德勒茲27

Deleuze 27 德勒茲 Treatise on Nomadology 論遊牧

Translated Springhero 雄伯

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

Problem 1: Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus ( or it equivalents in a group) ?

Proposition II: The exteriority of the war machine is also attested to by ethnology ( a tribute to the memory of Pierre Clastres).

 

問題一:有方法阻擋國家機構(或類同的團體)的形成嗎?

命題二:戰爭機器的外在性也從少數民族學獲得證明(紀念彼爾、克拉瑞)。

 

  Primitive, segmentary societies have often been defined as societies without a State, in other words, societies in which distinct organs of power do not appear. But the conclusion has been that these societies did not reach the degree of economic development, or the level of political differentiation, that would make the formation of the State apparatus both possible and inevitable: the implication is that primitive people “ don’t understand” so complex an apparatus. The prime interest in Pierre Clastre’s theories is that they break with this evolutionist postulate. Not only does he doubt that the State is the product of an ascribable economic development, but he asks if it is not a potential concern of primitive societies to ward off or avert that monster they supposedly do not understand. Warding off the formation of a State apparatus, making such a formation impossible, would be the objective of a certain number of primitive social mechanisms, even if they are not consciously understood as such. To be sure, primitive societies have chiefs. Buy the State is not defined by the existence of chiefs; it is defined by the perpetuation of conservation of organs of power. The concern of the State is to conserve. Special institutions are thus necessary to enable a chief to become a man of State, but diffuse, collective mechanisms are just as necessary to prevent a chief from becoming one. Mechanisms for warding off, preventive mechanisms, are a part of chieftainship and keep an apparatus distinct from the social body from crystallizing. Clastres describes the situation for the chief, who has no instituted weapon other than his prestige, no other means of persuasion, no other rule than his sense of the group’s desires. The chief is more like a leader or astar than a man of power and is always in danger of being disavowed, abandoned by his people. But Clastres goes further, identifying war in primitive societies as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the State” war maintains the dispersl and sementarity of groups, and the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits leading him to solitude and prestigious but powerless death. Clastres can thus invoke natural Law while reversing its principal proposition: just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible. It should not be concluded that war is a state of nature, but rather that it is the mode of a social state that wards off and prevents the State. Primitive war does not produce the State any more than it derives from it. And it is no better explained by exchange than by the State: far from deriving from exchange, even a sanction of its failure, war is what limits exchanges, maintains them in the framework of “ alliances” ; it is what prevents them from becoming a State factor, from fusing groups.

 

原始的四分五裂的社會時常被定義為沒有國家的社會,換言之,在此社會,並沒有出現顯而易見的權力單位。但是結論是,這些社會並沒有達到經濟發展的程度,或政治差異的水準,使國家機構的形成成為可能及必然。這意味著:原始人們「並不了解」國家機構的複雜性。彼爾,克拉瑞理論的引人之處在於捨棄進化論的假設。他不但懷疑國家是可證明的經濟發展的產物,而且他問到:阻擋或避開他們所不了解的國家怪物,是不是原始社會所潛在關心?阻擋一個國家機構的形成,使形成成為不可能,將是某些原始社會機制的目標,即使他們並非有意識地這樣做。不錯,原始社會有首領,但是首領並不是國家的定義。國家的定義就是永久保存權力單位。國家的關心是保存,因此需要特別的機構來使首領成為國家人。但是此機構也同樣需要擴散而集體,避免首領成為一尊。阻擋的機構或防止的機構是首領的部份職責,以維持不同於社會團體的國家機構不要僵化。克拉瑞描述首領的情況,首領除了威望外,別無其它可採用的武器,除了自己對團體目標的責任感外,別無其它說服的工具,也沒有其他的統治。首領更像是一個領隊或明星,而不像掌權力的人,因此總是瀕臨被族民否決及背棄的危險。但是克拉瑞更深一層探討,將原始社會的戰爭辨認為確實的機制,用來反對國家機構的形成。戰爭維持團體的分散跟分裂,戰士本身困於累積戰利品,因此陷於孤立,

死亡時雖負眾望,卻無權力。克拉瑞倒轉國家機構的主要命題時,因而引用自然法則:正如霍布思清楚所見,國家反對戰爭,所以戰爭反對國家,並使國家成為不可能。但也不應該就此結論說,戰爭就是自然的狀態,而是戰爭是社會狀態的模式,阻擋並防止國家。原始戰爭並沒有產生國家,正如國家也不是由原始戰爭延生而來。原始戰爭無法以交易或國家來解釋。戰爭不是因為交易而延生,也不是交易失敗的認可。相反的,戰爭是在限制交易,維持交易在「聯盟」的架構中。它阻止聯盟不要成為國家的因素,不要將各團體融合。

 

  The importance of this thesis is first of all to draw attention to collective mechanisms of inhibition. These mechanisms may be subtle, and function as micromechanisms. This is easily seen in certain band or pack phenomena. For example, in the case of gans of street children in Bogota, Jacques Meunier cites three ways in which the leader is prevented from acquiring stable power: the members of the band meet and undertake their theft activity in common, with collective sharing of the loot, but they disperse to eat or sleep separately; also, and especially, each member of the band is paired off with one, two, or three other member, so if he has a disagreement with the leader, he will not leave alone but will take along his allies, whose combined departure will threaten to break up the entire gang; finally, there is a diffuse age limit, and at about age fifteen a member is inevitably inducedto quit the gang. These mechanisms cannot be understood without renouncing the evolutionist vision that sees bands or packs as a rudimentary, less organized, social form. Even in bands of animals, leadership is a complex mechanism that does not act to promote the strongest but rather inhibits the installation of stable powers, in favor of fabric of immanent relations. One could just as easily compare the form “ high-society life” to the form “ sociability” among the most highly evolved men and women; high-society groups are similar to gangs and operate by the diffusion of prestige rather than by reference to centers of power, as in social groupings ( Proust clearly showed this non-correspondence of high-society values and social values). Eugene Sue, a man of high society and a dandy, whom legitimists reproached for frequenting the Orleans family, used to say: “ I’m not on the side of the family, I side with the pack.” Packs, bands, are groups of the rhizome type, as opposed to the arborescent type that centers around organs of power. That is why bands in general, even those engaged in banditry or high-society life, are metamorphoses of awar machine formally distinct from all State  apparatuses or their equivalents, which are instead what structure centralized societies. We certainly would not say that discipline is what defines a war machine: discipline is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated them. The war machine answers to other rules. We are not saying that they are better, of course, only that they animalte a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor, all of which, once against, impedes the formation of the State.

 

   這個命題的重要性首先是要吸引我們注意到壓抑的集團機制。這些機制可能很微妙,充當微小的機制。這在某些黑道黨派中很容易看得出來。例如,在波卡達的街頭小孩的幫派當中,約克、缪尼就引用三個方式,首領被阻止獲得穩定的權力。幫派的成員會聚一起從事共同的偷竊行動,集體分配掠奪物品,但是分散開來吃或分開睡覺。而且,特別的,每位幫派的成員都是兩人到三四人地成一組,這樣他若跟首領有異議,他不會單獨,而是帶走盟友。他們若連手離去,會威脅到使整個幫派瓦解。最後還有一個擴散的年齡限制,在大約十五歲時,成員無可避免要脫離幫派。這些機制若不放棄進化論的觀點,無法理解,因為進化論認為幫派是初期的組織鬆散的社會形態。即使在動物群聚,領導也是複雜的機制,被運用不是要提高最強者,而是壓抑穩定權力的安制,以贊同內在關係的組織。我們也可能很輕易地比較「高級社會」的形式,跟高度進化的男人與女人的形式。高級社會的團體類同幫派,運作時以威望的擴散,而不是中於權力核心,如同在社會的聚會(普魯斯特很清楚地顯示,他與高級社會的價值跟社會價質格格不入。)尤金、蘇是一位高級社會的人,也是一位花花公子,被正規成員譴責造訪奧爾良家庭,他常常說:「我不是偏向那個家庭,我偏向族群。」族群,幫派都是根莖類的團體,相對於環繞著權力核心的分枝形態。那就是為什麼一般的幫派,即使是從事高級社會黨派的人,都是戰爭機器的蛻變,形態上就跟國家機構或相等的組織不同,後者是中央集權為架構的社會。我們雅不欲說,紀律就是戰爭機器的定義,因為紀律是軍隊所要求的特色,當國家篡奪了軍隊。戰爭機器回應其它規則。當然,我們並不是說,這些規則更好,只是說這些規則激發戰士基本上不按紀律行事,質疑官僚階層,並不斷地以背棄跟叛離作為恫嚇,並發揮譽感。這些會一再地防礙到國家的形成。

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