德勒茲30

Deleuze 30 德勒茲 Perception in the Folds 摺疊之感

Translated by Springhero 雄伯

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

I must have a body, it’s a moral necessity, a “ requirement.” And in the first place, I must have a body because an obscure object lives in me. But, right from this first argument, Leibniz’s originality is tremendous. He is not saying that only the body explains what is obscure in the mind. To the contrary, the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body. We can call “ primary matter” our passive power or the limitation of our activity: we say that our primary matter requires extension, but also resistance or antitype, and yet an individuated requirement to possess a body that belongs to us. It is because there is an infinity of individual monads that each requires an individuated body, this body resembling the shadow of other monads cast upon it. Nothing obscure lives in us because we have a body, but we must have a body because there is an obscure object in us. In the place of Cartesian physical induction Leibniz substitutes a moral deduction of the body.

 

我必須要有身體,這是道德的需求,是「規定」。首先,我必須要有身體,因為一個不明物體住在我裏面。但是從第一個論點出發,萊布尼茲非常具有創見。他不是說,只有身體才能解釋心靈的不明物體。心靈是不明的,心靈深處是黑暗的,這個黑暗的特性解釋為什麼需要身體。我們稱呼「最初物體」為我們被動的力量或行動的限制;我們說我們物體需要延伸,但是也需要抗拒跟反制,可是又是一個各別的規定要擁有一個屬於我們的身體。這是因為有無數的各別的單子,每一個都要求一個各別的身體,這個單子類同投射在它身上的其它單子的陰影。不是我們有身體,不明物體就消失,而是因為我們內部有不明物體,所以我們需要有身體。萊布尼茲以道德推論身體說,來代替笛卡爾生理的歸納。

 

But this first argument gives way to another, which seems to contradict it, and which is even more original. This time, we must have a body because our mind possesses a favored—clear and distinct—zone of expression. Now it is that clear zone that is the requirement for having a body. Leibniz will go as far as stating that what I express clearly is what “ relates to my body.” And in effect, if the monad Caesar clearly expresses the crossing of the Rubicon, is it not because the river maintains a relation of proximity with his body? The same holds for all other monads whose zone of clear expression coincides with the body’s immediate environment.

 

但是這個論點為另外一個似乎矛盾,甚至更加有創意的論點所代替。這一次,我們需要身體,因為我們的心靈擁有一個清楚明白而且受鍾愛的表達區。這個表達區規定要有身體。萊布尼茲更進一步說,我清楚表達的東西跟「身體有關」。事實上,假如凱撒清楚地表達要越過盧比岡河,難道不是因為河流跟他的身體維持一個靠近的關係?同理,其它單子的清楚的表達區跟身體的鄰近環境會巧合。

 

  There are nonetheless find an inversion of causality—justifiable in certain respects—that must not impede our putting together the real order of deduction: (1) each monad condenses a certain number of unique, incorporeal, ideal events that do not put bodies in play, although they can only be stated in the form, “ Caesar crosses the Rubicon, he is assassinated by Brutus…”; ( 2) these unique events included in the monad as primary predicates constitute its zone of clear expression, or its “ subdivision”; (3) they necessarily relate to a body that belongs to this monad, and are incarnated in bodies that act immediately upon it. In brief, it is because every monad posses a clear zone that it must have a body, this zone constituting a relation with the body, not a given relation, but a genetic relation that engenders its own “ relation.” It is because we have a clear zone that we must have a body charged with traveling through it or exploring it, from birth to death.

 

可是在此,我們發現一個因果律的悖論,在某些方面言之成理,但是切勿妨礙到我們推論秩序的布置。其一,某個單子都聚集某些身體尚為運作的獨特、抽象、理念的事件,雖然要具有形式才能陳述,如「凱撒越過盧比岡河,被布盧塔斯所暗殺」。其二,這些被包含在單子裏的獨特事件,作為最初的描述,組成它清楚的表達區,或它的「次分區」。其三,事件必須跟屬於單子的身體有關。具體表現在立即行為的身體上。總之,因為每個單子擁有一個清楚的表達區,所以必須要有身體。這個表達區組成跟身體的關係,但不是特定的關係,而是產生自己的「關聯性」的基因的關係。因為我們擁有一個清楚的表達區,我們必須要有一個身體負責旅行或探索它,從生到死。

 

  Here we confront two difficulties. Why is the requirement of having a body sometimes based on a principle of passivity, in obscurity and confusion, and at others on our activity, on clarity and distinction? And more particularly, how does the existence of the body derive from the clear and distinct? As Arnauld states, how can what I express clearly and distinctly have anything to do with my body, the sum of whose movements are known only in obscurity?

 

在此我們遭遇到兩個困難。為什麼這個要有身體的規定,原則有時基於被動、不明及混亂,有時又基於主動、清晰及明白?更特別的,身體的存在如何從清楚明白的地區得來?如亞諾所述,我清楚明白表達的東西如何跟我的身體有關?而身體動作的次數又只能在不明地區知曉?

 

  Singularities proper to each monad are extended as far as the singularities of others and in all senses. Every monad thus expresses the entire world, but obscurely and dimply because it is finite and the world is infinite. That is why the lower depths of the monad are so dark. Since it does not exist outside of the monads that convey it, the world is included in each one in the form of perceptions or “ representatives,” present and infinitely minute elements. Still again, since the monad does not exist outside of other monads, these are minute perceptions lacking an object, that is, hallucinatory micro-perceptions. The world exists only in its representatives as long as they are included in each monad. It is a lapping of waves, rumor, a fog, or a mass of dancing particles of dust. It is a state of death or catalepsy, of sleep, drowsiness, or of numbness. It is as if the depths of every monad were made from infinity of tiny folds( inflections) endlessly furling and unfurling in every direction, so that the monad’s spontaneity resembles that of agitated sleepers who twist and turn on their mattresses?

 

每個單子本體的獨特性,從各方面會延伸到其它單子的獨特性。每個單子因此表達整個世界,但是單子有限,而世界無限,表達因而模糊不清。那就是為什麼單子的低層深處是如此黑暗。因為它並沒有存在於表達它的單子之外,世界以感覺或無限微小的元素組成的「符號」的形式,被包含在每個單子裏。再深一層,因為單子並不存在於其它單子之外,這些都是缺乏客體的微小的感覺,換言之,只是幻想的微細感覺。只有符號被包含在每個單子裏,世界才存在於自己的符號裏。這些符號是波浪的重疊、呢喃、迷霧、或一堆灰塵飛揚,是死亡或昏厥、睡眠、昏沉、或麻木的狀態。好像每個單子的深處都是由無窮的小小摺疊(屈折)所組成,朝每個方向摺疊及展開,所以單子的自主性類同心煩意亂的睡眠者的自主性,在睡床上蠕動翻轉。

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