拉岡講座210

拉岡講座210

ANAMORPHOSIS
歪像
The privilege of the gaze as objet a
凝視作為小客體特權
2
But what is the gaze? I shall set out from this first point of annihilation in which is marked, in the field of the reduction of the subject, a break—which warns us of the need to introduce another reference, that which analysis assumes in reducing the privileges of the consciousness.

但是什麼是凝視？我將先從毀滅力量這一點先講起。一個斷裂發生在主體的處境場域，就是毀滅的力量。這個毀滅的力量警告我們，有需要介紹精神分析學從事的另一個命題， 將意識的特權規範一下。

Psycho-analysis regards the consciousness as irremediably limited, and institutes it as a principle, not only of idealization, but of méconnaissance, as—using a term that takes on new value by being referred to a visible domain—scotoma. The term was introduced into the psycho-analytic vocabulary by the French School. Is it simply a metaphor? We find here once again the ambiguity that affects anything that is inscribed in the register of the scopic drive.

精神分析學認為意識是無可救藥地受到限制，不但將它限定為理念的原則，而且是錯誤辨識的根源。意識被認為是「盲點」所在，用在視覺領域頗具新義的術語來說。這個術語被法國學派介紹到精神分析學的辭彙。「盲點」只是個比喻嗎？我們在此再一次發現到，在視覺驅力欲望的場域，曖昧不清影響著一切。

For us, consciousness matters only in its relation to what, for propaedeutic reasons, I have tried to show you in the fiction of the incomplete text—on the basis of which it is a question of recentring the subject as speaking in the very lacunae of that in which, at first sight, it presents itself as speaking. But I am
stating here only the relation of the pre-conscious to the unconscious.

我們認為，意識的重要只存在於人作為主體，被構想成為是不完整的文本，這是我一再設法告訴你的。由於基礎是在缺憾中的文本不完整，乍看來，主體只得以言說來表現自己，因此就必須不斷以言說來找回作為主體的中心。但是我現在只先講前意識與無意圖的關係。

The dynamic that is attached to the consciousness as such, the attention the subject brings to his own text, remains up to this point, as Freud has stressed, outside theory and, strictly speaking, not yet articulated.

連接到意識這種狀況的動力是什麼，也就是主體如何看待他自己的文本，直到目前，理論學說始終沒有道盡其詳，如佛洛伊德所強調。嚴格地說，還沒有受到清楚研究。

It is here that I propose that the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it—namely, a privileged object, which has emerged from some primal separation, from some induced by the very approach of the real, whose name, in our algebra, is the objet a.

在此，我提出，主體對自己的分裂如此興趣濃厚，是跟主體的結構，換言之，跟特權的客體，也就是我們精神分析學所稱為的小客體，有密切關係。因為這個特權的客體的出現，是從某些原初的分裂，從真實界接近不得的分裂。

In the scopic relation, the object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze. Its privilege—and also that by which the subject for so long has been misunderstood as being in its dependence—derives from its very structure.

在視覺的關係，幻見所依賴的客體就是凝視，因為主體與幻見之間的懸盪基本上搖擺不定，而且凝視的特權來自於它自己的結構，因此主體長久以來都被誤解是依賴凝視的存在。

Let us schematize at once what we mean. From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt himself to it, he becomes that punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his own failure. Furthermore, of all the objects in which the subject may recognize his dependence in the register of desire, the gaze is specified as unapprehensible.

讓我們馬上將我們的意思系統化。從凝視出現的時刻，主體就設法讓自己適應它，他成為那個點狀的客體，那個存在消失的點，主體將他的失敗跟那個存在消失點混為一談。而且，在所有主體辨認是自己欲望所依賴的客體中，凝視被明確指定為無法理解。

That is why it is, more than any other object, misunderstood (méconnu), and it is perhaps for this reason, too, that the subject manages, fortunately, to symbolize his own vanishing and punctiform bar (trait) in the illusion of the consciousness of seeing oneself see oneself, in which the gaze is elided.
If, then, the gaze is that underside of consciousness, how shall we try to imagine it?

那就是為什麼凝視被錯誤辨識，遠超過其它客體。可能也因為這個理由，主體幸運地得以用看見自己看見自己的意識的幻覺，來象徵他自己正在消失的點狀客體，儘管凝視撲朔迷離。然後，假如凝視就是意識的陰暗面，我們將如何設法想像它？

The expression is not inapt, for we can give body to the gaze. Sartre, in one of the most brilliant passages of L’Etre et le Xéant, brings it into function in the dimension of the existence of others. Others would remain suspended in the same, partially conditions that are, in Sartre’s definition, those of
objectivity, were it not for the gaze. The gaze, as conceived by Sartre, is the gaze by which I am surprised—surprised in so far as it changes all the perspectives, the lines of force, of my world, orders it, from the point of nothingness where I am, in a sort of radiated reticulation of the organisms. As the locus of the relation between me, the annihilating subject, and that which surrounds me, the gaze seems to possess such a privilege that it goes so far as to have me scotomized, I who look, the eye of him who sees me as object. In so far as I am under the gaze, Sartre writes, I no longer see the eye that looks at me and, if I see the eye, the gaze disappears.

這樣說法並不恰當，因為我們不是能夠給凝視賦予身體嗎？哲學家沙特在他的「存在與空無」最著名的段落，將凝視的功用歸屬於別人的存在的向度。若是沒有這個凝視，別人將或多或少地會被懸空於同樣的情境，以沙特的定義，就是客觀存在的情境。對於沙特所構想的這個凝視，我非常驚訝，我的驚訝是因為它改變了我的世界的所有的觀看點，力量的途徑，凝視從我存在是空無的這一點，以有機體的視網膜煥發光輝的方式規劃秩序。作為我、無常的客體、及我四周的環境之間的關係的軌跡，凝視似乎擁有如此一個特權，可以囂張到將我變成為盲點，我是觀看者，卻存在於看待我當著客體的他的眼睛。沙特寫到，當我在別人的凝視之下，我不再看到眼睛正在看我，而是假如我看到別人的眼睛，凝視就消失。

Is this a correct phenomenological analysis? No. It is not true that, when I am under the gaze, when I solicit a gaze, when I obtain it, I do not see it as a gaze. Painters, above all, have grasped this gaze as such in the mask and I have only to remind you of Goya, for example, for you to realize this.

這是一個正確的現象學分析嗎？其實不然。當我受到凝視，當我祈求它，得到它，我就沒有看到它是凝視，這種說法並不真實。很多人，特別是畫家，都曾在面具上捕捉到這種的凝視。舉個例子，我只需要提到哥耶，你們就能體會到。

The gaze sees itself—to be precise, the gaze of which Sartre speaks, the gaze that surprises me and reduces me to shame, since this is the feeling he regards as the most dominant. The gaze encounter— you can find this in Sartre’s own writing—is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field
of the Other.

凝視看到它自己。確實地說，沙特所提到的凝視，使我驚訝到無以自容的凝視，會看到自己，因為這就是他認為是最具支配性的感覺。你在沙特的作品裡會發現到，凝視的邂逅並不是被看見的凝視，而是在大它者的領域，被我想像的凝視。

If you turn to Sartre’s own text, you will see that, far from speaking of the emergence of this gaze as of something that concerns the organ of sight, he refers to the sound of rustling leaves, suddenly heard while out hunting, to a footstep heard in a corridor. And when are these sounds heard? At the moment when he has presented himself in the action of looking through a keyhole. A gaze surprises him in the function of voyeur, disturbs him, overwhelms him and reduces him to a feeling of shame

假如你轉向沙特的本文，你會看到，他並沒有提到這個凝視的出現，是某件與視覺器官有關的東西，他只是提到落葉的沙沙作響聲，在狩獵時突然被聽見，提到在走廊被聽見的腳步聲。那些聲音什麼時候被聽見？在他透過鑰匙洞口窺看的行動，而洩露自己的時刻。在這個窺視的功用中，有個凝視驚嚇到他，困擾到他，使他陷入無地自容的羞愧感。

. The gaze in question is certainly the presence of others as such. But does this mean that originally it is in the relation of subject to subject, in the function of the existence of others as looking at me, that we apprehend what the gaze really is? Is it not clear that the gaze intervenes here only in as much as it is not the annihilating subject, correlative of the world of objectivity, who feels himself surprised, but the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire? Is it not precisely because desire is established here in the domain of seeing that we can make it vanish?

我們所討論的這個凝視，確實是因為別人作為凝視的存在。但難道這就意味著，凝視原先是主體與主體的關係，是別人作為觀看我的存在的功用，是我們理解凝視的真正的內涵？ 凝視的介入，不是在它作為與客觀世界相對時，使自己感受驚嚇的無常的主體，而是在藉欲望的功用維持自己的主體，這難道不是顯而易見？難道不就是因為在看到我們能夠使凝視消失的場域，欲望才在此被建立？

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座209

拉岡講座209

ANAMORPHOSIS
歪像

Of the foundation of consciousness. 意識的基礎
The privilege of the gaze as objet a 凝視作為小客體的特權
The optics of the blinds 瞎子的光學
The phallus in the picture 圖畫中的陽具

In vain your image comes to meet me
And does not enter me where I am who only shows it
Turning towards me you can find
On the wall of my gaze only your dreamt-of shadow.

真是枉然，你的影像前來跟我相會
沒有進入我的主體真正顯示的所在
當你轉身向我，你能夠發現到的
只是你夢想中的陰影出現在我凝視的壁上

I am that wretch comparable with mirrors
That can reflect but cannot see
Like them my eye is empty and like them inhabited
By your absence which makes them blind.

我的悲慘困境可與鏡子倫比
鏡子只能反映，但是不能觀看
像鏡子我的眼睛空茫，像鏡子我的眼睛
停駐的是你的缺席，使我的眼睛盲瞎

You may remember that, in one of my earlier lectures, I began by quoting the poem, Contrechant, from Aragon’s Le Fou d’Elsa. I did not realize at the time that I would be developing the subject of the gaze to such an extent. I was diverted into doing so by the way in which I presented the concept of
repetition in Freud.

你們可能記得，在我早先的一個演講中，我開始引述阿拉貢的這首詩。我當時沒有體會到，我會將凝視的主題發展到這個程度。當我在呈現佛洛伊德重複的觀念時，我不知不覺被牽引到這樣做

We cannot deny that it is within the explanation of repetition that this digression on the scopic function is situated —no doubt by Maurice Merleau-Poiity’s recently published work, Le Visible et l’invisible.

無可否認地，在解釋重複的觀念時，我離題談視覺的功用，無疑地，是因為當時梅洛、龐帝最近剛出版的書「可見與不可見」。

Moreover, it seemed to me that, if an encounter were to be found there, it was a happy one, one destined to stress, as I shall try to do today, how, in the perspective of the unconscious, we can situate consciousness. You know that some shadow, or, to use another term, some ‘resist’ —in the sense one speaks of ‘resist’ in the dying of material—marks the fact of consciousness in Freud’s very discourse.

而且，我覺得那是一個快樂的邂逅，假如我們認為那是一個邂逅。我們終究要強調，如我今天所要強調的，從無意識的觀點，我們如何能夠確立意識的位置。你知道，在佛洛伊德的學說，意識是由某個陰影，或換個用詞，某個「抗拒」顯示出來。這個「抗拒」的意義指的是人及物不願意被消滅。

But, before taking things up again at the point we left them last time, I must first clear up a misunderstanding that appears to have arisen in the minds of certain members of the audience
concerning a term I used last time. Some of you seem to have been perplexed by a word that is simple enough, and which I commented on, namely, the tychic. Apparently, it sounded to some of you like a sneeze. Yet I made it quite clear that it was the adjective formed from tuché just as psychique (psychical) is the adjective corresponding to psuché (psyche). I used this analogy at the heart of the experience of repetition quite intentionally, because for any conception of the psychical
development as elucidated by psycho-analysis, the fact of the tychic is central. It is in relation to the eye, in relation to the eutuchia or the dustuclzia, the happy encounter and the unhappy encounter, that my lecture today will be ordered.

但是在重新開展這個上一次遺留下來的命題之前，我必須首先澄清一個某些聽眾似乎已經產生的誤解，關於我上一次所用的術語。有些人似乎對我所評論的那個詞語，看來簡單，卻不免令人困惑，那就是「tychic邂逅 」。顯然，對於你們有些人，它聽起來像個一個噴嚏。可是，我表達得很清楚，那是一個tuche 邂逅所形成的形容詞，如同「psychical 心理的」是個「psyche心理」的 形容詞。我相當刻意地使用這個類比，在重複經驗的核心，因為由心理分析學所闡明的任何心理的發展的觀念，tychic 存在的事實是很重要的。就在跟眼睛的關係，跟eutuchia 及 dustuclzia的關係，快樂的邂逅跟不快樂的邂逅，就是我今天的演講主題。
I
I saw myself seeing myself, young Parque says somewhere. Certainly, this statement has rich and complex implications in relation to the theme developed in La Jeune Parque, that of femininity—but we haven’t got there yet. We are dealing with the philosopher, who apprehends something that is one of the essential correlates of consciousness in its relation to representation, and which is designated as I see myself seeing myself.

「我看到我自己看到我自己。」年輕人巴奎在某個地方說。的確，這個陳述有豐富而複雜的意涵，關於我在巴奎個案所發展的主題，那就是女性的主題。但是我們還沒有進展到這裡。我們正在處理一位哲學家，他理解到意識跟符號再現的基本相關因素，這個因素被指明為：我看見我自己看到我自己。

What evidence can we really attach to this formula? How is it that it remains, in fact, correlative with that fundamental mode to which we referred in the Cartesian cogito, by which the subject apprehends himself as thought?

我們有什麼證據可以証明這個公式？它跟我們所提到的笛卡爾的我思故所在這個基本模式，事實上如何扯上關係？

What isolates this apprehension of thought by itself is a sort of doubt, which has been called methodological doubt, which concerns whatever might give support to thought in representation.
How is it, then, that the I see myself seeing myself remains its envelope and base, and, perhaps more than one thinks, grounds its certainty?

孤立對於這個思想本身的理解的是一種被稱為方法論的懷疑，懷疑任何可能給予支持思想作為再現符號。因此，我看見我自己看見我自己這個命題，如何保持它的表面跟基礎，或者，超乎我們想像的，如何肯定它確實成立。

For, I warm myself by warming myself is a reference to the body as body—I feel that sensation
of warmth which, from some point inside me, is diffused and locates me as body. Whereas in the I see myself seeing myself, there is no such sensation of being absorbed by vision.

我以溫暖我自己，來溫暖我自己，等於是提到身體當著身體。從我身體內部某一點，我感覺到溫暖的感覺散發出來，將我定位為身體。而在我看見我自己看見我自己這個命題，並沒有像這樣的感覺被視覺所吸收。

Furthermore, the phenomenologists have succeeded in articulating with precision, and in the most disconcerting way, that it is quite clear that I see outside, that perception is not in me, that it is on the objects that it apprehends. And yet I apprehend the world in a perception that seems to concern the immanence of the I see myself seeing myself. The privilege of the subject seems to be established here from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations belong to me.

而且，現象學家成功地準確表達，雖然令人倉皇困窘：我看見的顯然是外在，感覺不是在我身體內部，它所理解的部份是在客體。可是我理解這個世界，是以一種感覺，這種感覺似乎關心到我看到我自己看到我自己這個命題的內在性。主體具有特權在此似乎可以成立，因為從兩極的反身代名詞的關係而言，只要我一感覺，我的再現符號就屬於我。

This is how the world is struck with a presumption of idealization, of the suspicion of yielding me only my representations. Serious practice does not really weigh very heavy, but, on the other hand, the philosopher, the idealist, is placed there, as much in confrontation with himself as in confrontation with
those who are listening to him, in an embarrassing position.

這就是世界如何會陷於理想主義的假設，然後又懷疑產生我的只是再現符號。不過，這個命題也沒有真的必要小題大作。在另一方面，哲學家，理想主義者的角色被定位在此，會面對他自己的質疑，也會面對傾聽他演講的那些人質疑（他的演講是主觀或客觀的真理，立場可是尷尬。

How can one deny that nothing of the world appears to me except in my representations? This is the irreducible method of Bishop Berkeley, about whose subjective position much might be said— including something that may have eluded you in passing, namely, this belong to me aspect of representations, so reminiscent of property. When carried to the limit, the process of this meditation, of this reflecting reflection, goes so far as to reduce the subject apprehended by the Cartesian meditation
to a power of annihilation.

我們如何否認，世界對於我，除了我的主觀再現符號外別無它物？這是柏克來主教哲學認識論的徹底方法。關於他的主觀論的立場，被談論過很多，包括某個你們可能不知其詳的命題，換言之，再現符號「屬於我」這個觀點。沉思的過程，思維的思維過程，若是從事到走火入魔，會將笛卡爾我思故我在的主體，變成為具有毀滅性的力量。

The mode of my presence in the world is the subject in so far as by reducing itself solely to this certainty of being a subject, it becomes active annihilation. In fact, the process of the philosophical meditation throws the subject towards the transforming historical action, and, around this point, orders
the configured modes of active self.consciousness through its metamorphoses in history. As for the meditation on being that reaches its culmination in the thought of Heidegger, it restores to being itself that power of annihilation—or at least poses the question of how it may be related to it.

當我存在於世界的模式，就是將自己視為絕對真理的主體，它會成為激進的毀滅力量。事實上，哲學沉思的過程，會將主體推向轉變的歷史的行動，然後透過歷史過程中自己的蛻變，制定激進自我意識的調整模式。至於在海德格思想登峰造極的對於存在的沉思，他將毀滅的力量回歸給存在本身，或至少提出這個問題：毀滅的力量如何跟存在相關。

This is also the point to which Maurice Merleau-Ponty leads us. But, if you refer to his text, you will see that it is at this point that he chooses to withdraw, in order to propose a return to the sources of intuition concerning the visible and the invisible, to come back to that which is prior to all reflection,
thetic or non-thetic, in order to locate the emergence of vision

這也是梅洛、龐帝引導我們到達的地方。但是假如你閱讀他的本文，你會看出，就在這一點，他選擇撤退，以便提議回轉到有關可見與不可見的本能的來源，回到所有思維之前的地方，不管是主觀不主觀，這樣他才定位視覺出現的位置。

For him, it is a question of restoring—for, he tells us, it can only be a question of a reconstruction or a restoration, not of a path traversed in the opposite direction—of reconstituting the way by which, not from the body, but from something that he calls the flesh of the world, the original point of vision
was able to emerge. It would seem that in this way one sees, in this unfinished work, the emergence of something like the search for an unnamed substance from which I, the seer, extract myself. From the toils (rets), or rays (rais), if you prefer, of an iridescence of which I am at first a part, I emerge as eye,
assuming, in a way, emergence from what I would like to call the function of seeingness

對於他，這是個恢復的問題，因為他告訴我們，那只能是重建或恢復的問題，不是朝相反方向跋涉前進，而是重新建設途徑。視覺的原初點的出現，不是從身體，而是從他所稱為世界肉身的地方。似乎以這種方式，在他未完成的作品裡，我們看到某件東西的出現，像是追尋一個無以名狀的物質，而我作為觀看者，就是從這裡將自己提昇出來。從眼睛的虹彩，換言之，從視網膜或光線，我起初是它們的一部份，現在以眼睛的角色出現，從我想要稱為觀看的功用，以某種方式，擺出出現的姿態。

A wild odor emanates from it, providing a glimpse on the horizon of the hunt of Artemis—whose touch seems to be associated at this moment of tragic failure in which we lost him who speaks.

一種瘋狂的氣息從這裡散發出來，讓我們瞥見獵人阿特米思的狩獵的地平線，他的冒險前進似乎被聯想到，在悲慘覆滅的這個時刻，我們失去他說話的這個主體。

Yet is this really the way he wished to take? The traces that remain of the part to come from his meditation permits us to doubt it. The reference-points that are provided in it, more particularly for the strictly psycho-analytic unconscious, allow us to perceive that he may have been directed towards some search, original in relation to the philosophical tradition, towards that new dimension of meditation on the subject that analysis enables us to trace.

可是，這真的是他希望前進的險路嗎？從他的沉思所遺留的痕跡，我們能夠懷疑。在他的沉思所提供出來的蛛絲馬跡，特別是適合於當著嚴謹的精神分析學的無意識，我們能夠感覺到，他可能曾經被引導到某個追尋，就哲學的傳統而言是原創性，朝向新的向度沉思我們精神分析學能夠追蹤的主體。

Personally, I cannot but be struck by certain of these notes, which are for me less enigmatic than they may seem to other readers, because they correspond very exactly to the schemata —with one of them, in particular—that I shall be dealing with here. Read, for example, the note concerning what he
calls the turning inside-out of the finger of a glove, in as much as it seems to appear there—note the way in which the leather envelops the fur in a winter glove—that consciousness, in its illusion of seeing itself seeing itself, finds its basis in the inside-out structure of the gaze.

就我個人而言，我對於某些他所遺留的這些記載，不禁肅然起敬，但是這些記載對於我而言，不像對於其它讀者那樣難於索解。特別是有一篇，我今天要在這裡處理的。舉個例子，讓我們閱讀一下，有關他所稱為的手套裡的手指的由內翻轉的記載。我們現在注意一下，在冬天的手套，外面的皮涵蓋裡面的毛。那似乎是說，意識找到它自己的基礎，在凝視的由內翻轉的結構中，換言之，在意識看到自己在看到自己的幻覺中。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座208

拉岡講座208

The Eye and the Gaze
眼睛與凝視
3
In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded it—that is we call Gaze.

就視覺方式所組成及按符號數目所排列順序的關係，在人與物的關係，某件東西被傳遞，從一個階段到另一階段，總有幾分程度閃避不見，這就是我們所謂的凝視。

You can be made aware of this in more than one way. Let me describe it, at its extreme point, by one of the enigmas that the reference to nature presents us with. It is a question of nothing less than the phenomenon known as mimicry.

使你明白這一點的方式不只一種。自然界的現象帶給我們許多謎團，讓我用其中一個玄妙至極的謎團描述這個凝視。這個問題道道地地就是眾所周知的模擬的現象。

A lot has been said about this subject and a great deal that is absurd—for example, that the phenomenon of mimicry can be explained in terms of adaptation. I do not think this is the case. I need only refer you, among others, to a short work that many of you may already know, Roger Caillois’ Méduse et compagnie, in which the reference to adaptation is criticized in a particularly perspicacious way.

關於模擬，很多理論曾被提出，不少是荒腔走板。例如，模擬的現象能夠用適應環境的觀點來解釋。我不認為是這樣。我只需要推薦你們去讀一本薄薄的書，你們許多人可能知道，凱洛思的「美杜思在康柏園」。在這本書裡，他頗具洞察力地批判適應環境的主張。

On the one hand, in order to be effective, the determining mutation of mimicry, in the insect, for example, may take place only at once and at the outset. On the other hand, its supposed selective effects are annihilated by the observation that one finds in the stomach of birds, predators in particular, as many insects supposedly protected by mimicry as insects that are not.

在一方面，在昆蟲部份，為了有效果，只有在當下及開始的時刻，模擬的決定性突變才可能發生。在另一方面，它所被認為的選擇模擬的效果其實蕩然無存，因為我們在鳥類，特別是在掠食的動物的胃腸的觀察中發現到：被認為靠模擬保護的昆蟲跟沒有靠模擬保護的昆蟲一樣多。

But, in any case, the problem does not lie there. The most radical problem of mimicry is to know whether we must attribute it to some formative power of the very organism that shows us its manifestations. For this to be legitimate, we would have to be able to conceive by what circuits this force might itself in a position to control, not only the very form of the imitated body, but its relation to the environment,- from which it has to be distinguished or, on the contrary, in which it has to merge.

但是，不管怎樣，問題不是在那裡。模擬最根本的問題是要知道，我們是否要將顯示有模擬能力的有機體的成長力量歸功於模擬。要證實這種主張，我們將必須要能夠構想出，這個力量憑藉怎樣的迴旋，本身不但可以控制被模擬身體的形式，而且還可以控制它跟環境的關係，因為它跟環境必須要區別出來，或相反的，它必須融入環境裡面。

In short, as Caillois reminds us very pertinently, on the subject of such mimetic manifestations, and especially of the manifestation that may remind us of the function of the eyes, that is, the ocelli, it is a question of understanding whether they impress—it is a fact that they have this effect on the predator or on the supposed victim that looks at them—whether they impress by their resemblance to eyes, or whether, on the contrary, the eyes are fascinating only by virtue of their relation to the form of the ocelli. In other words, must we not distinguish between the function of the eye and that of the gaze?

總之，如凱洛思一針見血地提醒我們，有關顯示這些摹擬的主張，特別是許多顯示可能都提到眼睛的功用，換言之，單眼瞳。問題是要瞭解它們是否產生印象，它們有否產生免於掠食動物攻擊的效果，或對認為是提防它們的受害動物有欺敵的效果，是否它們是靠著類似眼睛而產生印象，或相反的，眼睛是憑藉著類似單眼瞳形狀的關係，產生吸引力。換言之，我們難道不是要區別眼睛的功用跟凝視的功用？

This distinctive example, chosen as such—for its location, for its facticity, for its exceptional character—is for us simply a small manifestation of the function to be isolated, the function,
let us say the word, of the stain. This example is valuable in marking the pre-existence to the seen of a given-to-be-seen.

我選擇這個作為區別的例子，是考量到它的位置，它的現實狀況，以及它的特別屬性。我僅是用它來說明功用的顯示能夠被孤立出來，沾染之處的功用，我不妨這樣說。這個例子很有價值，因為它顯示一個被看之物的被看之處，有先存狀態。

There is no need for us to refer to some supposition of the existence of a universal seer. If the function of the stain is recognized in its autonomy and identified with that of the gaze, we can seek its track, its thread, its trace, at every stage of the constitution of the world, in the scopic field. We will then
realize that the function of the stain and of the gaze is both that which governs the gaze most secretly and that which always escapes from the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied
with itself in imagining itself as consciousness.

我們沒有必要去提到一些有關普世的靈視的存在。假如沾染之處的功用在其自主性被體認出來，或被等同於凝視的功用，我們就能夠尋找它的蹤跡，它的線索，它的痕跡，在世界形成的每個階段，在這個視覺的場域。我們就能夠體會到，沾染之處的功用及凝視的功用，兩者都極其隱秘地支配我們的凝視，總是有某個東西閃避視覺形式的理解，因為這種視覺形式滿意於想像自己是意識。

That in which the consciousness may turn back upon itself—grasp itself; like Valery’s Young Parque, as seeing oneself seeing oneself—represents mere sleight of hand. An avoidance of the function of the gaze is at work there.

意識會回向自身，理解自身，如同詩人梵樂希所描述年青人巴奎，看到自己在觀看自己，這代表凝視的靈巧變化。在此運作的是逃避凝視的功用。

This much we can map of this topology, which last time we worked out for ourselves on the basis of that which appears from the position of the subject when he accedes to the imaginary forms offered him by the dream, as opposed to those of the waking state.

上一次，我們曾根據主體的立場所展現的東西，描繪出一種地誌，當他認同夢給予他的幻想形式，相對於清醒狀態的那些幻想形式。但是對於這個地誌我們目前只能描繪到此。

Similarly, in that order, which is particularly satisfying for the subject, connoted in psycho-analytic experience by the term narcissism—in which I have striven to reintroduce the essential structure it derives from its reference to the specular image—in the satisfaction, not to say that diffuses from it, which gives the subject a pretext for such a profound meconnaissance—and does its empire not extend as far as this reference of the philosophical tradition represented by plenitude encountered by the subject in the mode of contemplation— can we not also grasp that which has been eluded,
namely, the function of the gaze?

同樣地，主體特別滿意的地誌的順序，在精神分析學是用自戀這個詞語來表達，用這個詞語，我曾經嘗試重新介紹它從幻影形象所得來的基本結構，那就是滿意，洋洋灑灑地溢出。這給主體一個藉口犯如此重大的錯誤辨識。它的版圖難道不是延伸到哲學傳統的符號，由主體在沉思的狀態所體悟到的圓滿境界，我們難道不是也理解到這種撲朔迷離的境界，換言之，凝視的功用？

I mean, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty points this out, that we are beings who are looked at, in the spectacle of the world. That which makes us consciousness institutes us by the same token as speculum mundi. Is there no satisfaction in being under that gaze of which, following Merleau-Ponty, I spoke just now, that gaze that circumscribes us, and which in the first instance makes us beings who are looked at, but without showing this?

我的意思是，梅洛、龐帝也指出這一點，在世界的景象中，我們是作為被觀看的人。構成我們意識的內涵，形成我們，如同幻影的材料。我跟隨梅洛、龐帝之後，侃侃而談凝視，所受到的凝視難道沒有滿足感？凝視籠罩我們，首先使我們成為被觀看的人，但是又隱而不宣？

The spectacle of the world, in this sense, appears to us as all-seeing. This is the phantasy to be found in the Platonic perspective of an absolute being to whom is transferred the quality of being all-seeing. At the very level of the phenomenal experience of contemplation, this all-seeing aspect is to be found in the satisfaction of a woman who knows that she is being looked at, on condition that one does not show her that one knows that she knows.

世界的景象，從這個意義而言，展現在我們面前作為全面觀看。這就是能夠被發現到的幻影，當
全面觀看的特質被轉移到絕對的主體存在，而成為柏拉圖的宏觀。就在沉思經驗到達圓融的層次，有位知道自己被觀看的女士歡喜踴躍，只要沒有人告訴她眾人知道她也知道自己正在被觀看，這個全面觀看於焉發現。

The world is all-seeing, but it is not exhibitionistic—it does not provoke our gaze. When it begins to provoke it, the feeling of strangeness begins too.

這個世界是全面觀看，但是並沒有是特意炫耀，它並沒有挑釁我們的凝視。當它開始挑釁我們的凝視，奇異陌生之感也於焉開始。

What does this mean, if not that, in the so-called waking state, there is an elision of the gaze, and an elision of the fact that not only does it look, it also shows.? In the field of the dream, on the other hand, what characterizes the images is that it shows。

這是什麼意思，難道不就是在我們所謂的清醒狀態時，凝視有所遺漏，遺漏一個事實，那就是世界不僅觀看，而且顯示？另一方面，在夢的領域，表現影像的特徵就是：世界在顯示。

It shows—but here, too, some form of ’sliding away’ of the subject is apparent. Look up some description of a dream, any one—not only the one I referred to last time, in which, after all, what I am going to say may remain enigmatic, but any dream—place it in its co-ordinates, and you will see that this it shows is well to the fore. So much is it to the fore, with the characteristics in which it is co-ordinated—namely, the absence of horizon, the enclosure, of that which is contemplated in the waking state, and, also, the character of emergence, of contrast, of stain, of its images, the intensification of their colors—that, in the final resort, our position in the dream is profoundly that of someone who does not see.

世界在顯示！但是在此也甚為明顯的是，有某種主體「遛走」的形狀出現。且讓我們翻閱某些有關夢的描述，隨便哪個夢都可以，不限我上次我提到的夢，畢竟，我正在談論的內容，可能始終是個謎團，而且任何夢。假如你將這個夢放置在完整的狀態，你就會發現，呈現在前面的就是：世界在顯示。它是如此的彰顯在前面，夢的完整的特徵顯著，換言之，沒有地平線，封閉，及在清醒狀態所沉思的東西，還有出現、對比、沾污、及其影像的特徵，顏色的強烈。最後，我們在這個夢中的地位，道道地地就是一無所見的人。

The subject does not see where it is leading, he follows. He may even on occasion detach himself, tell himself that it is a dream, but in no case will he be able to apprehend himself in the dream in the way in which, in the Cartesian cogito, he apprehends himself as thought. He may say to himself, It’s only a dream. But he does not apprehend himself as someone who says to himself—After all, I am the consciousness of this dream.

主體並沒有看見夢正引導到哪裡，他只是跟隨。他甚至可能有時會跟自己保持距離，告訴自己，這是個夢，但是他絕對沒有辦法在夢中理解自己，如同笛卡爾在「我思故我在」中，理解自己當著思想的主體。他可能會告訴自己，這只是個夢。但是他無法理解自己當著是告訴自己的人。畢竟，我是這個夢的意識。

In a dream, he is a butterfly. What does this mean? It means that he sees the butterfly in his reality as gaze. What are so many figures, so many shapes, so many colors, if not this gratuitous showing, in which is marked for us the primal nature of the essence of the gaze? Good heavens, it is a butterfly that is not very different from the one that terrorized the Wolf Man—and Maurice Merleau-Ponty is well aware of the importance of it and refers us to it in a footnote to his text.

在夢中，他是一隻蝴蝶。這是什麼意思？意思是他觀看在他現實中的蝴蝶，當著凝視。那麼多的體態，那麼多的形狀，那麼多的顏色，難道不就是無所為的炫耀，讓凝視的本質的原初特色呈現給我們？我的天！這隻蝴蝶跟驚嚇到狼人的那隻蝴蝶還沒有什麼兩樣！對於這個蝴蝶夢的重要性，梅洛、龐帝知道得很清楚，在他書中的附記中還跟我們提到。

When Choangtsu wakes up, he may ask himself whether it is not the butterfly who dreams that he is Choang-tsu. Indeed, he is right, and doubly so, first because it proves he is not mad, he does not
regard himself as absolutely identical with Choang-tsu and, secondly, because he does not fully understand how right he is. In fact, it is when he was the butterfly that he apprehended
one of the roots of his identity—that he was, and is, in his essence, that butterfly who paints himself with his own colors—and it is because of this that, in the last resort, he is Choangtsu.

莊子醒來時，他可能會問自己，難道不是蝴蝶夢見他是莊周？他確實沒有錯，百分之百沒有錯，首先因為這個夢證明他是正常人，他並不認為自己是完全認同於是莊周。其次，他並不瞭解自己正確到什麼程度。事實上，當他是蝴蝶時，他才理解到他的認同是根源於哪裡。在本質上，他過去是替自己粉飾成五彩繽紛的蝴蝶，現在也是。正因為那樣，他最後發現自己是莊周。

This is proved by the fact that, when he is the butterfly, the idea does not occur to him to wonder whether, when he is Choang-tsu awake, he is not the butterfly that he is dreaming of being. This is because, when dreaming of being the butterfly, he will no doubt have to bear witness later that he represented himself as a butterfly. But this does not mean that he is captivated by the butterfly
—he is a captive butterfly, but captured by nothing, for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody. It
is when he is awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their butterfly net.

他是莊周，以下這個事實可以證明。當他是蝴蝶時，他從來沒有想到要去懷疑，當他是清醒狀態時的莊周，他是不是他所夢見的蛻變的蝴蝶。這是因為他夢見蛻變成蝴蝶時，無疑地，他以後必然要見證到他代表自己當著蝴蝶。但是這並不意味著，他被蝴蝶所捕捉。他是一隻被捕捉住的蝴蝶，但是捕捉他的是空無，因為在夢中，他是一隻不歸屬於任何人的蝴蝶。而就在他清醒時，就別人而言，他是莊周，陷於他們凝視的蝴蝶網中，不能自拔。

This is why the butterfly may—if the subject is not Choangtsu, but the Wolf Man—inspire in him the phobic terror of recognizing that the beating of little wings is not so very far from the beating of causation, of the primal stripe marking his being for the first time with the grid of desire.

這就是為什麼假如主體不是莊周，而是佛洛伊德的狼人，蝴蝶可能會引起他害怕的恐懼，因為他認出小小翅膀的拍打，是那樣的類似於犯錯受到懲罰的拍打，類似於他首次以慾望的蠢動表現生命的存在，卻遭受的原初制約。
，
Next time, I propose to introduce you to the essence of scopic satisfaction. The gaze may contain in itself the objet a of the Lacanian algebra where the subject falls, and what specifies the scopic field and engenders the satisfaction proper to it is the fact that, for structural reasons, the fall of the subject always remains unperceived, for it is reduced to zero.

下一次，我要跟你們介紹視覺滿足的本質。凝視本身可能包括我時常提到的主體沉迷不拔的小客體。小客體之所成為視覺場域的明確內涵，及滿足的本體，是由於結構上的理由：主體對於小客體的沉迷不拔，自己始終無法覺察，因為小客體一但被剝奪，他便淪為空無。

In so far as the gaze, qua objet a, may come to symbolize this central lack expressed in the phenomenon of castration, and in so far as it is an objet a reduced, of its nature, to a punctiform, evanescent function, it leaves the subject in ignorance as to what there is beyond the appearance, an ignorance so characteristic of all progress in thought that occurs in the way constituted by
philosophical research.

凝視作為小客體，可能會漸漸象徵著閹割恐懼現象所表現的這個中心的欠缺。因為這個欠缺在性質方面，被化簡到零碎及纖細的功用，而成為小客體，主體也就渾然一無所知，在小客體這個表象之外還有什麼。思想界的進步，就哲學研究所採取的方向而言，其特徵也顯示他們蒙昧於表象之外的那個欠缺。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座207

拉岡講座302
THE EYE AND THE GAZE
眼睛與凝視

2
It is there that—free as I am to pursue, in the path in which I am leading you, the way that seems best to me—threading my curved needle through the tapestry, I jump on to the side
on which is posed the question that offers itself as a crossroads, between us and all those who try to conceive of the way of the subject.

就在此，雖然我自由地追尋，在我正在引導你們的途中，在我認為是最佳的途徑，像是在織錦上穿針引線，我突然躍向路邊，因為在我們跟那些設法構想主體何去何從時，這問題被提出充當十字路口。

In so far as it is a search for truth, is this way to be forged in our style of adventure, with its trauma seen as a reflection of facticity?

就真理的追尋而言，這條途徑應該以冒險的方式挺進，而將創傷看待是事實的反映嗎？

Or is it to be located where tradition has always placed it, at the level of the dialectic of truth and appearance, grasped at the outset of perception in its fundamentally ideic,
in a way aesthetic, and accentuated character as visual centering?

或者我們應該尋找它，在傳統習慣擺置它的地方，在真實跟表象互相辯證的層次，理解它，在感官的初始處於理型狀態，有某種的美感，及強調其特性為視覺中心？

It is not mere chance—belonging to the order of the pure psychic—if this very week I have received a copy of the newly published, posthumous work of my friend Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Le Visible ci l’invisible.

這不完全是巧合，心有靈犀一點通。就在這個星期，我剛收到一本我的朋友梅洛、龐帝死後出版的書「可見與不可見」。

Here is expressed, embodied, what made the alternation of our dialogue, and I remember so clearly the Congres de Bonneval where his intervention revealed the nature of his path, a path that had broken off at one point of the oeuvre, which left it nevertheless in a state of completion, prefigured in the work of piety that we owe to Claude Lefort, to whom I would like to pay homage here for the kind of perfection which, in a long and difficult transcription, he seems to me to have achieved.

這本書生動地表現出我們對談時的唇槍舌劍。我清楚地記得，在波內瓦講堂，他出席表達他研究途徑的性質。這條路徑可說以這本書的完成告一個段落。我們得歸功於克勞德、雷佛的忠誠，對於他漫長而艱辛的記錄，在此我想要表示敬意，我覺得他的力求完善已經達成。

This work, Le Visible ci l’invisible, may indicate for us the moment of arrival of the philosophical tradition—the tradition that begins with Plato with the promulgation of the idea, of which one may say that, setting out from an aesthetic world, it is determined by an end given to being as sovereign good, thus attaining a beauty that is also its limit. And it is not by chance that Maurice Merleau-Ponty recognized its guide in the eye.

「可見與不可見」這本書可能對我們指示著，該是哲學傳統到達的時候。這個傳統開始於柏拉圖闡明完美理型，我們不妨說，開始於美感的世界，給人的存在賦予一種目標，作為支配一切的良善，然後得到一種也是最崇高程度的美。梅洛、龐帝從眼睛的可見與不可見，體認到這種完美理型的引導，並不完全是巧合。

In this work, which is both an end and a beginning, you will find both a recapitulation and a step forward in the path of what had first been formulated in Merleau-Ponty’s La Phénomenologie de la perception.

這本書既是完成，也是開始。從這本書，我們不僅找到在梅洛、龐帝的感官現象學首先曾經闡述過的研究的總結，也發現是向前展望的一步。

In this work, one finds a recapitulation of the regulatory function of form, invoked in
opposition to that which, as philosophical thinking progressed, had been taken to that extreme of vertigo expressed in the term idealism—how could the ‘lining’ that representation then
became be joined to that which it is supposed to cover?

從這本書，我們發現龐帝替理型具有規範的功用做一個的總結。隨著哲學思想的演進，理型的二元對立被演繹到淋漓盡致，以理想主義一詞表現出來。問題是，理想的「鑲邊」是符號所組成，如何能夠銜接到它應該涵蓋的內容？

La Phénoménologie brings us back, then, to the regulation of form, which is governed, not only by the subject’s eye, but by his expectations, his movement, his grip, his muscular and visceral emotion—in short, his constitutive presence, directed in what is called his total intentionality.

感官現象學於是引導我們回到理型的規範。規範理型的不但是主體的眼睛，而且是他的期望、他的動作、他的掌握、他的肉體及內心的情感，總之，所謂他整體意向性所引導的全身的生命存在。

Maurice Merleau-Ponty now makes the next step by forcing the limits of this very phenomenology. You will see that the ways through which he will lead you are not only of the order of visual phenomenology, since they set out to rediscover—this is the essential point—the dependence of the visible on that which places us under the eye of the seer. But this is going too far, for that eye is only the metaphor of something that I would prefer to call the seer’s ’shoot’ (pousse) —something prior to his eye. What we have to circumscribe, by means of the path he indicates for us, is the pre-existence of a gaze—I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides.

梅洛、龐帝於是將這感官現象學的極限再推進到下一個步。你們可以看得出來，他引導你們的途徑，不但是視覺現象學的層次，因為他出發要重新找到什麼是視覺的依靠物，將我們放置在觀看者的目光之下，這是很重要的一點。而且他還走得更遠，因為那個眼光還僅僅是我想要說的觀看者的「放出光輝」的一個比喻而已，這個光輝的存在是早先於眼光。依照他所給我們指示的這條研究途徑，我們必然要指明出來的是凝視的預先存在：我只是從某一點觀看，但是在我的存在，我是被四面八方所觀看。

It is no doubt this seeing, to which I am subjected in an original way, that must lead us to the aims of this work, to that ontological turning back, the bases of which are no doubt to be
found in a more primitive institution of form.

無疑的，因為我這個主體一出生就會承受到觀看的凝視，這個觀看必然會引導我們到這本書的目標，回轉到那個人作為主體的本體論，因為那些目標的基礎，我們應該能夠在更原始的理型的結構中找到。

Precisely this gives me an opportunity to reply to someone that, of course, I have my ontology—why not?—like everyone else, however naive or elaborate it may be. But, certainly, what I try to outline in my discourse—which, although it reinterprets that of Freud, is nevertheless centered essentially on the particularity of the experience it describes—makes no claim to cover the entire field of experience.

這恰好給我一個機會來回答某人的問題。當然，像每一位其它的人，我有我自己的本體論，無論那是多麼的純樸或複雜。怎麼可能沒有？不過，我對真理的論述設法要描述的，並沒企圖要涵蓋生命經驗的整個領域，因為我的論述雖然是在重新詮釋佛洛伊德，基本上還是專注於所描述的經驗的特殊性。

Even this between the two that opens up for us the apprehension of the unconscious is of concern to us only in as much as it is designated for us, through the instructions Freud left us, as that of which the subject has to take possession. I will only add that the maintenance of this aspect of Freudianism, which is often described as naturalism, seems to be indispensable, for it is one of the few attempts, if not the only one, to embody psychical reality without substantifying it.

人際之間不同經驗的特殊性啟發我們去了解到無意識。我們關注到這個特殊性，甚至是因為我們生而為人所特殊賦有，這是我們人作為生命主體所必須擁有的存在，雖然這個道理，我們還是透過佛洛伊德學說才明白的。我只是要補充說，佛洛伊德學說的這個觀點似乎有必要不斷地維護，因為它時常被描述為自然主義，而佛洛伊德的少數幾個企圖之一，即使不是唯一企圖，就是要具體表現心理的真相，但是未竟全功。

In the field offered us by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, more or less polarized indeed by the threads of our experience, the scopic field, the ontological status, is presented by its most factitious, not to say most outworn, effects.

梅洛龐帝提供給我們的這領域，跟我們精神分析學的研究確實有點背道而馳。這是因為他呈現的視覺的領域，也就是本體論的狀態，已經受到人為造作的影響，姑且不說是司空見慣。

But it is not between the invisible and the visible that we have to pass. The split that concerns us is not the distance that derives from the fact that there are forms imposed by the world towards which the intentionality of phenomenological experience directs us—hence the limits that we encounter in the experience of the visible. The gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust of our experience, namely, the lack that constitutes castration anxiety.

我們所要跨越的不僅僅是可見與不可見之間。我們所關心的斷裂，並不是因為一方面世界賦予我們各種理型，而現象的經驗的意圖性引導前往我們這些理型，而產生了距離，因而我們在可見物的經驗方面遭遇到了限制。而是陌生的無常性的理型所呈現給我們的凝視，象徵著我們在地平線所發現的，當著是我們經驗的衝擊，換言之，組成閹割焦慮的欠缺。

The eye and the gaze—this is for us the split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field.

眼睛與凝視，對於我們而言，這才是欲望的驅力在視覺領域被顯示出來的斷裂。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座206

拉岡講座206

THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE EYE
AND THE GAZE
眼睛與凝視之間的斷裂

Wiederholung—let me remind you once again of the etymological reference that I gave you, holen (to haul), of its connotation of something tiring, exhausting.

讓我再一次提醒你們Wiederholung（拖拉）這個詞，字源意涵表示某件令人疲憊的事情。

To haul, to draw. To draw what? Perhaps, playing on the ambiguity of the word in French, to draw lots (tirer au sort). This Zwang this compulsion, would then direct us towards the obligatory card—if there is only one card in the pack, I can’t draw another.

拖拉或抽取。抽取什麼？也許我在玩弄法文字詞的模稜兩可。抽取命運的紙牌。然後這個衝動欲念會引導我們到這個強迫性的紙牌，假如整組只有一張紙牌，我別無他牌可抽。

The character of a set, in the mathematical sense of the term, possessed by the play of signifiers, and which opposes it for example to the indefiniteness of the whole number, enables us to conceive a schema in which the function of the obligatory card is immediately applicable.

從意符的遊戲所具有的數學的特性，如同一組具有整套不明確的數字的籤牌，我們能夠構想一個基型，能夠馬上運用這個強迫性紙牌的功用。

If the subject is the subject of the signifier—determined by it—one may imagine the synchronic
network as it appears in the diachrony of preferential effects. This is not a question, you understand, of unpredictable statistical effects—it is the very structure of the network that implies the returns.

假如主體就是意符的主體，或被意符操控，我們可以想像主體這個同時性的網絡，當意符以具有特別意涵的歷時性出現。你了解罷？這個問題並非是統計數字的影響無法預測，而是主體網絡的結構暗示著一再回轉。

Through the elucidation of what we call strategies, this is the figure that Aristotle’s automaton assumes for us. Furthermore, it is by automatisme that we sometimes translate into French the Zwang of the Wiederholuagszwang, the compulsion to repeat.

透過我們所謂策略的說明，這個人的主體就是亞力斯多德所說的機械裝置。而且，這個機械裝置，我們有時法文翻譯為 Zwang of Wiederholuagszwang，也就是欲念驅力的一再回轉。
I
Later, I shall give you the facts that suggest that at certain moments of that infantile monologue, imprudently termed egocentric, there are strictly syntactical games to be observed. These games belong to the field that we call pre-conscious, but make, one might say, the bed of the unconscious reserve—to
be understood in the sense of an Indian reserve—within the social network.

等一下，我將提供給你們一些事實說明，嬰兒在某個時刻會喃喃自語，我們常粗心地以為那是自我中心，其實從那裡，我們能夠觀察到具有嚴謹句法的遊戲。這些遊戲屬於我們稱為前意識的領域，但是也不妨說是主體在社會網絡中的無意識保留區的基地，如同我們撥給印地安原住民的保留區。

Syntax, of course, is pre-conscious. But what eludes the subject is the fact that his syntax is in relation with the unconscious reserve. When the subject tells his story, something acts, in a latent way, that governs this syntax and makes it more and more condensed. Condensed in relation to what? In
relation to what Freud, at the beginning of his description of psychical resistance, calls a nucleus.

當然，句法是前意識。但是主體所忽略的是句法跟無意識保留區的關係。主體說故事時，某件東西暗地活動，操控這個句法，然後使它越來越濃縮。濃縮成什麼？濃縮到佛洛伊德所稱為的核心，也就是他所描述的心理抗拒的開始。

To say that this nucleus refers to something traumatic is no more than an approximation. We must distinguish between the resistance of the subject and that first resistance of discourse, when the discourse proceeds towards the condensation around the nucleus. For the expression resistance of the subject too much implies the existence of a supposed ego and it is not certain whether—at the approach of this nucleus—it is something that we can justifiably call an ego.

說這個核心提到某件創傷僅僅是個近似的說法。我們必須區別主體的抗拒跟言說的抗拒的不同，因為言說繼續朝核心四周的濃縮前進。主體的抗拒這個表達強烈意味著，有一個假定的自我存在，只是當我們靠近核心時，我們不確定是否有理由稱之為自我。

The nucleus must be designated as belonging to the real—the real in so far as the identity of perception is its rule. At most, it is grounded on what Freud indicates as a sort of deduction, which assures us that we are in perception by means of the sense of reality that authenticates it. What does this mean, if not that, as fir as the subject is concerned, this is called awakening?

核心必須被指明歸屬於真實界，就感官的認同才是真實而言的真實界。它的位置，佛洛伊德充其量只能依據推論指明，但是明確告訴我們，憑藉這個真誠而道地的真實的感覺，我們才感覺生命的存在。這是什麼意思？難道不就是說，就主體而言，這就是所謂的覺醒。

Although, last time, it was around the dream in chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams that I approached the whole question of repetition, it was because the choice of this dream—so enclosed, so doubly and triply enclosed as it is, since it is not analysed—is very revealing here, occurring as it does at the moment when Freud is dealing with the process of the dream in its last resort.

上一次，我談到重複的整個問題，我是引證佛洛伊德夢的解析第七章的夢，那是因為我選擇的這個夢具有啟發性，雖然它的內涵是如此封閉，如此雙重及三重的封閉。這個夢發生在佛洛伊德正全神貫注在處理夢的過程。

Is the reality that determines the awakening the slight noise against which the empire of the dream and of desire is maintained? Is it not rather something else? Is it not that which is expressed in the depths of the anxiety of this dream—namely, the most intimate aspects of the relation between the father and the son, which emerges, not so much in that death as in the fact that it is beyond, in the sense of destiny?

將佛洛伊德從夢中喚醒的真實界，維持夢跟欲望的帝國，難道就是那輕微的噪音？這難道不是這個夢的焦慮所表達的，換言之，父親跟兒子之間的關係最親密的部份出現，不是在兒子的死亡，而是在人的命運會有死亡的超越這個事實。

Between what occurs as if by chance, when everybody is asleep—the candle that overturns and the sheets that catch fire, the meaningless event, the accident, the piece of bad luck —and the element of poignancy, however veiled, in the words Father, can’t you see I’m burning—there is the same relation to what we were dealing with in repetition. It is what, for us, is represented in the term neurosis of destiny or neurosis of failure. What is missed is not adaptation, but tuché, the encounter.

每個人都在睡眠，燭台傾覆，被單著火，偶發事件，意外，運氣不好，這些偶然發生的事情，跟那令人悲痛的隱約的呼叫「父親！你沒有看到我身上著火了嗎？」，它們之間的關係類似我們在處理重複的問題的關係。對我們而言，那就是命運的神經官能症，或失敗的神經官能症所代表的內容。我們所漏失的不是如何適應社會，而是如何跟真實界邂逅

Aristotle’s formula—that the tuché is defined by being able to come to us only from a being capable of choice, proairesis, that the tuche, good or bad fortune, cannot come to us from an inanimate object, a child or an animal—is controverted here. The very accident of this exemplary dream depicts this. Certainly, Aristotle marks the extreme limit of that point that stops it on the edge of the extravagant forms of sexual behaviour, which he can only describe as teriotes, monstrosities.

依照亞力斯多德的公式，邂逅被定義為能夠選擇的人彼此相遇，無論是善緣或惡緣，邂逅都不可能來自無生命的物體，小孩或動物。這個公式在此受到挑戰，因為剛才這個作為例子的夢的意外事件所描述的就是這個。的確，亞力斯多德對於性行為的放蕩形駭的邊緣，邂逅就被中止的那一點，他無以名之，只好描述為怪誕，並且發揮得淋漓盡致。

The enclosed aspect of the relation between the accident, which is repeated, and the veiled meaning, which is the true reality and leads us towards the drive—confirms for us that the demystification of that artefact of treatment known as the transference does not consist in reducing it to what is called the actuality of the situation. The direction indicated in this reduction to the actuality of the session, or the series of sessions, is not even of propedeutic value. The correct concept of repetition must be obtained in another direction, which we cannot confuse with the effects of the transference taken as a whole. Our next problem, when we approach the function of the transference, will be to grasp how the transference may lead us to the heart of repetition.

一再重複的意外，跟隱約的意義之間的關係受到封閉，因為意義是真正的真實界，並引導我們朝向驅力欲念。這為我們證實：眾所周知的移情治療的技巧的神秘，並不是在於將移情簡化到所謂情境的現實性。在簡化到個案治療或長期治療的現實性時，所顯示出來的方向，甚至不具有預備階段的價值。重複的正確觀念，必須從另一個方向尋找。我們切不可將這個方向跟移情作為整體的情意混為一談。當我們討論到移情的功用時，我們下一個問題是要了解，移情如何可能引導我們到達重複的核心。

That is why it is necessary to ground this repetition first of all in the very split that occurs in the subject in relation to the encounter. This split constitutes the characteristic dimension of analytic discovery and experience; it enables us to apprehend the real, in its dialectical effects, as originally unwelcome. It is precisely through this that the real finds itself; in the subject, to a very great degree the accomplice of the drive—which we shall come to last, because only by following this way will we be able to conceive from what it returns.

那就是為什麼我們首先要將重複的位置，放在主體跟真實界邂逅時所發生的斷裂。這個斷裂組成精神分析的發現及經驗所特有的向度；從這個向度，我們才能夠理解真實界，及其辯證的影響，作為原先抗拒的存在。確實是透過這裡，真實界才發現自己作為人的主體，相當程度是驅力欲念的共犯。我們會繼續討論驅力欲念，因為只有憑藉這條途徑，我們才能夠構想它從那裡回轉出來。

For, after all, why is the primal scene so traumatic? Why is it always too early or too late? Why does the subject take either too much pleasure in it—at least, this is how at first we conceived the traumatizing causality of the obsessional neurotic—or too little, as in the case of the hysteric?

Why doesn’t it arouse the subject immediately, if it is true that he is so profoundly libidinal? Why is the fact here dustuchia? Why is the supposed maturation of the pseudo-instincts shot through, transfixed with the psychic, I would say—from the word tuche?

畢竟，為什麼原初場景的創傷那麼強烈？為什麼它總是出現得太早或太遲？為什麼主體對於它不是過於狂喜？至少，這是我們在偏執的神經官能症的創傷因果關係所發現的。就是過於冷漠？如同在歇斯底里症的案例。假如主體確實是如此生命力昂揚，為什麼原初場景沒有立即使他義憤填膺？為什麼這個事實在此是不快樂？為什麼冒充的本能所被認為的成熟，是從邂逅這個地方，跟心靈的力量一起迸發貫穿？

For the moment, it is our horizon that seems factitious in the fundamental relation to sexuality. In analytic experience, it is a question of setting out from the fact that the primal scene is traumatic; it is not sexual empathy that sustains the modulations of the analysable, but a factitious fact. A factitious fact, like that which appears in the scene so fiercely tracked down in the experience of the Wolf Man—the strangeness of the disappearance and reappearance of the penis.

目前，談到性的基本關係，我們的研究範圍似乎是人為造作。在精神分析的經驗，我們的問題是從原初場景是創傷這個事實出發。維持被分析者的調適，並不是性的同理心，而是人為造作的事實。如同在佛洛伊德的「狼人」的經驗中所追蹤的，創傷場景的猛烈展現的事實，人為造作的事實是：陽具的消失跟重新出現產生的怪異感。

Last time, I wanted to point out where the split in the subject lay. This split, after awakening, persists—between the return to the real, the representation of the world that has at last fallen back on its feet, arms raised, what a terrible thing, what has happened, how horrible, how stupid, what an idiot he was to fall asleep—and the consciousness re-weaving itself, which knows it is living through all this as through a nightmare, but which, all the same, keeps a grip on itself; it is I who am living through all this, I have no need to pinch myself to know that I am not dreaming.

上一次，我想要指出，主體的斷裂位置在哪裡。在覺醒之後，這個斷裂持續存在於真實界的回轉，世界的符號再現，最終是依靠它的雙腳，舉起的手臂，多麼可怕的一件事！發生什麼事！多麼可怕！多麼愚蠢！他竟然睡著，真是個白癡！這個斷裂也持續存在於意識的重新自我編織，明白自己經歷這些場景，就像是經歷一場夢魘，但是它仍然可以掌握自己，因為是我在經歷這一切，我沒有必要捏一捏我自己，才會知道，我不是在作夢。

The fact remains that this split is still there only as representing the more profound split, which is situated between that which refers to the subject in the machinery of the dream, the image of the approaching child, his face full of reproach and, on the other hand, that which causes it and into which he sinks, the invocation, the voice of the child, the solicitation of the gaze—Father can’t you see…
這個事實仍然存在：斷裂依舊在那裡，代表更深刻的斷裂。位置就在作為人主體的夢的機械裝置，逼近的小孩的影像，充滿受到責備的他的臉龐。另一方面，位置也在引起斷裂，及他深陷的場景，呼救，小孩的聲音，凝視的哀求：父親，你難道沒看見我身上著火？

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座205

拉岡講座205

The Rat of the Maze
迷宮之鼠

To change the subject, I will say that what is important in what has been revealed by psychoanalytic discourse—and one is surprised not to see it thread everywhere—is that knowledge, which structures the being who speaks on the basis of a specific cohabitation, is closely related to love. All love is based on a certain relationship between two unconscious knowledges.

主體若是要轉變，我要說的是，精神分析論述所揭露的重要訊息，大家會很驚訝，因為線索無所不在，而我們竟然未覺察。就是那個知識跟愛有密切關聯，因為作為知識架構的主體，是根據明確的共同相處言說。所有的愛都是建立在兩個無意識知識之間的基礎。

If I have enunciated that the subject supposed to know is what motivates transference, that is but a particular, specific application of what we find in our experience. I’ll ask you to look at the text of what I enunciated here, in the middle of this year, regarding the choice of love. I spoke, ultimately, of recognition, recognition—via signs that are always punctuated enigmatically—of the way in which being affected qua subject of unconscious knowledge.

假如我曾明白地說，主體應該知道就是移情的動機，那只是特別而明確地應用一下我們在精神分析經驗的發現。我要求諸位參考一下，今年我在這裡演說過的有關愛的選擇的文本。最後，我會提到認同，認同主體藉由總是謎團般若隱若現的符號，如何影響作為無意識知識的主體。

There’s no such thing as a sexual relationship because one’s jouissance of the other taken as a body is always inadequate—perverse, on the one hand, insofaras the Other is reduced to object a, and crazy and enigmatic, on the other, I would say. Isn’t it on the basis of the confrontation with this impasse, with this impossibility by which a real is defined, that love is put to the test?

性的關係並不存在，因為我們的大它者的歡喜藉由身體表現，總是力有不逮。從某一方面來，是變態，因為大它者被化簡成為小客體；在另一方面，我不妨說，是瘋狂而神秘。愛之所以備受考驗，難道不就是因為它本質上會遭遇到這樣的僵局，遭遇到真實界難於定義的困局？

Regarding one’s partner, love can only actualize what, in a sort of poetic flight, in order to make myself understood, I called courage—courage with respect to this fatal destiny. But is it courage that at stake or pathways of recognition? That recognition is nothing other than the way in which the relationship said to be sexual—that has now become a subject-to-subject relationship, the subject being but the effect of unconscious knowledge—stops not being written.

關於我們的伴侶，愛只能以某種詩意的逃離，我不妨明白說，實現我所謂的勇氣，明知愛註定不會有好結局的勇氣。但是陷入危機的是勇氣？還是認同的曲徑？這個認同道道地地就是所謂性關係的模式，現在已經成為主體跟主體的關係，主體的存在僅僅是無意識知識的影響，認同是防止自己被遺漏。

“ To stop not being written” is not a formulation proffered haphazardly. I associated it with contingency, whereas I delighted in (characterizing) the necessary as that which “ doesn’t stop being written,” for the necessary is not the real. Let us note in passing that the displacement of this negation raises for us the question of the nature of negation when it takes the place of a non-existence.

「為了防止自己被遺漏」這句表述可不是隨意提出。我將它跟偶然性聯想在一起，雖然我很樂意將必要性定義為「不阻礙自己被記憶」，因為必要性並非是真實界。讓我順便提醒一下，這個否定的代替會替我們帶來否定的特性是什麼的問題，因為它代替了一個非存在。

I have also defined the sexual relationship as that which “ doesn’t stop not being written.” There is an impossibility therein. It is also that nothing can speak it—there is no existence of the sexual relationship in the act of speaking. But what does mean to negate it? Is it in any way legitimate to substitute for the proven apprehension of the non-existence? That too is a question I shall merely raise here. Does the word “ interdiction” mean any more, is it any more permitted? That cannot be immediately determined either.

我也曾經將性關係定義為「不阻礙自己被記憶」。在此有個無法突破的僵局。也是因為這個表述要如何言說，在言說的行為上，性關係並不存在？但是否定它是什麼意思？非存在的空無是約定俗成的理解，我們這樣的代替能自圓其說嗎？那也是一個我在此僅僅要提出的問題。「禁止」這個字眼有任何其它意義，其它可允許的意義嗎？那個問題也無法馬上決定。

I incarnated contingency in the expression “ stops not being written.” For here there is nothing but encounter, the encounter in the partner of symptoms and affects, of everything that marks in each of us the trace of his exile—not as subject but as speaking—his exile from the sexual relationship.

我用「防止自己被遺漏」這個表述，具體表現偶然性。因為在此只有邂逅，跟伴侶的病徵及情意邂逅，跟我們每個人放逐的痕跡的每個跡象邂逅，因為我們從性關係中被放逐，不是作為主體，而是作為言說。

Isn’t that tantamount to saying that it is owing only to the affect that results from this gap that something is encountered, which can vary infinitely as to level of knowledge, but which momentarily gives the illusion that the sexual relationship stops not being written? –an illusion that something is not only articulated but inscribed, inscribed in each of our destinies, by which, for a while—a time during which things are suspended—what would constitute the sexual relationship finds its trace and its mirage-like path in the being who speaks. The displacement of the negation from the “ stops not being written “ to the “ doesn’t stop being written,” in other words, from contingency to necessity—there lies the point of suspension to which all love is attached.

這難道不是等於是說，我們的邂逅是由於主體跟言說的差距所造成的情意？這個差距因為每人知識的水平而各有無窮變化，但是又瞬間產生幻覺，以為性關係可防止自己被遺漏。幻想在我們每個人的宿命中，某件事情冥冥中道出而且鐫刻，而在某段時間，事情會被懸置。組成性關係的內涵會在言說的主體，找到它的痕跡及其海市蜃樓般的曲徑。從「防止自己被遺漏」到「不阻礙自己被記憶」的否定的代替，換言之，從偶然性到必然性，所有連接到愛的懸置點就在此。

All love, subsisting only on the basis of the “ stops not being written,” tends to make the negation shift to the ‘ doesn’t stop being written,’ doesn’t stop, won’t stop.

所有的愛，存在的基礎只是「阻止自己不被遺漏」，都傾向於使否定轉移到「不阻礙被記憶」，不停止，將不會停止。

Such is the substitute that—by the path of existence, not of the sexual relationship, but of the unconscious, which differs therefrom—constitutes the destiny as well as the drama of love.

組成宿命跟愛的戲劇的代替就是這樣：在此差別的不是性關係，而是無意識存在的曲徑。

Given the time, which is that at which I normally desire to take leave of you, I won’t take things any further here—I will simply indicate that what I have said of hatred is not related to the level at which the hold of unconscious knowledge is articulated.

由於時間關係，我的講座正式將告一段落，我在此不再多說。我僅僅表明，我曾經說過的恨，跟無意圖的知識所表達的內涵並無關係。

The subject can’t desire not to know too much about the nature of the eminently contingent encounter with the other. Thus he shifts his focus from the other to the being that is caught up therein.

主體對於跟另一主體，顯而易見的偶然的邂逅，究竟是怎樣一個性質，他渴望知道越多越好。因此，他將他的焦點從另一主體轉移到被糾纏其間的存在主體。

The relation of being to being is not the relation of harmony that was prepared for us throughout the ages, though we don’t really know why, by a whole tradition in which Aristotle, who saw therein only supreme jouisssance, converges with Christianity, for which it is beatitude. That gets us bogged down in a mirage-like apprehension. For it is love that approaches being as such in the encounter.

雖然我們並不確實知道原因，存在主體彼此之間的關係，並不是自古以來我們被整個傳統安排好的和諧的關係。在這一點，亞力斯多徳跟基督教不謀而合，前者僅是認為這個關係是崇高的歡喜，後者認為是幸福美滿。這使我們耽溺於海市蜃樓般的理解，因為愛就是在邂逅中如此接近存在主體。

Isn’t it in love’s approach to being that something emerges that makes being into what is only sustained by the fact of missing each other ? I spoke of rats earlier—that was what was at stake. It’s no accident people chose rats. It’s because one can easily make a unit of it—the rat can be “ eradicated.” I already saw that a time when I had a concierge, when I lived in the rue de la Pompe—the concierge never missed a rat. His hatred for rats was equal to the rat’s being.

難道不就在愛接近存在主體時，某件事情出現，使存在主體成為彼此思念時所維持的狀態？我早先提到老鼠，那就是危機所在。人們選擇老鼠走迷宮並不意外的，因為老鼠很容易構成一個單位，老鼠能夠被「消滅」。我已經看出那一點，因為我曾經有位門房，當我居住在龐貝公寓時。那位門房看到老鼠就撲滅。他對於老鼠的痛恨相當於老鼠的存在。

Doesn’t the extreme of love, true love, reside in the approach to being? And true love—analytic experience assuredly didn’t make this discovery, born witness to by the eternal modulation of themes on love—true love gives way to hatred.

這種愛的極端，真正的愛，不就是在於接近存在本身？真正的愛是由愛的主題的永恆模式來見證，真正的愛會被恨代替。這確實不是精神分析的經驗憑空杜撰。

There—I’m leaving you.
Shall I say, “ See you next year?” You’ll notice that I’ve never ever said that to you. For a very simple reason—which is that I’ve never known, for the last twenty years, if I would continue the next year. That is part and parcel of my destiny as object a.

我今天講到這裡。
我要說「明年再見」嗎？你們注意到，我從來沒有這樣對你們說過。理由很簡單，過去二十年來，我從無法知道是否我第二年還能繼續。這是我作為小客體的命運的部份跟整體。

After ten years, my podium was taken away from me. It turns out, for reasons wherein destiny played a part, as did my inclination to please certain people, that I continued for ten more ( encore ) years. I have thus closed the twenty-year cycle. Will I continue next year? Why not stop the encore now?

過了十年，我的講座被取消。原因是命運的播弄，正如同我能夠再繼續十年，那也是我的講演受到某些人的鍾愛，命運使然。我因此結束這二十年的循環。明年我將再繼續嗎？現在就停止這個再來有何不可？

What is truly admirable is that no one ever doubted that I would continue. The fact that I am making this remark nevertheless raises the question. It could, after all, happen that to the encore I add—“ That’s enough.”

真正令人欣慰的，沒有人會懷疑我會繼續下去。我現在做這樣的表示引發這個問題。畢竟，這是可能發生的，我會對再來說聲：「夠了罷！」

Well, I’ll leave it for you to place bets on. There are many who believe they know me and who think that I find herein an infinite satisfaction. Next to the amount of work it involves, I must say that seems pretty minimal to me. So place your bets.

我就讓你們猜猜看。有很多人相信他們了解我，他們相信我在這裡得到無限的滿足。跟我所花的心血比較起來，我必須說，那對我而言是微不足道。所以你們就猜猜看。

And what will the result be? Will it mean that those who have guessed correctly love me? Well—that is precisely the meaning of what I just enunciated for you today—to know what your partner will do is not a proof of love.

結果將會如何？是不是猜對的人就是愛我？那確實就是我今天所表達的意思：了解你的伴侶會做些什麼並不是愛的證明。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座204

拉岡講座204

The Rat of the Maze
迷宮之鼠

It is on the basis of the notion of a kind of knowledge that is transmitted, integrally transmitted, that sifting occurred in the knowledge thanks to which the discourse called scientific discourse was constituted.

根據某種被傳遞，完整被傳遞知識的觀念，知識界從事探究。憑藉這個探究，形成所謂的科學真理的論述。

It wasn’t constituted without numerous misadventures. Hypotheses no fingo, Newton believed he could say, “ I assume nothing.” But it was on the basis of a hypothesis that the famous revolution—which wasn’t at all Copernican, but rather Newtonian—hinged, substituting “ it falls” for “it turns.” The Newtonian hypothesis consisted in positing that the astral turning is the same as falling. But in order to observe that—which allows one to eliminate the hypothesis—he first had to make the hypothesis.

科學真理的論述曾經歷許多嘗試的錯誤。「不預設立場的假設」，牛頓相信他能夠說「我沒有預先假設什麼。」但就是根據這種假設的基礎，產生了著名的物理觀念的革新，不是哥白尼的革新，而是牛頓的革新，以「它墬落」代替「它旋轉」。牛頓的假設在於提出：星球的旋轉跟墬落是同一回事。但是為了觀察，因為憑藉觀察他才能修正這種假設，首先他必須提出假設。

To introduce a scientific discourse concerning knowledge, one must investigate knowledge where it is. That knowledge, insofar as it resides in the shelter of Ilanguage, means the unconscious. I do not enter there, no more than did Newton, without a hypothesis.

為了要介紹有關知識的科學的真理論述，我們必須在知識所在的地方研究知識。
就駐紮在「真語言」領域的知識而言，那個知識就是無意識。我是預先提出假設才進入那個領域，跟牛頓一樣。

My hypothesis is that the individual who is affected by the unconscious is the same individual who constitutes what I call the subject of a signifier. That is what I enunciate in the minimal formulation that a signifier represents a subject to another signifier.. The signifier in itself is nothing but what can be defined as a difference from another signifier. It is the introduction of difference as such into the field, which allows one to extract from Ilanguage the nature of the signifier.

我的假設是：受到無意識影響的個人，跟組成我所謂意符的主體，是相同的一個人。這就是我清楚表達的，在我最初的構想：意符代表對於另一個意符的主體。這個意符本身的定義，只能就相對於另一個意符的差異而定。我在這個領域介紹這種差異，這樣我們才能從「真語言」中，抽取出意符的特性。

Stated otherwise, I reduce the hypothesis, according to the very formulation that lends it substance, to the following: it is necessary to the functioning of Ilanguage. To say that there is a subject is nothing other than to say that there is a hypothesis. The only proof we have that the subject coincides with this hypothesis, and that it is the speaking individual on whom it is based, is that the signifier becomes a sign.

換言之，依照這個將假設具體化的構想，我將假設簡化如下：假設對於「真語言」的功用是必需的。說主體存在等於就是說假設存在。主體跟這個假設巧合，說話的個人就是主體的基礎，我們擁有的唯一的証據是：意符成為符號

It is because there is the unconscious—namely, Ilanguage, insofaras it is on the basis of the cohabitation with Ilanguage that a being known as speaking being is defined—that the signifier can be called upon to constitute a sign. You can take “ sign” here as you like, even as the English “ thing.”

說話的主體所以被認識為存在主體，就是根據無意識跟「真語言」的共同相處。
因為無意識，也就是「真語言」存在，意符才能被召喚組成一個符號。這個符號各有差異，在英文甚至被稱為「物」。

The signifier is a subject’s sign. Qua formal medium, the signifier hits something other than what it is quite crudely as signifier, an other that it affects and that is made into a subject of the signifier, or at least which passes for such. It is in that respect that the subject turns out to be—and this is only true for speaking beings—a being whose being is always elsewhere, as the predicate shows. The subject is never more than fleeting and vanishing, for it is a subject only by a signifier and to another signifier.

意符是主體的符號。作為正式的媒介，意符碰撞到另一個不同於原先裸裎的意符，一個它影響到另一意符，然後才形成這個意符的主體，或至少是如此的被認為。以這種方式，就言說的存在主體而言，主體最後成為一個存在主體，其存在卻總是在別處，依照形成的發展而定。主體本身總是瞬息萬變，因為主體存在僅是憑藉意符及跟另一意符的關係。

It is here that we must return to Aristotle. In a choice guided by we know not what, Aristotle decided not to give any other definition of the individual than the body—the body as organism, as what maintains itself as one, and not as what reproduces. We are still hovering around the difference between the platonic idea and the Aristotelian definition of the individual as grounding being. The question that arises for the biologist is to know how a body reproduces. What is in question in any work in so-called molecular chemistry is to know how something can be precipitated thanks to the combination of a certain number of things in special soup—for example, the fact that a bacterium begins to reproduce.

在此，我們必須回到亞力斯多德。不知受到怎樣的引導影響，亞力斯多德決定不給個人下別的定義，除了就是身體：作為有機體的身體，自我維持的身體，而不是能夠繁殖的身體。柏拉圖的理念，迴異於跟亞力斯多德對於以個人作為基礎的存在主體的定義，現在依舊困擾著我們。對於生物學家，引起的問題是要知道身體如何繁殖。在所謂分子化學領域，所質疑的問題是要知道某件物質如何產生，例如在一碗特別的湯中，某些物質的結合，使細菌開始繁殖。

What then is the body? Is it or isn’t it knowledge of the one?

那麼這個身體是什麼？身體是或不是主體的知識？

Knowledge of the one turns out not to come from the body. The little we can say about knowledge of the one comes from the signifier “One.” Does the signifier “ One” derive from the fact that a signifier as such is never anything but one-among-others, referred to those others, being but its difference from the others? The question has been so little resolved to date that I devoted my whole seminar last year to accentuating this “ There’s such a thing as “ One”

主體的知識後來發現不是來自身體。我們對於主體的知識，目前所能夠說的，是來自「主體」的意符。這個意符的「主體」的形成，難道不就是意符道道地地是人際之間的產物，相對於跟別人的關係，及迴異於別人的獨特性？這個問題迄今懸而未決，所以我去年將整個講座專注於強調：「主體存在」。

What does “ There’s such a thing as One” mean? From the one-among-others—and the point is to know whether it is any old which one—arises an S1, a signifying swarm, a buzzing swarm. If I raise the question, “ Is it of them-two that I am speaking?” I will write this S1 of each signifier, first on the basis of its relation to S2. and you can add as many of them as you like. This is the swarm I am talking about.

「主體存在」是什麼意思？從人際關係，重點是要知道在群體的意符，嗡嗡的群體意符中，主體是否出現？假如我提出這個問題：「正在言說的我一分為二嗎？」我將寫下每個意符為S1，首先根據的是跟第二意符S2的關係。然後你可以隨你高興再添加。這就是我正在談到的群體意符。

S1 (S1(S1(S1－S2)))
S1, the swarm or master signifier, is that which assures the unity, the unity of the subject’s copulation with knowledge. It is in Ilanguage and nowhere else, insofar as Ilanguage is investigated qua language, that what a primitive linguistics designated with the term element—and that was no accident—can be discerned. The signifier “ One” is not just any old signifier. It is the signifying order insofar as it is instituted on the basis of the envelopment by which the whole of the chain subsists.

S1是群體或主子意符，確定了一致性，主體跟知識結合的一致性。就在「真語言」，而非別處，原始語言學所指定的元素這個術語能夠被覺察出來。因為「真語言」是當作是語言來探究，意符主體已經就不是原初的意符。這是符號化的順序，一層包一層地涵蓋，整體的意符鎖鏈就是賴此存在。

I recently read the work of a person who investigates the relation of S1 to S2, which that person takes to be a relation of representation. S1 is supposed ( by that person) to be related to S2 in sofar as it represents a subject. Whether that relation is symmetrical, antisymmetrical, transitive, or other, whether the subject is transferred from S2 to S3 and so on and so forth, these questions must be taken up on the basis of the schema that I am once again providing here.

我最近讀到一本書，作者探討主子意符跟次級意符的關係，認為那就是符號的關係。主子意符被認為跟次級意符相關，因為它代表一個主體。是否這個關係是均稱、反均稱，及物或不及物，是否主體被從次級意符轉移到主人意符，等等。這些問題必須要依據我現在再一次提供出來的基型來探討。

The One incarnated in Ilanguage is something that remains indeterminate between the phoneme, the word, the sentence, and even the whole of thought. That is what is at stake in what I call the master signifier. It is the signifier One, and it was no accident that, in order to illustrate the One, I brought to our last meeting that bit of string, insofar as it constitutes a ring, whose possible knot with another ring I began to investigate.

在「真語言」具體表現的主體，在音符、文字、句子、及整體思想之間，地位始終飄浮不定。這就是我所稱為的主子意符危機所在。這就是意符主體，為了解釋這個主體，我上次講座特別介紹環圈的觀念。主體組成一個環圈，跟另外一個主體的環圈可能的銜接。這是我開始要探究的。

I won’t pursue that point any further today, since we have been deprived of a class due to exams at this university.

今天我只能先探討到這裡，因為學校的考試，我們少上了一節課。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座203

拉岡講座203

The Rate in the Maze
迷宮之鼠

How can being know? It’s amusing to see how this question is supposedly answered. Since the limit, as I have posited it, is constituted by the fact that there are beings who speak, people wonder what the knowledge of those who do not speak could be. They wonder about it. They don’t know why they wonder about it. But they wonder about it all the same. So they build a little maze (labyrinth) for rats.

主體如何知道？明白這個問題被認為如何回答，頗耐人尋味。如我所假設的，有人言說，有人對於不言不語的人知道些什麼感到好奇，這個事實組成回答時的限制。他們好奇。他們不知道他們為何好奇。但是他們依舊好奇。所以他們建造一座老鼠的小迷宮。

They hope thereby to be on the right rack by which to determine what knowledge is. They believe a rat is going to show the capacity it has to learn. To learn to do what? What interests it, of course? And what do they assume interests it?

他們因此希望走上正確的路途，來決定知識是什麼。他們相信老鼠將會顯示它必須學習的能力。學習做什麼？什麼引起它的興趣，當然？他們認為是什麼引起他們的興趣？

They do not take the rat as a being, but rather as a body, which means that they view it as a unit, a rat-unit. Now what thus sustains the rat’s being? They don’t wonder about that at all. Or rather, they identify its being with its body.

他們並沒有將老鼠當存在主體，而是當一個身體，這表示他們看待它當一個單位，一個老鼠的單位。現在的問題因此是：維持老鼠主體存在的是什麼？對於這一點他們絲毫不好奇。換句話說，他們將老鼠的身體辨認為是它的主體存在。

People have always imagined that being had to contain a sort of fullness that is characteristic of it. Being is a body. That is where people began in first approaching being, and they laboriously concocted a whole hierarchy of beings. Ultimately, they began with the notion that each one should know what keeps it in being—that had to be its good, in other words, what gives it pleasure.

人們總是想像存在主體包括一種圓滿當其特徵。存在主體是身體。那就是人們首先接近存在主體開始的地方。然後他們辛勤地建造整個存在主體的階層。最後，他們開始這個觀念：每個存在主體應該知道維持主體存在的是什麼，那必然是它的優點所在，換言之，它獲得快樂的所在。

What change thus came about in discourse in order for people to suddenly question that being regarding the means it might have to go beyond itself, that is, to learn more than it needs to know in its being to survive as a body?

因此，在真理論述中發生了怎樣的改變？人們突然質疑那個存在主體，有什麼方法超越身體本身？換言之，假如存在主體只是作為身體存活，它有什麼方法知道非生存所需的東西。

The maze leads not only to nourishment but to a button or flap that the supposed subject of this being must figure out how to use to obtain nourishment. Or it has to recognize a feature, a lit or colored feature, to which the being is capable of reacting.

迷宮不僅引導到營養食物所在，而且引導到按鈕或門扉，這個所謂的存在主體必須理解如何使用，才能得到營養食物。或者說，它必須認出一個特徵，一個光亮或彩色的特徵，存在主體才能夠知所反應。

What is important is that the question of knowledge is transformed here into that of learning. If, after a series of trials and errors—“ trials and errors” was left in English ( in the translation ) considering the people who carved out this approach to knowledge—the rate diminishes sufficiently, they note that the rat-unit is capable of learning something.

重要的是，知識的問題被轉變成為學習的知識。假如經過一連串嘗試及犯錯後（我沿用嘗試及犯錯英文原譯，是對於創造這種求知方法的前輩表示敬意），認出及反應的時間大量縮短，他們就會注意到，老鼠作為單位是能夠學習一些東西。

The question that is only secondarily raised—the one that interests me—is whether the rat-unit can learn how to learn. Therein lies the true mainspring of the experiment. Once it has taken one of these tests, will a rat, faced with another test of the same kind, learn more quickly? That can be easily attested to by a decrease in the number of trials necessary for it to know how it must behave in such a montage—let us call the maze, taken in conjunction with the flaps and buttons that function here, a “ montage.”

我感到興趣的是第二個被提出的問題：是否老鼠作為一個單位能學習如何學習？試驗的真正的主要泉源就在此。老鼠一但參加這些迷宮的測驗之後，它再面臨相同迷宮的另一個測驗，他能學習得更快嗎？這個問題能夠很容易被證實，只要減少嘗試及犯錯的次數，這樣老鼠就知道它在我們姑且稱之為迷宮中的迷離世界中必須如何行為。這個大千世界有門扉及按鈕充當功用。

The question has been so rarely raised, though it has been raised, that people haven’t even dreamt of investigating the differential effect of having the themes one proposes to the rat—by which it demonstrates its ability to learn—come from the same source or from two different sources, and of having the experimenter who teaches the rat to learn be the same or different.

這個問題雖然曾被提出，但甚為罕見，所以人們甚至不曾夢想到要去探討我們所提議的老鼠的迷宮主題有何其他不同的影響。老鼠憑藉這些影響證明它有學習的能力，那麼這些影響來自相同來源或來自不同來源，教導老鼠學習的試驗者應該相同或不同，會有何不同的影響。

Now, the experimenter is the one who knows something in this business, and it is with what he knows that he invents this montage consisting of the maze, buttons, and flaps. If he were not someone whose relation to knowledge is grounded in a relation to Ilanguage, in the inhabiting of Ilanguage or the cohabitation with Ilanguage, there would be no montage.

現在，試驗者就是在這一行業知道些什麼的人，以他所知道的，他發明這個由迷宮、按鈕、門扉組成的迷離世界。假若他跟知識的關係不是建立在跟「真語言」有關的基礎上，在「真語言」的棲居，或「真語言」的共同棲居所，那麼他不會想出這個迷宮的迷離世界。

The only thing the rat-unit learns in this case is to give a sign, a sign of its presence as unit. The flap is recognized only by a sign and pressing its paw on this sign is a sign. It is always by making a sign that the unit accedes to that on the basis of which one concludes that there is learning.

在此情況，老鼠作為單位學習到唯一事情是提供符號，它存在作為單位的符號。門扉只是作為一個符號被認識，老鼠的爪壓在按鈕上也是一個符號。老鼠作為單位總是以創造一個符號，來表示認同學習的測驗。根據這個測驗，我們得到結論，老鼠正在學習。

But this relation to signs is external. Nothing confirms that the rat grasps the mechanism to which pressing the button leads. That’s why the only thing that counts is to know if the experimenter notes that the rat has not only figured it out, but learned how a mechanism is to be grasped, in other words, learned what must be grasped. If we take the status of unconscious knowledge into account, we must examine the maze experiment in terms of how the rat-unit responds to what has been thought up by the experimenter not on the basis of nothing, but on the basis of Ilanguage.

但是跟符號的這個關係是外在的。並沒有證實老鼠瞭解到，壓按鈕導致怎樣的機械學。這就是為什麼唯一重要的事情是要知道，試驗者是否注意到：老鼠不但理解這個試驗，而且學會如何了解機械學，換言之，學會它必須要了解些什麼。假如我們考慮到無意識知識的立場，我們必須檢查迷宮的試驗，了解老鼠作為單位如何反應，因為試驗者所構想出來的迷宮，不是憑空捏造，而是根據「真語言」。

One doesn’t invent just any old labyrinthine composition, and whether it comes from the same experimenter or two different experimenters is worth investigating. But nothing that I have been able to gather to date from this literature indicates that any such question has been raised.

任何古老迷宮的構造都不會僅是憑空發明。它來自相同的試驗者或兩個不同的試驗者，也值得再探討。但是，依據我迄今所收集的文獻資料，卻沒有顯示這樣的問題曾被提出過。

This example thus leaves the questions regarding the status of knowledge and the status of learning completely intact and distinct. The status of knowledge raises another question, namely, how it is taught.

有關知識的立場及學習的立場的問題，從這個例子看出被保持到相當完整而清楚。知識的立場還引起另一個問題，換言之，知識如何被教導。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座202

拉岡講座202

The Rat of the Maze
迷宮之鼠

I just got hold of an important book by an author named Bateson about which people had talked my ears off, enough to get on my nerves a bit.

我剛剛拿到一本重要的書，作者叫巴特森。關於這本書，很多人跟我一再提過，足夠讓我感到不勝其煩。

I should say that it was given to me by someone who had been touched by the grace of a certain text of mine he translated into his language, adding something that went significantly further than ‘ the unconscious structured like a language.’

我應該說，給我這本書的人曾經被我的某篇講演的深刻所感動，翻譯成他自己的語言，再將「無意識結構像個語言」發揮闡釋。

Now Bateson, not realizing that the unconscious is structure like a language, has but a rather mediocre conception of it.

現在這位巴特森並沒有體會到無意識結構像個語言，他對於這個觀念僅僅只有粗淺的瞭解。

But he creates some very nice artifices he calls “ metalogues.”

但是他創造了一些非常漂亮的命題，他稱為「後設語言學」。

They ‘re not bad, insofar as they involve, if we take him at his word, some internal, dialectical progress, being produced only by examining the evolution of a term’s meaning.

這些命題還不錯，假如我們相信他所說的為真實，因為他們牽涉到一些內部的辯證的進展，只有審察一個術語意義的演變才能獲得這樣的進展。

As has always been the case in everything that has been called a dialogue, the point is to make the supposed interlocutor say what motivates the speaker’s very question, in other words, to incarnate in the other the answer that is already there.

如同我們所謂的對話常有的情形，重點是要誘使假定的對話者說出問這個問題的動機，換言之，要對方具體說出他事先已有定見的達案。

It’s in that sense that dialogues,, classical dialogues—the finest examples of which are represented by the Platonic legacy—are shown not to be dialogues.

就這個意涵而言，對話，古典的對話，最有名的範例就是柏拉圖對話錄所留下的，其實顯示出來的不是對話。

If I have said that language is what the unconscious is structured like, that is because language, first of all, doesn’t exist. Language is what we try to know concerning the function of Ilanguage.

假如我說語言是無意識構成的樣子，那是因為語言首先不存在。語言是我們設法去知道的東西關於「真語言」的功用。

Certainly, it is thus that scientific discourse itself approaches languages, except that it is difficult for scientific discourse to fully actualize language, since it misrecognizes the unconscious.

不錯，科學論述就是這樣接近語言，但是科學語言很難完整地實踐語言，因為它誤認無意識。

The unconscious evinces knowledge that , for the most part, escapes the speaking being. That being provides the occasion to realize just how far the effects of Ilanguage go, in that it presents all sorts of affects that remain enigmatic.

無意識閃躲知識，大部份時間，還閃避說話的主體。說話主體供應機會來體會「真語言」的情意有多強，因為它展現各種迄今是謎團的各種情意。

Those affects are what result from the presence of Ilanguage insofar as it articulates things by way of knowledge that go much further than what the speaking being sustains by way of enunciated knowledge.

那些情意是「真語言」的存在而產生的，因為它藉由知識所表達的事情，意涵遠比說話主體藉由被說出的知識所道出還要深遠。

Language is, no doubt, made up of Ilanguage. It is knowledge’s harebrained lucubration about Ilanguage. But the unconscious is knowledge, a knowing how to do things with Ilanguage.

語言無疑地是由「真語言」所組成。語言是知識對於「真語言」孜孜不息的成果。但是無意識是知識，知道如何來處理「真語言」的內涵。

And what we know how to do with Ilanguage goes well beyond what we can account for under the heading of language.

我們所知道如何來處理「真語言」，遠超過我們在語言的標題下所能解釋的。

Llanguage affects us first of all by everything it brings with it by way of effects that are affects. If we can say that the unconscious is structured like a language, it is in the sense that the effects of Ilanguage, already there qua knowledge, go well beyond anything the being who speaks is capable of enunciating.

「真語言」首先以各種情意產生影響的方式影響到我們。假如我們能夠說，無意識結構像個語言，那是因為「真語言」的影響已經存在那裡作為知識，遠超過任何說話主體所能表達的內涵。

It is in that regard that the unconscious, insofar as I base it on its deciphering, can only be structured like a language, a language that is always hypothetical with respect to what supports it, namely, Ilanguage.

以這個角度看，無意識只能結構像個語言，因為我將它建立於解說的基礎上。這個語言總是假設性，關於所支撐它的東西，換言之「真語言」。

Language is what allowed me to turn my S2 into a question earlier and ask—is it truly a question of them-two in language.

憑藉語言，我才能夠將我的第二意符早先轉變成疑問，然後問：在語言中真的有一分為二的問題嗎？

Stated otherwise, it has become clear, thanks to analytic discourse, that language is not simply communication.

假如換個方式陳述，就顯而易見，由於精神分析的真理論述，語言不僅僅是溝通。

Misrecognizing that fact, a grimace has emerged in the lowest depths of science that consists in asking how being can know anything whatsoever. My question today regarding knowledge will hinge on that.

若是誤認那個事實，科學界的淺薄之士不免會嗤之以鼻，因為他們的知識立場就是在於問主體如何能知道任何事物。我今天關於知識的問題，就決定在那個地方。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座201

拉岡講座201

The rat of the maze
迷宮之鼠

Thanks to someone who is willing to polish up what I tell you here, four or five days ago I received the nicely scrubbed truffle in my elocutions this year.

感謝有人費心潤飾我對你們的講演，四五天前，我收到這本對於我今年講演整理得清楚明白的錄音稿。

With this title, Encore, I wasn’t sure, I must admit, that I was still in the field I have cleared for twenty years, since what it said was that it could still go on a long time.

我必須承認，我用「再來一次」這個書名，但是我並不確定我還依舊停留在這二十年來我開闢出來的領域，因為書的內容意味著，這個演講還有一段漫長的路要走。

Rereading the first transcription of this Seminar, I found that it wasn’t so bad, especially given that I began with a formulation that seemed a tad trivial to me, that
The Other’s jouissance is not the sign of love.

重讀這個講座的錄音初稿，我發現整理得還不錯，特別是考慮到我開始時的說明有點小題大作：大它者的歡喜並不是愛的跡象。

It was a point of departure I could perhaps come back to today in closing what I opened at that time.

那是個出發點，今天我回來重新替我當時開展的命題做個結語。

I spoke a bit of love. Yet the crux or key to what I put forward this year concerns the status of knowledge, and I stressed that the use ( exercise ) of knowledge could but imply a jouissance.

我略微提到愛。可是今年我提出的重點是有關知識的地位。我強調，知識的發揮只能意謂著歡喜。

That is what I’d like to add to today by a reflection concerning what is done in a groping manner in scientific discourse with respect to what can be produced by way of knowledge.

那就是我今天想要補充的。讓我們回顧一下，藉由知識，我們找出些什麼？科學的論述以探索的方式做了些什麼？
1
To get right to the point–Knowledge is an enigma.
言歸正傳：知識是個謎團。

That enigma is presented to us by the unconscious, as it is revealed by analytic discourse.

精神分析論述顯示：無意識所呈現給我們的就是那個謎團。

That enigma is enunciated as follows: for the speaking being, knowledge is that which is articulated.
那個謎團陳述如下：對於言說的主體，所表達出來的是知識。

People could have noticed that a long time ago, because in tracing out the pathways of knowledge they were doing nothing but articulate things, centering them for a time on being.

人們本來能夠知道，很久以前，追蹤知識的曲折幽徑時，他們所正在做的僅是表達事情，有一陣子，他們專注討論存在問題。

Now it is obvious that nothing is, if not insofar as it is said that it is.
現在顯然地，空無一物存在，就他們所說的存在而言。

I call that S2. You have to know how to hear that—is it of them-two that it speaks?
我稱那種存在為第二意符。你們必須知道如何區別，因為主體說話一分為二。
It is generally said that language serves to communicate.
通常人們說，語言是用來溝通之用。

To communicate about what, one must ask oneself, about which them?
為了溝通什麼，我們必須先問自己，哪一個我在溝通？

Communication implies reference.
溝通意謂提到事情。

But one is clear—language is merely what scientific discourse elaborates to account for what I call Ilanguage.

但有件事很清楚：語言僅僅是科學的論述建構來說明我所謂的「真語言」。

Ilanguage serves purposes that are altogether different from that of communication.
「真語言」充當的功用跟溝通的目的截然不同。

That is what the experience of the unconscious has shown us, insofaras it is made of Ilanguage, which, as you know, I write with two I’s to designate what each of us deals with, our so-called mother tongue, which isn’t called by accident.

無意識的經驗由「真語言」所組成，給我們顯示的就是這樣。你們知道，我寫作時有兩個我，各別指明處理的是哪一個我，才是我們所謂的母語，這可不是隨意稱呼的。

If communication approaches what is effectively at work in the joussance of Ilanguage, it is because communication implies a reply, in other words, dialogue. But does Ilanguage serves, first and foremost , to dialogue? As I have said before, nothing is less certain.

假如溝通到達「真語言」的歡喜踴躍的境界，那是因為溝通意味著回答，換言之，對話。但重要的是：「真語言」是充當對話之用嗎？如我先前所說，我們絲毫無法確定。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw