拉岡講座249

拉岡講座249
The Subject who is supposed to know
應該知道的主體

Alienation in pleasure
歡樂中的疏離

3
As usual, I must break off a train of thought in order to keep things within certain limits. However, I wish to say something, however briefly, about what I hope to discuss next time. I have illustrated the essential difference on the blackboard, in the form of two schemata.

像平常一樣，我必須中斷我的思緒，才不會天馬行空，漫無邊際。可是，關於下一次我要討論的內容，我希望簡短地提一下。我曾在黑板上，用兩個基型，說明重要的不同所在。

In his text on the Triebe and the Triebschicksale, the drives and the vicissitudes of the drive, Freud places love at once at the level of the real, at the level of narcissism, at the level of the pleasure principle in its correlation with the reality principle, and deduces from this that the function of ambivalence is absolutely different from what occurs in the Verkehrung, in the circular movement. At the level at which love is in question, we have a schema, which, Freud tells us, is spread over two
stages.

在「驅力與驅力的變遷」的一篇文章，佛洛伊德將愛同時放置在真實界的層次、自戀的層次、快樂原則與現實原則的層次。由此推論出，愛恨交加的功用，絕對不同於彼此翻轉的循環運轉。在愛受到質疑的層次，有一個基型，佛洛伊德告訴我們，延伸在兩個階段之上。

First there is an Ich, an Ich defined objectively by the combined functioning of the apparatus of the central nervous system and the condition of homeostasis, to preserve the tensions at the lowest possible level.

首先有一個「我」。這個「我」客觀上由腦神經系統的器官及體內平衡的狀況，共同運作，這樣才能減緩緊張。

We can conceive that what there is outside this, if one can speak of an outside, is merely indifference. And, at this level, since it is a question of tension, indifference simply means non-existence. Freud tells us however that the rule of autoeroticism is not the non-existence of objects, but the functioning of objects solely in relation to pleasure. In the zone of indifference a distinction is made between that which brings Lust and that which brings Unlust, pleasure or displeasure. In any case, did not the ambiguity of the term Lustprinzip become obvious to everyone long ago ?—since some people also write it Unlustprinzip.

我們能夠覺察出，除此而外，假如有所謂外在的話，那就是漠不關心。在這個層次上，因為牽涉到緊張，漠不關心僅是意味著不存在。可是，佛洛伊德告訴我們，性愛的自動並不就是客體的不存在，而是客體與快樂原則的運作。在漠不關心的地帶，帶來快樂跟帶來不快樂的驅力有所不同。無論如何，「快樂原則」這個術語老早以前，大家不就已經明顯覺得是模稜兩可？因為有些人寫下的是「不快樂原則」。

The next problem, then, is how this stage is to be represented— how are homeostasis and pleasure to be articulated? For, the fact that something brings pleasure is still too much for the equilibrium. What is the closest and most accurate schema that can be given of this hypothetical Ich, in which is motivated the first construction of an apparatus functioning as a psyche? I propose the following.

因此，下一個問題是這個階段如何代表？體內平衡與快樂如何清楚表達？某件事情會帶來快樂，這個事實就讓人耿耿於懷。關於這個假設的「我」，心理運作的器官的最早建構，最靠近，最正確的基型是什麼？我建議以下這個小客體存在的證據的圖形。

You see, indicated by the capital letters ICH, the Ich as apparatus tending to a certain homeostasis— which cannot be the lowest because that would be death and, indeed, this was envisaged by Freud in a second stage. As for Lust, this is not a field strictly speaking, it is always an object, an object of
pleasure, which, as such, is mirrored in the ego. This mirror-image, this bi-univocal correlate of the object, is here the purified Lust-Ich of which Freud speaks, namely, that which, in the Ich, is satisfied with the object qua Lust.

你們瞧，這個大寫字母的「我」，作為一種傾向於要得某種平衡的器官，不能擺置在最低位置，因為那是死亡的位置。的確，佛洛伊德在第二階段才構想到它。至於快樂，嚴格來說，它不是一個領域，它總是個客體，一個快樂的客體，如實地反映在這個自我裡。這個鏡子意象，這個客體的兩個單一體，在此是佛洛伊德所提到「我的快樂」，換言之，這個我以快樂作為滿足。

Unlust, on the other hand, is what remains unassimilable, irreducible to the pleasure principle. It is out of this, Freud tells us, that the non-ego will be constituted. It is situated—note well—within the circle of the original ego, it bites into it, without the homeostatic functioning ever managing to reabsorb it. You see here the origin of what we shall find again later in the so-called functioning of the bad object.
You will notice especially that what structures the level of pleasure already gives the beginning of a possible articulation of alienation.

在另一方面，不快樂始終無法被吸收，被化簡到快樂原則。佛洛伊德告訴我們，這個「非自我」的部份就是由不快樂由成。請注意，它的位置就在「原先的自我」的圈子裡。它跟原先的自我緊密相隨，體內平衡的功能卻無法重新將它吸收進來。你們在此看到，我們後來所謂的不好的客體的運作，起源就在此。你們將會特別注意到，快樂層次的結構，就是疏離的表達可能的起源。

In the external zone, Lust says to itself, more or less—Ah! the Ich is really something I must concern myself with. And as soon as it does concern itself with it, the perfect tranquillity of the Ich disappears. The Lust-Ich stands out and, by the same token, Unlust, the foundation of the non-ego, falls back. This does not imply the disappearance of the apparatus, quite the contrary. You simply see being produced at a primitive level that breaking-off, that splitting-off, which I indicated in the dialectic of the subject with the Other, but here in the opposite direction.

在外部的地區，快樂對自己大約是這樣說：「呀！這個我，我必須關心。」一但快樂不關心到自我，這個「我」的沉著寧靜就會消失。這個「快樂的我」突顯出來的同時，作為「非自我」的基礎的不快樂就會後退。這並不意味著，這個器官就這樣消失，完全相反。你們就會看到，在這個原始的層次，會產生中斷及分裂。在主體與大它者的辯證過程，也會有中斷及分裂，但是在這裡，方向相反過來。

This is expressed in the expression, No good without evil, no good without pain, which preserves in this good and in this evil a character of alternation, of a possible calibration, in which the articulation that I gave earlier of a dyad of signifiers will be reduced, and incorrectly. For, to return things at the level of good and evil, everyone knows that hedonism is unable to explain the mechanism of desire. This is because in passing over to the other register, to the alienating articulation, it is expressed quite differently. I almost blush to repeat here such catchphrases as beyond good and evil, which idiots have been playing around with for so long without knowing exactly what they were doing. Nevertheless, we must articulate what occurs at the level of the alienating articulation thus—no evil without there
resulting some good from it, and when the good is there, there is no good that holds with evil.

有一句很貼切的俗語：「善惡相連，福禍相依。」善行及惡行只是程度上的差異，彼此迭替，早先我提到過，意符的對立可以減緩，並不很適當。回到善惡與福禍的層次，大家都知道，享樂主義無法說欲望的機械學。這是因為傳遞到另一方面，傳遞到疏離的表達時，享樂主義的表達截然不同。容我不厭其煩地一再重複「超越善與惡」這個警句，即使是白痴都會樂此不疲地玩弄這個警句，而不知道自己在幹什麼。可是，我們必須表達在疏離的表達的這個層次。即使是惡行的開端，有時也會有善行的結果。至於善行，每個善行都包含某種邪惡。

That is why, by situating itself purely and simply in the register of pleasure, ethics fails and why, quite legitimately, Kant objects to it that the sovereign good can in no way be conceived as some small good carried to infinity. For there is no possible law to be given of what might be the good in objects.

The sovereign good, if this confusing term must be retained, can be found again only at the level of the law, and in Kant avec Sade’ I showed that this means that, at the level of desire, passivity, narcissism and ambivalence are the characteristics that govern the dialectic of pleasure at the level of the table on
the left. Its term is, strictly speaking, what is called identification.

這就是為什麼，倫理學若是將自己定位在僅是快樂原則上，往往功敗垂成。這也是為什麼，康德振振有詞地反對說：「統治的善，絕對不能僅從細微末節的善行，推到極端。」因為不能可有哪一條法則，將善行定位在客體上。統治的善，這個術語本身就有待商榷，只能在法則的層次被找到。在「康德即是沙德」文章中，我曾揭示，在欲望、自戀與愛恨交加的層次，表現的特徵是基於統治快樂原則的辯證法。它的術語，嚴格來說，就是所謂的「自我認同」。

It is the recognition of the drive that enables us to construct, with the greatest certainty, the functioning that I call the functioning of the division of the subject, or alienation. And how has the drive itself been recognized? It has been recognized in this that, far from the dialectic of what occurs in the subject’s
unconscious being able to be limited to the reference to the field of Lust, to the images of beneficent, favourable objects, we have found a certain type of objects which, in the final resort, can serve no function. These are the objets a—the breasts, the faeces, the gaze, the voice. It is in this new term that resides the point that introduces the dialectic of the subject qua subject of the unconscious.

辨認出欲望驅力，使我們能夠斬釘截鐵地建構，我所謂的主體分裂的功能。我們能用什麼方法辨認出這個欲望驅力？我們所能辨認的是，我們曾找到某一種客體，但是在最後關頭，它卻無法發揮功用。因為發生在主體的無意識的東西，根本不是局限於快樂的領域，不是局限於一些善行及福祉的客體的意象。這些被統稱為「小客體」，如乳房、糞便、凝視、及聲音。人作為無意識的主體，展開的辯證法，就是從這些小客體開始。

Next time, I shall continue to develop the theme of the subject of the transference.

下一次，我將繼續講述「人作為移情的主體」這個命題。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記990204

雄伯手記990207

以出家的心情，過在家的日子。

作為真實的人並不容易，時而興奮激情，時而冷漠，不近情理。在別人眼中看起來，是有點精神異常的。

然而，返真歸樸，減少無聊的虛榮浮華，是我多年來冥思及讀書的結論，好歹也得讓自己有限的餘生，實踐貫徹一下。

又是一年歲末，可是絲毫沒有想要添購新衣新鞋，慶祝新年的念頭。平素深居簡出，幾年來買的幾件衣服，幾雙鞋子迄今看起來猶是嶄新。沒有必要在歲末物價正昂貴的時候，出去湊這個熱鬧。

每日在家安靜地讀書、寫作、從網路下載一些好東西瀏覽。自覺智慧有成長，心靈得以充實，時時有下載期盼，哥倫布發現新大陸般的滿足。每多存活一天，都是上天給我的恩賜！

每夜詭譎的夢境不再使我驚慌失措。那就是真實的我，沒有必要去逃避。周旋於人際之間時，我或許需要佯裝沉著，以掩飾自己內心的感覺。既然是在夢境，反正是身不由己，狼狽或滅亡，都聽天由命罷！

拉岡講座248

拉岡講座248

The subject who is supposed to know

應該知道的主體

Belief.
信仰
Alienation apprehended in the fort-da
我去你來之間的疏離

2
I will now re-articulate a number of formulae to be preserved as link points, without which thought will stumble and slip.

現在我重新表達許多被保留當著聯接點的公式，因為假如沒有這些公式，思維將會零亂散漫。

Alienation is linked in an essential way to the function of the dyad of signifiers. It is, indeed, essentially different, whether there are two or three of them. If we wish to grasp where the function of the subject resides in this signifying articulation, we must operate with two, because it is only with two that he can be cornered in alienation.

基本上，疏離與意符的善惡對立的功用有關。至於是否二元對立或是三元對立，確實還是事關重大。假如我們希望了解主體作為意符表達的功用的位置，我們必須以二元對立的方式運作。因為唯有在二元對立的情況，人的疏離可能會被逼迫成僵局。

As soon as there are three, the sliding becomes circular. When passed from the second to the third, it comes back to the first—but not from the second. The effect of aphanisis that is produced under one of the two signifiers is linked to the definition—let us say, to use the language of modem mathematics—
of a set of signifiers. It is a set of elements such that, if there exist—as one says in the theory, with a capital E inverted for notation—only two, the phenomenon of alienation is produced, in other words, the signifier is that which represents the subject for the other signifier. Hence there results that, at
the level of the other signifier, the subject fades away.

一但是三元對立，思維的散漫會成為循環。從第二意符傳遞到第三意符，它回到第一意符，但不是從第二意符那裡。兩個意符之一，會產生失蹤的影響，跟這個定義有關，讓我們用現代數學的語言來說，一組意符的集合。如同在數學理論，一組意符有一個元素的大寫字首E，被倒轉當著指稱，若有兩個意符存在，疏離的現象就會產生。換言之，意符就是主體對另外一個主體的代表。因此，在另外一個意符的層次，造成的結果是：主體消失。

This is also why I pointed out to you the mistake that occurs in a certain translation of this Vorstellungsrepr&entanz, which is, as I told you, the signifying S2 of the dyad.

這也就是為什麼我跟你們指出，欲望驅力，也就二元對立的第二意符，傳譯時會發生錯誤。

I must articulate here what is involved and what, in the text of one of my pupils of whom I have spoken, was sensed, but expressed in a way that misses the point, and which may lead to error, because it specifically omits the fundamental character of the function of the subject. There is constant reference to the relation of the signifier and the signified, which has to do with what I will call the a,b,c, of the question. Of course, it had to happen that one day I would put on the blackboard something that had already been formulated at the roots of the Saussurian development, in order to show my starting point.

我在此必須表明牽涉到什麼。我曾引用我的一位學生的論文所發現的，但是表達時漏掉一點，可能會導致錯誤。因為它明確地漏掉主體的功用最基本的特性。他不斷地提到意符與意旨的關係，這跟我所謂的基本問題有關。當然，有一天，我將必然要在黑板上，寫下某件根據語言學家索緒爾所推衍出來的東西，作為我的開端。

But I immediately showed that it was effective and manageable only to include in it the function of the subject at the original stage. It is not a question of reducing the function of the subject to nomination,
namely, to a label stuck on something. This would be to miss the whole essence of language. I must say that this text, which I described last time as providing proof of infatuation, also provides proof of crass ignorance, in letting it be understood that this is what is involved at the level of the Pavlovian experiment.

但是我立刻要表示，這個東西只有被包含在主體的功用初期的階段，才能有效地掌控。這個問題不是要將主體的功用簡化成為命名，換言之，成為一個黏附於某件東西的標籤。這將會漏失語言的本質。我必須說，我上一次描述作為迷戀的證據的本文，也提供懵懂無知的證據，因為它讓人瞭解到，巴夫洛夫的制約反應，牽涉到些什麼。

If there is something that is situated at the level of the experiment of the conditioned reflex, it is certainly not the association of a sign with a thing.

即使制約反應的試驗層次顯示某件東西，那也確定不會是符號跟事物的聯想。

Whether or not Pavlov recognizes this, the characteristic of every experimental condition is strictly to associate a signjfier, in so far as the experiment is instituted with the cut that may be made in the organic organization of a need—which is designated by a manifestation at the level of a cycle of interrupted needs, and which we find here again, at the level of the Pavlovian experiment, as being the cut of desire.

無論巴夫洛夫是否體會到這一點，每次制約反應的試驗的特性，都會讓人聯想到一個意符。因為試驗的開始，在於需求的有機組織所造成的割裂。需求被中斷的循環所顯示出來的割裂。我們再一次在巴夫洛夫試驗的層次發現到，作為欲望的割裂。

And—rather as one says, that’s why your daughter is dumb —that is why the animal will never learn to speak. At least in this way. Because, obviously, the animal is one step behind. The experiment may cause in him all sorts of disorders, all sorts of disturbances, but, not yet being a speaking creature, he is not called to put in question the desire of the experimenter, who, indeed, if one interrogated him, would be hard put to reply.

「這就是為什麼你的女兒是啞巴？」有人說。那就是為什麼動物永遠學不會說話。至少不會像人類這樣說話。因為，顯而易見，動物的智慧劣於人類。制約試驗會引起動物的各種疾病，各種的困擾，但是由於不會說話，動物不會質問試驗者的欲望是什麼。試驗者若是受到質問，其實很難回答。

Nevertheless, when articulated in this way, this experiment is interesting, indeed is essential, in enabling us to situate our conception of the psycho-somatic effect. I will go so far as to formulate that, when there is no interval between S1 and S2, when the first dyad of signiflers become solidified, holophrased, we have the model for a whole series of cases—even though, in each case, the subject does not occupy the same place.

可是，用這種方式來表達時，這種試驗頗耐人尋味，它確實很重要，因為它讓我們能夠明白心理跟生理的影響。甚至我要說，當第一意符跟第二意符之間沒有間隔，意符最初的二元對立固定用一個詞語來表達，整個案例的模式就展現出來，即使主體並不一定在每案例佔有相同的位置。

In as much, for example, as the child, the mentally-deficient child, takes the place, on the blackboard, at the bottom right, of this S, with regard to this something to which the mother reduces him, in being no more than the support of her desire in an obscure term, which is introduced into the education of
the mentally-deficient child by the psychotic dimension. It is precisely what our colleague Maud Mannoni, in a book that has just come out and which I would recommend you to read, tries to indicate to those who, in one way or another, may be entrusted with the task of releasing its hold.’

例如，黑板上底端的這個意符位置的小孩，是精神異常的小孩，他的母親模糊地將他視為僅僅是自己欲望的支持，因此造成小孩的精神異常，具有精神病患的特質。我們的同事曼諾尼剛出版一本書，我推薦你們閱讀。他確實設法向有關精神病患的單位，作這樣的說明。

It is certainly something of the same order that is involved in psychosis. This solidity, this mass seizure of the primitive signifying chain, is what forbids the dialectical opening that is manifested in the phenomenon of belief.

這確實跟精神病患的層次有相同的東西。原初的意符鎖鏈，若具體地遭到大量的損毀，會使主體的信仰的辯證法無法展開。

At the basis of paranoia itself, which nevertheless seems to us to be animated by belief, there reigns the phenomenon of
X ◇ S1
0. s, s’, s”, s”,… S (i (a, a’, a”, a”,…))
S2
0. s, s’, s”, s”,… : series of meanings.
i (a, a’, a”, a”,…) : series of identifications.
the Unglauben. This is not the not believing in it, but the absence of one of the terms of belief, of the term in which is designated the division of the subject. If, indeed, there is no belief that is full and entire, it is because there is no belief that does not presuppose in its basis that the ultimate dimension that it has to reveal is strictly correlative with the moment when its meaning is about to fade away.

偏執妄想症，我們似乎覺得是由於信仰危機所造成，顯示以下信仰崩裂的現象：
X ◇ S1
0. s, s’, s”, s”,… S (i (a, a’, a”, a”,…))
S2
0. s, s’, s”, s”,… : 意義系列
i (a, a’, a”, a”,…) : 認同系列
這並不等於就是不信仰，而是某種信仰模式的欠缺，某種主體分裂所顯示的信仰的欠缺。的確，假如主體欠缺完整的信仰，那是因為每一種信仰的基礎要能顯示最後的意義，而他的信仰的意義卻是若存若亡。

There are all kinds of experiences that bear this out. One of them, concerning one of Casanova’s misadventures, was told me in a very humorous way by Mannoni, who is with us today, and whose commentary on it is most amusing and revealing.

所有的精神分析經驗都證明這一點。曼諾尼先生今天在現場，他曾經幽默地告訴我，有關一個卡薩諾瓦的奇異冒險。他的評論頗耐人尋味。

At the end of a practical joke that succeeded to the point of moving the celestial forces and unleashing around him a storm which, in actual fact, terrified him, Casanova—who had been pursuing a cynical adventure with some silly goose of a girl, who was the object of the prank, which gathered round him a whole circle of idiots— Casanova, seeing his practical joke begin to work, become real, was so deeply affected—in a surprisingly comic way for a Casanova who defied earth and heaven at the level of his desire—that he was struck with impotence, as if he had really been stopped at the sight of God’s face.

卡薩諾瓦一直在跟某些癡情女人逢場作戲，他是情場的老手，他的身邊總是不乏圍繞一些自作多情的女人。有一次他的惡作劇戀情掀起議論糾紛，引起的風暴自己都嚇到。卡薩諾瓦看到惡作劇的後果，態度變得認真，因為這一次他自己也動了真情。這對卡薩諾瓦而言，頗為滑稽反諷，因為他一向在欲望的層次，恣所欲為，沒有絲毫顧忌。結果，他突然變成性無能，好像上帝對他怒目相向，他真的束手無策。

Take another look at the text I was talking about earlier. In this text, for example, the fort-da is presented as something rather old hat—it is almost as if this individual were apologizing for mentioning once again this fort-da, which everyone had wiped his feet on. It is treated as an example of primal symbolization, while apologizing for mentioning it as if it were something that had now passed into the public domain. Well!

再看一下我先前提到的文章。例如，在這個文章，「我去你來」閃躲遊戲被呈現像是一件古老把戲，好像這個人抱歉再一次又提到這個「我去你來」，因為他的躲避處已經被每個人發現。這就是原初象徵的一個例子。他抱歉提到它，好像它是某件已經是公共領域家喻戶曉的東西。

This is just as big a mistake, for it is not from a simple opposition of the fort and the da that it derives the inaugural force that its repetitive essence explains. To say that it is simply a question for the subject of instituting himself in a function of mastery is idiotic. In the two phonemes are embodied the very mechanisms of alienation—which are expressed, paradoxical as it may seem, at the level of the fort.

這同樣是大錯特錯。它得到開始的力量，是從它重複出現的本質來解釋，而不單純是「我去你來」的對立。認為它僅僅是主體以自主掌控來表現自己，這是愚昧的說法。在「我去你來」兩個字詞裡，具體表現的是疏離的運作，表現在「我去」的層次，雖然聽起來有點矛盾。

There can be no fort without da and, one might say, without Dasein. But, contrary to the whole tendency of the phenomenology of Daseinanalyse, there is no Dasein with the fort. That is to say, there is no choice. If the young subject can practice this game of fort-da, it is precisely because he does not practice it at all, for no subject can grasp this radical articulation. He practices it with the help of a small bobbin, that is to say, with the objet a. The function of the exercise with this object refers to an alienation, and not to some supposed mastery, which is difficult to imagine being increased in an endless repetition, whereas the endless repetition that is in question reveals the radical vacillation of the subject.

每次的「我去」，都預期「你來」，換言之，預期「存在」。但是跟存在主義的現象所描述的相反，在「我去」的地方，我並沒有存在。換言之，我沒有選擇的餘地。假如年輕人樂此不疲玩這個「我去你來」的躲閃遊戲，那確實是因為他們並沒有真的在玩，沒有一個主體知道這個躲閃遊戲的真正意涵。他們靠著一個小線圈的幫助在玩，換言之，靠著小客體的幫助。這個小客體運作的功用是疏離，而不是有些人認為的自我的掌控。在永無止境的重複中，我們很難想像有什麼自我掌控在增加。相反的，這個永無止境的重複顯示出，主體的存在始終搖擺不定。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記990131

雄伯手記99001231

承蒙C的良法美意，臨時將週日早上的歲末的讀書會，改為星期一晚間的聚餐會。我原先有一個家教，正在煩惱如何調課，星期一早上忽然接到對方電話，主動改期，真是應證了心理學家榮格所謂的同時性原理synchronicity。

下午四點鐘，A開著他那台豪華的轎車前來接我。坐在前座的年輕的E，回頭對我說：「後座是上座，請老師上坐！」

退休將近五年的我，其實並不在乎什麼座位的禮數。就座後，就將話題導向我在網路上搜尋到A在研究所時代發表的論文，作為奉承。不料A竟然是懊惱的反應：「網路的搜尋，固然甚為方便，有時也是自尋煩惱。例如，我前幾天就偶然搜尋到一篇學生對我的抨擊

我最近正在翻譯精神分析師拉岡的東西，趁機想要發揮一下：「以前權威的時代，主管開會，常說：我們歡迎建設性的批評！言下之意，惡意或傷害性的建議其實是不受歡迎的。問題是，我們讀書會的成員，既然以開明通達的輔導心理學、哲學、及文學的人士自居，對於抨擊的來源，理應比一般人更具有承受及反省的能力。否則，我們自許的啟悟，豈不是淪為文字意符的遊戲言論？」

坐在前座的E，突然冷冷地回應：「我現在看法是，不是看一個人怎麼說，而是看一個人怎麼做！」

汽車駛進鯉魚潭時，A 用手機跟先行到達的C夫妻聯繫，得知「餐廳是在服務中心的對面。」於是A將汽車開到湖的對岸，繞了一陣子，才發現對岸沒有什麼餐廳，而且環湖道路也不容許汽車通行。於是再用手機聯繫，準備回轉。我於是有感而發：「你們瞧！如此實際的語言溝通，都會產生表達者跟聽話者之間的誤差，文學、哲學、心理學、牽涉到的層面更廣，人與人之間所謂的瞭解，其實正是拉岡所謂的誤識及自我幻見！我們的一生都處於自我幻見，而不自覺！」

「人的一生，難免是誤識與自我幻見！」親炙余教授教誨，耳濡目染的年經的E，玄機處處地說：「不過，我們現在不就修正誤識，漸漸找到正途？」

汽車在服務中心旁邊的停車場找到停車位。下車時，年輕的E，環首四顧，忽然恍然大悟地說：「呀！我想起來了！有一次我們跟C來過這個地方，我首次跟你提到法國作家莒哈絲的情人。」

拉崗講座247

拉岡講座247

OF THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW,
應該知道的主體

OF THE FIRST DYAD, AND OF THE GOOD
善行與惡行的對立
The trust placed in the analyst
對於精神分析師的信任
Science itself•
科學本身
As soon as there is a subject who is supposed to know, there is transference
一但有了一個應該知道的主體，就會有移情的信仰。

The aim of my teaching has been and still is the training of analysts. The training of analysts is a subject that is well to the forefront of analytic research. Nevertheless—I have already given you evidence of this—in the analytic literature, its principles are lost sight of.

我教學的目的始終是精神分析師的訓練。精神分析師的訓練是精神分析研究最迫切的課題。可是，我已經跟你們證實過，這個原則在精神分析的領域，卻受到漠視。

It is clear, in the experience of all those who have passed through this training, that in the absence of adequate criteria, something that is of the order of ceremony is put in their place and—since for the psycho-analyst there is no beyond, no-substantial beyond, by which to justify his conviction that he is
qualified to exercise his function—the substitution, in this instance, can be interpreted in only one way—as simulation.

顯而易見，根據所有通過這個訓練的那些人的經驗，由於欠缺充份的標準，只好使用一些儀式的東西來充當代替。精神分析師沒有超越的神，沒有非實質的神，可以用來證實，他確信擁有資格來發揮他的功能。在此情況下，儀式的代替，只能用一種方式來解釋，那就是模擬。

Yet what he obtains is of incalculable value—the trust of a subject as such, and the results that this involves by virtue of a certain technique. Now, he does not present himself as a god, he is not God for his patient. So what does this trust signify? Around what does it turn?

可是，他所獲得的是無與倫比的價值，那就是主體對他的信任，以及憑藉諮商技巧所獲得的結果。現在，問題是，他再怎樣表現，都不會是神。他無法成為解救他的病人的神。因此，這樣的信任意味什麼？信任的憑藉是什麼？

For him who places the trust, and who receives its reward, the question can no doubt be ignored. It cannot be for the psycho-analyst. The training of the psycho-analyst requires that he should know, in the process through which he guides his patient, what it is around which the movement turns. He must
know, to him must be transmitted, through actual experience, what it is all about. This pivotal point is what I designate—in a way, which, I think, will seem to you sufficiently justified, but which, I hope, as we progress, will appear more and more clear to you, more and more necessary—it is what I designate
under the term the desire of the psycho-analyst.

對於信任他，並且因此獲益的病人，這個問題無可置疑地可以被忽視。但是對於精神分析師，這個問題不能夠被忽視。精神分析師的訓練要求，在他引導病人的過程中，他應該知道這個引導的動作意義是什麼？他必須要知道，透過實際的精神分析經驗，所要傳達的意義是什麼。重點就是我所指明的問題，我想你們在某方面似乎認為它是天經地義。但是我希望，這個問題會隨著我們的進展，會越來越明朗，越來越迫切，那就是精神分析師的欲望這個術語。

Last time, I showed you the point of application of the Cartesian approach, which, in its origin and in its end, is directed essentially not towards science, but towards its own certainty. It is at the heart of something that is not science in the sense in which, since Plato and before him, it has been the object of the meditation of philosophers, but Science itself.’

上一次，我告訴過你們，關於笛卡爾方法論的運用要點。這個方法論的起源跟目的，基本上並不是朝向科學，而是朝向它自己的確定性。這個問題的核心，並不是自從柏拉圖以降，哲學家思考的那種科學的意義，而是科學的本身。

The science in which we are caught up, which forms the context of the action of all of us in the time in which we are living, and which the psycho-analyst himself cannot escape, because it forms part of his conditions too, is Science itself.

我們陷溺其中的科學，就是科學的本身。因為它組成我們所有人生存世間的行動內涵，精神分析師也無法倖免這種陷溺，因為他也是世間人的一個成員。

It is in relation to this second science, Science itself, that we must situate psycho-analysis. We can do so only by articulating upon the phenomenon of the unconscious the revision that we have made of the foundation of the Cartesian subject. First, today, I shall say something about the phenomenology of the
transference.

我們必須將精神分析學，定位在這個次級的科學，也就是科學的本身。我們充其量所能做的就是，根據無意識的現象，對於笛卡爾主體的基礎，清楚表達我們的修正看法。可是今天，我將先談移情的現象。

I
The transference is a phenomenon in which subject and psycho-analyst are both included. To divide it in terms of transference and counter-transference—however bold, however confident what is said on this theme may be—is never more than a way of avoiding the essence of the matter.

移情是一個主體與精神分析師都被包含在內的現象。分別被稱為移情與反移情，僅是避開事情本質的方式，不管你對這個主題，多麼侃侃而談，多麼信心滿滿。

The transference is an essential phenomenon, bound up with desire as the nodal phenomenon of the human being—and it was discovered long before Freud. It was perfectly articulated—I took up a large part of a year devoted to the transference to showing this—with the most extreme rigor, in a text in which the subject of love is discussed, namely, Plato’s Symposium.

移情是一個重要的現象，跟人類作為一位個體產生的欲望息息相關，在佛洛伊德之前，早已經有人發現。在一篇討論愛的主體的文章，也就是柏拉圖的「嚮宴，」這個主題被發揮得淋漓盡致。我曾花了將近一年的時間，專注討論它有關移情這個問題。

It is possible that this text was written for the character of Socrates, who, nevertheless, is depicted in it in a particularly discreet way. The essential, initial moment that is of particular relevance to the question we must ask ourselves about the action of the analyst, is that in which it is said that Socrates never claimed to know anything, except on the subject of Eros, that is to say, desire. By this fact alone, and because, in the Symposium, he goes further than anywhere else in showing us the signification of comedy in his dialogues, carrying it even to the point of farce, Plato could not fail to show us, in the most precise way, the place of the transference.

這篇文章很可能是為了蘇格拉底這個角色而寫。但是對於他的描述，卻是頗為慎重其事。
跟我們必須要問到有關精神分析師的功能問題，有特別關聯的重要地方是，據說蘇格拉底從來不宣稱說他知道什麼，除了愛神這個主體，換言之，欲望的主體。光憑這個事實，柏拉圖就一定能夠斬釘截鐵地告訴我們，移情的位置在哪裡，因為在「嚮宴」中，他將他的「對話錄」所表現的喜劇的意義，比任何地方都更加透徹明白。

As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere— I have abbreviated it for you today at the top of the blackboard as S.s.S. (sujet suppose savoir) there is transference.

一但應該知道的主體存在於某處，移情就存在。今天我在黑板的上方，用縮寫字母給你們顯示：S s S （主體預設歡樂）。

What does an organization of psycho-analysts mean when it confers certificates of ability, if not that it indicates to whom one may apply to represent this subject who is supposed to know?

當精神分析師協會頒發一張合格證照時，那意味著什麼？難道不就是指明，獲頒證照的人，代表他是應該知道的主體？

Now, it is quite certain, as everyone knows, that no psychoanalyst can claim to represent, in however slight a way, a corpus of absolute knowledge. That is why, in a sense, it can be said that if there is someone to whom one can apply there can be only one such person. This one was Freud, while he was alive.

大家知道，沒有一位精神分析師，能夠宣稱他代表某一個絕對知識的體系。不管他代表到什麼程度，那都是千真萬確的。那就是為什麼，在某方面，我們可以說，假如有某個人應該獲頒這張證照，那只有一個人有資格。那一位就是佛洛伊德，假如他還在世的話。

The fact that Freud, on the subject of the unconscious, was legitimately the subject that one could presume to know, sets aside anything that had to do with the analytic relation, when it was initiated, by his patients, with him.

探討無意識這個主題，佛洛伊德充當能夠知道的主體，是當之無愧。這個事實還暫時不牽涉到他跟病人之間的精神分析有關的問題。

He was not only the subject who was supposed to know. He did know, and he gave us this knowledge in terms that may be said to be indestructible, in as much as, since they were first communicated, they support an interrogation which, up to the present day, has never been exhausted. No progress has been made, however small, that has not deviated whenever one of the terms around which Freud ordered the ways that he traced, and the paths of the unconscious, has been neglected. This shows us clearly enough what the function of the subject who is supposed to know is all about.

他不但是唯一知道的主體。他確實知道，而且還用讓人無可辯駁的方式，讓我們信服這個知識。自從他首次發表他的發現，迄今，這些發現經得起接連不斷的一再質疑。我們後來的發展，不論大小，都沒有超越佛洛伊德條分縷析的範圍，也就是無意識的途徑，雖然他原先的發現的功勞被人淡忘。這足夠清楚地顯示，應該知道的主體，他的功用是什麼？

The function, and by the same token, the consequence, the prestige, I would say, of Freud are on the horizon of every position of the analyst. They constitute the drama of the social, communal organization of psycho-analysts.

我要說，佛洛伊德的功用，換言之，他成果，他的威望，是精神分析師的立場的範圍。他們形成精神分析師協會的各色各樣的社會機能的活動。

Who can feel himself fully invested by this subject who is supposed to know? This is not the question. The question is first, for each subject, where he takes his bearings from when applying to the subject who is supposed to know. Whenever this function may be, for the subject, embodied in some individual, whether or not an analyst, the transference, according to the definition I have given you of it, is established. If things reach the point that this is already, on the part of the patient, determined for someone nameable, for a figure accessible to him, there will result from this, for whoever assumes responsibility for him in analysis, a quite special difficulty, concerning the enacting of the transference.

有誰能夠感覺自己完全代表應該知道的主體？這個問題不重要。重要的問題是，對於每個人而言，當他訴諸於應該知道的主體時，他的立場在哪裡？對於每一個主體而言，每當這個功用具體表現在某個個人身上，無論他是否是一位精神分析師，移情的關係就被建立，依照我所給你們的定義。假如在病人這一方面，事情發展到完全寄託於某一特定對象，某一位他可以接近的人物，移情的扮演就會形成困擾重重，對於在精神分析過程，任何替他擔任責任的人而言。

And it can happen that even the most stupid analyst—I don’t know whether this extreme term exists, it is a function that I designate here only in the way one designates that sort of mythical number in logic which is, for example, the greatest number that may be expressed in so many words—even the most stupid analyst realizes it, recognizes it and directs the analysis towards what remains for him the subject who is supposed to know. This is a mere detail, and almost an anecdote. Let us now begin the
examination of what is really at issue.

即使是愚不可及的精神分析師（容我使用這個偏激的術語），我所指明的移情的功用，就像是我們指明一個邏輯的神秘數字，例如，最大數字用許多字來表達。即使是愚不可及的精神分析師，都會體會到移情，認出移情，並且將精神分析引導到應該知道的主體的其它方面。這只是個粗略說法，近乎八卦軼聞。讓我們再檢查一下真正的問題所在。

The analyst, I said, occupies this place in as much as he is the object of the transference. Experience shows us that when the subject enters analysis, he is far from giving the analyst this place.

我要說，精神分析師佔有作為移情的對象這個地位。我們從精神分析的經驗獲知，當主體進入精神分析時，他絲毫沒有打算給予精神分析師這個地位。

For the moment let us leave the Cartesian hypothesis that the psycho-analyst is a deceiver. This hypothesis is not to be excluded absolutely from the phenomenological context of certain entries into analysis. But psycho-analysis shows us that what, above all in the initial phase, most limits the confidence of the patient, his abandonment to the analytic rule, is the threat that the psycho-analyst may be deceived by him.

我們暫時不去討論笛卡爾的假設命題：精神分析師是一位騙子。只是，從某些精神分析的諸般現象來看，這個假設命題無法完全被排除。但是精神分析經驗告訴我們，在剛開始的階段，病人的信任，以及他完全遵守精神分析的規定，最大的阻礙是，唯恐精神分析師會被他蒙騙過去。

How often in our experience does it happen that we discover only very late some important biographical detail? Suppose, for example, that at a particular moment in his life, the subject contracted a venereal disease. But why didn’t you tell me earlier? one might ask, if one is still naive enough. Because, the analysand may reply, I had told you earlier, you might have regarded it as responsible, in part at least, perhaps even wholly, for my disorders and I am not here for you to find an organic cause for them.

在我們精神分析的經驗，曾經發生多少次，我們只是到很後來，才發現到一些重要的傳記的細節？例如，在病人一生中的某一個特別時刻，主體傳染上梅毒性病。「你為什麼不早一點告訴我？」假如我們還懵懂不覺，我們可能會這樣問。被分析的病人可能會回答說：「因為我若先告訴你了，你可能會將部份責任，甚至是全部責任，怪罪到我的性病。而我來找你求助，不是要你將原因歸咎於我的生理機能。」

This is an example that is unlimited in its implications, and which may be understood in a number of different ways—from the angle of social prejudice, of scientific discussion, of the confusion that remains around the very principle of analysis. I quote it here only as an illustration of the fact that the patient may think that the analyst may be misled if he gives him certain facts. He holds back certain facts so that the analyst may not go too quickly. I could give you other, better examples of this.
Should not he who may be misled (être trompé) be afortiori under suspicion of being capable, quite simply, of being mistaken (se tromper)?

這是一個攤開天窗說明白的例子，我們可以用不同方式來解讀，從社會偏見的角度，從科學討論的角度，從精神分析原理的混淆角度。我在這裡引述它，只是舉例說明，病人可能認為自己胡言亂語，可以誤導精神分析師這個事實。他保留某些事實，以免精神分析師太快下斷語。我還可以給你們舉其它更好的例子。被誤導的精神分析師，他的診療能力，難道不是因此更應該受到置疑，單純來說，受到誤解嗎？

Now, that certainly is the limit. It is around this being mistaken (Ce SC tromper) that the balance lies of that subtle, infinitesimal point that I wish to mark.

現在若是確定回答是肯定，那就是它的限制。我希望標明的那個微妙及奧妙的平衡點，就位在那個被誤解的四周。

Given that analysis may, on the part of certain subjects, be put in question at its very outset, and suspected of being a lure —how is it that around this being mistaken something stops? Even the psycho-analyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility, which means that certain intentions, betrayed, perhaps, by some chance gesture, will sometimes be attributed even to the analyst put in question, You did that to test me!

假如考慮到，對於某些主體，精神分析一開始就會受到質疑，並且被懷疑是一個陷阱，那這個位在被誤解的四周的那個平衡點，如何能得到？即使是受到質疑的精神分析師，在某些時候，曾被推崇是診斷如神，這意味著，某些的意圖，若是在不經意間洩露出來，可以歸咎於被質疑的精神分析師的問題：「你故意來考驗我！」

The Socratic discussion introduced the following theme—that the recognition of the conditions for the good in itself would have something irresistible for man. This is the paradox of the teaching, if not of Socrates himself—what do we know about him other than through the Platonic comedy ?—I will not even say Plato’s comedy—for Plato develops in the terrain of the comic dialogue and leaves all the questions open—but of a certain exploitation of Platonism, which may be said to perpetuate itself in general derision. For, as we all know, the most perfect recognition of the conditions of the good will never prevent anyone from dashing into its opposite. So what is it all about, this trust placed in the analyst? How are we to know that he wishes this good, let alone for another?

蘇格拉底的討論介紹以下的主題：體認善行本身的情況，對於人是不可抗拒的力量。這是我們教學的矛盾，更不用說是蘇格拉底的矛盾。除了透過柏拉圖的喜劇，我們對於蘇格拉底懂得多少呢？我甚至要說，柏拉圖對話錄表現的不是喜劇，而是某種柏拉圖理念的廣播。因為柏拉圖發揮喜劇對話的這個平台，然後開放所有的問題懸而未決。據說，柏拉圖的理念雖然飽受冷嘲熱諷，卻是迄今屹立不搖。大家都知道，善行的情況雖然被人體認得千真萬確，人人卻還照常朝相反方向的惡行，橫衝直撞。那麼，病人對於精神分析師的信任，究竟是怎麼一會事？我們如何能夠知道，精神分析師所作所為是善行，遑論是對另外一個人的善行？

Let me explain. Who does not know from experience that it is possible not to want to ejaculate? Who does not know from experience, knowing the recoil imposed on everyone, in so far as it involves
terrible promises, by the approach of jouissance as such? Who does not know that one may not wish to think?—the entire universal college of professors is there as evidence.

讓我解釋一下。從精神分析的經驗，有誰不知道，男女做愛時，堅忍不早洩是可能的。從精神分析經驗，有誰不知道，高潮來臨時，深怕體內洩精會招來懷孕後果，每個人常會緊急撤退？有誰不知道，做愛時的欲罷不能，要渾然忘掉思維？全世界的大學教授，可以在此做個見證。

But what does not wanting to desire mean? The whole of analytic experience—which merely gives form to what is for each individual at the very root of his experience—shows us that not to want to desire and to desire are the same thing.

但是壓抑欲望意味著什麼？所有的精神分析的經驗，不過是在表達每個人在自己經驗的核心，所存在的問題。我們從那裡知道，壓抑欲望跟欲望本身是相同一回事。

To desire involves a defensive phase that makes it identical with not wanting to desire. Not wanting to desire is wanting not to desire. This discipline which, in order to find a way out of the impasse of the Socratic interrogation, was practiced by people who were not only specifically philosophers, but,
in their own way, some kind of practitioners of religion—the Stoics and the Epicureans. The subject knows that not to want to desire has in itself something as irrefutable as that Moebius strip that has no underside, that is to say, that in following it, one will come back mathematically to the surface that is supposed to be its other side.

欲望牽涉到防衛的部份，這個防衛部份使它跟壓抑欲望相同一致。壓抑欲望等於是設法不要欲望。為了找到一個方法，避開蘇格拉底的詰問的僵局，不但某些哲學家，在實踐這種自我克制，而且某些的宗教的修行者，如斯多葛學派及伊璧鳩魯學派，也都以各自的方式在進行。主體知道，不要去欲望本身有無法反駁的道理，就像莫比烏斯帶，表裡無二般無法反駁。換言之，我們回到數學角度來觀看，應該是裡面的部份，其實就是表面。

It is at this point of meeting that the analyst is awaited. In so far as the analyst is supposed to know, he is also supposed to set out in search of unconscious desire. This is why I say—I will illustrate it for you next time with a small topological drawing that has already been on the blackboard—that desire is the
axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer, by which is applied the force-element, the inertia, that lies behind what is formulated at first, in the discourse of the patient, as demand, namely, the transference. The axis, the common point of this two-edged axe, is the desire of the analyst, which I designate here as an essential function. And let no one tell me that I do not name this desire, for it is precisely this point that can be articulated only in the relation of desire to desire.

就在這個表裡相會的時刻，我們期待精神分析師。既然精神分析師應該知道，他也應該出發去尋找無意識的欲望。這就是為什麼我說，欲望是軸心、是樞紐、是把手、是鐵鎚。憑藉它們，先前病人陳述及說明的背後的需求，換言之，就是移情，才能發揮力量的因素及它的慣性定理。這一點，我下一次再舉例說明，它的小小地形圖，我已經畫在黑板上。這個軸心，這個雙邊利斧的共同點，就是精神分析師的欲望。我在此指明出來，當著是一個重要的功用。這個欲望，我沒有明確指明是什麼欲望，因為這一點，確實只有憑藉欲望跟欲望的關係，才表達得出來。

This relation is internal. Man’s desire is the desire of the Other. Is there not, reproduced here, the element of alienation that I designated for you in the foundation of the subject as such? If it is merely at the level of the desire of the Other that man can recognize his desire, as desire of the Other, is there not something here that must appear to him to be an obstacle to his fading, which is a point at which his desire can never be recognized? This obstacle is never lifted, nor ever to be lifted, for analytic experience shows us that it is in seeing a whole chain come into play at the level of the desire of the Other that the subject’s desire is constituted.

這個欲望跟欲望的關係是內在的。人的欲望就是大它者的欲望。在這裡被複製的，難道不就是我跟你們所指明的，人作為主體的基礎，所產生的疏離的因素？假如僅僅是在大它者的欲望的層次，人才能夠體認出他的欲望，就是對於大它者的欲望，那麼，難道不是有某件東西，是主體萬萬不可消失的障礙？這個東西，難道不就是欲望始終無法被體認出來的原因？這個障礙從來沒有被消除過，也無法被消除，因為精神分析的經驗告訴我們，主體的欲望被形成，就是在大它者的欲望的層次，觀看意符的鎖鏈運作的時刻。

In the relation of desire to desire, something of alienation is preserved, not with the same elements— not with the S1 and S2 of the first dyad of signifiers, from which I deduced the formula of the alienation of the subject in my last but one lecture—but with, on the one hand, what has been constituted on the basis of primal repression, of the fall, of the Unterdruckung, of the binary signifier, and, on the other hand, what appears first as lack in what is signified by the dyad of signifiers,
in the interval that links them, namely, the desire of the Other.

在欲望跟欲望之間的關係，某種疏離的東西被保留下來，但是元素並不相同。不是在上上次的演講中，我推論出來的主體的疏離的公式，善惡首次對立時的第一意符及第二意符，而是，一方面亞當與夏娃從伊甸園墮落時的原始壓抑所產生的疏離，另一方面，大它者的欲望，聯接意符的善惡對立的表達，首先形成的欠缺，造成的疏離。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座246

拉岡講座246
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者：失蹤

Small letters
小寫字母

4
Certainty, for Descartes, is not a moment that one may regard as acquired, once it has been crossed. Each time and by each person it has to be repeated. It is an ascesis. It is a point of orientation that is particularly difficult to sustain in the incisiveness that makes its value. It is, strictly speaking, the establishment of something separate.

對於笛卡爾而言，確定性並不被認為是一但被得到，就永遠保存。對於每一個人，確定性需要每次調整。它是一種自我克制。因為它的價值在於它的敏銳性，它是一個特別難於維持的定向點。嚴格說，它建立某件分裂的東西。

When Descartes introduces the concept of a certainty that holds entirely in the I think of cogitation, marked by this point of non-exit that exists between the annihilation of knowledge and scepticism, which are not the same thing—one might say that his mistake is to believe that this is knowledge. To say that he knows something of this certainty. Not to make of the I think a mere point of fading. But it is because he has done something quite different, which concerns the field, which he does not name, in which all this knowledge wanders about—all this knowledge which he had said should be placed in a radical suspension. He puts the field of this knowledge at the level of this vaster subject, the subject who is supposed to know, God. You know that Descartes could not help reintroducing the presence
of God. But in what a strange way!

笛卡爾完全用「我思故我在」來介紹確定性的觀念時，我們可以說，他的錯誤在於相信，這就是知識的真理，在於說明確說，對這個確定性，他已經清楚明白，在於沒有將「我思」僅僅解釋為一個出發點。因為毀滅知識的真理，並不等於就是懷疑主義。笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的特徵是，在知識真理的毀滅跟懷疑主義中間，他並沒有找到存在的出口。關於這個領域，他做了某件相當不同的事情，但是他沒有明確說，因為所有這些知識四處流竄，所有他曾經表明過的知識，確定性應該是懸而未決。他將這些知識的領域，放置在更大的主體的層次，那位主體應該無所不知，那就是上帝。大家知道，笛卡爾不得不重新介紹上帝的存在。但是立場是多麼曖昧！

It is here that the question of the eternal verities arises. In order to assure himself that he is not confronted by a deceiving God, he has to pass through the medium of a God—indeed, in his register, it is a question not so much of a perfect, as of an infinite being. Does Descartes, then, remain caught, as everyone up to him did, on the need to guarantee all scientific research on the fact that actual science exists somewhere, in an existing being, called God? —that is to say, on the fact that God is supposed to know?

在此，就產生了永恆的證實問題。為了告訴自己，他面臨的不是一位騙人的上帝，他必須透過作為媒介的上帝。的確，笛卡爾的思維裡，上帝的存在不是完美，而是永恆。笛卡爾以及他的同樣思維人，難道不是面對如何依據科學的研究，證實實際的科學存在於某個地方，存在於在一個現有的存在，被人稱之為上帝的存在？換言之，他難道不是要用科學研究去證實上帝無所不知？

It may seem that I am taking you a long way from the field of our experience, and yet—I would remind you, both by way of an apology and in order to maintain your attention at the level of our experience— the subject who is supposed to know, in analysis, is the analyst.

我現在似乎引導你們遠離精神分析經驗的立場。可是，我要提醒你們，在精神分析學，應該知道的主體是精神分析師。我很抱歉這樣說，但是你們的注意力，還是應該擺在精神分析的層次。

Next time, we shall discuss, in terms of the function of the transference, how it is that we have no need of the idea of a perfect, infinite being—who would dream of attributing these qualities to his analyst ?— to introduce the function of the subject who is supposed to know.

下一次，我們將討論，作為移情的功用，為了要介紹一位無所不知的主體，我們如何能夠免除不用一位完美的永恆的存在。有誰會夢想將這些屬性歸屬於他的精神分析師？

Let us go back to our Descartes, and to his subject who is supposed to know. How does he get rid of it?’ Well, as you know, by his voluntarism, by the primacy given to the will of God. This is certainly one of the most extraordinary sleights of hand that has ever been carried off in the history of the mind—the eternal verities are eternal because God wishes them to be.

讓我們回到笛卡爾，回到他應該無所不知的主體。他如何能免除不用這樣的主體？大家知道，他採用的方法是，願者前來，願意屈從上帝的意志者前來。相較於古聖先賢，這確實是匠心獨具的靈巧：永恆的證實問題，亙古常在，因為這是上帝對我們的期許。

I think you will appreciate the elegance of such a solution, which leaves a whole portion of the truths, in particular the eternal truths, in God’s charge. Let us be quite clear about this, what Descartes means, and says, is that if two and two make four it is, quite simply, because God wishes it so. It is his business.

我相信你們會欣賞這種解決的巧妙。他將全部的真理問題，特別是永恆的真理，留待上帝來負責。讓我們打開天窗說亮話，笛卡爾的意思是：假如二加二等於四，道理很簡單，因為上帝希望如此。那是上帝的事情。

Now, it is true that it is his business and that two and two make four is not something that can be taken for granted without his presence.

這確實是上帝的事情。假如上帝不存在，二加二等於四，如何能夠被視為天經地義？

I’m going to try to illustrate what I mean here. When Descartes speaks to us of his process, of his method, of clear ideas and confused ideas, simple ideas and complex ideas, he places the order to be followed between these two terms of his method.

我將設法說明我的意思。當笛卡爾對我們提到他的過程，他的方法，他的清楚或模糊的觀念，他的簡單或複雜的觀念，他將順序按照他的方法的兩個術語排列。

It is very possible after all that one plus one plus one plus one do not make four and I must tell you that what I am articulating the vel of alienation on is a good example of it. For, in the cardinal
order, this would give more or less something like the following:

I + (‘ + (‘ + (‘ + (… )))).

畢竟，這也是可能的，一加一、再加一、再加一、再加一，並不等於四。我必須告訴你們，我提到的疏離的欲望驅力的累積，就是一個好例子。因為在基數的順序，出現的結果將是如下：

I + (‘ + (‘ + (‘ + (… )))).

Whenever a new term is introduced, one always runs the risk of letting one or several of the others slip between one’s fingers. In order to reach four, what matters is not the cardinal but the ordinal. There is a first mental operation to be carried out and then a second, then a third, then a fourth. If you do not do them in the right order, you fail. To know whether, in the last resort, it makes three, or four, or two, is of secondary importance. That’s God’s business.

每當一個新的術語被介紹，我們時常遇到的危險是，總是會有一個或幾個其它術語消失不見。為了得到四的結果，重要的不是基數，而是序數。先有一個心算運算出來，然後才有第二個心算，然後第三個心算，然後第四個心算。假如你按照正確順序運算，你會算不出來。至於，最後的結果等於三，或四，或二，那是次要的事情。那是上帝的事情。

What Descartes now introduces, and which is illustrated at once, for, at the same time as his discourse on method he introduces his geometry and his dioptrics, is this—he substitutes the small letters, a, b, c, etc., of his algebra for the capital letters. The capital letters, if you will, are the letters of the Hebrew
alphabet with which God created the world and to each of which, as you know, there corresponds a number. The difference between Descartes’ small letters and the capital letters is that Descartes’ small letters do not have a number—they are interchangeable and only the order of the commutations will
define their process.

笛卡爾現在所介紹的方法，跟他在方法論所介紹的幾何學及折光學，同時進行。他用他的代數的一些小寫字母 a, b,.c 等等，來代替大寫字母。你們知道，大寫字母是上帝用來創造世界的希伯來文的字母，每一個字母都有一個數字相對應。笛卡爾的小寫字母跟大寫字母之間的差異是，笛卡爾的小寫字母沒有一個數字相對應。他們彼此可以互換，只有交換的順序的差異，會界定他們的過程。

To show you that the presence of the Other is already implied in number, I need only point out to you that the series of numbers can only be figured by introducing the zero, in a more or less masked way. Now, the zero is the presence of the subject who, at this level, totalizes. We cannot extract it from the
dialectic of the subject and the Other. The apparent neutrality of this field conceals the presence of desire as such. I will illustrate this simply by a return effect. However, we should take a few more steps forward in the function of desire.

為了顯示，大它者的存在總是暗藏在數字裡，我只需要跟你們指出，數字的系列先要隱隱約約地介紹零，然後才能計算。現在，零就是作為完整的主體，在這個層次的存在，在主體與大它者之間的辯證過程，我們不能抽取掉這個零。零這個領域看起來明顯中立，其實隱藏欲望的本身。我只要用驗算的方式，就能證明。可是，對於欲望的功用，我們應該再進一步探討。

In effect, Descartes inaugurates the initial bases of a science in which God has nothing to do. For the characteristic of our science, and its difference with the ancient sciences, is that nobody even dares, without incurring ridicule, to wonder whether God knows anything about it, whether God leafs through modern treatises on mathematics to keep up to date.

事實上，笛卡爾開展的這門科學的最初基礎，跟上帝完全沒有關係。因為我們科學的特性，以及它跟古代科學的差異是，甚至沒有人敢冒著受人嘲笑的危險，去質問上帝是否懂得科學，是否上帝會翻閱現代的科學論文，才不會被時代淘汰。

I have gone far enough today, and I apologize for not going further. I will leave you at this point, and do no more than indicate for you the last aim of my discourse for this year— namely, to pose the question of the position of psycho-analysis in science. Can psycho-analysis be situated in our science, in so far as this science is considered as that in which God has nothing to do?

我今天已經講得夠多了，很抱歉只能先談到這裡。我將在此先告一段落，我只是要告訴你們，今年我的講座的最後目的是什麼。換言之，我的目的是要提出，精神分析學在科學領域的定位是什麼？假如精神分析學被認為跟上帝沒有任何關係，它能夠被列入我們科學的領域嗎？

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座245

拉岡講座245

Scepticism, certainty and the subject who is supposed to know
懷疑主義、確定性、與應該知道的主體

3
What distinguishes the Cartesian approach from the ancient search of the episteme, what distinguishes it from the skepticism that has been one of its terms, is what we shall try to articulate on the basis of the double function of alienation and separation.

區別笛卡爾的方法，跟古代認識論的尋求有何不同，區別它跟懷疑主義的術語有何不同，正是我們憑藉疏離與分裂的雙重功用的基礎，所要表達的內容。

What is Descartes looking for? He is looking for certainty. I have, he says, an extreme desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false—note the word desire—in order to see clearly—in what?— in my actions, and to walk with assurance in this life.

笛卡爾正在尋找什麼？他正在尋找確定性。他說：「我極度渴望要學會區別真理跟虛假」。請注意渴望這個字，他渴望清楚地看到什麼？「我渴望在我的這一生，在我的立身處世，我要確定知道，我到底為何而為。」

Is not this something quite different from the aim of knowledge? This approach is not that of a dialectician or a professor, still less that of a cavalier. It has been stressed that Descartes’ biography is marked above all by his wanderings in the world, his encounters and, after all, his secret ambition—
Larvatus prodeo. If I point this out, although I am one of those who regard concern for biography as secondary to the meaning of a work, it is because Descartes himself stresses that his biography,
his approach, is essential. to the communication of his method, of the way he has found to truth.

這難道不是相當迴異於知識的目標嗎？這個作風不是一位辯士或一位學者的作風，尤其不是一位浪漫騎士的作風。有人強調，笛卡爾的傳記的特色，尤其是在於他的漫遊各地，他的傳奇際遇，他深藏不露的尋求真理的企圖心。雖然我一向認為笛卡爾著作的偉大，遠勝過他的傳記，我還是指出這一點，那是因為笛卡爾本人強調，他以傳記作體驗的作風，對於他的研究的溝通及尋求真理的方式，是非常重要的。

He makes it quite clear that what he has given is not—as Bacon tried to do some years earlier—the general means of conducting one’s reason correctly, without abdicating it, for example, to experience. It is his own method, in so far as he set out in this direction with the desire to learn to distinguish the
true from the false in order to see clearly—in what? —in my actions. This example, then, is a particular one, and Descartes goes so far as to add that if what was for me, at a particular moment, my way, does not seem right for others, that is their affair, that they should gather from my experience what they
think is worth gathering. This forms part of the introduction by Descartes of his own way to science.

他清楚地表達，他提供我們的方法，跟培根早先幾年提供我們的方法不同。他的方法不是要尋求如何理性地安身立命，而是要親身體驗來證實。當他開始朝這個方向，渴望學習到如何區別真實跟虛假，他就是用這一套方法，看明白「自己的立身處世」。由於這個例子只是他自身的一個特例，笛卡爾繼續補充說：「在特殊時刻，適用於我的方式，似乎未必適用於別人。各人有各人的不同際遇，我的經驗充其量只供參考，他們應該收集他們認為值得收集的。」笛卡爾以科學作為真理之道，就這樣形成。

Does this mean that no knowledge is aimed at? Does it mean that knowledge weighs lightly in Descartes? Not at all, it is with this that he begins—there’s, enough knowledge around and to spare, there always has been, there still is. It is not I who have imposed this allusion here, but Descartes’ own text. He was trained by the best teachers, he was a pupil of the Jesuits at the College de La Flèche and there was no lack of knowledge, or of sapience, there.

這是否意味著，笛卡爾的目標是主觀體驗，而不是客觀知識？這是否意味著，客觀知識對於笛卡爾無足輕重？絕非如此！雖然他從主觀體驗出發，但是存在他四周圍的客觀知識，仍然綽綽有餘，始終存在，也一直存在。這不是我牽強附會，而是笛卡爾自己的文本記載。他接受過無數傑出師長的教導，他在拉、菲列齊學院，是耶穌會的門徒。那裡，客觀知識或雋永睿智，從來是不虞匱乏。

Shall I go so far as to say that it is not for nothing, that it is precisely a result of his Jesuit education, that he acquired his acute feeling of the superabundance of knowledge? Is there not at the heart of what is transmitted through a certain humanist wisdom something like a hidden perinde ac cadaver, which is not where it is usually placed, namely, in the supposed death that the rule of St Ignatius seems to require?

他博聞強識，觸類旁通，不是憑空而來，確實就是他曾接受過耶穌會教育的結果。我這樣說，不算是誇張罷？然而，這個人本主義薈萃的耶穌會核心，所傳遞的智慧，難道沒有透露出某些像是隱藏的「僵化教條」？這些僵化教條早已奄奄一息，依照聖、伊革拿提斯的規章所要求的，不是應該揚棄更新嗎？

Personally, I don’t feel very close to it, and these Jesuits, as I myself see them, from the outside, always seem to me to be very much there, not to say full of life —they make their presence felt, and with a diversity that is far from suggesting that of death. No, the death referred to here is that which is hidden behind the very notion of humanism, at the heart of any humanist consideration. And even when an attempt is made to animate the term as in the phrase the human sciences, there is something that we shall call a skeleton in the cupboard.

就我個人而言，我不覺得它已經到達如此地步。這些耶穌會教士，依我所見，從外表看來，他們似乎還是昂揚自在，有時甚至是意氣風發。他們到處耀武揚威，顯露多方才學，絲毫不會讓人聯想到是奄奄一息。不會的，這裡所提到的奄奄一息，是指人本主義這個觀念，由於背離人本主義的理想核心，所潛藏的危機。現在，即使有人企圖以人本科學這個詞語，使它振衰起蔽，但是我們還是覺得其核心價值，已經積重難返了。

It is here that Descartes finds a new way. His aim is not to refute uncertain knowledge. He is happy to let such knowledge run around quite freely, and with it all the rules of social life. Indeed, like everyone at this historical moment at the beginning of the seventeenth century, in that inaugural moment
of the emergence of the subject, he has present all around him a profusion of libertines who serve as the other term of the vel of alienation. They are in reality Pyrrhonians, sceptics, and Pascal calls them by their name, except that he does not stress in a sufficiently free way its meaning and implications.
Scepticism does not mean the successive doubting, item by item, of all opinions or of all the pathways that accede to knowledge.

笛卡爾就是在這個地方，開闢一條新路。他的目的不是要反駁客觀知識的不確定。他很樂意讓這樣的客觀知識，以及社會生活的規範，順其自然地運作。的確，十七世紀剛開始，是一個歷史轉捩點，是人本主義的主體剛出現的時刻。笛卡爾跟大家一樣，周圍環繞著一大群的自由主義份子。這些人後來充當疏離的欲望驅力的代名詞。他們實際上古代的庇羅主義者，也就是懷疑論者，巴斯卡就直接稱呼其名為懷疑論者，只是不恣意妄為地強調懷疑一詞的意涵及引伸。懷疑主義並不意味著不斷地懷疑，對於所有的意見，對於處理客觀知識的各項途徑，逐一懷疑。

It is holding the subjective position that one can know nothing. There is something here that deserves to be illustrated by the range, the substance, of those who have been its historical embodiments. I would show you that Montaigne is truly the one who has centred not around scepticism but around the living moment of the aphanisis of the subject. And it is in this that he is fruitful, that he is an eternal guide, who goes beyond whatever may be represented of the moment to be defined as a historical turning-point. But this is not scepticism.

人若只堅持主觀的立場，將永遠無法瞭解客觀的知識。任何事情的理解，端賴在歷史上躬逢其會者，他們的見識及才識的範圍。我舉個例子。哲學家蒙田的思想，就不是以人本的懷疑主義的為中心，而是以主體的失蹤作為生命的覺醒時刻為中心。在這一點，蒙田的成就輝煌，足以當我們永遠的嚮導。他超越所謂歷史轉捩點的可能的代表。但是，他並不是懷疑主義者。

Scepticism is something that we no longer know. Scepticism is an ethic. Scepticism is a mode of sustaining man in life, which implies a position so difficult, so heroic, that we can no longer even imagine it—precisely perhaps because of this passage found by Descartes, which led the search for the path of certainty to this very point of the vel of alienation, to which there is only one exit—the way of desire.

懷疑主義現在已經不再盛行。它是一門倫理學，是人安身立命的一種模式。它意味著，人生的處境如此艱難，如此悲壯，以致於它超越我們的想像能力。笛卡爾就在此時開闢一條新的通道。他引導我們尋求確定性的途徑，到達疏離的欲望驅力這裡。這裡只有一個出口，就是透過欲望的途徑

This desire for certainty led Descartes only to doubt—the choice of this way led him to operate a rather strange separation. I would simply like to touch on a few points, which will serve as reference points in grasping an essential function, masked though it may be, which is still vital, present and directive in
our method of investigating the unconscious.

尋求人生確定答案的欲望，導致笛卡爾處處懷疑。這條途徑的選擇，引導他進行一項奇異的分裂。我現在只想先說幾點，可以充當理解一個基本功能的指標。雖然這個功能隱而不顯，它的存在作為指標依舊很重要，當我們設法要探討無意識的時候。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座244

拉岡講座244
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者：失蹤

Descartes’ desire
笛卡爾的欲望
2
Do I need to stress that we must understand Representanz here in the sense in which things happens at the real level, where communication takes place in every human domain.

我需要強調，我們在此必須從發生在真實界的意義來了解「符號」嗎？因為每一個人的溝通其實都發生在真實界那裡。

We mean by representatives what we understand when we use the phrase, for example, the representative of France. What do diplomats do when they address one another? They simply exercise, in relation to one another, that function of being pure representatives and, above all, their own signification must not intervene. When diplomats are addressing one another, they are supposed to represent something whose signification, while constantly changing, is, beyond their own persons, France, Britain, etc. In the very exchange of views, each must record only what the other transmits in his pure function as signifier, he must not take into account what the other is, qua presence, as a man who is likable to a greater or lesser degree. Interpsychology is an impurity in this exchange.

我們所謂的「符號」，意思是指當我們使用一個詞語時，我們了解它的意思。例如，法國這個符號代表什麼。當外交家彼此對談時，他們在做些什麼？他們僅僅是互相在運用純粹是語言符號的功能，尤其是，他們是代表國家發言，個人情感務必不要介入。當外交家彼此對談時，他們代表的不應該純屬個人意見，而是法國或英國等自己國家的意見，雖然觀點不斷地改變。在交換彼此意見時，每位外交官都必須記錄，對方的語言所傳遞的訊息。他一定不能只是考慮到在現場的對方，作為有情感的個人的想法。外交家交換意見時，彼此的內心感受在此不列入考慮。

The term Repro.sentanz is to be taken in this sense. The signifier has to be understood in this way, it is at the opposite pole from signification. Signification, on the other hand, comes into play in the Vorstellung.

「符號」這個用詞要用這層意義來理解。意符必需以這種方式來理解，它跟真實意義是背道而馳的。在另一方面，真實意義是在觀念的領域運作。

It is with the Vorstellung that we are dealing in psychology, when the objects of the world are taken in charge, in some way, under the parenthesis of a subject in which a whole series of a, a’, a’, etc., unfolds.

在觀念領域，我們正在處理的是心理學。世界作為一個客體，被放置在在主體的括弧裡來處裡。在那裡，一連串的意符展開運作。

Here is situated the subjectivity on which the theory of knowledge is suspended. Of course, every representation requires a subject, but this subject is never a pure subject. If one believes that each subject is sustained in the world with his original—in both senses of the word (originale ou originelle ) — Weltanschauung, then the path of truth passes—as a backward psychology or psycho-sociology is still showing us —through the inquiry, the totalization, the statistics of different
Weltanschauung. And things might be thus, were there in the world subjects, each entrusted with the task of representing certain conceptions of the world.

知識的理論建立在人的主觀性，這個主觀性的位置就在這裡。當然，每一個符號都要求有一個人的主體。假如我們相信，每一個主體生存於這個世界，都有他自己原創的一套的世界觀，那麼真理經過的道路，必然是穿梭於不同的世界觀之間的探索、整合、及累積。假如世界是由不同的主體組成，事情的情況將是：每一個主體都被委任一個任務，那就代表某種的世界觀。

Indeed, this is the essential flaw in philosophical idealism which, in any case, cannot be sustained and has never been radically sustained. There is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject, and it is in this alienation, in this fundamental division, that the dialectic of the subject is established.

的確，這是哲學的理念主義的基本瑕疵。無論如何，理念主義無法長久維持，也從來沒有風行一時。每一個主體，總是在某個地方，會有主體的失蹤。就是這種疏離，這個基本的區隔，主體被建立。

In order to answer the question I was asked last time concerning my adhesion to the Hegeian dialectic, is it not enough that I should answer that, because of the vel, the sensitive point, point of balance, there is an emergence of the subject at the level of meaning only from its aphanisis in the Other locus, which is that of the unconscious?

為了回答我上一次被問道的問題，關於我一直堅持黑格爾正反合辯證法。我的回答是，因為欲望驅力是一個敏感點與平衡點，只有從在大它者領域，也就是無意識的領域，主體自己失蹤的時刻，主體才出現。我這樣回答夠清楚嗎？

Furthermore, this involves no mediation, and I promise, if I am provoked into doing so, to show that
the effective experience that has been established in the perspective of an absolute knowledge never leads us to anything that may, in any way, illustrate the Hegeian vision of successive syntheses, nothing that provides even so much as a hint of the moment that Hegel in some obscure way links to this stage,
and which someone has been pleased to illustrate by the title of Dimanche de la vie—when no opening remains in the heart of the subject.

而且，主體失蹤與主體出現，沒有仲介。假如你們硬要逼我作個仲介，我只能承諾表示，從絕對知識的觀點，我們精神分析經驗的效用，從來沒有引導我們能像黑格爾正反合辯證法那樣運作，沒有一樣暗示，可以提供我們得黑格爾那樣的精神現象學，像有些人喜歡提到「為國捐軀」那樣的標題。在主體的核心，失蹤與消失沒有仲介。

I should indicate here where the Hegeian lure proceeds from. It is included in the approach of the Cartesian I think, in which I designated the inaugural point that introduces, in history, in our experience, in our necessity, the vel of alienation, which prevents us for ever from misunderstanding it. It is in
the Cartesian approach that the vel was taken for the first time as the constituent of the dialectic of the subject, which now cannot be eliminated in his radical foundation.

我在此應該指出，黑格爾的陷阱從哪裡推展。他的陷阱就潛藏在哲學家笛卡爾的「我思故我在」。我指明這個「我思」，就是導致疏離的驅力起始的地方，不論是歷史上的疏離，我們精神分析經驗的疏離，或我們生命必然的疏離。因為這個疏離，我們永遠無法不誤解它。在笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的方法，欲望驅力第一次被當著是主體辯證法的組成要素，無法從他的根本基礎上被消除掉。

This reference will be useful to me in characterizing the experience of the transference, so I shall be returning to it later in order to articulate certain of its features.

當我在表達移情的經驗的特性時，我們想到「我思」這一點是很有幫助的。以後，我還會回到這一點，為了要清楚表達移情的某些特徵。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座243

• 拉岡講座243

‘7
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者：失蹤

The question of the Vorstellungsreprasentanz
自由符號的問題

Freedom, Representation, and the Hegelian lure
自由、符號、與黑格爾的陷阱

When I said, at the beginning of these talks— I do not seek, I find, I meant that, in Freud’s field, one has only to bend down and pick up what is to be found. The real implication of the nachtrdglich, for example, has been ignored, though it was there all the time and had only to be picked up. I also remember the surprise of someone who was on the same track as I, seeing one day what could be done with the einziger Zug, the single stroke.

在我這些演講的開始，我說「我並沒有尋求，我只是找到」，我的意思是，在佛洛伊德的學說，我們只需要彎下身，檢拾起我們所必須要找到的東西。例如，「自由」的真正意涵一直受到忽視，僅管它始終是在那裡，我們只需要將它檢拾起來。我也記得有某個人大吃一驚，因為他研究的途徑跟我一樣，有一天他看到，只要敢放手一搏，就會豁然開朗。

Today I would like to show you the importance, already designated by my schema last time, of what Freud calls, at the level of repression, the Vorstellungsreprasentanz.

今天，我想要給你們觀看，佛洛伊德所謂的the Vorstellungsreprasentanz.「自由符號」，在表壓抑的層次，有多麼重要，雖然在上一次，我已經用我的構圖指明過。

Vorstellung involves a sort of defect that leads the German language to put unwarranted ss, which cannot be attached to the normal declension of the determinate, but which are necessary to it when forming composite words. There are therefore two terms— Vorstellung, Representan.

Vorstellung自由，牽涉到某種的缺點，導致德文的語言，沒來由地將Vorstellungs-reprasentanz 自由符號這個複合字，前後兩個字，各有複數的s跟z，這並非是的限定詞的語尾變化的正式用法。可是組成複合字時，卻又無法避免。因此，這裡有兩個術語：自由與符號。

I spoke to you last time about the form of alienation, which I illustrated with several examples, and which I told you could be articulated in a vel of a very special nature. Today we might try to articulate it in some other ways. For example—not something. . . without something else. The dialectic of the slave is obviously no freedom without life, but there will be no life for him without freedom. From one to the other there is a necessary condition. This necessary condition becomes precisely the adequate reason that causes the loss of the original requirement.

我上一次跟你們談到疏離的形式。我用好幾個例子說明，我也告訴你們，我們能夠用一種特別性質的欲望驅力，來表達疏離。今天，我們將用一些其它的方式來表達它。例如，沒有某件東西，就沒有某件其它的東西。奴隸的辯證法邏輯，顯而易見是「要先有生命，才會有自由」，但結果是「沒有自由，生命形同死亡」。從前者到後者，有一個必要的條件。這個必要的條件，確實成為充份的理由，造成原先的要求的喪失。

Perhaps this is something like what also happens among some of my followers. There is no way of following me without passing through my signifiers, but to pass through my signifiers involves this feeling of alienation that incites them to seek, according to Freud’s formula the small difference.

也許，這正是我的某些聽眾也經常發生的事情。假如沒有透過我的意符，他們沒有辦法來了解我的學說，但是要透過我的意符，會牽涉到一種疏離的感覺，因為根據佛洛伊德的模式，這種疏離的感覺會激發他們去尋找這個小小的差異。

Unfortunately, this small difference makes them lose the full significance of the direction I pointed out to them. Heavens, I am not so touchy, I leave everyone to go his own way in the direction that I point out —but I could have done without having to take note of what seemed to a particular individual so worthy of rectification in the translation that I had first given of this Vorstellungsrepr&entanz. I had noted that Freud stresses the fact that repression bears on something that is of the order of representation that he calls the Vorstellungsreprdsentanz.

不幸地，這個小小的差異，使我對他們所標示出來的追尋途徑的意義，全部蕩然無存。我的天呀，我並不是多愁善感，我讓每個人根據我指出的方向各自努力，但是我本來大可自行其是，而不需要去注意，哪一位值得我去糾正他的誤解，我將Vorstellungsrepr&entanz. 「自由符號」這個德文字的翻譯。

As soon as I introduced this remark several years ago— which was also a way of reading what Freud writes under the heading of Verdrängung, the article that follows the one on the unconscious in the series of texts collected together under the term metapsychological—I insisted on the fact that Freud emphasizes that it is not the affect that is repressed. The affect —and we shall see what this means in our theory—goes off somewhere else, as best it can. There will always be enough professors of psychology to justify with the patient that its meaning is to be found precisely where it is no longer in its place. So I insisted on the fact that what is repressed is not the represented of desire, the signification, but the representative (it représentant) —I translated literally—of the representation (de la representation).

好幾年前，我剛介紹這個論述時，我堅持說，佛洛伊德強調，被壓抑的並不是情意。佛洛伊德當時寫的標題是Verdrängun，這一篇文章放在「形上心理學」標題的文集裡，緊跟在「論無意識」那一篇之後。情意會盡其可能，在某個地方迸發。讓我們看看在我們的理論裡，這意味著什麼？不乏眾多的心理學教授跟他們的病人證實：情意的意義，要在它不復存在的地方，才能夠被找到。所以，我堅持說，所被壓抑的東西，並不是欲望的符號所代表的意義，而是符號的代表物，容我照字面翻譯。

Here the function of alienation intervenes for this or that individual, who, more or less animated by a care for the privileges of university authority, and anxious to enter the lists, claims to correct the translation that I have given. The Vorstellungsreprosentanz is the representative representative (le reprCsentant reprIsentatif), let us say.

在此，對於這位或那位先生，疏離發揮了功用。他們相當關心到大學當局的特權，渴望慎重其事，宣稱要糾正我對於這字詞的翻譯。「自由符號」就是「符號的代表物」，容我們這樣說。

This doesn’t seem to amount to very much. But in a little book on psycho-somatics that has just appeared, one finds a whole passage arguing that there is some misunderstanding in something that must be called my theory of desire and, in a small note referring to some inaccessible passage taken from the text offered by two of my pupils, it is stressed that, following me, they make desire the representative representative of need.

這似乎無關緊要。但是在一本剛出版的論心理與生理的小書，有人發現有一整個篇章都在辯駁，我的欲望理論，有誤導的地方。並且在注釋裡，還引用我的兩位學生所提供的文本，再斷章取義地強調說，我的學生追隨我之後，將欲望解釋著需求的代表符號。

I’m not questioning whether in fact my pupils wrote that—we have been unable to find the passage in question—the important thing is that the only pertinent remark in this extremely slight book is as follows—we would say rather that desire is the nonrepresentative representative.

我不是在質疑，事實上是否我的學生所寫的東西，因為我無法找到他們所引述的那個段落。重要的是，在這本無關緊要的書裡，唯一中肯的說法應該如下：我們應該說，欲望是無法代表的代表符號。

Now, that is precisely what I mean, and say—for what I mean, I say—in translating Vorstellungsrepro.sentanc by representative of the representation.

現在，這確實是我的意思。我的意思是要將Vorstellungsrepro.sentanc「自由符號」 翻譯為「符號的代表物」

We can locate this Vorstellungsrepresentanz in our schema of the original mechanisms of alienation in that first signifying coupling that enables us to conceive that the subject appears first in the Other, in so far as the first signifier, the unary signifier, emerges in the field of the Other and represents the
subject for another signifier, which other signifier has as its effect the aphanisis of the subject. Hence the division of the subject—when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading’, as disappearance. There is, then, one might say, a matter of life and death between the unary signifier and the subject, qua binary signifier, cause of his disappearance. The Vorstellungsreprtisentanz is the binary signifier.

我們能夠「自由符號」的位置，放在我們原先疏離的機械結構的基模。那個第一個意符的組合，使我們能夠構想，主體首先出現在那個大它者的意符鎖鏈。在大它者的領域，第一個意符出現，代表主體對於另外一個意符。這另外一個意符，擁有主體的失蹤作為自己的影響。因此，主體形成分裂，當主體作為意義，出現在某個地方，他在別的地方，被證明是「隱退」，是消失。我們因此可以說，最初的意符跟主體之間，有一個生死交關的問題，那就是，作為最初的意符，主體造成自己的消失。「自由意符」就是最初的意符。

This signifier constitutes the central point of the Urverdrangung— of what, from having passed into the unconscious, will be, as Freud indicates in his theory, the point of Anziehung, the point of attraction, through which all the other repressions will be possible, all the other similar passages in the locus of the Unterdruckt, of what has passed underneath as signifier. This is what is involved in the term Vorstellungsreprdcentanz.

這個自由意符進入無意識的領域時，處於吸引力的中央位置，如佛洛伊德在其學說所主張。透過這個吸引力的中央位置，所有的其他壓抑，所有通過這個軌跡底下的類似意符，才成為可能。這就是「自由符號」牽涉到的運作。

That by which the subject finds the return way of the vet of alienation is the operation I called, the other day, separation. By separation, the subject finds, one might say, the weak point of the primal dyad of the signifying articulation, in so far as it is alienating in essence. It is in the interval between these two signifiers that resides the desire offered to the mapping of the subject in the experience of the discourse of the Other, of the first Other he has to deal with, let us say, by way of illustration, the mother. It is in so far as his desire is beyond or falls short of what she says, of what she hints at, of what she brings out as meaning, it is in so far as his desire is unknown, it is in this point of lack, that the desire of the subject is constituted.

主體找到疏離的驅力的歸途，就是我前天所稱為的分裂的運作。我們可以說，憑藉這個分裂，主體找到意符表達的原初架構的弱點，因為它在本質上是疏離的。在大它者的論述的經驗中，在主體必須要處理的第一個大它者的領域，例如，母親作為大它者的意符，主體展現的欲望，就駐留在這兩個意符之間的間隔。主體的欲望，常會超越，或沒有達到母親所期望，母親所暗示，以及母親所揭示的意義，因為欲望無以名狀。就在這個欠缺點的地方，主體的欲望被構成。

The subject—by a process that is not without deception, which is not without presenting that fundamental twist by which what the subject rediscovers is not that which animates his movement of rediscovery—comes back, then, to the initial point, which is that of his lack as such, of the lack of his aphanisis.

主體經歷的過程，並非沒有欺騙，並非沒有呈現那個基本的演變，只是在演變的過程，主體重新發現的東西，並不是原先激發他去重新發現的動作的動機。然後，主體又回來，到原初的地方，原先欠缺本身的地方，他失蹤的欠缺處。

We will come back in greater detail to the consequences that flow from it for the analytic treatment itself, and we shall see that this twist effect is essential in integrating the emergence phase of the transference. For the moment, I would like to dwell on what is essential in the function of desire, namely, that it is in as much as the subject plays his part in separation that the binary signifier, the Vorsellungsrepr&sentanz, is untera’rilckt, sunk underneath.

我們將再回來詳述，從精神分析治療本身所觀看到的結果。我們將看到，這個演變的影響的重要性，因為它包含移情出現的部份。目前，我想要先描述欲望的功用最重要的東西，換言之，當主體在分裂的狀況，扮演自己的角色時，這個二元的意符沉落到底下。

The thing is essential if we are to articulate properly—it immediately throws some light on very different regions—what is the sign of interpretation.

假如我們想要表達得貼切，這件事情非常重要。它讓我們明白那截然不同的地區，也就是解釋的符號的地區。

It might be useful in passing to bring out—however metaphysical it may seem, but in any case our technique often makes use, as if it were self-evident, of the expression to free something
—it might be useful to remark that it is there that the whole business of this term freedom, which certainly merits the description of phantom, is played out. What the subject has to free himself of is the aphanisic effect of the binary signifier and, if we look at it more closely, we shall see that in fact it is a question of nothing else in the function of freedom.

聽起來有點形而上地抽象，可是偶爾用它來開導啟發，還是蠻有用途。無論如何，我們精神分析的技巧，經常使用這個表達來解放一些東西，好像這是天經地義。我們也不妨這樣說：「自由」這個術語，聽起來像是天馬行空的幻影，就是在那個主體失蹤的欠缺處耀武揚威。主體必須替自己解放的東西，就是那個二元意符的失蹤的影響。如果我們觀看得更仔細，我們將會看到，事實上，那就是自由的功用，不是別的。

It is not for nothing that having had to justify the term vel of alienation at the level of our experience, the two most obvious supports to occur to us were those two choices which, by their formula, structure, firstly, the position of the slave and, secondly, the position of the master. When the slave is confronted with the choice of his freedom or his life, he decides, no freedom without life–life remains forever deprived of freedom. And, when we stand back to look at things, we will see that the alienation of the master is structured in exactly the same way. For if Hegel shows us that the status of the masters is established in the struggle to the death of pure prestige, it is because it is to bring his choice through death that the master also constitutes his fundamental alienation.

我們必須從精神分析的經驗，來證實疏離的欲望驅力這個術語，並不是沒有道理。我們得到兩個最顯而易見的支持，就是根據這套公式，我們有兩種選擇的架構，首先是奴隸的位置，其次是主人的位置。奴隸面臨「要自由？或是要生命？」的抉擇時，他決定「沒有生命，也等於沒自由」，於是他苟且偷生，始終被剝奪掉自由。可是，當我們回顧那些事情時，我們將會看到，主人的疏離所架構的方式，也確實大同小異。黑格爾告訴我們，主人的地位，自始至終被建立在維護自我的威望跟尊嚴。那是因為主人在將他的抉擇貫徹始終時，也構成了自己基本的疏離感。

Certainly, one can say that the master is no more spared by death than is his slave, that he will always die in the end, and that this is the limit of his freedom. But to say this is insufficient for this death is not the death that constitutes the alienating choice of the master, the death of the struggle to the death of
pure prestige. The revelation of the essence of the master is manifested at the moment of terror, when it is to him that one says freedom or death, and then he has obviously only death to choose in order to have freedom. The supreme image of the master is that character in Claudeian tragedy, Sygne de Confontaine, of whom I have spoken at length in one of my seminars. It is she who wished to abandon nothing of her register, the register of the master, and the values to which she sacrifices bring her, over and above her sacrifice, no more than the need to renounce, in all its depths, her very being. It is in so far as, through the sacrifice of these values, she is forced to renounce her essence, her very being, her most intimate being, that she illustrates, in the end, how much radical alienation of freedom there is in the master

的確，我們能夠說，主人跟奴隸一樣，都沒有被死亡所赦免，他最後還是難逃一死，這是他自由的極限。但是如此說法並不公道，因為這樣的死亡，跟構成主人的疏離的選擇的死亡，跟自始至終護尊嚴威望的死亡，迴然不同。在遭逢恐嚇的時刻，主人的本質顯示得最為明顯。因為是他在說「不自由，毋寧死」，然後，顯而易見地，他只有死亡可以選擇，為了要維護他的自由。主人的崇高意象，就是克勞地安悲劇小說「孔芬坦夫人」 的人物，在我以前的演講，我曾詳細描述過。這位女主角不希望放棄自己的尊嚴，作為主人的尊嚴，以及她願意犧牲一切來維護的價值，正如她不希望放棄生命最真實的存在。可是就在透過這些價值的犧牲，她被迫放棄她的本質，她生命的存在，她最親密的存在。最後，她發揮主人的自由的強烈的疏離，而成為最佳典範。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座242

拉岡講座242

THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: ALIENATION
主體與大它者：疏離

The why?
「為什麼」的問題

4
Given the time, I can do no more here than introduce the second operation. It completes the circularity of the relation of the subject to the Other, but an essential twist is revealed in it.

由於時間限制，我現在只能夠介紹這第二回合的運作。它完成主體到大它者的循環，但是在這裡有一個重要的演變。

Whereas the first phase is based on the sub-structure of joining, the second is based on the sub-structure that is called intersection or product. It is situated precisely in that same lunula in which you find the form of the gap, the rim.

雖然第一部份的基礎是聯合的次級結構，第二部份的基礎，是所謂交會或結果的次級結構。它的位置確實就是在那個相同的新月形狀的地分，你會發現到分裂的形狀，邊緣的形狀。

The intersection of two sets is constituted by the elements that belong to the two sets. It is here that the second operation in which the subject is led by this dialectic takes place. It is as essential to define the second operation as the first, because it is there that we shall see the emergence of the field of the transference. I shall call it—introducing my second new term here—separation.

這兩組的交會，分由屬於這兩組的因素所組成。受到辯證法引導的主體的第二次運作，就發生在這裡。第二次運作，可以認定跟第一次運作同樣的重要，因為在這裡，我們將會看到移情的場域出現。我將稱之為分裂，作為我第二個新的術語。

Separare, to separate—I would point out at once the equivocation of the se parare, of the se parer, in all the fluctuating meanings it has in French. It means not only to dress oneself; but also to defend oneself; to provide oneself with what one needs to be on one’s guard, and I will go further still, and Latinists
will bear me out, to the se parere, the s’engendrer, the to be engendered, which is involved here. How, at this level, has the subject to procure himself? For that is the origin of the word that designates in Latin to engender. It is juridical, as indeed, curiously enough, are all the words in Indo-European that designate to put into the world. The word parturition itself originates in a word which, in its root, simply means to procure a child from the husband—a juridical and, it should be said, social operation.

在法文裡，分裂這個字詞有各種模稜兩可的意涵，容我馬上指出它的曖昧雙關處。它的意思不僅是替自己穿衣，而且也是要保衛自己，供應自己防衛所需的東西。我會再詳加說明，分裂這個字詞，意思牽涉到「即將產生」，拉丁語學家可以為我證實。在這個層次上，主體如何實現自己？因為那個字詞起源於拉丁文的原意「即將產生」。確實耐人尋味的是，在所有印歐語系，這個字詞合情合理地指的是「進入世界」。「分娩」這個字詞本身，從字根起源的原意，僅是從丈夫那裡得到一個小孩。我們應該說，這樣的運作是合情合理的。

Next time, I shall try to show how, like the function of the alienating vel, so different from the other vels defined so far, use is to be made of this notion of intersection. We shall see how it emerges from the superimposition of two lacks.

下一次，我將設法顯示，我們如何利用「交會」這個觀念，因為如同疏離的欲望驅力的功用，它跟迄今所談論到其它欲望驅力如此的不同。我們將會看到，從兩個欠缺的重疊處，有交會的現象出現。

A lack is encountered by the subject in the Other, in the very intimation that the Other makes to him by his discourse. In the intervals of the discourse of the Other, there emerges in the experience of the child something that is radically mappable, namely, He is saying this to me, but what does he want?

主體在大它者那裡遭遇到一個欠缺，由於大它者憑藉自己的論述，給予它種種耳提面命。在大它者的論述的間隔，孩童經驗到某種明顯可找得出來的東西，換言之，「他正在跟我這樣說，但是他到底要我怎麼做？」

In this interval intersecting the signifiers, which forms part of the very structure of the signifier, is the locus of what, in other registers of my exposition, I have called metonymy. It is there that what we call desire crawls, slips, escapes, like the ferret. The desire of the Other is apprehended by the subject
in that which does not work, in the lacks of the discourse of the Other, and all the child’s why’s reveal not so much an avidity for the reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me this? ever-resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the adult’s desire.

這個意符的交會的間隔，組成意符結構的部份，也是我所謂意符轉喻的軌跡，用我在其它表述的說法。就在那裡，我們所謂的欲望，像雪貂一樣，潛行、溜走、又逃脫。大它者的欲望，看似不著運作痕跡，卻是在大它者的論述的兩個欠缺處，被主體所理解。小孩發出種種「為什麼」，顯示著，他不是熱切地想尋問各種理由，而是對大人的一種探問：「你為什麼跟我說這些？」這個問句，從它的根源處，週而復始地冒出來，是大人欲望的謎團。

Now, to reply to this hold, the subject, like Gribouille, brings the answer of the previous lack, of his own disappearance, which he situates here at the point of lack perceived in the Other. The first object he proposes for this parental desire whose object is unknown is his own loss—Can he lose me? The phantasy of one’s death, of one’s disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring into play in this dialectic, and he does indeed bring it into play—as we know from innumerable cases, such as in anorexia nervosa. We also know that the phantasy of one’s death is usually manipulated by the child in his love relations with his parents.

現在，為了回答這糾纏的問句，像「格瑞波利」影片中主角一樣，主體以自己的消失，及先前的欠缺，作為回答。主體自己的位置，在大它者的領域，所感受的是欠缺。這個父母親的期望的目標，主體不甚瞭然，他替自己豎立的第一個目標，是讓自己消失：「他能夠失去我嗎？」幻想自己的死亡，幻想自己的消失，就是主體在這個意符辯證法，必須運作的第一個目標。他確實讓這個目標運作，如同我們從無數神經性厭食症的例子所獲知。我們也知道，小孩在處理自己跟父母親的關係時，常幻想自己的死亡。

One lack is superimposed upon the other. The dialectic of the objects of desire, in so far as it creates the link between the desire of the subject and the desire of the Other—I have been telling you for a long time now that it is one and the same—this dialectic now passes through the fact that the desire is not replied to directly. It is a lack engendered from the previous time that serves to reply to the lack raised by the following time.

一個欠缺重疊著另一個欠缺。欲望的各種目標的辯證法，創造主體的欲望，跟大它者的欲望之間的關係，我長久以來一直告訴過你們，兩者常是混為一談。這個欲望目標的辯證法，所經歷的現實是，欲望並沒有得到直接的回應。欲望是先前欲望所產生的欠缺，而先前的欲望，卻又充當後來欲望提出的欠缺的回應。

I think I have sufficiently stressed the two elements that I have tried to present today, in this new and fundamental logical argument—non-reciprocity and the twist in the return.

我想我已經反覆再三地強調，在這個新的根本的邏輯辯證裡，我今天設法提出的這兩種因素：非互惠的特性及回轉時的演變。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw