Deleuze 30 德勒茲 Perception in the Folds 摺疊之感

Translated by Springhero 雄伯



I must have a body, it’s a moral necessity, a “ requirement.” And in the first place, I must have a body because an obscure object lives in me. But, right from this first argument, Leibniz’s originality is tremendous. He is not saying that only the body explains what is obscure in the mind. To the contrary, the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body. We can call “ primary matter” our passive power or the limitation of our activity: we say that our primary matter requires extension, but also resistance or antitype, and yet an individuated requirement to possess a body that belongs to us. It is because there is an infinity of individual monads that each requires an individuated body, this body resembling the shadow of other monads cast upon it. Nothing obscure lives in us because we have a body, but we must have a body because there is an obscure object in us. In the place of Cartesian physical induction Leibniz substitutes a moral deduction of the body.




But this first argument gives way to another, which seems to contradict it, and which is even more original. This time, we must have a body because our mind possesses a favored—clear and distinct—zone of expression. Now it is that clear zone that is the requirement for having a body. Leibniz will go as far as stating that what I express clearly is what “ relates to my body.” And in effect, if the monad Caesar clearly expresses the crossing of the Rubicon, is it not because the river maintains a relation of proximity with his body? The same holds for all other monads whose zone of clear expression coincides with the body’s immediate environment.




  There are nonetheless find an inversion of causality—justifiable in certain respects—that must not impede our putting together the real order of deduction: (1) each monad condenses a certain number of unique, incorporeal, ideal events that do not put bodies in play, although they can only be stated in the form, “ Caesar crosses the Rubicon, he is assassinated by Brutus…”; ( 2) these unique events included in the monad as primary predicates constitute its zone of clear expression, or its “ subdivision”; (3) they necessarily relate to a body that belongs to this monad, and are incarnated in bodies that act immediately upon it. In brief, it is because every monad posses a clear zone that it must have a body, this zone constituting a relation with the body, not a given relation, but a genetic relation that engenders its own “ relation.” It is because we have a clear zone that we must have a body charged with traveling through it or exploring it, from birth to death.




  Here we confront two difficulties. Why is the requirement of having a body sometimes based on a principle of passivity, in obscurity and confusion, and at others on our activity, on clarity and distinction? And more particularly, how does the existence of the body derive from the clear and distinct? As Arnauld states, how can what I express clearly and distinctly have anything to do with my body, the sum of whose movements are known only in obscurity?




  Singularities proper to each monad are extended as far as the singularities of others and in all senses. Every monad thus expresses the entire world, but obscurely and dimply because it is finite and the world is infinite. That is why the lower depths of the monad are so dark. Since it does not exist outside of the monads that convey it, the world is included in each one in the form of perceptions or “ representatives,” present and infinitely minute elements. Still again, since the monad does not exist outside of other monads, these are minute perceptions lacking an object, that is, hallucinatory micro-perceptions. The world exists only in its representatives as long as they are included in each monad. It is a lapping of waves, rumor, a fog, or a mass of dancing particles of dust. It is a state of death or catalepsy, of sleep, drowsiness, or of numbness. It is as if the depths of every monad were made from infinity of tiny folds( inflections) endlessly furling and unfurling in every direction, so that the monad’s spontaneity resembles that of agitated sleepers who twist and turn on their mattresses?



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