相對化的危險，被要求融入普及的精神或世界的靈魂，把所有系列所複雜化。但是，假如世界是無限的系列，那麼它會組成邏輯地理解一個理念，或只有屬於個體的理念。它因此被無數個體化的靈魂所涵蓋，每個靈魂都保留它無可化減的觀點。獨特觀點的認同或和諧將會代替普及的複雜化，並阻止人人皆神論或內在性的危險。萊布尼茲堅持抨擊這個假設或這個普及精神的立論，因為它會將複雜化轉變成為抽象的運作，個體將被淹沒。

All of this remains obscure. For if, by pushing to its limit a metaphor sketched by Plotinus, Leibniz makes of the monad a sort of point of view on the city, must we understand that a certain form corresponds to each point of view? For example, a street of one from or another? In conic sections, there is no separate pint of view to which the ellipse woul return, and another for the parabola, and another for the circle. The point of view, the summit of the cone, is the condition under which we apprehend the group of varied forms or the series of curves to the second degree. It does not suffice too state that the point of view apprehends a perspective, a profile that would each time offer the entirety of a city in its own fashion. For it also brings forth the connection of all the related profiles, the series of all curvatures or inflections. What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all possible connections between the course of a given street and that of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered. The world is an infinite eries of curvatures or inflections, and the entire world is enclosed in the soul from one point of view.

這一點始終沒說清楚。因為假如萊布尼茲將普羅提拿斯的描述推到極點，把單子當著是對城市的觀點，我們必須了解某個形式對應於每個觀點嗎？例如，某個形式的街道？在圓錐形部份，並沒有分開的觀點，橢圓可以迴轉，一點是給拋物線，另一點是給圓形。這個觀點，圓錐形的頂端是這個狀況，我們可以理解不同形式的團體或彎曲到第二層次的系列。這尚不足以陳述說，觀點理解到這個輪廓的看法：城市的完整性以自己的方式呈現。因為它也牽涉所有相關的輪廓，凹面或曲折的系列。從一個觀點所能理解的，因此不是一條決定的街道，也不是跟其它固定的街道一起決定的關係，而是在特定的街道跟另一條街道之間各種可能的關聯的多樣性。城市私乎是一座井然有序的迷宮。世界是一個凹面跟曲折的無數系列，整個世界被封閉在從一個觀點的靈魂裡

* The world is the infinite curve that touches at an infinity of points an infinity of curves, the curve with a unique variable, the convergent series of all series. *But why then is there not a single and universal point of view? Why does Leibniz so strongly deny “ the doctrine of a universal spirit” ? Why are there several points of view and several irreducible souls, an infinity? We can consider the series of the twelve sounds: the series can undergo in turn many variations that are both rhythmic and melodic, but that also follow the contrary, or retrograde, movement. With greater reason an infinite series, even if the variable is unique, cannot be separated from an infinity of variations that make it up: we necessarily take it in accord with all possible orders, and we favor this or that partial sequence at this or that time. That is why only one form—or one street—recovers its rights, but only in respect to the entire series.

* **世界是無限的彎曲，在無限點，碰觸到無限的彎曲，彎曲有無限的變數，所有系列的聚集系列。*但是為什麼沒有一個特別而普及的觀點？為什麼萊布尼茲如此強烈地否認「普及精神的信條」？為什麼有好幾個觀點及好幾個不可化減的靈魂，是無限？我們能夠考慮這十二個聲音的系列：這些系列能夠輪流經歷許多既有韻律又有節奏的變數，但也遵照相反或倒退的動作。因為更大的理由，無限的系列，即使變數是獨特的，也無法跟彌合它的無限的變數分開。我們需要將它跟所有可能的秩序相一致，我們時而贊同這個或那個部份的系列。這就是為什麼只有一個形式或街道恢復它的權利，但是要尊重其他整個系列。

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