The Psychoses 13
精神病患
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康
Ill
AUTOMATISM AND ENDOSCOPY
自动机制与内视镜检视
PARANOID KNOWLEDGE
偏执狂的知识
GRAMMAR OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
无意识的文法
I once tried to outline an analysis of psychotic discourse in an article published
in the Annales medico-psychologiques in the thirties.7 It concerned a case of schizophasia where effectively one can, at every level of discourse, semanteme
as well as taxeme, pick out the structure of what is, perhaps not without reason, but no doubt without full awareness of the term’s significance, known as schizophrenic disintegration.
我曾经尝试描绘精神疾病论述的分析轮廓，在三十年代出版的医学心理学的一篇文章。它包含一个精神分裂的个案。在这个案，我们能够有效地，在论述的层次，从语意及语素，挑选出实质内容的结果，或许不是没有道理的。但是无可置疑并没有充分知道这个术语的意义。这就是众所周知的精神分裂症的崩裂。
I’ve been talking about language. You must in this respect touch upon the inadequacy, the undesirable tendency that is betrayed in the expression – One has to speak the patients language.
我一直在谈论语言。在这一方面，你们必须触及到这种不充足，这种不被渴望的倾向，在这个表达里被泄露出来：我们必须用病人的语言谈论。
No doubt those who say such things must be forgiven, like all those who don’t know what they are saying. Evoking so summarily what is at issue is the sign of hasty thoughts, of repentance.
无可质疑的，那些说这样的事情的人，必须被原谅。就像那些不知道他们正在说什么的人。如此结论性地召唤受到争议的东西，是轻率思想及悔恨的迹象。
One absolves oneself, pays one’s debts – except that one only displays condescension
and reveals at what distance one maintains the object in question, namely the patient. Since he, too, is present, well then, let’s speak his language, the language of simpletons and idiots.
我们赦免我们自己，偿付我们的债务，除了我们仅是展示纡尊降贵的态度，并且显示我们将受质疑的客体维持在怎样的距离。换句话说，病人。 因为他也在现场，呵呵，就让我们用他的语言谈论，傻瓜与白痴的语言。
To mark this distance, to make language a pure and simple instrument, a way of making oneself understood by those who understand nothing, is completely to elude what is at issue – the reality of speech.
为了标示这个距离，标识语言是一种纯粹而简单的工具，一种让自己受人了解的方式，受到那些什么都不了解的人的了解。这仅是逃避受到争议的问题—那就是言说的现实界。
Let’s leave analysts to one side for the moment. On whom is the psychiatric discussion of delusion, whether it seeks to be phenomenological, psychogenetic, or organogenetic, centered? What do the extraordinarily penetrating analyses of a de Clerambault signify, for instance? Some people think that it is a matter of discovering whether or not delusion is an organic phenomenon.
让我将分析家暂时搁置一边。幻觉的精神分裂的讨论，无论它尝试成为现象学，心因性，或是器官基因性，都集中在谁的身上？譬如，克勒蓝伯特的这个特别透彻的精神分析意指着什么？有些人认为，问题是要发现，是否幻觉是一种器官的现象。
This, it seems, is supposed to be discernible in its very phenomenology. This
is all very well, but let’s look at the thing a bit more closely.
似乎，这被认为是从它的现象学可觉察到。这没问题，但是让我们更加仔细地观察事情。
45 Does the patient speak? If we did not distinguish language and speech, it’s true, he speaks, but he speaks like those sophisticated dolls that open and close their eyes, drink liquid, etc. When a de Clexambault analyzes the elementary phenomena, he looks for their signature in their mechanical, serpiginous structure, and God only knows what neologisms.
病人在言说吗？假如我们没有区别语言与言说，的确，他是在言说，但是他言说的样子像是那些精致的洋娃娃，他们的眼睛一开一阖，喝饮料等等。但克勒蓝伯特分析这些基本的现象，他寻找它们的意义，在它们的机械的，逐渐恶化的结构。仅有天晓得，那些新的词语是什么。
But even on that analysis personality is never defined but is always assumed, since everything rests on the ideogenic character of a primary comprehensibility, on the link
between affections and their linguistic expression. This is supposed to be self evident, this is where the demonstration starts from. We are told this – the automatic character of what takes place is demonstrable phenomenologically, and this proves that the disorder isn’t psychogenetic.
但是即使在那个精神分析，人格从来没有被定义，而总是被假定。因为每一样东西都依靠原初的可理解性的观念起因的特性，依靠情感与它们的语言的表达之间的连接。这被认为是自明的。这就是证明从那里开始的地方。我们被告诉这一点：所发生的事情的自动的特性，在现象上是可被证明的。这证明，这种混乱并不是心因性。
But it’s in relation to a psychogenetic reference itself that the phenomenon is defined as automatic. It’s assumed that there is a subject who understands by himself and who
observes himself. Otherwise, how would the other phenomena be grasped as foreign?
但是这个现象被定义为自动，是根据跟心因性的指称。有人认为，会有一个主体自己会了解，会观察他自己。否则，其他的现象如何被理解为外来的？
Notice that this isn’t the classical problem that has brought all philosophy since Leibniz to a standstill, that is, at least since consciousness has been emphasized as the foundation of certainty – must a thought, to be a thought, necessarily think of itself thinking? Must all thought necessarily perceive that it’s thinking of what it is thinking?
请注意，将从莱布尼思以来的所有哲学告一停顿，这并不是经典的问题。换句话说，至少从意识被强调作为确定性的基础以来，一定有一个思想，被认为的思想，必须出于自动思想，思想什么呢？所有的思想必须感觉到，这是它思想的内容的思想吗？
This is so far from being straightforward that it immediately leads into an endless play of mirrors – if it’s the nature of thought to think of itself thinking, there will be a third thought that will think of itself thinking thought, and so on.
这根本不是那么清楚，以致于它立即导致一个永无止境的镜子的遊戏—假如这就是思想自己本身的思想的特性，那将会有一个第三者思想，将会出于自动思想什么是思想，等等。
This small problem, which has never been resolved, suffices on its own to demonstrate the insufficiency of the subject’s foundation in the phenomenon of thought as transparent to itself. But this isn’t at all what is at issue here.
这个小问题，从来没有被解决过，它独立自足地证明，在思想作为它自己的透明体的这个现象，主体的基础是不够充分的。但是这根本并是争议所在。
Once we allow that the subject has knowledge as such of the parasitic phenomenon
as such, that is, as subjectively unmotivated, as written into the structure of the mechanism, into the disturbance of the supposed neurological pathways, we cannot avoid the idea that the subject has an endoscopy of what is actually going on within his own mechanisms.
一旦我们承认，主体拥有这个寄生现象本身的知识本身，换句话说，作为主体性没有被引发动机，作为被书写成为机械的结构，成为被认为是神经脉络的扰乱，我们无法避免这个观念：主体拥有这个内视镜检视，对于在他自己的机械结构里面，实际上正在进行的东西。
This is a necessity imposed on any theory that makes intraorganic phenomena the center of what happens in the subject. Freud attacks this problem more subtly than other authors, but he is equally obliged to admit that the subject is somewhere, at
a privileged point where he is able to have an endoscopy of what is going on
inside himself.
这是一个必要性被赋加在任何以器官内部的现象，作为主体身上所发生的任何理论上。弗洛伊德探究这个问题，比起其他作者，态度更加细腻。但是他同样不得不承认：主体是在某个其他地方，在一个具有特权的点。在那里，他能够拥有这个内视镜的检视，对于在他自己内部所正在发生的事情。
This idea doesn’t surprise anybody when it’s a question of more or less delusional endoscopies that the subject has of what is happening inside his stomach or his lungs, but it’s a more difficult matter when intracerebral phenomena are concerned.
这个观念并没有让任何人大吃一惊，因为这个问题是主体拥有的几乎是幻觉的内视镜检视，对于在他的胃肠或肺的内部正在发生的事情。但是这个一个更加棘手的问题，因为它牵涉到脑的内部现象。
The authors are forced to admit, though usually without being aware of it, that the subject has some endoscopy of what goes on inside the system of nerve fibers.
作者们被迫承认，虽然他们通常并不知道它，主体拥有某些的内视镜的检视，对于脑神经组织的系统内部进行的事情。
Take a subject who is the object of a thought-echo. Let’s agree with C1erambault
that this is the effect of a delay produced by a chronaxic deterioration – one of the two intracerebral messages, one of the two telegrams, as it were, is impeded and arrives after the other, thus as its echo.
以这个思想迴响的客体的主体为例。让我们同意克勒蓝伯特的看法：这是脑神经反应的恶化，产生的延迟效应。这两个脑内部的讯息的其中之一，所谓这两个电报之一，受到干扰，然后跟随另外一个到达，因为作为它的迴响。
For this delay to be registered, there must be some privileged reference point at which this can occur, from which the subject notes a possible discordance between one
system and another. However the organogenetic or automatizing theory is constructed, there is no escaping the consequence that some such privileged point exists. In a word, one is more of a psychogeneticist than ever.
为了让这个延迟被铭记，必须要有某种具有特权的指称点，在那里，这件事情能够发生。从那里，主体注意到一个可能的不协调，处于一个系统及另一个系统之间。无论这个器官起源或自动发送的理论如何被建构，不可能逃避这个结果：某个这样的特权点存在。总之，我们比起以前，更加是心因性学家。
What is this privileged point if it’s not the soul? – except that one is even more idolatry than those who confer the crudest reality on the soul by locating it in a fiber or a system, in what President Schreber designates as the unique fiber attached to the personality. It’s what is habitually called the function of synthesis, the nature of a synthesis being to have its point of convergence somewhere – even if ideal, this point exists.
这个特权点难道不就是灵魂？除了，我们甚至更加崇拜偶像，比起赐给灵魂简陋现实界的那些人，他们在脑组织或脑系统里找出灵魂的位置，在苏瑞伯首席法官指明是这个独特性连系到人格的组织。这就是习惯性地所谓综合的功用，一个综合性的生命实存的特性，拥有它在某个地方的汇集点，甚至是理想点，这个点存在。
So whether we are organogeneticists or psychogeneticists, we shall always be forced to assume the existence of a unifying entity somewhere. Does that entity suffice to explain the level of psychotic phenomena? The sterility of these sorts of hypotheses is astounding. If psychoanalysis has revealed anything significant, clarifying, illuminating, fruitful, rich, dynamic, it’s through disturbing the minuscule psychiatric constructions pursued over the decades with the help of purely functional notions of which the ego, which camouflaged them, necessarily formed the essential hub.
所以无论我们是器官起源学家，或是心因性学家，我们将总是被迫假定，一个统一的实体存在于某个地方。那个实体足够解释精神疾病的现象的层次吗？这些种类的假设的贫瘠是令人大吃一惊。假如精神分析曾经显示什么东西，那么重要，清澈，启蒙，有成果，丰富及活力，那就是通过这个微小的精神分裂的建构，这是过去几十年来被寻求，凭借着这些纯粹功用性的观念的帮助：伪装是他们的自我，必然是形成这个基本的枢纽。
But as for what psychoanalysis has contributed that is new, how do we approach it without again falling into the same rut from a different direction, through multiplying egos, themselves variously camouflaged?
至于精神分析曾经贡献的新颖的东西，我们如何探讨它，而不要从不同的方向，重蹈复徹地通过自我的繁殖，它们本身以各种方式被伪装？
The only approach consistent with the Freudian discovery is to raise the issue within
the same register in which the phenomenon appears to us, that is, in the register of speech. It’s the register of speech that creates all the richness of the phenomenology of psychosis, it’s here that we see all its aspects, decompositions, refractions. Verbal hallucination, which is fundamental to it, is precisely one of speech’s most problematic phenomena.
唯一跟弗洛伊德的发现互相一致的方法，是在相同的铭记里，提出这个问题。在这个铭记里，现象出现在我们身上，换句话说，言说的铭记。就是这个言说的铭记创造出精神疾病的现象的丰富性。就在这里，我们看到它所有的各方面，瓦解，反射。文辞的幻觉，这是它的基本，这确实是言说最棘手的现象之一。
Is there no way of dwelling on the phenomenon of speech as such? Simply by taking it into consideration, don’t we see a primary structure emerge, an essential and obvious structure that enables us to make distinctions that are not mythical, that is, that do not assume that the subject is somewhere?
难道没有方法详述语言的现象的本身？仅是凭借着考虑到它，我们难道不是看见一个原初的结构出现? 一个基本而明显的结构让我们能够从事并非是神秘的区别？ 换句话说，这种结构并没有假定，主体是在某个地方？
雄伯译
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