拉岡講座223

拉岡講座223

The I lie and the I think•
我說謊及我思故我在
2
You will see why the relation of the subject to the signifier is the reference-point that I wished to place at the forefront of a general rectification of analytic theory, for it is as primary and constitutive in the establishment of analytic experience as it is primary and constitutive in the radical function of the
unconscious.

你們將看出，為什麼主體跟意符的關係是我希望擺置在分析理論矯正的前鋒的符號點，因為那個關係是精神分析經驗建立的根基，如同它是無意識的積極運作的根基。

It is, no doubt, one of the effects of my teaching to limit the unconscious to what might be called its narrowest platform. But it is in relation to this point of division that I cannot err on the side of any substantification.

無疑地，將無意識局限於它最狹窄的平台，是我講學受到影響的不得不然。由於這個區分點，我要將無意識具體表述時，我才不會犯錯誤。

I will centre things on the four-cornered schema of my graph, which purposely distinguishes the level of the enunciation (énonciation) from the level of the statement (énoncé). Its use can be illustrated from the fact that a too formal logical thinking introduces absurdities, even an antinomy of reason in the statement I am lying, whereas everyone knows that there is no such thing.

我將主題集中於我圖形的四個角落的基型，這樣我才可以刻意區分表達的層次跟陳述的層次。它的用途可以從以下事實看出端倪：太過正式的邏輯推理會導致自相矛盾的悖論，即使在「我正在說謊」這句陳述，本身就是邏輯上自相否定的矛盾，可是大家卻習焉不察。

It is quite wrong to reply to this I am lying—If you say, I am lying, you are telling the truth, and therefore you are not lying, and so on. It is quite clear that the I am lying, despite its paradox, is perfectly valid. Indeed, the I of the enunciation is not the same as the I of the statement, that is to say, the shifter which, in the statement, designates him. So, from the point at which I state, it is quite possible for me to formulate in a valid way that the I—the I who, at that moment, formulates the
statement—is lying, that he lied a little before, that he is lying afterwards, or even, that in saying I am lying, he declares that he has the intention of deceiving. One does not have to go very far to illustrate this with an example—take the Jewish joke in which one Jew tells another that he is catching the
train for Lemberg.

「我正在說謊」這句話怎麼回答都會有矛盾。假如你說「我正在說謊」，這句話屬實，那麼你就不算是正在說謊。可是，顯而易見地，「我正在說謊話」這句話，雖然本身矛盾，卻又是千真萬確。的確，作為表達的「我」跟作為陳述的「我」，並不相同，換言之，在陳述中，「我」被轉換成為指明是「他」。所以，從我在陳述這個角度來看，我明確地說明，在當時，正在說明這句陳述的「我」，其實是在說謊。他先前說謊，他隨後又圓謊說，在說「我正在說謊」時，他宣稱他是有意說謊。這樣的情境是可能存在的。這樣的例子多到不勝枚舉。例如，有個猶太人的笑話。一位猶太人告訴另一位猶太人，他正在趕搭乘開往列伯革的火車

Why are you telling me you are going to Lemberg, the other replies, since you really are going there, and that, jf you are telling me this, it is so that I shall think that you are going to Cracow?

「你為什麼告訴我，你正在往列伯革途中？」另一位猶太人問，「假如你真的正在那裡的途中，那在我面前是誰？我們現在搭乘的是開往克拉羅的火車。」

This division between the statement and the enunciation means that, in effect, from the I am lying which is at the level of the chain of the statement—the I am lying is a signifier, forming part, in the Other, of the treasury of vocabulary in which the I, determined retroactively, becomes a signification, engendered at the level of the statement, of what it produces at the level of the enunciation—what results is an I am deceiving you. The I am deceiving you arises from the point at which the analyst awaits the subject, and sends back to him, according to the formula, his own message in its true signification, that is to say, in an inverted form. He says to him— in this I am deceiving you,
What you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are felling the truth.

陳述主體跟表達主體的區分意味著，從「我正在說謊」這句陳述的鎖鏈層次而言，「我正在說謊」是意符，在大它者那裡組成辭彙集錦的部份。在辭彙集錦裡，「我」勢必被反應成為一種符號意義，這個意義在陳述的層次被產生。而在表達層次所產生的結果，就變成一句「我正在欺騙你」。「我正在欺騙你」這句陳述之所以成立，因為精神分析師正在等待主體的時刻，將自己的訊息的真實意義，禮尚往來地回饋給他，換言之，以一種倒轉的方式。他對他說，「我正在欺騙你」這句陳述，你所要傳送的訊息，是我對你所表達的內容，當你在傳送訊息時，你正在說實話。

In the way of deception in which the subject is venturing, the analyst is in a position to formulate this you are telling the truth, and my interpretation has meaning only in this dimension.

主體正在欺騙，精神分析師回之以欺騙，他的立場能夠說「你正在欺騙我」這句話是實話。我的詮釋只有從這個角度來看，才有意義。

I would like to show you how this schema can help us in grasping Freud’s fundamental approach, which became possible with the discovery of the unconscious—which, of course, has always been there, at the time of Thales and at the level of the most primitive inter-human modes of relations.

我想要告訴你們，這個基型如何能夠幫忙我們，設法了解佛洛伊德在發現無意識之後，建立的一些基本的研究途徑。當然，自古以來，即使在原始的人際關係模式中，無意識早已經存在。

Let us bring to this schema the Cartesian I think. Certainly, the distinction between the enunciation and the statement is what makes their sliding away (glissement) always possible, and their possible stumbling block. In effect, if anything is established by the cogito, it is the register of thought, in so far as it is extracted from an opposition to extension—a fragile status, but a sufficient status in the order of the constitution.

讓我們再回到笛卡爾的「我思故我在」。的確，表達跟陳述之間的區別是彼此閃失，障礙的原因。事實上，在認知的「我」方面，可成立的部份就是思想，因為思想是從其相對的部份（也就是身體）延伸出來。這是一個脆弱的地位，但是在構成的秩序上卻能自成一方。

Let us say that it is by taking its place at the level of the enunciation that the cogito acquires its certainty. But the status of the I think is as reduced, as minimal, as punctual—and might be just as affected by the connotation of the that is meaningless— as that of the I am lying referred to earlier.

我們不妨這樣說，就是認知的我思，在表達的層次上替而代之，他才得到自己的確定性。但是這個「我思」的地位，跟我先前所提到的「我正在說謊」一樣，是抵銷，是妄自菲薄的確定，同樣受到「我說的是空話」的內涵的影響。

Perhaps the I think, reduced to this punctuality of being certain only of the absolute doubt concerning all signification, its own included, has a still more fragile status than that in which we were able to attack the I am lying.

也許這個「我思」甚至比「我正在說謊」的地位還更加脆弱，因為它淪落的地位，是確定他對於所有意義都絕對懷疑

I will now dare to define the Cartesian I think as participating, in its striving towards certainty, in a sort of abortion. The difference of status given to the subject by the discovered dimension of the Freudian unconscious derives from desire, which must be situated at the level of the cogito. Whatever animates, that which any enunciation speaks of, belongs to desire. I would remark in passing that desire, as I formulate it, in relation to what Freud contributes here, goes further.

我現在大膽地把笛卡爾的「我思故我在」定義為：一邊追求確定性，一邊又參與廢除確定性。佛洛伊德所發現的無意識國度，使主體的地位整個改觀，其根源來自欲望，位於「我思故我在」的層次。任何激發生命力的東西，任何表達所提到的東西，都屬於欲望。容我再三地說，我所闡述的，以及佛洛伊德所發現的這個欲望，影響還不僅僅是這些。

I will pinpoint the function of the Cartesian cogito by the term monster or homunculus. This function is illustrated by the curve, which has not failed to occur in the history of what is called thought, which consists in taking this I of the cogito for the homunculus who has long been represented whenever one has wished to practise psychology—whenever one has wished to account for inanity or psychological discordance by the presence, inside man, of the celebrated little fellow who governs him, who is the driver, the point of synthesis, as we now say. The function of this little fellow was already denounced by pre-Socratic thought.

我想要用怪物或侏儒的觀念，來詮釋笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的功用。在所謂的思想史上，「我思」的地位有其興衰的變化。有時，「我思故我在」的「我」被認為是怪物。每當我們希望從事心理學，我們就以這個怪物的「我思」當代表。而每當我們希望解釋，由於支配人的這位著名的侏儒怪物「我思」存在於人的內部，產生了生命的麻木不仁及不協調，這個侏儒的怪物又成為人的行為的驅動者，成為總其事者，如我們現在的說法。這個「我思」的侏儒怪物的功用，在前蘇格拉底思想的時代，就已經受到抨擊。

In my own vocabulary, on the other hand, I symbolize the subject by the barred S [$1, in so far as it is constituted as secondary in relation to the signifier. In order to illustrate this, I will remind you that the thing may be presented in the simplest possible way by the single stroke. The first signifier is the notch by which it is indicated, for example, that the subject has killed one animal, by means of which he will not become confused in his memory when he has killed ten others. He will not have to remember which is which, and it is by means of this single stroke that he will count them.

另一方面，以我的術語，我用中間畫一條斜線槓的S，來象徵作為主體的人，因為意符與主體組成的關係的層次是次級。我要提醒你們，這一條斜線的槓，簡單地呈現人的真相。第一層次的意符就是那被指明的猛力一擊，例如，主體殺死一隻動物，這第一次的殺戮記憶最為鮮明，即使當他後來又殺死十隻其它動物。他不需要去記住哪一次是哪一隻，憑藉那猛力一擊，他就能夠算得清楚。

The subject himself is marked off by the single stroke, and first he marks himself as a taboo, the first of the signifiers. When this signifier, this one, is established—the reckoning is one one. It is at the level, not of the one, but of the one one, at the level of the reckoning, that the subject has to situate himself as such. In this respect, the two ones are already distinguished. Thus is marked the first split that makes the subject as such distinguish himself from the sign in relation to which, at first, he has been able to constitute himself as subject. I would now warn you against confusing the function of the $ with the image of the objet a, in so far as it is thus that the subject sees himself duplicated— sees himself as constituted by the reflected, momentary, precarious image of mastery, imagines himself to be a man
merely by virtue of the fact that he imagines himself.

主體本身就是由那一擊標示出來。首先，他標示自己是一個受到禁忌的主體，是意符的第一層次。當這個意符，這個第一次，被建立的時刻，刻骨銘心的就是這個第一次。主體將自己的位置，不是定在意符的刻痕，而是定在刻骨銘心的第一次。在這一方面，兩個主體的第一次就被區分出來。主體的第一次分裂在此被標示，區別他自己跟符號有所不同。起初，他還能夠維持跟符號的互動關係，組成自己作為主體。不過，我現在要警告你們，不要將這個欲望被禁制的主體的功能，跟小客體的形象混為一談。在小客體的地方，主體看到自己被複製，看到組成自己的形象，是倒影、是瞬間、是身不由己的變化無常。他想像自己作為人的主體，只存在於自己的想像之中。

In analytic practice, mapping the subject in relation to reality, such as it is supposed to constitute us, and not in relation to the signifier, amounts to falling already into the degradation of the psychological constitution of the subject.

在精神分析領域，不是找出主體跟意符的關係，而是找出主體跟真實界的關係，因為主體應該是在真實界組成。不過，這等於是倒退到以前的說法：人是個心理組成的主體。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記981224

雄伯手記981224

「C真是好能幹！」A望洋興嘆。
「能幹有什麼不好？」B 問道。
「太能幹的人就太容易成功。」
「成功有什麼不好？我們不都也曾經渴望成功？」
「問題是在成功的人眼中，原先的大它者都會成為小客體。」
「能夠當人家的小客體也不錯，難道你還真以為你曾經是人家的大它者？」
「沒什麼。我只是突然聯想到列維納斯Levinas在整體與無限Totality and Infinity 開頭第一句所說的 Real life is absence and we are in the world. （真實的生命是欠缺，而我們在世界裡。）」
「那有什麼好大驚小怪的。拉岡不也說過：You never look at me from the place I see you.!」

拉岡講座223

拉岡講座222

II
ANALYSIS AND TRUTH OR
THE CLOSURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
精神分析與真理 或無意識的封閉

Telling the truth, lying, being wrong•
說實話、說謊話、說錯誤的話

Last time, I introduced the concept of the transference. I did so in a rather problematic way, from the standpoint of the difficulties it presented to the analyst. I took the opportunity offered me by an article published in a recent number of the most official organ of psycho-analysis, The International Journal
of Psycho-Analysis, which went so far as to question the use in analysis of the notion of transference. I now intend to return to this article.

上一次，我介紹移情的觀念。從它呈現給精神分析師的困境的觀點而言，我介紹得相當具有爭議性。國際精神分析雜誌是精神分析的官方喉舌，最近剛出版的一期有一篇文章，囂張地質疑移情在精神分析學的用途。我利用人家送給我看的機會，借題發揮。

I
According to the author, the analyst is supposed to point out to the patient the effects of more or less manifest discordances that occur with regard to the reality of the analytic situation, namely, the two real subjects who are present in it.

依照作者，精神分析師應該對病人指出，在精神分析的情境現況中，多多少少會發生一些明顯不協調的印象，換言之，出現在現場的是兩位生命的主體。

First, there are the cases in which the effect of discordance is very obvious. It is illustrated, in a humorous way, by Spitz, one of the old guard, and no fool, by way of amusing his public. He takes as an example one of his patients, who, in a dream that is called a transference dream—that is to say, a
dream involving the realization of erotic desires with one’s analyst, with Spitz himself; as it happens—sees him sporting a head of luxuriant blond hair—which, for anyone who has seen
the bald pate of the character in question, and it is well enough known to be regarded as famous, would seem to be a case in which the analyst could quite easily show the subject just how far the effects of the unconscious can give rise to distortion.

首先，有些情形，不協調的印象甚為顯著。史匹茲是捍衛精神分析學的前輩，不是泛泛之輩。他幽默地舉出一個例子博君一笑。他取他的一位病人當例子。這位病人在所謂移情之夢中，換言之，這個夢的內容是跟她的精神分析師，也就是史匹茲他自己，實現性慾望的滿足。她在夢中偶然地看到他展現一頭蓬勃的金髮。對於曾見過史匹茲光禿頭頂的人，知道那個禿頂還鼎鼎大名，這個夢會讓人詼諧失笑。精神分析師能夠很輕易地告訴病人，無意識的情懷會產生多大的扭曲。

But when it is a question of qualifying a patient’s behavior as uncomplimentary to the analyst, You have the choice of two things, says Szasz—the analyst’s view is correct and is considered
‘reality’; the patient’s view is incorrect, and is considered ‘transference’. This brings us back to that at once mythical and idealizing pole that Szasz calls the integrity of the analyst.

但是病人的行為若是貶抑精神分析師，要如何處理？薩茲說你有兩種選擇：一是精神分析師的觀點正確，而且是「真實」所在，二是病人的觀點不正確，並且被認為是一種「移情」。這讓我們又回到，薩茲所稱為的精神分析師的尊嚴，扮演既神秘又理想化的角色。

What can this mean, if it is not a recall to the dimension of truth? 1 can only situate this article, then, in the perspective in which its author himself places it, considering him as operating not in a heuristic, but in an eristic way, manifesting, in the impasse into which his reflection has led him, the presence of a true crisis of conscience in the function of the analyst. This crisis of conscience concerns us only in an incidental way, since I have shown that a certain one-sided way of theorizing the practice of the analysis of the transference would necessarily lead to it. It is a slippery slope that I myself have been denouncing for a long time.

這難道不是意味著真理向度的被撤銷？因此，我只能將這篇文章定位為作者自己身陷僵局，進退維谷時的自白，文章的開展不是啟發探索，而是辯解自道，因為精神分析師的功能，在良心的煎熬中危急存亡。這個良心的危機，我們只是偶然遭遇。我曾說過，一廂情願地建構移情在精神分析的理論，必然會導致這樣的窘困。

To bring us back to the almost phenomenological data that enable us to resituate the problem where it actually is, I showed you last time that in the relation of the one with the other that is set up in analysis, one dimension is eluded.

我們再回到近乎現象學的資訊，我們才能夠將此難題放置回原來位置。上一次，我說過，我們跟它者在精神分析所建立的關係，有一個向度被閃躲掉。

It is clear that this relation is established on a plane that is not reciprocal, not symmetrical. This much Szasz observes, only, quite wrongly, to deplore it—in this relation of the one with the other, there is established a search for truth in which the one is supposed to know, or at least to know more than the other.

顯而易見，這個關係不是被建立於互惠或平衡的基準上。薩茲已經觀察到，卻只是痛心疾首：在我們跟它者的關係，建立的基礎是對於真理的追尋。在追尋真理的過程，有一方應該知道，至少應該知道得比另一方多。

From the latter, the thought immediately arises that not only must he not make a mistake (se trompa) , but also that he can be misled (on pent le tromper). The making a mistake (se tromper) is, by the same token, thrown back upon the subject. It is not simply that the subject is, in a static way, lacking, in error. It is that, in a moving way, in his discourse, he is essentially situated in the dimension of the making a mistake (se tromper).

就後者而言，他立刻會浮起這樣的念頭：他不但一定不要犯錯誤，而且他有被誤導的可能。同樣地，犯錯誤在前者也會發生。並不僅是因為主體本身的欠缺，犯錯誤本是家常便飯，而且因為在他極力表述真理時，他基本的位置就是錯誤頻仍的國度。

I have found a description of this from yet another analyst. I am referring to Nunberg, who, in the International Journal of Psycho-analysis, published, in 1926, an article entitled The Will of Recovery. By recovery, he means not so much guérison (cure), as restauration (restoration), retour (return). The word is very well chosen and poses a question well worth our attention. What, in the last resort, can drive the patient to have recourse to the analyst, to ask him for something he calls health, when his
symptom—so the theory says—is created in order to bring him certain satisfactions?

我曾經從另外一位精神分析師找到這樣的描述。我指的是任伯格。在1926年出版的國際精神分析雜誌，他發表一篇文章，標題是「康復的意志」。所謂康復，他的意思不是治療，而是恢復健康。他精挑細選的這個字詞，暴露一個值得我們注意的問題。依據理論的說法，病徵的出現是為了讓病人得到心理的補償。那追根究底，是什麼動機驅使病人尋求精神分析師的幫助，要求給予他所謂的健康？

With a great many examples, many of them humorous, Nunberg has no difficulty in showing that one doesn’t have to have gone very far in analysis to see, sometimes with great clarity, that what motivated the patient in his search for health, for balance, is precisely his unconscious aim, in its most immediate implications. What shelter, for example, does recourse to analysis have to offer him, in order to re-establish peace in his home, when some hitch has occurred in his sexual function, or some extra-marital desire!

用許多幽默的例子，任伯格輕而易舉地顯示，我們甚至不需要是精神分析的行家，有時也會很明白地看出，病人尋求恢復健康及平衡的動機，確實就是他的無意識的目標，他當下的起心動念。若是這樣，例如，萬一病人的起心動念發生在性欲望的蠢動，外遇或劈腿的念頭，精神分析有什麼方法給予求助者庇護，可以讓他重新建立他在家裡的平靜？

From the outset, the patient admits to a desire, in the form of a temporary suspension of his presence at home, the opposite of what he came to propose as the first aim of his analysis—not the restoration of
his marriage, but a break with it.

從一開頭，病人就坦白承認，他的欲望，跟他來尋求精神分析的首要目的相反，只是暫時擺脫處在家中的困境。他的欲望不是要恢復他的婚姻，而是要終止它。

We now find ourselves at last—in the very act of the commitment to analysis and certainly, therefore, in its first stages —in maximum contact with the profound ambiguity of any assertion on the part of the patient, and the fact that it is, of itself; double-sided. In the first instance, it is as establishing itself in, and even by, a certain lie, that we see set up the dimension of truth, in which respect it is not, strictly speaking, shaken, since the lie as such is itself posited in this dimension of truth.

我們現在發現，當我們還在精神分析的前面幾個階段努力從事，我們自己最後大量接觸到的是，病人方面的主張極端曖昧，以及精神分析本身就是雙邊互動的事實。在第一個情形，精神分析的立場就是謊言，及根據謊言。我們看到某些的謊言建立了真理的國度。在這一方面，嚴格說，謊言並沒有受到動搖，因為謊言本身就被定位在真理的國度。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座221

拉岡講座201

An article in The International Journal
國際雜誌的一篇文章

4
There is a crisis in analysis and, to show that there is nothing biased in this, I would support my view by citing a recent article that demonstrates this in the most striking way—and it is the work of no mediocre mind. It is a closely argued, very engaging article by Thomas S. Szasz—who hails from Syracuse, which fact, unfortunately, does not make him any more closely related to Archimedes, for this Syracuse is in New York State—which appeared in the latest number of The International
Journal of Psychoanalysis

精神分析界有一個危機。為了表示我不是危言聳聽，我引述一篇文章支持我的觀點。這篇文章一針見血地揭露時弊，足見其睿智不凡。這是一篇頗具爭議性的引人注意的文章，發表在「國際精神分析學雜誌」，作者是湯姆士、薩茲。他從錫拉丘茲發聲，不幸地，這個事實未能讓他沾上跟阿基米德有什麼關係的光，因為這是位於的美國錫拉丘茲。

The author was inspired to write this article by an idea in keeping with the line of investigation that inspired his earlier articles, a truly moving search for the authenticity of the analytic way. It is quite striking that an author, who is indeed one of the most highly regarded in his circle, which is specifically that of American psychoanalysis , should regard transference as nothing more than a defence on the part of the psycho-analyst, and should arrive at the following conclusion—the transference is the pivot on which the entire structure of psycho-analytic treatment rests.

作者寫這篇文章的動機，是他早先曾發表文章，苦心孤詣地探索精神分析學的真誠問題。他現在想要繼續觀察是否有新的發展。耐人尋味地，這位作者在其學界，明確地說，在美國精神分析學的學界頗受人敬仰。但是他卻將移情視為僅僅是精神分析師單方面的一種防衛，並且竟然得到以下的結論：移情是精神分析治療整個架構所依賴的軸心。

This is a concept that he calls inspired—I am always suspicious of faux arnie in English vocabulary, so I have tried to tread warily when translating it. This inspired, it seemed to me, did not mean inspire, but something like offiicieux. It is an inspired and indispensable concept—I quote—yet it harbors the seeds, not only of its own destruction, but of the destruction of psycho-analysis itself. Why? Because it tends to place the person of the analyst beyond the reality testing of patients, colleagues, and self . This hazard must be frankly recognized. Neither professionalization, nor the ‘raising of standards’, nor coerced training analyses can protect us from this danger. And here the confusion arises—only the integrity of the analyst and of the analytic situation can safeguard from extinction the unique dialogue between analysand and analyst.

這是一個觀念，他稱之為「啟發」。法文是faux arnie，英文辭彙我不太把握，所以翻譯時我掙扎了很久。我覺得「啟發」並不完全是望文生義地啟發，而是有點類似法文的 offiicieux啟悟。這是一個受到啟發的不可欠缺的觀念，容我引述一下：「可是它不但蘊含會毀滅自己，而且會毀滅精神分析界的種子。為什麼？因為它傾向於將精神分析師這個位置放置於病人、同事、跟自己的考驗場域之外。這個危險，我們必須坦白承認，因為再多的專業，再怎樣的提高水準，再怎樣的強制分析訓練，都無法保護我們避開這個危險。」但是矛盾的地方就在此：「只有精神分析師跟精神分析情境的尊嚴，才能捍衛病人跟精神分析師之間的對話，免於消滅。」

This blind alley that Szasz has created for himself is, for him, necessitated by the very fact that he can conceive of the analysis of the transference only in terms of an assent obtained from the healthy part of the ego, that part which is capable of judging reality and of separating it from illusion.

薩茲自己創建出來的這道死巷，存在的必要是由於以下這個事實：他只有從自我的健全得到同意，他才能夠構想移情的分析，而且自我的健全要有能力判斷現實以及分開現實跟幻覺。

His article begins thus, quite logically— Transference is similar to such concepts as delusion, illusion, and phantasy. Once the presence of the transference has been established, it is a question of agreement between the analysand and the analyst, except that here the analyst is a judge against whom there is neither appeal nor recourse, we are led to call any analysis of the transference a field of pure, uncontrolled hazard.

他的推論因此順理成章開展：「移情類同於幻覺、幻想、及幻見。」移情的存在一但被建立，那就是病人跟精神分析師之間兩相同意的問題。唯一不同的是，精神分析師本身是法官，無法對他提出抗告或訴訟。我們不得不認為任何這種移情的分析，是一個危機四伏的場域。

I have taken this article only as an extreme case, but a very revealing one, so as to encourage us to restore here a determination that should bring into play another order—that of truth. Truth is based only on the fact that speech, even when it consists of lies, appeals to it and gives rise to it. This dimension
is always absent from the logical positivism that happens to dominate Szasz’s analysis of the concept of transference.

我引述這篇文章，只是當著是一個極端的例子，但是它頗引人深省，鼓勵我們重振旗鼓，探討另一個運作的層次，真理的層次。作為真理基礎的事實是：話語訴諸於真理，並產生真理，即使話語本身有時是由謊言組成。可是，薩茲談論移情的觀念的分析時，他表現的理性實證主義，總是欠缺這個自知之明。

My own conception of the dynamics of the unconscious has been called an intellectualization—on the grounds that I based the function of the signifier in the forefront. Is it not apparent that it is in this operational mode—in which everything makes light of the confrontation between a reality and a connotation of illusion attributed to the phenomenon of the transference— that this supposed intellectualization really resides?

我自己對於無意識作為生命力的觀念，一直被稱為科學的知性研究，因為我將意符的功用擺置在前鋒。這難道不是顯而易見？我們所被認為的知性研究，基礎不就在於無意識與意符之間的這個運作的模式，也就是，移情現象產生的幻想，意味著，它完全不把跟現實之間的衝突，當著一回事？

Far from us having to consider two subjects, in a dual position, to discuss an objectivity that appears to have been posited there as the gravitational effect of a compression in behaviour, we must bring out the domain of possible deception.

這個幻想跟現實分離的現象，我們絲毫不需要考慮到是兩個主體處於雙重立場。似乎有人已經提出：在存在的客觀環境，人的行為會受到類似地心引力的壓縮的影響。為了討論這個客觀環境，我們必須顯示，這裡有可能是欺騙的領域，

When I introduced you to the subject of Cartesian certainty as the necessary starting-point of all our speculations as to what the unconscious reveals, I pointed out the role of essential balancer played in Descartes by the Other which, it is said, must on no account be deceptive. In analysis, the danger is that this Other will be deceived. This is not the only dimension to be apprehended in the transference. But one has to admit that if there is one domain in which, in discourse, deception has some chance of success, it is certainly love that provides its model.

我跟你們介紹過，笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的這個主體是確定性，是我們研究無意識顯露出什麼的一個必須的出發點。我曾指出，笛卡爾用來扮演重要的平衡角色的這個大它者，有人說，必然是欺騙性的。在精神分析學，危險所在是，大它者將會被欺騙。談到移情時，我們所要理解的還不僅僅是這個角度。我們還需要承認，在真理表述時，假如還有讓欺騙有得逞的機會，確實只有愛情表述時，庶幾可以類比。

What better way of assuring oneself, on the point on which one is mistaken, than to persuade the other of the truth of what one says! Is not this a fundamental structure of the dimension of love that the transference gives us the opportunity of depicting?

在我們受人誤解的時刻，除了說服對方，我們所說的內容是千真萬確外，還有什麼更好的方法來確信我們自己的心？移情之所以讓我們有表述的機會，難道不就是愛情表述這個基本的結構？

In persuading the other that he has that which may complement us, we assure ourselves of being able to continue to misunderstand precisely what we lack. The circle of deception, in so far as it highlights the dimension of love at the point named—this will serve us as an exemplary door to demonstrate the trick next time.

在說服對方，他擁有跟我們互補的東西，我們讓自己確信，我們能夠繼續誤解我們自己確實所欠缺的。這是欺騙的循環，因為它強調愛之所以為愛的角度。這是個典範的例子，下一次我們要証明移情的詭計時還會用到。

But this is not all I have to show you, for it is not what radically causes the closure involved in the transference. What causes it, and this will be the other side of our examination of the concepts of the transference, is—to come back to the question mark inscribed in the left part, the shaded, reserved
part—what I have designated by the objet a.

不過，這還不是我要告訴你們的全部，因為移情牽涉到的封閉，主要的原因還不是在此。引起封閉的原因，位於移情的觀念受到審查的另一邊，讓我們回到左邊的這個問號，這個陰影的保留區，也就是我曾經指明小客體的東西。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡220

拉岡講座200

The Presence of Analysts
精神分析師在現場

The Other, already there•
大它者已經在那裡

The unconscious is outside
無意識在外面。

3
This brings us to the function of the transference. For this indeterminate of pure being that has no point of access to determination, this primary position of the unconscious that is articulated as constituted by the indetermination of the subject—it is to this that the transference gives us access, in an enigmatic way. It is a Gordian knot that leads us to the following conclusion—the subject is looking for his certainty. And the certainty of the analyst himself concerning the unconscious cannot be derived from the concept of the transference.

這使我們又回到移情的功用。純粹存在的不確定性並沒有讓確定性有進入的點，無意識的原初位置被表達為由主體的不確定性所組成，所以只有靠著移情才能接近這個地方。這似乎有點奧秘，像高地安的三環相扣的結，因此我們得到以下的結論：主體正在尋找他自己的確定性。關於無意識，從移情的觀念那裡，我們也無法得到精神分析師自己的確定性。

It is striking, therefore, to observe the multiplicity, the plurality, the plurivalence even, of the conceptions of the transference that have been formulated in analysis. I do not claim to be able to provide you with an exhaustive account of them. I shall simply try to guide you through the paths of a
chosen exploration.

因此，耐人尋味的，我們觀察到，精神分析學所闡釋的移情的觀念具有多重性、多樣性、甚至像是多重原子價。我不敢確定，我能夠提供給你們詳盡的描述。我只是設法引導你們穿過這條我們苦心孤詣探索的小徑。

At its emergence in the writings and teachings of Freud, a sliding-away (glissenzent), which we cannot impute to him, lies in wait for us —this consists in seeing in the concept of the transference no more than the concept of repetition itself. Let us not forget that when Freud presents it to us, he says —what
cannot be remembered is repeated in behaviour. This behaviour, in order to reveal what it repeats, is handed over to the analyst’s reconstruction.

佛洛伊德的著作及學說出現時，等待我們去接觸的就是欠缺。這不能怪罪於他，倒是讓我們從移情的觀念上看到僅僅是重複本身的觀念。我們不要忘記，佛洛伊德傳道授業時，他說：「我們忘記的事，會在行為表現出來。」為了讓這個行為顯露它的重複，我們只好將它送到精神分析師那裡重新建構。

One may go so far as to believe that the opacity of the trauma—as it was then maintained in its initial function by Freud’s thought, that is to say, in my terms, its resistance to signification—is then specifically held responsible for the limits of remembering. And, after all, it is hardly surprising,
given my own theorization, that I should see this as a highly significant moment in the transfer of powers from the subject to the Other, what I call the capital Other (le grand Autre), the locus of speech and, potentially, the locus of truth.

有人甚至相信，我們的記憶所以受阻，是因為創傷的難於釋懷，這是佛洛伊德在早期的學說所主張，換言之，我的說法是，創傷抗拒符號化。畢竟，從我的理論系統，我竟然會將這一點看著是權力從主體轉移到大它者的非常重要的時刻，並不足為奇。我用大寫字母的這個大它者，是言說的軌跡，潛藏著真理的軌跡。

Is this the point at which the concept of the transference appears? It would seem so, and one often goes no further. But let us look at it more closely. In Freud, this moment is not simply the moment-limit that seems to correspond to what I designated as the moment of the closing up of the unconscious, a temporal pulsation that makes it disappear at a certain point of its statement (enonce). When Freud introduces the function of the transference, he is careful to mark this moment as the cause of what we call the transference. The Other, latent or not, is, even beforehand, present in the subjective revelation, It is already there, when something has begun to yield itself from the unconscious.

移情的觀念就出現在這個時刻嗎？看起來似乎是這樣，然後有些人就不再探究下去。但是讓我們更仔細觀察一下。佛洛伊德認為，這個時刻並不僅僅是限制的時刻，似乎對應於我所指明是無意識封閉的時刻，一個瞬間的悸動，在表達的某個時刻消失。佛洛伊德介紹移情的功用時，他很謹慎地將這個時刻標明為我們所謂的移情的原因。大它者，無論潛藏與否，存在於主體的啟悟，甚是事先存在。大它者已經先在那裡，然後從無意識那裡，某種情愫開始產生。

The analyst’s interpretation merely reflects the fact that the unconscious, if it is what I say it is, namely, a play of the signifier, has already in its formations—dreams, slips of tongue or pen, witticisms or symptoms—proceeded by interpretation.

精神分析師的解釋僅僅反映這個事實，無意識若是我說的那個樣子，換言之，是意符的運作，它在形成時，我們解釋所運用的夢、口誤或筆誤、機智語或病徵等，都已經先存在。

The Other, the capital Other, is already there in every opening, however fleeting it may be, of the unconscious. What Freud shows us, from the outset, is that the transference is essentially resistant, Ubertragungiwiderstand. The transference is the means by which the communication of the unconscious is interrupted, by which the unconscious closes up again. Far from being the handing over of powers to the unconscious, the transference is, on the contrary, its closing up.

大它者、字母大寫的它者，已經在無意識的每道開口的地方，無論是多麼的瞬間短暫。從一開始，佛洛伊德就告訴我們，移情本質上具有抗拒作用。移情是一個媒介，無意識的溝通被這個媒介所中斷，無意識因而又再關閉。

This is essential in noting the paradox that is expressed quite commonly in the fact —which may even be found in Freud’s writings—that the analyst must await the transference before beginning to give his interpretation.

我們必須注意到一個時常聽到的矛盾，在佛洛伊德著作也可能找到的矛盾：精神分析師必須先等待對方移情，才開始解釋。

I want to stress this question because it is the dividing line between the correct and incorrect conception of the transference. In analytic practice, there are many ways of conceiving the transference. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They may be defined at different levels. For example, although the conceptions of the relation of the subject to one or other of• those agencies which, in the second stage of his Topography, Freud was able to define as the ego-ideal or the super-ego, are partial, this is often simply to give a lateralized view of what is essentially the relation with the capital Other.

我要強調這個問題，因為這是移情的觀念正確或不正確的分界線。在精神分析學領域，有關移情的看法很多種。這些看法未必都互相排斥。他們可能有不同層次的定義。例如，在佛洛伊德用地形學詮釋的第二階段，他能夠將主體與代理主體的關係的觀念，定義為自我的理想或超我。雖然這個觀念只是部份說法，它時常被用來片面解釋，基本上它是跟大它者的關係。

But there are other divergences that are irreducible. There is a conception which, wherever it is formulated, can only contaminate practice—I am referring to the conception which would have the analysis of the transference proceed on the basis of an alliance with the healthy part of the subject’s ego, and consists in appealing to his common sense, by way of pointing out to him the illusory character of certain of his actions in his relation with the analyst.

但是有些其他的歧義無法如此一目了然。有一個不知是何方神聖提出的觀念，卻只會污染精神分析的領域。這個觀念，將移情的分析牽扯到要維護主體的自我的建康，訴諸於他自己的俗見，作為詮釋他跟精神分析師互動時的一廂情願的幻想。

This is a thesis that subverts what it is all about, namely the bringing to awareness of this split in the subject, realized here, in fact, in presence. To appeal to some healthy part of the subject thought to be there in the real, capable of judging with the analyst what is happening in the transference, is to misunderstand that it is precisely this part that is concerned in the transference, that it is this part that closes the door, or the window, or the shutters, or whatever—and that the beauty with whom one wishes to speak is there, behind, only too willing to open the shutters again. That is why it is at this moment that interpretation becomes decisive, for it is to the beauty one must speak.

這樣的觀點實在是顛倒是非，換言之，這個觀點忽略了，主體自己的這個分裂被醒悟到，事實上，就在精神分析師在現場時被體會到。訴諸於被認為是處於真實界的主體的建康部份，以為這樣就能夠跟分析師一起分享移情所發生的情愫，實在是誤解跟移情有關的這一部份，也誤解門扉、窗戶、或窗簾等等被封閉的這一部份。甚至誤解我們樂於跟其交談的這位美麗的人，以為她就在那裡，很願意將心扉再一次打開。這就是為什麼在這個時刻，解釋就非常重要，因為我們必須交談的就是這位美麗的人。

I can do no more than suggest here the reversion involved in this schema in relation to the model one has of it in one’s head. I say somewhere that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. Now, the discourse of the Other that is to be realized, that of the unconscious, is not beyond the closure, it is outside. It is this discourse, which, through the mouth of the analyst, calls for the reopening of the shutter.

我在此只能建議，不妨將我們腦海裡若有類似剛才牽扯的思維模式反轉過來。我曾經說過，無意識是大它者的真理表述。現在，即將要被實現的大它者的這個表述，也就是無意識的表述，不是在封閉之外，而是在外面。只是這個真理的表述，透過精神分析師之口，要求心扉重新再打開。

Nevertheless, there is a paradox in designating this movement of closure as the initial moment when the interpretation may assume its full force. And here is revealed the permanent conceptual crisis that exists in analysis concerning the way in which the function of the transference should be conceived.
The contradiction of its function, which causes it to be apprehended as the point of impact of the force of the interpretation by the very fact that, in relation to the unconscious, it is a moment of closure—this is why we must treat it as what it is, namely, a knot. Whether or not we treat it as a Gordian knot remains to be seen. It is a knot, and it prompts us to account for it—as I have been doing for several years—by considerations of topology. It will not be thought unnecessary, I hope, to remind you of these.

可是，有一個矛盾存在，當我們指明封閉的動作是最初的動作，各種解釋可能會就此紛至沓來。這裡顯示，關於移情的功用應該如何構想的問題，有一個觀念上的危機，常久存在於精神分析領域。移情功用的矛盾，使它被人理解為精神分析師解釋的力量產生影響的時刻，因為相較於無意識，移情是一個封閉的時刻。這就是為什麼我們必須依照它的本質處理它，換言之，把它當著一個結。至於這個結，是否能像高地安的三環結一般被我們解開，還有待觀察。它是一個結，它激勵我們去解開它，如同我過去幾年來用地形學的思維方法一直在從事的。我不厭其煩再提醒你們一次是有必要的。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座219

拉岡講座219

The Presence of analysts
精神分析師的在現場

Obscurantism in Ablata
對於目標消失的蒙昧無知

2
The aim of this introduction is to remind you that if we are to approach the fundamentals of psycho-analysis we must introduce a certain coherence into the major concepts on which it is based. Such a coherence is already to be found in the way I have approached the concept of the unconscious— which, you will remember, I was unable to separate from the presence of the analyst.

這次介紹的目的是要提醒你們，假如我們想要理解精神分析學的基本原理，我們必須先介紹作為它的基礎的主要觀念，是具有一貫性。這個一貫性已經能夠被找到，在我介紹無意識的觀念的方式上。你們還記得，我無法將無意識跟分析師的在現場分開。

Presence of the analyst—a fine phrase that should not be reduced to the tear-jerking sermonizing, the serous inflation, the rather sticky caress to be found in a book that has appeared under this title.

精神分析師在現場，好個漂亮的詞語，不應該只是被解釋為分析師說頭頭是道，讓人感動涕泣，躊躇滿志，或溫情地撫慰，如一本書名「精神師在現場」所描述的。

The presence of the analyst is itself a manifestation of the unconscious, so that when it is manifested nowadays in certain encounters, as a refusal of the unconscious—this is a tendency, readily admitted, in some people’s thinking—this very fact must be integrated into the concept of the unconscious. You
have rapid access here to the formulation, which I have placed in the forefront, of a movement of the subject that opens up only to close again in a certain temporal pulsation—a pulsation I regard as being more radical than the insertion in the signifier that no doubt motivates it, but is not primary to it at the level of essence, since I have been driven to speak of essence.

分析師的在現場本身就是證明無意識存在，可是我們不得馬上不承認有個趨勢，有些人竟然認為，今天某些互動的邂逅，精神師在現場被證明是無意識受到拒絕。這個事實必須要合併到無意識的觀念來談。你們在此可以迅速獲得說明，因為我開門見山所談的就是，主體的動作是在顯示某一個心靈的悸動瞬間展開，結果又關閉。這個心靈的悸動，我認為比意符的介入更加激烈，但是意符雖然激發心靈的悸動，在本質的層次，還不算是它最根本的所在。說到這裡，我不得不談一下本質的問題。

I have shown, in a maieutic, eristic way, that one should see in the unconscious the effects of speech on the subject—in so far as these effects are so radically primary that they are properly what determine the status of the subject as subject. This proposition was intended to restore the Freudian unconscious to its true place. Certainly, the unconscious has always been present, it existed and acted before Freud, but it is important to stress that all the acceptations given, before Freud, to this function of the unconscious have absolutely nothing to do with the Freudian unconscious.

我已經用問答及闡釋的方式，說明我們應該在無意識的領域看到主體有話要說產生的影響。這些影響是主體最根本的底層，決定主體的地位所在。我這樣建議，是要將佛洛伊德的無意識恢復到它真實的位置。的確，無意識始終是存在的，它在佛洛伊德之前就已經存在，而且活躍。但是我們必須強調一點，在佛洛伊德之前，所有對於無意識的這個功用的認識跟接納，跟佛洛伊德的無意識絲毫沒有關係。

The primal unconscious, the unconscious as archaic function, the unconscious as veiled presence of a thought to be placed at the level of being before it is revealed, the metaphysical unconscious of Edward von Hartmann —whatever reference Freud makes to it in an ad hominem argument—above all the
unconscious as instinct—all this has nothing to do with the Freudian unconscious, nothing at all, whatever its analytic vocabulary, its inflections, its deviations may be—nothing at all to do with our experience. I will ask analysts a straight question: have you ever, for a single moment, the feeling that you are handling the clay of instinct?

原初的無意識，是范、哈特門的形上學的無意識，雖然是過時的說法。他認為無意識的功用是作為思想的遮蔽，在顯示之前，被定位在生命存在的層次。尤其是，他認為無意識是本能，這跟佛洛伊德的無意識真是風馬牛不相及，被佛洛伊德嗤之以鼻。這種無意識無論是分析辭彙、推論變化，或衍生運用，都跟精神分析學沒有絲毫關係。我乾脆直接問分析師一個問題：你們什麼時候曾感覺到你們是在處理人的本能問題？

In my Rome report,l I proceeded to a new alliance with the meaning of the Freudian discovery. The unconscious is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier.

我在羅馬演講時，我繼續將我的學說跟佛洛伊德發現無意識的意義合為一談。這個無意識是主體作為有話要說產生的影響的總合。在這個層次上，主體使用意符的影響，組成自己的本質。

This makes it clear that, in the term subject—this is why I referred it back to its origin—I am not designating the living substratum needed by this phenomenon of the subject, nor any sort of substance, nor any being possessing knowledge in his pathos, his suffering, whether primal or secondary, nor even
some incarnated logos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at the moment when doubt is recognized as certainty—except that, through my approach, the bases of this subject prove to be wider, but, at the same time much more amenable to the certainty that eludes it. This is what the unconscious is.

我不妨說個清楚。我之所以一再回頭談到主體這個術語，是因為我指明的，不是主體現象學所需要的那種基層生命，也不是任何物質，或任何擁有或多或少的知識、情懷、及痛苦的生命主體，甚至不是一些具體表現的理性主體，而是笛卡爾的我思故我在的主體。這個主體出現在以懷疑自己的存在當作是確定性的時刻，差別的只是我探討的主體的基礎還要更廣泛，更加閃爍地捉摸不定。這就是無意識所在。

There is a link between this field and the moment, Freud’s moment, when it is revealed. It is this link I express when I compare it with the approach of a Newton, an Einstein, a Planck, an a-cosmological approach, in the sense that all these fields are characterized by tracing in the real a new furrow in
relation to the knowledge that might from all eternity be attributed to God.

這個無意識識領域跟佛洛伊德所顯示的啟悟時刻有關。我表達這個關聯時，我是將它比喻為牛頓、愛因斯坦、布蘭克，或超驗宇宙論的研究。所有這些領域的特徵是以新的視野，探討自古以來被歸屬為上帝轄域的知識。

Paradoxically, the difference which will most surely guarantee the survival of Freud’s field, is that the Freudian field is a field which, of its nature, is lost. It is here that the presence of the psycho-analyst as witness of this loss, is irreducible.

矛盾的是，確定佛洛伊德領域能夠自成一家之言的差異，在佛洛伊德的領域是一個本質上損失的領域。就在這裡，精神分析師的在現場，作為損失的見証人，這是無可置疑的。

At this level, we can get nothing more out of it—for it is a dead loss, with no gain to show, except perhaps its resumption in the function of pulsation. The loss is necessarily produced in a shaded area—which is designated by the oblique stroke with which I divide the formulae which unfold, in linear form, opposite each of the terms, unconscious, repetition, transference.

在這個層次，我們一無所獲，因為這是個平白的損失，沒有利益可得，可能除了一再重現的心靈的悸動的功用外。這個損失必然是在一個陰影的地區產生。這個陰影的地區，可用一道歪斜的橫槓標示。我用這道橫槓來區隔直線展開的常規，相對於其它的每個術語，如無意識、重復、移情。

This area of loss even involves, as far as these facts of analytic practice are concerned, a certain deepening of obscurantism, very characteristic of the condition of man in our times of supposed information—obscurantism which, without really knowing why, I can well believe will be regarded as incredible in the future. What I mean by obscurantism is, in particular, the function assumed by psycho-analysis in the propagation of a style that calls itself the American way of in so far as it is
characterized by the revival of notions long since refuted in the field of psycho-analysis, such as the predominance of the functions of the ego.

這個損失的地區，就精神分析的行業而言，甚至牽涉到對於生命更深層的蒙昧無知。在我們認為是資訊蓬勃的時代，作為人的狀況的特徵恰恰就是這種蒙昧無知。至於將來，我也不知為什麼會深信，這種蒙昧無知只會有過之而無不及。我所謂的蒙昧無知，特別是指精神分析學所擔負的功用，在宣揚自己的風格為美國式思維。這個風格的特色，其實是精神分析學原先排斥的舊觀念的復活，例如，過份彰顯自我的功用。

In this sense, then, the presence of the psycho-analyst, seen in the very same perspective in which the vanity of his discourse appears, must be included in the concept of the unconscious. Psycho-analysts of today, we must take account of this slag in our operations, as we must of the caput mortuum of the discovery of the unconscious. It justifies the maintenance, within analysis, of a conflict situation, necessary to the very existence of analysis.

因此，從這個意義來看，精神分析師在現場，必須要被包括為無意識的觀念的部份，因為精神分析師論述真理時的躊躇滿志，不也是棋局中人觀棋局？作為這個時代的精神分析師，我們必須將自身的運作的立場考量進去，如同我們必須考量到無意識的發現時，自身的頭顱何在？在精神分析的內部，必然會維持某種衝突的情況，這對於精神分析的存在是不可或缺的。

If it is true that psycho-analysis rests on a fundamental conflict, on an initial, radical drama as far as everything that might be included under the heading psychical is concerned, the innovation to which I refer, and which is called recall of the field and function of speech and language in psychoanalytic experience, does not claim to exhaust the possibilities of the unconscious, since it is, itself, an intervention in the conflict.

就精神分析學的領域概括一切而言，假如精神分析學確實是依賴某件基本的衝突，某個原初激烈的戲劇，我所提到的這種創新，被稱為「精神分析經驗：言說及語言的領域與功用的撤銷」並沒有宣稱可以窮盡無意識的一切可能性，因為它自身就是這種衝突的介入。

This recall has an immediate implication in that it has itself a transferential effect. In any case, this is recognized by the fact that my seminar has been criticized precisely for playing, in relation to my audience, a function regarded by the orthodoxy of the psycho-analytic association as dangerous, for intervening in the transference. Now, far from denying it, I would regard this effect as radical, as constituting, indeed, this renewal of the alliance with Freud’s discovery. This indicates that the cause of the unconscious—and you see that the word cause is to be taken here in its ambiguity, a cause to be sustained, but also a function of the cause at the level of the unconscious—this cause must be conceived as, fundamentally, a lost cause. And it is the only chance one has of winning it.

這個撤銷有當下的意涵，因為它本身具有移情的影響。無論如何，從現實狀況就可看得出來：我的講座一直受到批評，因為它跟觀眾扮演一種正統精神分析師協會認為是危險的功用，也就是對於移情的介入。現在，我絲毫不否認，我認為這種影響是激烈的，是在建構回歸佛洛伊德發現無意識的復興。這意味著，無意識的目標，你們知道，目標這個字讓我們聚集在這裡，雖然它的語意模稜兩可。這個目標不但是一個值得維護的目標，而且是處於無意識層次的目標。這個目標基本上必須被構想為是一個損失的目標。我們唯一的機會就是將它贏取回來。

That is why, in the misunderstood concept of repetition, I stress the importance of the ever avoided encounter, of the missed opportunity. The function of missing lies at the centre of analytic repetition. The appointment is always missed—this is what constitutes, in comparison with tuche, the vanity of
repetition, its constitutive occultation.

這就是為什麼，談到重複的觀念飽受誤解時，我強調這個失落機會的千載難逢，因為我們一直逃避心靈的邂逅。這個失落的功用就在於精神分析的重複的核心。相約總是未能相逢，跟邂逅比較起來，這就構成渴望重複的虛榮心，本質上的奧秘。

The concept of repetition brings me to the following dilemma—either I assume quite simply my implication as analyst in the eristic character of the discord of any description of my experience,
or I polish up the concept at the level of something that would be impossible to objectify, if not at the level of a transcendental analysis of cause.

重複的觀念使我們陷入以下的困境：一方面，我就是實踐我在描述精神分析經驗的衝突的辯証特色時，我作為分析師必然要扮演的角色。另一方面，我對於重複這個觀念閃爍其辭，當我遇到我作為生命主體必然要介入的時刻，姑且不談精神分析學的目標必須要我超越的時刻。

Cause might be formulated on the basis of the classical formula of the ablata causa tollitur effectus—I would have only to stress the singular of the protasis, ablata causa, by putting the terms of the apodosis in the plural tolluntur would mean that the effects are successful only in the absence of cause. All the effects are subjected to the pressure of a transfactual, causal order which demands to join in their dance, but, if they held their hands tightly, as in the song, they would prevent the cause intruding in their round.

目標可能要用「原因消除就是結果消除」這個古典的公理的基礎來說明。我要強調的是，原因消除的條件是單數主詞，而消除卻是複數動詞。這意味著：只有在目標消失的時刻，結果才會成功。所有的結果都必須承受轉移的因果律的壓力，而因果律卻要求加入牽手共舞。問題是，假如因果之手牽得太緊，如同歌詞所說的，因緣的成果反而受阻。

At this point, I should define unconscious cause, neither as an existent, nor as a a non-existent—as, I believe Henri Ey does, a non-existent of possibility. It is a of the prohibition that brings to being an existent in spite of its non-advent, it is a function of the impossible on which a certainty is based.

此時此刻，我應該將無意識的目標定義為：既不是已經存在，也不是不虛無飄渺，而是看似虛無飄渺，卻是有其存在的可能，如法國精神分析師亨利、艾所深信的。這是禁制的效應：越是禁止的東西，越是有人要。正因為其不可能實現，我們確定有一天會實現。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座218

拉岡講座218

I0
PRESENCE OF THE ANALYST
精神分析師的存在

Problems of the transference.
移情的問題

So that I would not always have to be looking for a box of matches, someone gave me a very large box, as you can see. On it is written the following motto: the art of listening is almost as
important as that of saying the right thing. This apportions our tasks. Let us hope that we will measure up to them.

我並不需要隨身攜帶火柴，你們知道，總是有人遞給我一大盒。在火柴盒上寫著以下的座右銘：傾聽的藝術總是跟說話適宜同樣重要。這可適用到我精神分析的行業。讓我們希望，我們不要辜負我們的行業。

Today I shall be dealing with the transference, or rather I shall approach the question, in the hope of giving you some idea of the concept, as I promised I would do in my second talk.

今天，我將處理移情的問題。換言之，我接觸這個問題，希望你們對於移情的觀念有一些認識，這是我以下我打算要談論的內容。

I
The transference is usually represented as an affect. A rather vague distinction is then made between a positive and a negative transference. It is generally assumed, not without some foundation, that the positive transference is love—though it must be said that, in the way it is used here, this term is employed in a very approximate way.

移情通常被認同是一種情感，只是在正面的移情跟負面的移情之間略有區別。一般都將正面的移情認為是愛，不是沒有根據的。儘管如此，我們還是必須說，在精神分析師使用的方式，移情這個術語並不完全是愛情。

At a very early stage, Freud posed the question of the authenticity of love as it occurs in the transference. To come to the point, it is usually maintained that in these circumstances it Is a sort of false love, a shadow of love. But Freud himself did not weigh down the scales in this direction—far from it. Not least among the consequences of the experience of the transference
was that it led Freud to take the question of what is ailed true love, eine echte Lisbe, further perhaps than it had ever been taken.

在早期的階段，佛洛伊德提出發生在移情的愛有多麼真誠問題。我們就不拐彎抹角了，在這些情況當中，移情通常被認為是一種假的愛情，一種愛的陰影。但是佛洛伊德對於這一方面並沒有如此妄自菲薄。絲毫沒有！對於移情經驗產生的後果，他頗為看重，因為這促使佛洛伊德去探討什麼是令人痛苦的真愛的問題，他探討得比前人深入。

In the case of the negative transference, commentators are more prudent, more restrained, in the way they refer to it, and it is never identified with hate. They usually employ the term
ambivalence, a term which, even more than the first, conceals things very well, confused things that are not always handled in a satisfactory way.

在負面的移情方面，評論者則較為謹慎，較為慎重其事，因為他們提到負面的移情，並不將它認同是恨。他們通常使用的術語是愛恨交加。因為愛恨交加這個術語比起前一個術語恨，定義更加模稜兩可，而且混淆不清，所以處理的情況未必能令人滿意。

It would be truer to say that the positive transference is when you have a soft spot for the individual concerned, the analyst in this instance, and the negative transference is when you have to keep your eye on him.

這樣說也許會更真實，正面的移情是當你對你關懷的人有軟心腸的時刻，例如精神分析師。負面的移情是當你對你關懷的人有警戒提防的時刻。

There is another use of the term transference that is worth pointing out, as when one says that it structures all the particular relations with that other who is the analyst, and that the value of all the thoughts that gravitate around this relation must be connoted by a sign of particular reserve. Hence the
expression—which is always added as a kind of after-thought or parenthesis, as if to convey some kind of suspicion, when used about the behaviour of a subject—he is in full transference. This presupposes that his entire mode of apperception has been restructured around the dominant centre of the transference.

移情這個術語還有另一個用法值得一提。換言之，移情架構跟作為他者的分析師，彼此之間的特殊關係，以及環繞著那個關係運轉的所有思想的價值，必須要以特別含蓄的符號來表現內涵。因此，這個「他完全是移情」這個表達，總是被增加當著是一種恍然大悟或括弧內的說明，好像是在傳達某種的難以置信，用來描述主體的行為。這等於是預先假設，人的整個感覺的重新建構，一直是以移情作為支配的中心。

I will not go any further because this double semantic mapping seems to me to be adequate for the moment. We cannot, of course, remain satisfied with this, since our aim is to approach the concept of the transference. This concept is determined by the function it has in a particular praxis. This concept directs the way in which patients are treated. Conversely, the way in which they are treated governs the concept.

這一點我就不必再多所贅言，因為我認為移情語意的內涵目前就已經不言而喻。當然，我們不是這樣就心滿意足，因為我們的目標是要處理移情這個觀念。這個觀念由它在特殊的對象所具有的功能來決定。這個觀念引導我們如何治療病人的方式。在另一方面，病人被治療的方式，又影響到這個觀念的內容。

It might seem to settle the question at the outset if we could decide whether or not the transference is bound up with analytic practice, whether it is a product, not to say an artefact, of analytic practice. Ida Macalpine, one of the many authors who have been led to express their opinions on the transference,
has carried as far as possible the attempt to articulate the transference in this direction. Whatever her very stubborn person—let me say at once that I cannot, in any sense, accept this extreme position.

假如我們能夠決定，移情是否跟精神分析的做法有密切關係，不論是精神分析的情境產物，或是情不自禁，那麼這個問題從一開頭就可看出端倪。很多作者曾經在某些情境下不得不表達對於移情的意見，艾達、瑪卡賓就是其中一位。她斬釘截鐵以這樣的方式清楚表達。不管她是如何擇情固執，我要馬上說，無論如何，我無法接受她這種極端的立場。

In any case, approaching the question in this way does not settle it. Even if we must regard the transference as a product of the analytic situation, we may say that this situation cannot create the phenomenon in its entirety, and that, in order to produce it, there must be, outside the analytic situation,
possibilities already present to which it will give their perhaps unique composition.

無論如何，以這種方式處理移情的問題，並沒有完全解決。即使我們必須將移情視為一種精神分析情境的產物，我們還是要說，這種情境並不必然會產生這種現象。而且，為了產生移情，除了精神分析情境外，還必須要有已經先存在的可能性，移情才可能水到渠成。

This in no way excludes the possibility, where no analyst is in view, that there may be, properly speaking, transference effects that may be structured exactly like the gamut of transference phenomena in analysis. It is simply that, in discovering these effects, analysis will make it possible to give them an experimental model that need not necessarily be at all different from the model I shall call the natural one. So to bring out the transference in analysis, where it acquires its structural foundations, may very well be the only way of introducing the universality of the application of this concept. It should be enough, then, to open up this package in the sphere of analysis and, more especially, of the doxa that goes with it.

這種說法絲毫沒有排除，在沒有精神分析師在現場的地方，移情印象，貼切地說，仍然有存在的可能。移情印象的架構可能確實就像是精神分析的全部移情現象。只是在發現這些移情印象時，精神分析讓它們有試探接近的機會。這跟我們所謂的自然移情的模式，絲毫沒有什麼兩樣。所以，探討出精神分析的移情，在它要求有結構基礎的地方，很可能是唯一的方法，來介紹移情這個觀念的適用是普遍存在的。因此，我們只要打開精神分析領域的這個包裹內容及附帶的價值理念，移情的觀念就應該真相大白。

This, after all, is a truism. Nevertheless, it is a rough indication worth making as a start.

畢竟，這是老生常談。可是，凡事起頭難，值得我們一窺究竟。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座216

拉岡講座 216

What is a picture?
圖畫是什麼？

2
In the scopic field, everything is articulated between two terms that act in an antimonic way—on the side of things, there is the gaze, that is to say, things look at me, and yet I see them.

在視覺的領域，一切事情都以兩個術語矛盾演出的方式表達，事情的這一邊，總是存在著凝視，換言之，事情凝視我，而我看到他們。

This is how one should understand those words, so strongly stressed, in the Gospel, They have eyes that they might not see. That they might not see what? Precisely, that things are looking at them.

這就是我們應該了解這些字詞的方式，他們在基督教福音書中一再被強調。人擁有眼睛，為了不要看見。為了不要看見什麼？準確地說，為了不要看見事情正在觀看他們。

This is why I have introduced painting into our field of exploration by the narrow door offered by us by Roger Caillois —everyone noticed last time that I made a slip of the tongue in calling him René, heaven knows why—in observing that mimicry is no doubt the equivalent of the function which, in
man, is exercised in painting.

這就是為什麼我經由羅傑、凱洛思，提供給我們的這道窄門 (上一次，每個人都注意到，我不知為什麼一時口誤，把他的名字說錯為雷諾)，我經由他介紹圖畫到我們探索的領域，因為他觀察到，模擬無可置疑是相等於在圖畫中所運用的功用。

This is not the occasion to begin a psycho-analysis of the painter, which is always such a tricky matter, and which always produces a shocked reaction on the part of the listener. Nor is it a question of art criticism, and yet someone who is close to me, and whose views count for a great deal with me, told me that he was very troubled when I embarked on something very like art criticism. Of course, that is the danger, and I shall try to avoid any such confusion.

我現在並不是要開始替畫家作精神分析，這可是茲事體大，而且會在聽眾方面引起震撼的反應。我也不是要從事藝術批評的問題，可是我有一位密友，我很在乎他的觀點，他告訴我，我從事談論有關藝術批評的事情，使他頗感困窘。當然，這是危險所在，我應該避免這樣的混淆。

If one considers all the modulations imposed on painting by the variations of the subjectifijing structure that have occurred in history, it is clear that no formula can possibly embrace those aims, those ruses, those infinitely varied tricks. Indeed, you saw clearly enough last time that after declaring that there is in painting a certain dompte-regard, a taming of the gaze, that is to say, that he who looks is always led by the painting to lay down his gaze, I immediately introduced the corrective that it is nevertheless in a quite direct appeal to the gaze that expressionism is situated.

假如我們考慮到，在繪畫史上，曾發生過不同層次的主體化結構，賦予圖畫的所有調適，我們就清楚知道，沒有一個公式能夠涵蓋那些目的、那些策略，那些千變萬化的技巧。的確，你們上一次很清楚看到，在圖畫中有一種的欺眼法，一種凝視的馴化，換言之，觀看的人總是被圖畫引導放下他的凝視。我現在馬上做個補充，它的方法可是完全直接訴諸於表達主義所在的凝視。

For those who remain unconvinced, I will explain what I mean. I am thinking of the work of such painters as Munch, James Ensor, Kubin, or even of that painting which, curiously enough, one might situate in a geographical way as laying siege to that which in our time is concentrated in painting in Paris. When will we see the limits of this siege lifted?

若有人還不相信，我再解釋一下我的意思。我是想到諸如孟克、詹姆斯、安索、古賓等畫家的作品，甚至於聯想到那幅圖畫，耐人尋味地，在地理上，我們可能都將它定位在我們的時代巴黎畫廊所展示的圖畫當中。

That, if I am to believe the painter André Masson, with whom I was talking recently, is the most immediate question. Well! To point out references like these, is not to enter into the shifting, historical game of criticism, which tries to grasp what is the function of painting at a particular moment, for a particular author at a particular time. For me, it is at the radical principle of the function of this fine art that I am trying to place myself.

那是最迫切的問題，假如畫家安德烈、馬森的話可信的話，我最近跟他談論過。嗯！我指出諸如其事，並不是要進入藝術批評的歷史的變化脈絡，去了解繪畫在某個特別的時代、對於某個畫家在某個特別時刻的功用。對於我而言，我將把我自己定位在討論這個高雅藝術的功用的根本的原理。

To begin with, I would stress that it is in setting out from painting that Maurice Merleau-Ponty was particularly led to overthrow the relation, which has always been made by thought, between the eye and the mind. What he has shown in a quite admirable way, beginning with what he calls, with Cezanne himself, those little blues, those little browns, those little whites, those touches that fall like rain from the painter’s brush, is that the function of the painter is something quite different from the
organization of the field of representation in which the philosopher held us in our status as subjects.

首先，我要強調，梅洛、龐帝先從繪畫開始，然後才特別被引導去顛覆眼睛跟心靈的關係，因為那個關係總是由思想所形成。令人讚賞地，他先從他自己開始，從塞尚本人，那些藍色斑點，那些棕色斑點，那些白色斑點，那些從畫家畫筆像是雨水般掉落的色調，他顯示出，畫家的功用完全不同於符號領域的組織，因為哲學家將我們人定位為主體。

And what is that? Where does that get us? It already gives form and embodiment to the field in which the psycho-analyst has advanced since Freud, with what, in Freud, is crazy daring, and what, in those who follow him, soon becomes imprudence.

那是什麼？我們人被定位為主體是那裡？那個主體已經替自從佛洛伊德以來，精神分析學所主張的領域，界定了形式跟內容。佛洛伊德大膽首開風氣，那些跟隨他繼續研究的人，也同樣冒險挺進。

Freud always stressed with infinite respect that he did not intend to settle the question of what it was in artistic creation that gave it its true value. When he is dealing with painters and poets, there is a point at which his appreciation stops. He cannot say, he does not know, what, for everybody, for those who look or hear, is the value of artistic creation. Nevertheless, when he studies Leonardo, let us say, roughly speaking, that he tries to find the function that the artist’s original phantasy played in his creation—his relation to those two mothers Freud sees represented in the painting in the Louvre or in the cartoon in London, by that double body, branching at the level of the waist, which seems to blossom from the entwined legs at the base. Is it in this direction that we must look?

佛洛伊德總是莊重其事地強調，他並沒有意圖要解決藝術創作及其藝術價值所牽涉到的問題。當他正在處理畫家跟詩人的問題時，他的專注總是在某一點適可而止。他無法說明白，他也不知道，對於所有人，對於那些觀看或聆聽的人，藝術創作的價值是什麼。可是，當他研究李奧納多、達文西時，容我們坦率以道，他設法找到達文西作為藝術家的原初幻想在創作時扮演的功用，以及佛洛伊德在羅浮宮看到的那幅圖畫，或在倫敦的那幅卡通畫，所呈現出來的達文西跟兩位母親的關係，因為圖畫中有雙重身體在腰部的地方分叉，而腰部似乎是從基座的交纏的雙腿開展出來。這難道不就是我們精神分析必須要探索的方向？

Or should we see the principle of artistic creation in the fact that it seems to extract—remember how I translated Vorstellungsreprasentanz— that something that stands for representation? Was it to this that I was leading you when I made a distinction between the picture and representation? Certainly not— except in very rare works, except in a painting that sometimes emerges, a dream painting, so rare that it
can scarcely be situated in the function of painting. Indeed, perhaps this is the limit at which we would have to designate what is called psychopathological art.

從它似乎抽取出來的事實，有某件代表符號的東西，我們應該看出藝術創作的原理嗎？當我區別圖畫跟符號的差異時，我當時有引導你們到達這裡嗎？當然沒有，除了在非常罕見的作品，除了在偶爾出現的一幅圖畫，一幅夢的圖畫，如此罕見，以致於它幾乎無法在圖畫的功用找到定位。的確，可能這就是我們所謂的精神分析及病理的藝術，要發揚光大受到限制的地方。

That which is the creation of the painter is structured in a quite different way. Precisely to the extent that we restore the point of view of structure in the libidinal relation, perhaps the time has come when we may question to advantage—because our new algorithms allow us to articulate the answer better
—what is involved in artistic creation. For me, it is a question of creation as Freud designated it, that is to say, as sublimation, and of the value it assumes in a social field.

畫家的創作所架構的方式迴然不同。假如我們將結構的觀點恢復到力比多的關係，可能時機已經來到，讓我們發出有益的質問：藝術創作牽涉到什麼？因為新的知識使我們能夠更清楚地表達這個回答。對我而言，創造的問題正如佛洛伊德所指明的，換言之，是昇華的問題，它具有社會領域的價值。

In a way that is at once vague and precise, and which concerns only the success of the work, Freud declares that if a creation of desire, which is pure at the level of the painter, takes on commercial value—a gratification that may, all the same, be termed secondary—it is because its effect has something profitable for society, for that part of society that comes under its influence.

為了使發現能讓大眾接受，佛洛伊德以模糊及準確兼具的方式宣稱，假如在畫家層次純粹是欲望的創作，具有商業的價值，那畫家的滿足感可能會便淪為次要，因為圖畫的結果對於社會，對於受到它的影響的部份社會有利可圖。

Broadly speaking, one can say that the work calms people, comforts them, by showing them that at
least some of them can live from the exploitation of their desire. But for this to satisfy them so much, there must also be that other effect, namely, that their desire to contemplate finds some satisfaction in it. It elevates the mind, as one says, that is to say, it encourages renunciation. Don’t you see that there is something here that indicates the function I called dompte-regard?

廣義地說，我們能夠說，作品使人心情平靜，撫慰人們的力量，在於顯示有些人能夠生活於免除欲望的蹂躪。但是要讓藝術品能更這樣滿足人心，還必須要有另外一個效果，換言之，人們沉思的欲望能夠在藝術品裡找到滿足。如某位藝評家說的，它提昇心靈，換言之，它鼓勵捨棄。你們難道沒有看出來？這不就是我所說的欺眼法或凝視的馴化在發揮功用？

As I said last time, dompte-regard is also presented in the form of trompe-l’ail. In this sense, I appear to be opposite direction from tradition, which situates its function as being very distinct from that of painting. Yet I did not hesitate to end my last talk by observing, in the opposition of the works of Zeuxis and Parrhasios, the ambiguity of two levels, that of the natural function of the lure and that of trompe-l’ail.

如我上一次所說的，凝視的馴化也以錯視法的方式呈現。在這個意義上，我似乎採取跟傳統相反立場，傳統將錯視法的功用定義為跟畫圖迴然不同。可是，我上一次結束講座時，卻是斬釘截鐵地觀察到宙西思與巴哈西斯兩位畫家作品的對照，兩種層次的模稜兩可，一是誘惑的自然功能，另一是錯視法的功能。

If the birds rushed to the surface on which Zeuxis had deposited his dabs of colour, taking the picture for edible grapes, let us observe that the success of such an undertaking does not imply in the least that the grapes were admirably reproduced, like those we can see in the basket held by Caravaggio’s
Bacchus in the Uffizi. If the grapes had been painted in this way, it is not very likely that the birds would have been deceived, for why should the birds see grapes portrayed with such extraordinary verisimilitude? There would have to be something more reduced, something closer to the sign, in something representing grapes for the birds. But the opposite example of Parrhasios makes it clear that if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him is the painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask what is behind it.

假如鳥衝向宙西思描繪的色彩的表面，誤將圖畫當著是可吃的葡萄，我們觀察到，這種畫作的成功絲毫並不意味著，葡萄已經被複製得盡善盡美，就像是我們在卡拉凡吉奧的「布加丘在烏菲基」那幅圖畫中看到的籃子裡的葡萄。假如葡萄以這種方式繪畫，鳥被欺騙的可能性不高，因為鳥憑什麼會看到描繪得如此逼真的葡萄？對於鳥而言，還必須要有某件更背後的東西，某件更靠近符號的東西，某件代表葡萄的東西。但是巴哈西斯的相反例子就顯而易見，假如我們希望欺騙一個人，我們提供給他的是一個面紗的圖畫，換言之，某件激發他去詢問圖畫背後是什麼。

It is here that this little story becomes useful in showing us why Plato protests against the illusion of painting. The point is not that painting gives an illusory equivalence to the object, even if Plato seems to be saying this. The point is that the trompe-l’ail of painting pretends to be something other than
what it is.

在此這個小故事就有了意義，因為它顯示出為什麼柏拉圖不贊同圖畫產生的幻覺。重點並不是圖畫產生一種客體的幻覺的相等物。重點是圖畫的錯視法假裝它道道地地就是客體的本身。

What is it that attracts and satisfies us in trompe-l’ail ? When is it that it captures our attention and delights us? At the moment when, by a mere shift of our gaze, we are able to realize that the representation does not move with the gaze and that it is merely a trompe-l’ail. For it appears at that moment as something other than it seemed, or rather it now seems to be that something else. The picture does not compete with appearance, it competes with what Plato designates for us beyond appearance as being the Idea. It is because the picture is the appearance that says it is that which gives the appearance that Plato attacks painting, as if it were an activity competing with his own.

以這種錯視法，是什麼在吸引滿足我們？什麼時候它捕捉我們的注意力，愉悅我們？就在我們凝視稍微一轉，我們就能體會到，符號並沒有隨著凝視轉移的那個時刻，那僅僅是錯視法的欺騙。因為在那個時刻，它出現成為某件不同於當時或現在的別的東西。圖畫並沒有跟表象競爭，圖畫的競爭對象是柏拉圖為我們所指明的超越表象的理念。因為圖畫是道出表象內容的表象，柏拉圖處理畫圖時的態度，好像是畫圖是一個跟他自己的理念競爭的活動。

This other thing is the petit a, around which there revolves a combat of which trompe-l’ril is the soul.

這個別的東西就是小客體，環繞小客體是一場搏鬥，搏鬥的靈魂是錯視法。

If one tries to represent the position of the painter concretely in history, one realizes that he is the source of something that may pass into the real and on which, at all times, one might say, one takes a lease. The painter, it is said, no longer depends on aristocratic patrons. But the situation is not fundamentally changed with the advent of the picture dealer. He, too, is a patron, and a patron of the same stamp.

假如我們設法具體地代表畫家在歷史中的立場，我們會體會到，透過畫家，某件東西可能進入真實界領域，我們可以說，有始以來，這個某件東西是我們渴望以求的。據說，畫家現在不再需要貴族當贊助人。但是隨著圖畫經紀人的時代來臨，情況基本上並沒有改變。經紀人也是一位贊助人，相同類型的贊助人。

Before the aristocratic patron, it was the religious institution, with the holy image, that gave artists a living. The artist always has some financial body behind him and it is always a question of the objet a, or rather a question of reducing it—which may, at a certain level, strike you as being rather mythical—to an a with which—this is true in the last resort—it is the painter as creator who sets up a dialogue.

在貴族當贊助人之前，那是擁有神聖意象的宗教的機構給予藝術家謀生的機會。藝術家背後總是有某個財團支持，總是會有一個小客體的問題，換言之，在某個層次上，你可能會覺得相當神秘，這個問題可以簡化成為一個小它者，畫家作為一位創造者，跟小它者建立一個對話。追根究底，情況確實是如此。

But it is much more instructive to see how the a functions in its social repercussions.

更加具有啟發性的，是要明白這個小它者如何在它的社會環境中發揮功用。

Icons—the Christ in triumph in the vault at Daphnis or the admirable Byzantine mosaics—undoubtedly have the effect of holding us under their gaze. We might stop there, but were we to do so we would not really grasp the motive that made the painter set about making this icon, or the motive it satisfies in being presented to us. It is something to do with the gaze, of course, but there is more to it than that.

無可置疑，神像擁有將我們置身於它們的凝視之下的效果，例如，在達佛尼斯神殿的拱頂睥睨萬物的耶穌像，或是拜占庭那些令人贊賞的馬賽克壁畫。我們可以在那裡駐足觀看，但是假如我們光是駐足觀看，我們將無法了解，是什麼動機促使畫家從事畫這幅神像，換言之，當圖畫被呈現給我們觀看時，它滿足我們什麼動機。當然，這個動機跟凝視有些關係，但是不僅是如此而已。

What makes the value of the icon is that the god it represents is also looking at it. It is intended to please God. At this level, the artist is operating on the sacrificial plane—he is playing with those things, in this case, images, that may arouse the desire of God.

神像畫的價值是，它所代表的上帝也正在觀看我們。神像畫是被用來取悅上帝。在這個層次，藝術家正在運用的是犧牲獻祭的層次，他所正在運用那些東西，在神像畫而言，是撩撥我們渴望上帝救贖的意象。

Indeed, God is the creator of certain images—we see this in Genesis, with the Zelem Elohim. And iconoclastic thought itself still preserves this when it declares there is a god that does not care for this. He is certainly alone in this. But I do not want to go too far today in a direction that would take us right to the heart of one of the most essential elements of the province of the Names-of-the-Father: a certain pact may be signed beyond every image. Where we are, the image remains a go-between with the divinity—if Javeh forbids the Jews to make idols, it is because they give pleasure to the other gods. In a certain register it is not God who is not anthropomorphic, it is man who is begged not to be so. But that’s enough of that.

的確，上帝是某些意象的創造者。我們在約羅希的創世紀的圖畫中看出這一點。即使是詆毀神像的無神論思想本身也肯定這一點，因為這種思想宣稱，有某個神不喜歡上帝的神像。在這一點，上帝並不孤單。不過，我今天並不想進一步談論這一點，那會帶我們進入到「以天父之名」最基本要素的核心：每幅神像之外，有著人跟上帝所簽的盟約。無論我們身置何處，這個意象始終是跟聖靈交往的媒介：即使耶和華上帝禁止猶太人崇拜偶像，那是因為他們崇拜的是其它的眾神。依照某個記載，並不是上帝不以人類的形象出現，而是人被請求不要將上帝想像成這樣。但是今天先談到這裡。

Let us pass now to the next stage, which I shall call communal. Let us go to the great hall of the Doges’ Palace in which are painted all kinds of battles, such as the battle of Lepanto, etc. The social function, which was already emerging at the religious level, is now becoming clear. Who comes here? Those who form what Retz calls ‘lespeuples’, the audiences. And what do the audiences see in these vast compositions? They see the gaze of those persons who, when the audience are not there, deliberate in this hall. Behind the picture, it is their gaze that is there.

我們現在先進入下一次段落，我所稱為的社區。我們先到羅傑的圖畫「宮殿」的大廳。在那裡畫有各種的戰役，例如，列巴圖戰役，等等。原先是以宗教層次出現的社會的功能，現在就顯而易見。誰來這裡？來的是那些組成雷茲所稱呼的「觀眾」。那些觀眾在這寬敞的大構圖中看到什麼？他們看到當時那些在大廳全神貫注的人們的凝視，雖然現在的觀眾並不在當時現場。在這幅圖畫背後，觀眾的凝視總是在那裡。

You see, one can say that there are always lots of gazes behind. Nothing new is introduced in this respect by the epoch that Andre Malraux distinguishes as the modern, that which comes to be dominated by what he calls ‘the incomparable monster’, namely, the gaze of the painter, which claims to impose itself as being the only gaze. There always was a gaze behind. But—this is the most subtle point—where does this gaze come from?

你們瞧，我們可以說，總是有許多的凝視在背後。安德烈、莫洛曾將這個時代劃分為現代，這個時代被他所稱為的「史無前例的怪物」所統治，換言之，這個怪物是畫家的凝視。這個凝視宣稱自己登基，當著是唯一無二的凝視。這種時代所介紹的凝視統治的這種說法，其實並不是什麼新潁的東西。自古以來，總是有凝視在背後。但是，最微妙的一點是：這個凝視來自哪裡？

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座215

拉岡講座205
9
WHAT IS A PICTURE?
圖畫是什麼？

Being and its semblance•
存在及其類似

Today, then, I must keep to the wager to which I committed myself in choosing the terrain in which the objet a is most evanescent in its function of symbolizing the central lack of desire, which I have always indicated in a univocal way by the algorithm I don’t know whether you can see the blackboard, but as
usual I have marked out a few reference-points. The objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze. After which, enclosed in a chain bracket, I have written: f in nature 1. as=(—#)

今天，我必須遵守我選擇這個領域時所做的承諾，因為在這個領域，小客體作為欲望中央欠缺的象徵功用逐漸消失，儘管我曾經始終如一地指出它的軌跡。我不知道你們是否能看到這塊黑板，但是像平常一樣，我畫出幾個指標點。在可見物的這個領域，小客體就是凝視。包括在方括弧裡，我將公式寫在後面： F in nature 1. as=(—#)

We can grasp in effect something which, already in nature, appropriates the gaze to the function to which it may be put in the symbolic relation in man. Below this, I have drawn the two triangular systems that I have already introduced—the first is that which, in the geometral field, puts in our place the subject of the representation, and the second is that which turns me into a picture.

事實上，我們能夠了解到，在大自然中，已經有某件東西挪用凝視的功能，這個東西可以適用於人跟符號的關係。在底下，我畫了我曾經介紹過的兩個三角形的系統。第一個三角形是在幾何學的領域，以符號的主體代替我們；第二個三角形是將我轉換成圖畫。

On the right-hand line is situated, then, the apex of the first triangle, the point of the geometral subject, and it is on that line that I, too, turn myself into a picture under the gaze, which is inscribed at the apex of the second triangle. The two triangles are here superimposed, as in fact they are in the functioning of the scopic register.

右邊線位置所在是第一個三角形的頂端，幾何學主體的點，我也將我自己轉變成凝視下的圖畫，被鐫刻在第二個三角形的頂端。這兩個三角形在此是互相交插，如同他們在視覺的領域。
1
I must, to begin with, insist on the following: in the scopic field, the gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say, I am a picture. This is the function that is found at the heart of the institution of the subject in the visible. What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze .is the instrument through which light is embodied and through which—if you will allow me to use a word, as I often do, in a fragmented form— I am photo-graphed.

首先，我必須堅持下列的觀點：在視覺的領域，凝視在外面，我被觀看，換言之，我是一幅圖畫。這就是在可見物方面主體形成的核心，被發現的功用。在可見物的最深層，決定我是誰的就是外在的這個凝視。透過這個凝視，我進入光。從這個凝視，我接收到光的效果。因此，就發生凝視成為工具的現象，透過這個工具，光被具體展現，透過這個工具，我被照相，恕我使用這個字眼，如同我在閒談時經常使用。

What is at issue here is not the philosophical problem of representation. From that point of view, when I am presented with a representation, I assure myself that I know quite a lot about it, I assure myself as a consciousness that knows that it is only representation, and that there is, beyond, the thing, the thing itself. Behind the phenomenon, there is the noumenon, for example. I may not be able to do anything about it, because my transcendental categories, as Kant would say, do just as they please and force me to take the thing in their way. But, then, that’s all right, really—everything works out for the best.

在此受到爭議的不是哲學符號的問題。從那個觀點，當我面對一個符號，我告訴自己說，我對這個符號知之甚詳。我告訴自己作為一種意識，我知道那只是個符號，符號之外尚有物自體。例如，在這個現象背後，有物體的本尊。對於它，我無可奈何，因為如同哲學家康德常說，我超驗的範疇自行其是，我不得不遵循他們的方式行事。然後一切順利，樣樣事情否極泰來。

In my opinion, it is not in this dialectic between the surface and that which is beyond that things are suspended. For my part, I set out from the fact that there is something that establishes a fracture, a bi-partition, a splitting of the being to which the being accommodates itself, even in the natural
world.

依我之見，物自體被懸置，不是在表面跟超驗之間的辯證法。就我而言，我的出發點是：某件東西形成一個斷裂，一個雙邊的分隔，一種存在的分裂內蘊於存在本身，即使在大自然的世界也是如此。

This fact is observable in the variously modulated scale of what may be included, ultimately, under the general heading of mimicry. It is this that comes into play, quite obviously, both in sexual union and in the struggle to the death. In both situations, the being breaks up, in an extraordinary way, between its being and its semblance, between itself and that paper tiger it shows to the other.

這個事實可被觀察出來，涵蓋在模擬的總標題下，有各種不同規模的調適。這個分裂顯而易見地在運作，不論是性的結合，或是在跟死亡的搏鬥。在這兩種情況中，主體分裂，以特別的方式，主體的存在與主體的類似分裂，主體本身跟它顯示給別人觀看的紙老虎分裂。

In the case of display, usually on the part of the male animal, or in the case of grimacing swelling by which the animal enters the play of combat in the form of intimidation, the being gives of himself; or receives from the other, something that is like a mask, a double, an envelope, a thrown-off skin, thrown off in order to cover the frame of a shield.

在顯示出來的案例，通常是在雄性動物，或在扮鬼臉壯膽的案例，動物以虛張聲勢的方式進行搏鬥，主體自己或從對方展示某種像是面具、替身、外殼、或是拋開的獸皮，拋開是為了要掩蓋自衛的架構。

It is through this separated form of himself that the being comes into play in his effects of life and death, and it might be said that it is with the help of this doubling of the other, or of oneself, that is realized the conjunction from which proceeds the renewal of beings in reproduction.

透過跟自己分開的形式，主體扮演生存或死亡的互動。我們可以說，就是憑藉著這種對方或自己的替身的幫助，主體以繁殖方式更新，薪火相傳下去。

The lure plays an essential function therefore. It is not something else that seizes us at the very level of clinical experience, when, in relation to what one might imagine of the attraction to the other pole as conjoining masculine and feminine, we apprehend the prevalence of that which is presented as
travesty. It is no doubt through the mediation of masks that the masculine and the feminine meet in the most acute, most intense way.

因此，陷阱扮演重要的功用。在精神分析的診所，引起我們注意的不是別的，就是這個普遍呈現的滑稽的模仿，男人跟女人的結合，就是這種吸引對方及被對方吸引的想像跟理解。無可置疑的，透過這種面具的媒介，男人跟女人心有靈犀般地邂逅。

Only the subject—the human subject, the subject of the desire that is the essence of man—is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. How? In so far as he isolates the function of the screen and plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the gaze. The screen is here the locus of mediation.

只是人作為主體，不像動物那樣完全陷入這種非真實的陷阱，因為人的本質是欲望的主體。人會在非真實的陷阱描繪自己。用什麼方法？人將螢幕的功用隔開，然後遊戲其間。事實上，人懂得如何玩弄面具，好似有個凝視正在觀看。螢幕在此就是媒介的場所。

Last time, I alluded to the reference given by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in La Phénoménologie de la perception in which, from well-chosen examples based on the experiments of Gelb and Goldstein, one can already see, simply at the perceptual level, how the screen re-establishes things, in their status as
real. If, by being isolated, an effect of lighting dominates us, if, for example, a beam of light directing our gaze so captivates us that it appears as a milky cone and prevents us from seeing what it illuminates, the mere fact of introducing into this field a small screen, which cuts into that which is illuminated without being seen, makes the milky light retreat, as it were, into the shadow, and allows the object it concealed to emerge.

上一次，我提到梅洛、龐蒂在「感官現象學」所舉的例子，根據蓋博跟郭史坦的試驗的精選例子，我們已經能夠看出，僅就在感官的層次，螢幕如何重新建立事情，讓事情本身的立場充當真實界。假如孤立來看，光線的效果會支配我們，例如，一道引導我們凝視的光線會如此吸引我們，以致於它會形成乳狀的圓錐形，使我們看不見它所照亮的東西。也就是形成小螢幕的這個場域，會介入所被照亮的東西，而沒有被觀看到，乳狀的光線會隱退到所謂的陰影地帶，而使它所隱藏的客體顯現出來。

At the perceptual level, this is the phenomenon of a relation that is to be taken in a more essential function, namely, that in its relation to desire, reality appears only as marginal.

在感官的層次，這個關係會有更重要的功用，換言之，在它跟欲望的關係，真實界出現只是作為邊緣的現象。

This is certainly one of the features that scarcely seems to have been noticed in pictorial creation. Yet rediscovering in the picture what is, strictly speaking, composition, the lines dividing the surfaces created by the painter, vanishing traces, lines of force, frames in which the image finds its status is a fascinating game—but I am astonished that in one very remarkable book they are called frameworks (charpentes). For this term eliminates their principal effect. By a sort of irony, on the
back of this book, there nevertheless figures, as being more exemplary than any other, a picture by Rouault on which is traced a circular line to enable us to grasp the main point.

的確，這個特徵在創造圖畫時，似乎很少被注意到。可是，最引人入勝的遊戲，不就是要在圖畫中重新它的構圖？嚴謹地說，就是光線隔開畫家所創造的表面，消失的痕跡，用力的線條，而形成意象賴於存在的內涵。但是在一本非常著名的書中，這些竟然被稱之為「構圖」，真是令人吃驚。因為「構圖」這個術語使圖畫主要的效果蕩然無存。令人諷刺的是，在這本書的後面，一幅羅奧特的人像畫，有一道圓形的痕跡，使我們理解到畫中有畫的要點，最足以作為典範。

Indeed, there is something whose absence can always be observed in a picture—which is not the case in perception. This is the central field, where the separating power of the eye is exercised to the maximum in vision. In every picture, this central field cannot but be absent, and replaced by a hole—a
reflection, in short, of the pupil behind which is situated the gaze. Consequently,-and in as much as the picture enters into a relation to desire, the place of a central screen is always marked, which is precisely that by which, in front of the picture, I am elided as subject of the geometral plane.

的確，在一幅圖畫中，我們總是能夠觀察到某件欠缺的東西，這在感官的情形是罕見的。這就是中央的領域，眼睛的分開的力量在視覺方面被運用到最高點。在每幅圖畫，中央的領域必然是欠缺，而以洞口來代替。簡而言之，這個洞口就是凝視位置所在的瞳孔的反映。結果，當圖畫進入跟欲望有關的領域，中央螢幕的位置總是被顯現出來，而在圖畫的前面，我作為幾何平面的主體總是消失不見。

This is why the picture does not come into play in the field of representation. Its end and effect are elsewhere.

這就是為什麼在符號的領域，圖畫並沒有發揮功用。圖畫的目的跟圖畫的影響在別處。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座214

拉岡講座 214
THE LINE AND LIGHT
線條與光線

The screen Mimicry•
螢幕的摹擬

3
In this direction, a remark of Caillois’ should guide us. Caillois assures us that the facts of mimicry are similar, at the animal level, to what, in the human being is manifested as art, or painting. The only objection one might make to this is that it seems to indicate, for René Caillois, that the notion of painting is itself so clear that one can refer to it in order to explain something else.

在這方面，凱洛斯有句話可以引導我們。凱洛斯告訴我們，動物層次的模擬的這些事實，類似於人類在藝術或繪畫所展現的。唯一我們可能會提出的異議是，對於凱洛斯而言，這似乎指示著，繪畫的觀念本身顯而易見，我們可以先提到它，用來解釋別的事情。

What is painting? It is obviously not for nothing that we have referred to as picture the function in which the subject has to map himself as such. But when a human subject is engaged in making a picture of himself; in putting into operation that something that has as its centre the gaze, what is taking place? In the picture, the artist, we are told by some, wishes to be a subject, and the art of painting is to be distinguished from all others in that, in the work, it is as subject, as gaze, that the artist intends to impose himself on us. To this, others reply by stressing the object-like side of the art product. In both
these directions, something more or less appropriate is manifested, which certainly does not exhaust the question.

繪畫是什麼？我們曾經提到主體必須將自己定位為繪畫，我們將這種功能認為就是圖畫，不是毫無意義。但是當人的主體從事於將自己描繪成圖畫，發揮將凝視作為圖畫中心的功用，會發生什麼事？有人告訴我們說，在圖畫中，藝術家希望成為主體，繪畫的藝術就是要跟其它主體區別出來，因為在作品中，藝術家所要將自己賦加在我們身上的，就是作為主體，作為凝視。對於這一點，還有些人以強調藝術作品具有客體的一面作為回應。在這兩個方向，或多或少顯示某些中肯的東西，但是並沒有詳盡這個問題。

I shall advance the following thesis—certainly, in the picture, something of the gaze is always manifested. The painter knows this very well—his morality, his search, his quest, his practice
is that he should sustain and vary the selection of a certain kind of gaze. Looking at pictures, even those most lacking in what is usually called the gaze, and which is constituted by a pair of eyes, pictures in which any representation of the human figure is absent, like a landscape by a Dutch or a Flemish
painter, you will see in the end, as in filigree, something so specific to each of the painters that you will feel the presence of the gaze. But this is merely an object of research, and perhaps merely illusion.

我將提出以下的命題：的確，在繪畫中，屬於凝視的東西總是顯示出來。畫家自己心知肚明，他的德行，他的尋求，他的追尋，他的所作所為，就是要維持及變化某種凝視的選擇。當你觀看圖畫，即使是最缺乏通常所謂凝視的圖畫，也就是缺乏人的雙眼構成的圖畫，或沒有人物的符號存在的圖畫，如荷蘭或法蘭德斯的畫家的圖畫，你最後還是會看到，如同在裝飾品中，每一位畫家都有某件明確的東西，讓你感覺到凝視的存在。但是這僅僅是研究的客體，或許僅僅是幻覺。

The function of the picture—in relation to the person to whom the painter, literally, offers his picture to be seen—has a relation with the gaze. This relation is not, as it might at first seem, that of being a trap for the gaze. It might be thought that, like the actor, the painter wishes to be looked at. I do not think so. I think there is a relation with the gaze of the spectator, but that it is more complex. The painter gives something to the person who must stand in front of his painting which, in part, at least, of the painting, might be summed up like thus—Do you want to see? Well, take a look at this! He gives something for the eye to feed on, but he invites the person to whom this picture is presented to lay down his gaze there as one lays down one’s weapons. This is the Apollonian effect of painting. Something is given not so much to the gaze as to the eye, something that involves the abandonment, the laying down, of the gaze.

圖畫的功用，實質上是牽涉到畫家提供他的圖畫讓人看見，跟凝視息息相關。這個關係不是如乍看來是一個凝視的陷阱的關係。可能有人會認為，，就像演員，畫家希望自己被人觀看。我認為不是這樣。我認為跟觀眾的凝視是有關係，但是問題比較複雜。畫家提供某件訊息給站在他的圖畫前面的人，這個訊息至少就圖畫而言，可體簡述如下：你想要看嗎？好，那你就觀看罷！他提供某件東西讓人飽嚐眼福，但是他邀請觀看圖畫的人放下他的凝視，如同放下他的武器。這就是圖畫具有陽光令人目眩的效果。某件東西被發出，不是給予凝視，而是給予眼睛。某件東西牽涉到放棄或放下凝視。

The problem is that a whole side of painting—expressionism —is separated from this field. Expressionist painting, and this is its distinguishing feature, provides something by way of a
certain satisfaction—in the sense in which Freud uses the term in relation to the drive—of a certain satisfaction of what is demanded by the gaze. In other words, we must now pose the question as to the
exact status of the eye as organ. The function, it is said, creates the organ. This is quite absurd— function does not even explain the organ. Whatever appears in the organism as an organ is always presented with a large multiplicity of functions.

問題是，圖畫的整個一面是表現主義，卻是跟這個領域分開。表現主義的圖畫，提供某件東西作為某種的滿足，是它顯著的特色。猶如佛洛伊德使用跟欲望驅力有關的術語，凝視要求某種的滿足。換言之，我們現在必須提出這個問題：眼睛作為器官，其確實的地位是什麼？有人說，是功用創造器官。這是相當荒謬的說法，因為功用甚至連解釋器官都難於自圓其說。出現在有機體的器官，總是表現出多重性的功能。

In the eye, it is clear that various functions come together. The discriminatory function is isolated to the maximum degree at the level of the fovea, the chosen point of distinct vision. Something quite different occurs over the rest of the surface of the retina, incorrectly distinguished by specialists as the locus of the scotopic function. But here, too, chiasma is to be found, since it is this last field, supposedly created to perceive things in diminished lighting, which provides the maximum possibility of perceiving the effects of light. If you wish to see a star of the fifth or six size, do not look straight at it—this is known as the Arago phenomenon. You will be able to see it only if you fix your eye to one side.

顯而易見，眼睛是各種功能聚集在一起。最明顯的功用，在視網膜的中央窩處，被發揮到最高點，那就是清楚視覺的精華點。完全不同的東西發生在視網膜表面的其它各處，很多專家錯誤將它們辨認為是視覺功用的焦點。但是我們在此也發現到交錯的功用，因為這個最後的領域，據說是被創造來以減弱的光度來感覺事情，其實是供應最大量的可能性，讓眼睛感覺到光線的效果。假如你希望第五或第六顆小的星星，你不要眼睛直視。這個被稱為阿拉哥斜視現象。你只有將你的眼睛專注一邊，你才能看得到。

These functions of the eye do not exhaust the character of the organ in so far as it emerges on the couch, and in so far as the eye determines there what every organ determines, namely, duties. What is wrong about the reference to instinct, a reference that is so confused, is that one does not realize that instinct is the way in which an organism has of extricating itself in the best possible way from an organ. There are many examples, in the animal kingdom, of cases in which the organism succumbs to an excess, a hyper-development of an organ. The supposed function of instinct in the relation between organism and organ certainly seems to have been defined as a kind of morality. We are astonished by the so-called pre-adaptations of instinct. The extraordinary thing is that the organism can do anything with its organ at all.

眼睛的這些功用，展現在精神分析的躺椅時，並沒有窮盡器官的特性，因為在那裡是眼睛決定每個器官所決定的內容，換言之，器官的責任。這個責任的本能如此混淆的問題所在是，我們都沒有體會到，責任本能是有機體用以盡可能掙脫器官的極限。在動物界，有許多有機體將器官予以高度發展到過度的例子。在有機體跟器官之間的關係，我們所認為的責任本能的功用，似乎已經被定義為某種道德。我們很驚奇還有所謂的適應社會之前的本能存在。特別的事是，有機體會器官任所欲為。

In my reference to the unconscious, I am dealing with the relation to the organ. It is not a question of the relation to. sexuality, or even to the sex, if it is possible to give any specific reference to this term. It is a question rather of the relation to the phallus, in as much as it is lacking in the real that might be
attained in the sexual goal. It is in as much as, at the heart of the experience of the unconscious,
we are dealing with that organ—determined in the subject by the inadequacy organized in the castration complex —that we can grasp to what extent the eye is caught up in a similar dialectic.

我每次提到無意識，我總是免不了正在處理它跟器官的關係。這個問題不是跟性愛的關係，我不妨說得更明確，不是跟性交的關係。這個問題是跟陽具的關係，因為在性愛的目標所渴望得到的無意識的真實是欠缺的。這個問題同樣是因為我們正在處理那個器官時，在無意識的經驗核心， 主體由於受到閹割情結宰制，而力不從心，我們能夠了解，以類似的辯證法，眼睛被捕捉到什麼程度。

From the outset, we see, in the dialectic of the eye and the gaze, that there is no coincidence, but, on the contrary, a lure. When, in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and always missing is that—you never look at me from the place from which I see you.

從一開始，在眼睛跟凝視的辯證法中，我們看到，這不是巧合，相反的，這是一個刻意的陷阱。在戀愛中，我懇求一個愛的眼神。令人永不滿足，總是漏失的是：你從未從我看到你的地方來觀看我。

Conversely, what I look at is never what I wish to see. And the relation that I mentioned earlier, between the painter and the spectator, is a play, a play of trompe-l’wil, whatever one says.
There is no reference here to what is incorrectly called figurative, if by this you mean some reference or other to a subjacent reality.

反過來說，我所觀看的，從來就不是我希望看到的。我早先提到的畫家跟觀眾之間的關係，是遊戲，是視覺欺騙的遊戲，不妨這樣說。一般所謂的象徵的關係，其實風馬牛不相及，假如你的意思是作為根本的真實是象徵的話。

In the classical tale of Zeuxis and Parrhasios, Zeuxis has the advantage of having made grapes that attracted the birds. The stress is placed not on the fact that these grapes were in any way perfect grapes, but on the fact that even the eye of the birds was taken in by them. This is proved by the fact that his friend Parrhasios triumphs over him for having painted on the wall a veil, a veil so lifelike that Zeuxis, turning towards him said, Well, and now show us what you have painted behind it. By this he showed that what was at issue was certainly deceiving the eye (tromper l’ail). A triumph of the gaze over the eye.

在「宙西思與巴哈西」的古典故事中，宙西思擁有製造葡萄來吸引鳥的便利。這個強調點不是放置在，葡萄是多麼完美的葡萄，而是放置在，即使是鳥的眼睛都會被葡萄所欺騙。有個事件可以證明這一點。他的朋友巴哈西在牆壁上畫一道窗簾，讓他信以為真，因為這道窗簾如此逼真，以致宙西思轉身向他說：「現在就請你給我觀看窗簾背後你所畫的東西！」這個事件顯示，我們爭論不休的確實就是眼睛的欺騙。凝視戰勝了眼睛。

Next time, we shall return to this function of the eye and the gaze.

下一次，我們將回到眼睛與凝視的功用。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw